# Jaggu Kol & Anr v. State Of U.P

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 1004
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-02
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 1987
- **Bench:** Chandra Dhari Singh, Devendra Singh-I
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jaggu-kol-anr-v-state-of-u-p-54091
- **Pages:** 13

## Text

1004 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. Hon'ble Apex Court, in Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs.
State of Gujarat, (2023) 9 SCC 164 and in Ram Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 4 SCC
208, has laid down the principle that when there is similar or identical evidence of eye-witnesses
against two accused by scribing the same or similar role, the Court cannot convict one accused and
acquit the other. It was also held that in such a case both the accused will be governed by the
principles of parity, which means that the criminal court should decide like cases alike. Thus the
Hon'ble Apex Court on carefully analyzing the evidence on record gave the benefit of doubt to the
accused persons.

25. In the instant case before the learned trial court there are three accused, one is convicted
and two others are acquitted on the same set of evidence.

26. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the judgment and order of conviction
recorded by the learned trial court dated 17.05.1989 suffers from infirmity and is liable to be set
aside.

27. Hence, the judgment and order of the trial court convicting and sentencing the appellant
for life imprisonment for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. is set aside for the reasons
mentioned above.

28. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby allowed.

29. The appellant shall be set free, if not wanted in any other case.

30. Office is directed to return the trial court record as expeditiously as possible and notify this
judgment to the trial court too.
---------
(2026) 2 ILRA 1004
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE DEVENDRA SINGH-I, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 1987

Jaggu Kol & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
State Of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to prosecution case failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Headnotes
2 All. Jaggu Kol & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
1005
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 302, 302/34 and 394 - Circumstantial evidence -There is no direct
evidence on record to connect the accused with the commission of crime -no eye witness - PW-1 and PW-2
had not seen as to who fired pistol shot -recovered pistol was not sent to ballistic expert for comparison with
the fired cartridges recovered from the spot- was not established that fatal shot was fired from the same pistol
which was recovered - Held, evidence adduced-not worth to be relied upon-prosecution failed to prove its
case "beyond reasonable doubt" -Judgment and order set aside - Appellants acquitted- Appeal allowed.(E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193
2. Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172
3. Sattatiya v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210
4. State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite, (2008) 16 SCC 714
5. Laxman Pradad alias Laxman Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,
6. R. Sreenivasa Vs. State of Karnataka,
7. Sukhwant Singh vs. State of Punjab
8. Pankaj vs. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192
9. Goverdhan and Another vs. State of Chhattisgarh Goverdhan and Another vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025)
3 SCC 378
10. Jitendra Kumar Mishra @ Jittu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 20
List of Acts
1. Indian penal Code, 1860
2. Indian Evidence Act

List of Keywords
No eye witness; beyond reasonable doubt; ballistic expert

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Ashish Kumar, Rajesh Kumar Vishwakarma, S.p. Singh Counsel for Respondent(s) :
A.G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Dhari Singh, J.)

1. The instant Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the accused-appellants- Jaggu Kol and
Shankar against a judgment and order dated 31.03.1987 passed by Additional Sessions Judge,
Mirzapur in Sessions Trial No. 251 of 1986 arising out of Case Crime No. 151 of 1986, under
Section 302 I.P.C., Police Station Lalganj, District Mirzapur, convicting and sentencing the
appellants as under:-

Accused-appellant Jaggu Kol

(a) Imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 read with 34 I.P.C.

(b) Rigorous imprisonment of five years' and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under
Section 394 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo for rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year.

(a) Imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C.
1006 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(b) Rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years' and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence
under Section 394 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo for rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year.

However, all the sentences awarded to both the appellants have been directed to run
concurrently.

