# Jagmohan v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 191
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-03
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 11524 of 2024
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jagmohan-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53044
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

(A) Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings
challenged
and
imposition
of
major
penalty - Invalid Inquiry - Uttar Pradesh
Government
Servants
(Discipline
and
Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7,13 - Failure
to hold oral inquiry and prove charges by
evidence -U.P. Civil Services Regulations -
Article
351-A
-
post-retirement
disciplinary action - against a government
servant - U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act,
1976 - Section 4 - remedy before Tribunal
- In all major penalty matters, charges
have to be proved by production of
evidence in the first instance by the
employer - Inquiry Officer cannot return
findings by merely reading the chargesheet and the reply of the charge-sheeted
employee;
evidence,
both
oral
and
documentary, must be produced by the
establishment
and
witnesses
crossexamined - Departmental inquiry must
strictly follow the procedure laid down in
Rule 7; failure to do so vitiates the entire
proceedings - Non-consideration of Article
351-A renders denial of emoluments
legally vulnerable. (Para -2,10,13,35)

Petitioner challenged disciplinary proceedings
initiated against him - earlier remanded for de
novo inquiry by Tribunal - Inquiry Officer failed
to fix date, time, and place for inquiry - No oral
evidence was led by establishment - No
opportunity given to petitioner to cross-examine
witnesses - Inquiry Officer erroneously assumed
that charges stood proved based on documents
and petitioner's reply alone - Inquiry Officer
was bound to require establishment to prove
charges by leading oral and documentary
evidence - Breach of Rule 7 of the U.P.
Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1999 - Violated salutary principles of
natural justice - Disciplinary authority passed
order of reduction to basic pay - later amended
to denial of salary for dismissal period as
petitioner
retired
during
pendency
of
proceedings.(Paras 24 to 32)

HELD: - After retirement, only the Governor
had the authority to impose punishment under
Article 351-A of the Civil Service Regulations.
Punishment imposed was not permissible either
under Rule 3 of Rules of 1999 or under Article
351-A. Respondents were held incompetent to
pass any punitive order based on a flawed
inquiry report. Fresh inquiry could be held only
in accordance with Rule 7 and salutary
principles. Any punishment, if warranted, could
only be imposed by the Governor under Article
351-A. impugned orders were quashed. (Para
-33 to 37)

Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

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3 All. Jagmohan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
191
(2025) 3 ILRA 191
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ A No. 11524 of 2024

Jagmohan ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Arvind
Kumar,
Bansh
Narayan
Vishwakarma, Sharda Vishwakarma

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

(A) Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings
challenged
and
imposition
of
major
penalty - Invalid Inquiry - Uttar Pradesh
Government
Servants
(Discipline
and
Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7,13 - Failure
to hold oral inquiry and prove charges by
evidence -U.P. Civil Services Regulations -
Article
351-A
-
post-retirement
disciplinary action - against a government
servant - U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act,
1976 - Section 4 - remedy before Tribunal
- In all major penalty matters, charges
have to be proved by production of
evidence in the first instance by the
employer - Inquiry Officer cannot return
findings by merely reading the chargesheet and the reply of the charge-sheeted
employee;
evidence,
both
oral
and
documentary, must be produced by the
establishment
and
witnesses
crossexamined - Departmental inquiry must
strictly follow the procedure laid down in
Rule 7; failure to do so vitiates the entire
proceedings - Non-consideration of Article
351-A renders denial of emoluments
legally vulnerable. (Para -2,10,13,35)

Petitioner challenged disciplinary proceedings
initiated against him - earlier remanded for de
novo inquiry by Tribunal - Inquiry Officer failed
to fix date, time, and place for inquiry - No oral
evidence was led by establishment - No
opportunity given to petitioner to cross-examine
witnesses - Inquiry Officer erroneously assumed
that charges stood proved based on documents
and petitioner's reply alone - Inquiry Officer
was bound to require establishment to prove
charges by leading oral and documentary
evidence - Breach of Rule 7 of the U.P.
Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1999 - Violated salutary principles of
natural justice - Disciplinary authority passed
order of reduction to basic pay - later amended
to denial of salary for dismissal period as
petitioner
retired
during
pendency
of
proceedings.(Paras 24 to 32)