Brief Facts

2. In nutshell, the case of the prosecution as set up in the first information report is that a
written report was filed by Kanhaiya Lal Kol son of Lalai Kol, resident of Village Godar Kala,
Police Station Lalganj, District Mirzapur stating inter-alia that on 07.08.1986 he was returning
home via road going from Duwar Kalan to Dadri. As soon as he reached the eastern road of his
village at about 04:30 P.M., he saw that three persons namely Radhe Kol, Jaggu Kol and Shankar
Kol were standing and talking among themselves. Thereafter, he proceeded to north of the Dhesur
tree situated on the western side of the road. After that he took the footpath (pakdandi) and
proceeded towards his village. As soon as he reached the eastern side near the pond, he heard a
sound of firing. He immediately returned back and saw that Jaggu Kol and Shankar Kol have shot
the injured Radhe Kol near the eastern side of the road. On hearing the sound of firing, Premlal,
Chhotkau Kurmi and Ludhar Kol reached at the spot and they saw that Jaggu Kol and Shankar Kol
were dragging Radhe Kol (who was in an injured condition). Seeing them, the accused persons left
Radhe Kol near the bush and ran away towards the north side of the forest. When they approached
to Radhe Kol, they saw that he had a gunshot wound on his left shoulder and was bleeding
profusely. He groaned, hiccuped and died. The aforesaid written report was marked Ext.Ka.1.

3. On the basis of aforesaid written report filed by Kanhaiya Lal Kol (hereinafter referred to as
'informant'), the First Information Report was lodged at Case Crime No. 151 of 1986, under Section
302 I.P.C., Police Station Lalganj, District Mirzapur, which was marked as Ext.Ka.9. The said
information has been endorsed in G.D. vide report no. 5 by Constable Moharir Chandrika Sharma,
which was marked as Ext.Ka.10.

4. After registration of the F.I.R., the law set into motion and investigation of the case was
entrusted to S.H.O. Rampratap Arya (PW-6). He in his deposition has stated that on 08.08.1986, he
was posted as Station House Officer at Police Station Lalganj. He recorded the statement of the
informant. Thereafter he reached at the place of occurrence at 07:30 am and found the dead body of
Radhe Kol (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') lying near the bushes. The deceased was wearing
kurta-pajama. Upon search of his clothes, a sum of Rs. 200/- was recovered from the right pocket
of his kurta. A sack about 50 steps north of the dead body was found containing 10 kilograms of
paddy and wood. He took him in his possession, marked them as Ext.Ka.5 and handed over to
Rangila Lal (uncle of the deceased). He took the dead body in his possession and conducted the
inquest proceedings, which was marked as Ext.Ka.6. He prepared photo lash, challan lash, letter to
R.I., letter for post-mortem and took the clothes of the deceased, which was marked as Ext.Ka.11 to
Ext.Ka.15. He sealed the dead body and prepared sample seal, which was marked as Ext.Ka.16.
Thereafter he handed over the dead body of the deceased in a sealed cover to Constable Ram Dev
and Sant Prasad for post-mortem. He inspected the spot and prepared the site-plan, which was
2 All. Jaggu Kol & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
1007
marked as Ext.Ka.17. Blood stained soil and plain soil were took into possession, seized and
marked as Ext.Ka.2. An empty cartridge was found lying towards the north of the dead body,
which was marked as Ext.ka.3. He also recorded the statement of witnesses namely Premlal and
Rangilal. Search of the accused was conducted but they were not found. On 09.08.1986, he
received an information that the accused persons were present at the tri-junction road to village
Nardagahna. He, along with other police personnel, reached at the said place, the accused seeing
them attempted to flee but were apprehended. Upon interrogation, accused Shankar told that he had
a country-made pistol which was used in the commission of crime and could get it recovered.
Accused Jaggu disclosed that he could get the bicycle of the deceased recovered. Thereafter,
accused Shankar led us to his house situated in the southern side of the village. He opened the lock
of the southern room, removed mud from the eastern wall and took out one country-made pistol
and cartridge, which were wrapped in a paper. The said pistol and cartridge were sealed, recovery
memo was prepared and the same was marked as Ext.Ka.7. Thereafter accused Jaggu led us to his
house, where bicycle was recovered. He had also prepared a site-plan of the place of recovery,
which was marked as Ext.Ka.18.