HELD: - After retirement, only the Governor
had the authority to impose punishment under
Article 351-A of the Civil Service Regulations.
Punishment imposed was not permissible either
under Rule 3 of Rules of 1999 or under Article
351-A. Respondents were held incompetent to
pass any punitive order based on a flawed
inquiry report. Fresh inquiry could be held only
in accordance with Rule 7 and salutary
principles. Any punishment, if warranted, could
only be imposed by the Governor under Article
351-A. impugned orders were quashed. (Para
-33 to 37)

Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of U.P. Vs Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2
SCC 772

2. Radhey Kant Khare Vs U.P.Corp. Sugar
Factories Federation Ltd., 2003(21) LCD 610

3. Roop Singh Negi Vs P.N.B., (2009) 2 SCC 570

4. St. of Uttaranchal Vs Kharak Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 236

5. Satyendra Singh Vs St. of U.P., 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3325

6. St. of U.P. Vs Kishori Lal, 2018 (9) ADJ 397
(DB)
192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7. Smt. Karuna Jaiswal Vs St. of U.P., 2018 (9)
ADJ 107 (DB)
8. St. of U.P. Vs Aditya Prasad Srivastava, 2017
(2) ADJ 554 (DB)
9. Gaya Prasad Yadav Vs St. of U.P., 2022 SCC
OnLine All 685

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This writ petition is directed
against the order of the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Koraon, District Prayagraj dated
16.04.2024, punishing the petitioner, a
Lekhpal,
after
holding
disciplinary
proceedings and the further order of the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Koraon, Prayagraj
dated 30.04.2024, modifying the last
mentioned order. By the order dated
16.04.2024,
disciplinary
proceedings
initiated
against
the
petitioner
were
concluded, punishing the petitioner by
reducing him to his basic pay. In addition,
it was directed that the petitioner would not
be entitled to any emoluments during the
period that he remained out of service on
account of dismissal from service earlier
ordered and since set aside by the State
Public Services Tribunal (for short, 'the
Tribunal') with liberty to hold a fresh
inquiry. The modification of the order
dated 16.04.2024 came, because pending
proceedings
the
employee
has
superannuated.

2. The facts, giving rise to this
petition, make a sordid reading and
convinces this Court that come what may,
the Disciplinary Authorities in various
departments of the Government, who are
Administrative Officers, cannot appreciate
the essentials of valid procedure to hold a
departmental inquiry on a charge against an
employee,
which
may
lead
to
the
imposition of a major penalty. They would
not understand what Rule 7 of the Uttar
Pradesh Government Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (for short, 'the
Rules
of
1999')
requires
of
the
establishment in proving charges against a
delinquent/
charge-sheeted
employee,
facing charges, that may lead to the
imposition of a major penalty. This we say
because the law in this regard has been laid
down authoritatively across more than two
decades, which holds that in all major
penalty matters charges have to be proved
by production of evidence in the first
instance by the employer, which would
include
both
oral
and
documentary
evidence. The Inquiry Officer cannot return
findings by merely reading the charge-sheet
and the charge-sheeted employee's reply.
Documentary evidence has to be led by the
establishment, together with the production
of witnesses to prove the charges in the
first instance. It is not that the chargesheeted employee is to be presumed guilty
of the charges and after perusing his reply,
which is not found satisfactory, sans
evidence by the establishment, held guilty.
The guilt can be proved upon following the
procedure of holding an inquiry, consistent
with Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999, where the
Inquiry Officer sits as a Tribunal and the
establishment bear the burden of proving
the charges in the first instance by
producing
documentary
evidence
and
witnesses with opportunity to the chargesheeted employee to cross-examine such
witnesses. That is the salutary procedure
for any valid inquiry to be held in a major
penalty matter.