5. After culmination of investigation, the investigating officer submitted charge-sheet against
the accused appellants, namely, Jaggu Kol and Shankar @ Sheo Shankar, which was marked as
Ext.Ka.20.

6. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate
committed the case to the Court of Sessions, where case was registered as Sessions Trial No. 251 of
1986. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mirzapur vide order dated 09.12.1986 framed charges
against the accused appellant Jaggu Kol for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 I.P.C. and
Section 394 I.P.C. whereas accused-appellant Shankar for the offence under Section 302 and 394
I.P.C. The aforesaid charges were read over and explained to them in Hindi, whereby they pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.

7. To bring home the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond the hilt, the prosecution has
examined as many as six prosecution witnesses, out of whom Premlal Tiwari (PW-1), Kanhaiya
(PW-2), Rangilal (PW-4) and Ramlakhan (PW-5) are witnesses of fact whereas Dr. Chandra
Prakash (PW-3) and S.H.O. Rampratap Arya (PW-6) are formal witnesses.

8. Premlal Tiwari (PW-1) in his deposition has stated that on 07.08.1986 at about 04:30 PM
after attending the call of nature, he heard a sound of a gunshot followed by Kanhaiya Kol's cries
and he followed it's direction. Chhotkau Kunvi, who was shooting birds in his field, also reached
there. Laudhar Kol had also arrived on his bicycle. Upon reaching there, they saw that accusedappellants Jaggu Kol and Shankar were assaulting a man and dragging him into the bushes. Jaggu
was holding his hands whereas Shankar was holding his feet. As soon as they raised an alarm, the
accused persons hid the deceased into the bush and ran away from the place of incident on a
bicycle. They have not chases the accused persons as they were having pistol (katta). Thereafter,
they reached to the injured person, who groaned, hiccuped and died. Blood was oozing from his left
shoulder. Laudher Kol, upon seeing the deceased, started crying and said 'he is my nephew Radhe'.
Jaggu and Shankar are residents of village Nadighana. Jaggu's in-law's house is in his village. Both
the accused persons are friends.
1008 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. Kanhaiya (PW-2/informant) in his deposition has stated that on the day of incident when he
was returning to his house, he saw that Shankar, Jaggu and Radhe were talking to each other. He
knew Radhe as he was from Village Kota, four-five miles from his village. Seeing them talking to
each other, he headed towards his village and after some time, he heard a sound of gunshot from
the north-east direction. Hearing the sound of gunshot, he immediately ran towards the direction of
gunshot and saw that Shankar and Jaggu were dragging Radhe to the east side of the road.
Thereafter, he along with Premlal Tiwari, Laudhar Kol and Chhotkau reached there. Seeing them,
the accused persons ran away from the place of incident on two bicycles which were parked there.
They have not chased the accused persons as they were carrying pistol. Thereafter they went to the
deceased who groaned, hiccuped and died. Thereafter, he went to the village Majra to call Pradhan.
After the written report was prepared, he along with Kheladi Vishwakarma, Lalata Kohar, Sukhdev
and Punjabi Kol went to Lalganj police station and gave the same to the Inspector.

10. Dr. Chandra Prakash (PW-3) in his deposition has stated that on 09.08.1986, he was posted
Senior Orthopedic at District Hospital, Mirzapur. At about 04:00 PM, he he conducted the postmortem on the cadaver of the deceased. As per post-mortem, following ante-mortem injuries were
found:-

'Gunshot wound 2.0cm x 2.5cm x cavity deep on the upper and anterior part of the left
shoulder joint. Wound was directly medially and downwards. Margins are inverted and charred.
The surrounding skin in an area of 1.0cm round the wound is also blacked and charred. On cut the
underlying tissue and muscle lacerated and rib fractured. The lung left upper lobe was badly
lacerated and the wadding caps and pellets metallic 27 found in the upper lobe of left lung cavity of
left side full of clotted blood about 400 ml.'