3. We would presently refer to
authority on the point. Howsoever high and
consistent
authority
may
there
be,
excluding any other possible course of
action,
experience
dictates
that
Administrative
Authorities,
acting
as
3 All. Jagmohan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
193
Disciplinary Authorities, would not give up
the practice of presuming a charge-sheeted
employee guilty by reading the chargesheet, where the charges are regarded true,
and then, look into the reply to find out if a
plausible explanation, consistent with the
charge-sheeted employee's innocence, has
come forth. This is the approach which
Disciplinary Authorities across the State in
various
establishments,
including
the
Government, adopt and we are convinced
that they would not give it up. When we
refer to authority on the point, its age and
consistency, it would leave no one in doubt
that the principles there are consistently
observed in breach. In this case, as in
almost all others, a mere reference to the
authority, followed by a quashing of the
order on that ground, may not suffice.
Something more would have to be done to
compel Disciplinary Authorities in various
establishments of the State to ensure that
the procedural law, regarding the holding
of a valid inquiry, in accordance with Rule
7 of the Rules of 1999 or salutary
procedure in regard to such inquiries,
involving the imposition of a major
penalty, is followed. Enforcement of the
settled law in this regard would spare
unnecessary harassment to the employees
facing inquiry and avoidable expenditure to
the State. How and why this Court has
remarked in the terms indicated above,
would be apparent from the facts of this
case, that would be presently referred to.

4. The petitioner was a Lekhpal in
the District of Allahabad (now Prayagraj).
He was appointed and initially posted at
Tehsil Handia vide order dated 20.10.1982,
where he worked up to the year 2001. He
was transferred to Tehsil Meja and stayed
there until 11.05.2010. The petitioner was
suspended pending inquiry on charges of
misconduct, vide order dated 12.05.2010.
This happened in the circumstances that
while posted as a Lekhpal in Bari, Tehsil
Meja, District Prayagraj, in the months of
April and May, 2010, an order of mutation
was passed regarding Khata Nos. 39, 198
and 120 in error by the Revenue Inspector.
The order was passed on the basis of a
report made by the petitioner, which led to
an irregular succession being recorded.