The deceased was aged about 25 years and had died two days' before. Rigor-mortis
passed off from both upper and lower limbs. Blisters was present all over body. Hairs of his head
are falling out easily. Green discolouration of of skin at some place.

On internal examination, it was found that the first rib of left side was fractured. Pleura
was lacerated on the left side. The left lungs was lacerated and metallic pellets twenty-seven in
number and wadding cap one in number were found in upper lobe of left lung. Clotted blood was
present in left lobe. The stomach contained digested rice and dal. The small intestine contained
gasses and fecal matters.

As per the opinion of doctor, the cause of death of the deceased-Radhe was 'shock and
haemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injury'.

11. Rangilal (PW-4) in his deposition has stated that at the midnight of the day of incident,
uncle (mama) of the deceased had informed him about the incident. He was informed that some
miscreants had killed Radhe (deceased) and thrown his dead body in the forest. He also stated that
about two days ago, Radhe left on a bicycle for his sister's house in Jamohara. He was also a
witness of inquest proceedings and the investigating officer had handed over the same to him.
2 All. Jaggu Kol & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
1009

12. Ram Lakhan (PW-5) in his deposition has stated that while he along with Chandu Lal were
in a search of paddy seeds, the police office of police station Lalganj along with a constable, who
were holding two mens, stopped them and asked for to accompany them as these two accused can
recover some goods. One of the accused took us to his house located in the south of Nadgahna
Village. The room was locked from the outside. The accused dig a hole on the eastern side of the
wall with his hands and took out a pistol and a live cartridge wrapped in a plastic sheet. Thereafter
another accused Jaggu took us to his house where as bicycle was recovered.

13. The evidence of S.H.O. Rampratap Arya (PW-6) has already been discussed above.

14. After the closure of prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused-appellants namely
Jaggu Kol and Shankar @ Sheo Shankar have been recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., who
denied the charges levelled against them.

15. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mirzapur after hearing the learned counsel for the
parties and assessing, evaluating and scrutinizing the evidence on record, convicted and sentenced
the accused-appellants as indicated herein above.

16. Hence, the instant appeal.

Arguments on behalf of Accused-Appellants

17. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Vishwakarma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the motive for committing the murder
of the deceased.

18. It is next submitted that the alleged incident took place on 07.08.1986 at 04:30 PM
whereas the First Information Report of the said incident was lodged on 08.08.1986 at about 04:00
AM, after delay of about 12 hours without any plausible explanation.

19. It is also submitted that from the perusal of evidence of Premlal Tiwari (PW-1) and
Kanhaiya (PW-2/informant), it is clear that they are not the eye-witnesses of the incident in
question as they have not seen that who had fired the deceased, as such, their testimonies falsifies
the prosecution story.

20. So far as the recovered weapon (pistol/katta) and cartridge is concerned, it cannot be said
that the alleged fire was made by from the same pistol, which has been recovered, as the
investigating officer has deliberately did not get the ballistic report of the same to establish the fact
that whether the recovered weapon was used in the commission of crime or not, hence, the
prosecution story cannot be relied upon. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhwant Singh vs. State of Punjab1.

21. There is no evidence on record or any circumstantial evidence on the basis of which it can
be said that there was a common intention to both the appellants to commit the murder of the
deceased-Radhe as there is no implication of Section 34 I.P.C.
1010 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. It is lastly submitted that the accused-appellants were arrested on 09.08.1986 and were
granted bail on 07.11.1989. They have incarcerated in jail for more than three years' for an offence
that prosecution could not even prove. As of today, the appellants are old aged person and are
unable to perform their routine work independently. The prosecution has failed to bring home the
guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Arguments on behalf of Respondents-State

23. Per-contra, Mr. S.K. Ojha, learned Additional Government Advocate-Ist vehemently
opposed the aforesaid contentions of learned counsel for the appellants and submitted that the
prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, which is also evident from the
depositions of Premlal Tiwari (PW-1) and Kanhaiya (PW-2/informant).