5. A charge-sheet was served upon
the petitioner on 19.07.2010, carrying four
charges. These read:

 "आरोप 1 :- अपचारी कमचारी के ऊपर प्रथम
आरोप यह है दक वह ग्राम बरी खाता सांख्या - 198, 39 पर दजज
खातेदार दसतावी देवी पत्नी रामराज दनवासी बेदौली को मृत दशाजकर
उसके स्थान पर धमजराज पुत्र ठाकुर प्रसाद दन0 ग्राम बेदौली का नाम
दहतबद्ध होकर दजज करा ददया गया, जबदक दसतावी देवी पत्नी
रामराज अिी जीदवत है। इस आरोप के जवाब में अपचारी कमजचारी
द्वारा कहा गया है दक धमजराज पुत्र ठाकुर प्रसाद ने उसको बताया दक
दसतावी देवी हमारी िािी है तथा मृतक हो चुकी है और उनके कोई
सांतान नहीं है, वाररस हमी है, तब मैने दसतावी देवी के स्थान पर
धमजराज पुत्र ठाकर प्रसाद (देवर) के नाम ददनाांक 20.04.2010
को वरासत करा ददया। अपचारी कमजचारी के कथन से ही स्पष्ट है दक
उसने दहतबद्ध व्यदक्त के अदतररक्त दकसी अन्य व्यदक्त से दसतावी
देवी के बारे में कोई जॉच नहीं की और उससे दमलकर गलत ढांग से
जीदवत व्यदक्त को मृतक ददखाकर वरासत दजज कर ददया। अपचारी
कमजचारी का जवाब सांतोिजनक नहीं है। आरोप सांख्या-1 उसके
ऊपर पूणजतया दसद्ध होता है ।
 आरोप 2:- अपचारी कमजचारी के ऊपर दद्वतीय
आरोप यह है दक उसने ग्राम बरी के खाता सेख्या - 120 पर दजज
खातेदार रामबरन पुत्र रामलाल के स्थान पर उसके जायज वाररसान
सिाजीत पुत्र रामबरन व दवनय कुमार पुत्र कमेशचन्र का नाम न दजज
करके अन्य व्यदक्त रमेश पुत्र जयनारायण दनवासी बेदौली का नाम
ददनाांक 20.04.2010. को वरासतन दजज कर ददया। जवाब में
अपचारी कमजचारी द्वारा कहा गया है दक रमेश पुत्र जयनारायण ने
उनसे कहा दक रामबरन उसके बाबा है, उसके मरे 10 विज हो गये
और अिी तक मेरे नाम उनकी वरासत नहीं हुई है। अपचारी
कमजचारी ने कहा है दक दवश्वास में आकर गलत वरासत दजज कर
ददया। अपचारी कमजचारी के जवाब से स्पष्ट है दक वरासत दजज करने
से पहले उसके द्वारा समुदचत जॉच पड़ताल नहीं दक गई और गलत
ढांग से वरासत दजज कर दी गई। आरोपी कमजचारी का जवाब
194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
सांतोिजनक नहीं है और आरोप सांख्या-2 उसके ऊपर पूणजतया दसद्ध
है ।
 आरोप 3 :- अपचारी कमजचारी के ऊपर तीसरा
आरोप यह है दक उसने पदेन दादयत्वों का दनवजहन न करके
स्वेच्िाचाररतापूवजक दहतबद्ध होकर अनुदचत रूप से दूसरे व्यदक्त के
नाम वरासत दजज कर लाि पहुाँचाने का दोदि है। इस आरोप का
जवाब िी सांतोिजनक नहीं है और यह आरोप िी अपचारी कमजचारी
पर दसद्ध होता है ।
 आरोप 4: - अपचारी कमजचारी के ऊपर चौथा
आरोप यह है दक वह एक लापरवाह कमजचारी है और िूमादफयों से
सॉठ-गााँठ करके उन्हे लाि पहुाँचाने का दोिी है। जवाब में अपचारी
कमचारी द्वारा कहा गया है दक वह सत्यदनष्ठा पूवजक कायज करने वाला
कमजचारी है और उसके साथ दवश्वासघात करके कायज कराया गया
तथा उसने कमजचारी आचार सांदहता का उल्लांघन नहीं दकया है। हो
सकता है दहतबद्ध व्यदक्त िू-मादफयों न हो, लदकन वरासत दजज करने
में आरोपी कमजचारी द्वारा अत्यदधक लापरवाही बरती गयी है। दो-दो
प्रकरणों में एक साथ ऐसी वरासत दजज हो जाना सांयोग की बात नहीं
हो सकती है। इसदलए आरोप सांख्या - 4 िी अपचारी कमजचारी पर
दसद्ध होता है।"
6. The petitioner filed his reply to
the charge-sheet on 04.08.2010, denying
the charges and raising pleas in defence.