24. It is next submitted that there is no contradiction in the statement of Premlal (PW-1) and
Kanhaiya (PW-2). It is further submitted that the opinion of the doctor is also matches with the
prosecution story.

25. It is lastly submitted that since the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt and complete the entire chain of evidence, the trial court has rightly convicted the accused
appellants. There is no error in the impugned judgment and order, therefore, the instant criminal
appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.

Analysis and Conclusion

26. Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumr Vishwakarma, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S.K. Ojha,
learned Additional Government Advocate-Ist for the State of U.P. and perused the documents on
record.

27. In this case, the occurrence had taken place on 07.08.1986 at about 04:30 PM, but the
F.I.R. was lodged on 08.08.1986 at 04:00 AM i.e. about 12 hours after the occurrence. Premlal
Tiwari (PW-1) and Kanhaiya (PW-2) have explained the delay in preparing the report at 01:00 PM.
Thereafter, Kanhaiya (PW-2) went to police station in the night as stated by him. The way to police
station passes through jungle and river. It was night and therefore, he would have taken atleast
three hours in covering the distance of 10 miles in the night.

28. PW-1, Premlal Tiwari stated and admitted that he had not seen as to who fired pistol shot.
PW-2 Kanhaiya Lal states that when he reached near lake, he heard sound of fire and rushed
towards the spot where he observed the accused taking the deceased towards bushes. He had also
not seen the occurrence as who filed pistol shot to the deceased. There is no direct evidence on
record to connect the accused with the commission of crime.

29. It is well settled that where there is no direct evidence connecting the accused-appellant
with the commission of the offence and no witness had seen the accused-appellant committing the
murder of the deceased, the case of the prosecution rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. In
such circumstances, the law mandates that each incriminating circumstance relied upon must be
2 All. Jaggu Kol & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
1011
firmly established and the chain of circumstances must be so complete as to unerringly point
towards the guilt of the accused and exclude every possible hypothesis consistent with his
innocence. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, and if the circumstances
proved do not form a continuous and cogent chain leading only to the conclusion that the accusedappellant is alone the author of the crime, the benefit of doubt must necessarily enure to the
appellant.

30. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra2, the Supreme Court has
framed five golden principles for the circumstantial evidence, which are as under;

(i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established.

(ii) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of
the accused that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the
accused is guilty.

(iii) The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency

(iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and,

(v) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.

31. In State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava3, it was pointed out that great care must
be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable
of two inferences, the one in the favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out
that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have fully established and cumulative effect of
all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.

32. In the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.4, the Supreme Court has
observed as under:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully
established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and
they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other
words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. ...."

33. In the case of Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P.5, the Supreme Court has opined as
under:
1012 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"10. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel, we shall at the
threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with
the offence in question and the prosecution rests its case solely on circumstantial evidence. This
Court in a series of decisions has consistently held that when a case rests upon circumstantial
evidence such evidence must satisfy the following tests:

(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be
cogently and firmly established;

(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards
guilt of the accused;

(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is
no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the
accused and none else; and

(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and
incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such
evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with
his innocence.

34. In the case of C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P.6, the Supreme Court while
considering a case of conviction based on the circumstantial evidence, held as under:

"21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances
from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be
conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no
gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In the present
case the courts below have overlooked these settled principles and allowed suspicion to take the
place of proof besides relying upon some inadmissible evidence."

35. In the case of Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P.7, the Supreme Court
again considered the case of conviction based on circumstantial evidence and held as under:

"26. It is now well settled that with a view to base a conviction on circumstantial
evidence, the prosecution must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable
and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form such a chain of events as would
permit no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused. The circumstances cannot be on any
other hypothesis. It is also well settled that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot be a
substitute for a proof and the courts shall take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only
on the basis of the circumstantial evidence.'

36. In the case of Sattatiya v. State of Maharashtra8, the Supreme Court held as under:
2 All. Jaggu Kol & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
1013

"10. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. It is settled law that an offence
can be proved not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence where there is no
direct evidence. The court can draw an inference of guilt when all the incriminating facts and
circumstances are found to be totally incompatible with the innocence of the accused. Of course,
the circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt is drawn have to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be
inferred from those circumstances." This Court further observed in the aforesaid decision that:

"17. At this stage, we also deem it proper to observe that in exercise of power under
Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court will be extremely loath to upset the judgment of
conviction which is confirmed in appeal. However, if it is found that the appreciation of evidence in
a case, which is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by serious errors and on that
account miscarriage of justice has been occasioned, then the Court will certainly interfere even
with the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court and the High Court--Bharat v. State of
M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 106. "

37. In the case of State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite9, the Supreme Court has reiterated the
settled law that where a conviction rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt
can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any person. The circumstances from
which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred
from those circumstances.

38. The decision in Sharad Birdichand Sarda (Supra) has recently been followed by the
Supreme Court in catena of judgement including Laxman Pradad alias Laxman Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh10, and R. Sreenivasa Vs. State of Karnataka11.

39. An 'unbroken chain of safe custody' for the recovered weapon and sample packets must be
proved by the prosecution. Failure to do so leads to the acquittal of the accused.

40. The Supreme Court in the case of Sukhwant Singh vs. State of Punjab12, has observed
as under:

'There is yet another infirmity in this case. We find that whereas an empty had been
recovered by PW6, ASI Raghubir Singh from the spot and a pistol along with some cartridges were
seized from the possession of the appellant at the time of his arrest, yet the prosecution, for reasons
best known to it, did not send the recovered empty and the seized pistol to the ballistic expert for
the examination and expert opinion. Comparison could have provided link evidence between the
crime and the accused. This again is an omission on the part of the prosecution for which no
explanation has been furnished either in the trial court or before us. It hardly needs to be
emphasised that in cases where injuries are caused by fire arms, the opinion of the Ballistic Expert.
is of a considerable importance where both the fire arm and the crime cartridge are recovered
during the investigation to connect an accused with the crime. Failure to produce the expert
1014 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
opinion before the trial court in such cases affects the creditworthiness of the prosecution case to a
great extent.'

41. The Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj vs. State of Rajasthan13, has held that 'when
the genesis and the manner of the incident is doubtful, the accused cannot be convicted.' It also
referred to Bhagwan Sahai vs. State of Rajasthan14, which states that once the prosecution is
found to have suppressed the origin of the occurrence, the only proper course is to grant the benefit
of doubt.

42. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Kishore Gopal Das15, the Supreme Court has succinctly
explained the concept 'reasonable doubt', which is as under:

''''''...There is an unmistakable subjective-element in the evaluation of the degrees of
probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a
robust common-sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the judge. While the protection
given by the criminal process to the accused-persons is not to be eroded, at the same time,
uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal
justice.'

43. In the case of Ramakant Rai vs. Madan Rai and Others16, the Supreme Court has held
as under:

'24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract
speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it
must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to
the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to
mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible
doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common-sense. It must grow out of the evidence in
the case.'

44. The aforesaid judgment has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Goverdhan and Another vs. State of Chhattisgarh17 wherein, the Court has held as under:-

'20. As per Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a fact can be said to have been
proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist or
considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
particular case, to act up on the supposition that it exists. The court undertakes this exercise of
examining whether the facts alleged including the particular criminal acts attributed to the accused
are proved or not.

21. It is also to be noted that the law does not contemplate stitching the pieces of
evidence in a watertight manner, for the standard of proof in a criminal case is not proof beyond
all doubts but only beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, if a clear picture emerges on piecing
together all evidence which indicates beyond reasonable doubt of the role played by the accused in
the perpetration of the crime, the court holds the accused criminally liable and punishes them
2 All. Jaggu Kol & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
1015
under the provisions of the penal code, in contradistinction to the requirement of proof based on
the preponderance of probabilities as in case of civil proceedings.