7. As regards the first charge, the
petitioner's defence was that Dharmraj son
of Thakur Prasad, described as a Pahi
Kastkar in Village Bari, had told the
petitioner that Sitabi Devi wife of Ramraj,
who was his sister-in-law is no more and
that he is entitled to be mutated in her
place. The petitioner made a report in this
regard before the Revenue Inspector,
proposing a mutation in good faith. A
mutation order dated 20.04.2010 was
passed on its basis. The petitioner came to
know
that
the
intimation
given
by
Dharmraj was incorrect. He, therefore,
immediately
approached
the
Naib
Tehsildar with a report, as a result whereof
the flawed mutation, directed by the
Revenue Inspector on 20.04.2010, was set
aside by the Naib Tehsildar vide order
dated 04.05.2010. Sitabi Devi's name was
restored.
8. About the second charge, the
petitioner says that one Ramesh Chandra
son of Jay Ram had informed him that Ram
Baran son of Ram Lal, being a Pahi
Kastkar in Village Bari, who was his
grandfather, is dead. Ramesh Chandra
represented himself to be Ram Baran's heir
and legal representative entitled to inherit.
The petitioner in good faith, believing the
aforesaid state of things to be correct, made
a mutation report to the Revenue Inspector,
who passed a mutation order dated
20.04.2010 on its basis. Again, as soon as
the petitioner came to know that the
intimation given by Ramesh Chandra was
incorrect, he immediately approached the
Naib Tehsildar with a report, on the basis
of which the mutation granted by the
Revenue Inspector was set aside on
04.05.2010.

9. About the third and fourth
charges, the petitioner said in his defence
that he had taken immediate steps for
cancellation of the wrong mutations,
without any complaint from the affected
parties or a direction by any higher
Authority in this regard. He, therefore, said
that he is entitled for protection of his
actions earlier done on ground of good faith
and a mere error during the course of
duties, discharged bona fide.

10. It is the petitioner's case that the
Inquiry Officer failed to adhere to the
procedure of holding an inquiry in
accordance with Rule 7 of the Rules of
1999. He did not fix any date, time and
venue of inquiry, where the establishment
would be called upon to produce their
evidence, in particular, witnesses in order
to prove the charges. The inquiry report
dated 31.08.2010 was submitted by the
Inquiry Officer, after going through the
charge-sheet and the petitioner's reply with
3 All. Jagmohan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
195
no inquiry being held. All the charges were
held proved by the Inquiry Officer. The
petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the
inquiry report, apparently, in answer to a
show cause served along with a copy of the
inquiry report dated 31.08.2010. The
petitioner's reply is one dated 15.09.2010.
The
Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Meja,
Prayagraj, the Disciplinary Authority, by an
order dated 09.12.2010 dismissed the
petitioner from service.

11. Aggrieved by the order of
punishment, the petitioner preferred a
statutory appeal on 10.01.2011 to the
Appellate Authority, the District Magistrate
of Prayagraj. Upon a writ petition filed,
being Writ-A No.18116 of 2011, the relief
sought wherein is not clear at all, this Court
directed the Appellate Authority to ensure
that the petitioner's pending appeal was
decided in accordance with law within two
months next from the date of receipt a
certified copy of the order passed in the
aforesaid writ petition. This order was
passed by this Court on 29.03.2011. The
Prayagraj District Magistrate, the Appellate
Authority, dismissed the petitioner's appeal
vide order dated 30.04.2011. The petitioner
then put to challenge both these orders vide
Writ-A No.40747 of 2011. In the said writ
petition, the learned Standing Counsel
raised an objection that against the
appellate order, the petitioner still had an
alternative remedy by way of revision
before the State Government under Rule 13
of the Rules of 1999. This Court, sustaining
the challenge and trusting the efficacy of
the alternative remedy urged by the learned
Standing Counsel, dismissed the writ
petition on that ground, relegating the
petitioner vide order dated 22.07.2011.

12. The petitioner lodged a revision
before
the
State
Government
on
04.08.2011, addressing it to the Principal
Secretary,
Department
of
Revenue,
Government of U.P. The said revision
came to be dismissed by the Principal
Secretary, Department of Revenue, acting
for the State Government, exercising their
powers under Rule 13 and saying no more
than this for a reasoning:

 "7- उपयुजक्त तथ्यों के पररप्रेक्ष्य में श्री जगमोहन,
लेखपाल, क्षेत्र बरी, तहसील मेजा, जनपद इलाहाबाद द्वारा प्रस्तुत
पुनरीक्षण अभ्यावेदन दजलादधकारी की आख्या तथा पत्रावली में
उपलब्ध अन्य अदिलेखों का िलीिााँदत परीक्षण दकया गया और
यह पाया गया दक श्री जगमोहन, लेखपाल के पुनरीदक्षत अभ्यावेदन
ददनाांक 04-08-2011 में उदल्लदखत तथ्यों में कोई बल नहीं है।
अतः वदणजत दस्थदत में श्री जगमोहन, लेखपाल, (पदच्युत) क्षेत्र बरी,
तहसील मेजा, जनपद इलाहाबाद का पुनरीक्षण अभ्यावेदन ददनॉक
04-08-2011 आधारहीन एवां तथ्यों से परे होने के कारण
एतद्द्वारा दनरस्त करते हुए दनस्ताररत दकया जाता है।"

13. Again, the petitioner came back
to this Court a third time, challenging all
the orders, to wit, the order of the
Disciplinary Authority, the appellate order
and the revisional order, by means of WritA No.40170 of 2013. This time, this Court
dismissed the writ petition on ground that
the petitioner had a statutory alternative
remedy under Section 4 of the Uttar
Pradesh Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976
(for short, 'the Act of 1976'). Until this
time, the petitioner was not heard by this
Court on merits. The petitioner instituted
Claim Petition No.258 of 2014, questioning
all the three orders passed by the
Disciplinary
Authority,
the
Appellate
Authority and the Revisional Authority,
dispensing with his services. The Tribunal
allowed the claim petition vide order dated
06.02.2015 and quashed all the three
orders.
Liberty
was
granted
to
the
respondents
to
proceed
with
the
departmental inquiry against the petitioner
afresh from the stage of recording evidence
196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in his presence and, after providing
opportunity to him, to cross-examine
witnesses as well as opportunity to adduce
evidence in his defence. The inquiry was
directed to be concluded within a period of
four months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of the Tribunal's judgment.
Why this relief was granted to the
petitioner, would be pellucid from the
following remarks of the Tribunal, carried
in their judgment dated 06.02.2015, which
say:

 "6. The impugned order of
dismissal has been assailed mainly on the
ground that the inquiry officer has not
examined any witness in support of the
charges and the petitioner has not been
provided
an
opportunity
of
crossexamination and no date, time and place
was fixed for conducting the inquiry as
such the inquiry was not conducted as per
provisions of rule 7 of U.P. Government
Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1999, which is violative of principles of
natural justice.
 7. In this regard, we have gonethrough Rule 7(vii) of U.P. Government
Servants(
Discipline
and
Punishment)
Rules, 1999 reads as under:-
 Where the charged government
servant denies the charges the in inquiry
officer shall proceed to call the witnesses
proposed in the charge sheet and record
their oral evidence in presence of the
charged Government servant who shall be
given opportunity to cross-examine such
witnesses. After recording the aforesaid
evidences, the Inquiry Officer shall call and
record the oral evidence which the charges
Government servant desired in his written
statement to be produced in his defence."
 8. Perusal of record shows that
the petitioner was placed under suspension
in contemplation of departmental inquiry
vide order dated 12.5.2010 and a chargesheet dated 19.7.2010 was issued to the
petitioner containing four charges. The
main charges levelled against the petitioner
relates to wrong and illegal mutation,
which was made by the petitioner. We have
also gone-through the inquiry report dated
31.8.2010, which reveals that the inquiry
officer has not fixed any date, time and
place for conducting the inquiry and no
witness was examined to prove the charges.
The petitioner was also not provided any
opportunity
of
cross-examination
of
witnesses and the inquiry officer has only
considered the reply to the charge sheet and
submitted the inquiry report on 31.8.2010
proving the charges levelled against him.
Perusal of charge sheet clearly shows that
the report of Tehesildar, Meza dated
07.5.2010 was cited as evidence, but the
inquiry officer has not examined the
Tehsildar, Meza for proving the charges.
 9. From the perusal of above rule,
It is clear that when the petitioner denies
the charges levelled against him, it is
obligatory on the part of the inquiry officer
to fix date, time and place for recording the
oral evidence of the witnesses, in support
of charges, in presence of the petitioner, but
in the present case, no oral inquiry was ever
held and no witness was examined either in
his presence or in his absence, so, the
inquiry has not been conducted as per
provisions of aforesaid rules. The Petitioner
was also not afforded an opportunity to
cross-examine
the
witnesses.
It
was
obligatory on the part of the inquiry officer
to have provided an opportunity to crossexamine
the
witnesses,
whether
the
petitioner requests for it or not. No
opportunity for adducing defence evidence
was provided to petitioner. Thus, it is
established beyond any doubt that the
inquiry has not been conducted as per
provisions of rules and the petitioner was
3 All. Jagmohan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
197
denied reasonable opportunity of defence
also. Therefore, the inquiry report is
vitiated and on the basis of vitiated inquiry
report, no punishment can be inflicted on
incumbent.
 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
has also held in a case reported in 2010(2)
Supreme Court Cases 772 State of U.P.&
others vs. Sąroj Kumar Sinha as under:
 An inquiry officer acting in a
quasi-judicial authority is in the position of
an independent adjudicator. He is not
supposed to be a representative of the
department/disciplinary
authority/
Government. His function is to examine the
evidence presented by the Department,
even in the absence of the delinquent
official to see as to whether the un-rebutted
evidence is sufficient to hold that the
charges are proved. In the present case the
aforesaid. procedure has not been observed.
Since no oral evidence has been. examined,
the documents have not been proved and
could
not
have
been
taken
into
consideration to conclude that the charges
have been proved against the respondents."
 11. In view of above position of
case law, it is clear that departmental
inquiry conducted against the petitioner
was not according to prescribed rules. No
oral evidence has been recorded. No
witness was examined either in presence of
the
petitioner
or
in
his
absence.
Opportunity
of
cross-examination
of
witnesses
was
not
provided
to
the
petitioner, so, the on the basis of irregular
inquiry cannot be said to be legal and is
liable to be quashed. The appellate
authority and Revisional authority have
also not considered these points before
passing the order dated 30.4.2011 and
22.4.2013, so, they are also liable to be
quashed. Thus, on this technical ground,
the impugned order is not sustainable in
eye of law and liable to be quashed.
 12. In the instant case, no oral
inquiry was held and no date, time and
place was fixed under intimation to the
petitioner, so, the whole inquiry is vitiated
and on the basis of vitiated inquiry, no
punishment could be awarded to the
petitioner.
 In 2003(21) LCD 610 Radhey
Kant Khare Vs. U.P. Coop. Sugar
Factories Federation Ltd. The division
bench of Hon'ble High Court Allahabad
(Lucknow Bench) while dealing with the
procedure of enquiry before imposing
major punishment has held as follows:
 "After a charge sheet is given to
the employee an oral enquiry is a must,
whether the employee requests for it or not.
Hence a notice should be issued to him
indicating him the date, time and place of
the enquiry.""