22. It will be relevant to discuss, at this juncture, what is meant by 'reasonable doubt'. It
means that such doubt must be free from suppositional speculation. It must not be the result of
minute emotional detailing, and the doubt must be actual and substantial and not merely vague
apprehension. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or amerely possible doubt, but a fair
doubt based upon reason and common sense.'

45. The Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Kumar Mishra @ Jittu vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh18, has held as under :

'We are conscious of the fact that the appellate court should be slow in interfering with
the conviction recorded by the courts below but where the evidence on record indicates the
prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a
plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken, the appellate
court should not shy away in giving the benefit of doubt to the accused persons.'

46. The recovered pistol (Ex.Ka.7) was not sent to ballistic expert for comparison with the
fired cartridges recovered from the spot, therefore, it is not established that fatal shot was fired
from the same pistol which was recovered. The recovery of the said pistol on the pointing out of
accused Shankar @ Sheo Shankar after a day of occurrence is doubtful. The evidence adduced by
the prosecution regarding the manner of occurrence and complicity of accused as well as recovery
are not worth to be relied upon. None of the witness had seen any accused person firing gunshot
upon the deceased. PW-2 Kanhaiya had only seen the accused persons talking with the deceased
person and after few minutes, the other witnesses heard the sound of firing and rushed to the spot
immediately, therefore, there is no eye witness of the occurrence and the entire case of the
prosecution is based upon circumstantial evidence.

47. When we evaluate the testimony of Premlal Tiwari (PW-1) and Kanhaiya (PW2/informant) carefully and with due caution, as is required in the facts of the case, we find that their
testimony do not inspire our confidence to sustain the conviction. The evidence produced by the
prosecution has neither quality nor credibility and it would be unsafe to rest conviction upon such
evidence. After having considered the matter thoughtfully, we find that the evidence on record in
the case is not sufficient to bring home guilt of the appellants. We, therefore, conclude that
prosecution has failed to prove it's case 'beyond reasonable doubt' against the appellants.

48. This Court has decided the present criminal appeal on its merits and held as above. Even
otherwise, it deserves to be noticed that occurrence in the present case is more than four decades
old. The appellants have remained in jail for more than three years.

49. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 31.03.1987 passed by Additional Sessions
Judge, Mirzapur is hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges levelled against
him.
1016 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

50. Consequently, for all the foregoing reasons, the instant criminal appeal is allowed.

51. The appellants'Jaggu Kol and Shankar @ Sheo Shankar are already on bail. His bail bonds
shall stand discharged.

52. The trial court record be sent back.
---------
(2026) 2 ILRA 1016
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SALIL KUMAR RAI, J.
THE HON'BLE VINAI KUMAR DWIVEDI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 1330 of 1989

Kishan Lal & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to ingredients of Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code-Section 302 - murder - PW-1 and PW-2 have turned hostile - not supported the
prosecution case - only eye-witness of the alleged incident is the informant- the evidence of the sole is wholly
reliable - the postmortem report clearly establishes that the deceased sustained thirteen injuries on vital parts
of the body - strong motive of the accused-appellants to commit the murder - acted with pre-planning,
premeditation, and actively participated in the commission of alleged crime - ingredients of Section 34 of
Indian Penal Code are fully established .Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab; AIR 1977 Supreme Court 109
2. Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v. State of Maharashtra; AIR 2005 Supreme Court 1460
3. Virendra Singh v. State of M.P.; (2010) 8 SCC 407

List of Acts
1. Indian Penal Code
2. Code of Criminal Procedure

List of Keywords
Murder; sole eyewitness; turned hostile; thirteen injuries on vital parts; strong motive; pre-planning;
premeditation; common intention.

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Raghuvansh Misra, Rahul Misra
Counsel for Respondent(s) : D.G.A.