14. In compliance with the order
dated 06.02.2015 passed by the Tribunal,
the Sub-Divisional Officer, Meja, Prayagraj
passed
an
order
dated
27.04.2015,
reinstating the petitioner in service and
suspended him pending inquiry in the same
breath. The inquiry from stage of the chargesheet was proposed to be held again, acting
on the directions of the Tribunal. The
petitioner challenged the part of the order that
had directed his suspension from service by
means of Writ-A No.23323 of 2015. This
Court issued a notice of motion on
19.05.2015
and
stayed
the
order
of
suspension, leaving it open to the respondents
not to assign any work to the petitioner. It is
pointed by the learned Counsel for the
petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority
went beyond the judgment of the Tribunal
and issued a fresh charge-sheet dated
02.06.2015 to the petitioner, to which he filed
a reply dated 08.06.2015. The four charges,
that were then laid against the petitioner vide
charge-sheet dated 02.06.2015, read:
198 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 "प्रथन आरोप- आपके दवरूद्ध प्रथम आरोप यह है
दक ग्राम बरी के खाता सां0 198, 39 पर दजज दसतावी देवी पत्नी
रामराज की मृत ददखाकर धमजराज पुत्र ठाकुर प्रसाद दन0 बेदौली प0
क0 11 क पर आदेश 20.04.2010 द्वारा वरासतन दजज करा
ददया है जब दक मूल खातेदार दसतावी देवी पत्नी रामराज अिी
जीदवत है। इस प्रकार जीदवत को मृतक ददखाकर उसके स्थान पर
दूसरे व्यदक्त के नाम वरासत दजज कराकर दहतवद्ध होकर लाि पहुचाने
के दोिी है।
 साक्ष्य में तहसीलदार मेजा की आख्या ददनाांक
07.05.2010 पठनीय है।
 दद्वतीय आरोप- आपके दवरूद्ध दूसरा आरोप यह है
दक ग्राम बरी के खाता सांख्या 120 पर दजज खातेदार राम बरन पुत्र
राम लाल के मृत होने पर उनके वाररसान सिाजीत पुत्र रामबरन व
दवनय कुमार पुत्र कमलेश चन्र का नाम वरासतन दजज न कराकर
अन्य ब्यदक्त रमेश चन्र पुत्र जयनरायन दन0 बेदौली का नाम वजररए
वरासत ददनाांक 20.04.2010 को आदेश पाररत कराकर दजज
करा ददया । इस प्रकार अवैधादनक कायज करके आवांदित ब्यदक्त को
अनुदचत लाि पहुचाने के दोिी है।
 साक्ष्य में तहसीलदार मेजा की आख्या ददनाांक
07.05.2010 पठनीय है।
 तृतीय आरोप- आपके दवरूद्व तीसरा आरोप यह है
दक आपने अपने पदेन दादयत्वों का दनवजहन नहीं दकया और स्वेच्िा
चाररता पूवजक दहतबद्ध होकर अनुदचत रूप से दूसरे व्यदक्तयों के नाम
वरासत दजज कराकर लाि पहुचाने के दोिी है।
 चौथा आरोप- आपके दवरूद्ध चौथा आरोप यह है
दक आप एक लापरवाह कमजचारी है और िूमादफयों से साांठ- गाठ
करके उन्हे लाि पहुचाने के दोिी है और आप द्वारा कमजचारी आचार
सांदहता का उल्लघन दकया है। आपके इस कृत्य से आप सरकारी
सेवा में रहने योग्य नहीं है।"

15. It is the petitioner's case
pleaded in paragraph No.25 of the writ
petition that in the inquiry held de novo
under the judgment of the Tribunal, the
establishment did not produce witnesses in
support of the charges or afford opportunity
to the petitioner to cross-examine them. An
inquiry report dated 06.02.2016 was
submitted, holding the first and the second
charge proved, but the third and the fourth
not proved. The Sub-Divisional Officer, on
occasion, did not serve the petitioner with a
show cause notice along with a copy of the
inquiry report to enable the petitioner to
reply. Instead, considering the inquiry
report without the petitioner's answer to it,
the Sub-Divisional Officer proceeded to
punish the petitioner vide order dated
30.04.2024 in the following terms:

 (1) the petitioner would not
receive any emolument for the period of his
suspension;
 (2)
the
punishment
earlier
awarded to the petitioner would remain the
same; and,
 (3) a censure was awarded to the
petitioner in the terms set forth in the
order.

16. Later on, vide order dated
04.05.2016, the order of punishment dated
30.04.2016 was amended to clarify that in
the ninth line of paragraph No.8, the
direction to deprive the petitioner of his
emoluments
for
the
period
of
his
suspension
from
service,
had
been
incorrectly mentioned, which ought be read
as the period of removal from service.

17. The petitioner, aggrieved by the
orders dated 30.04.2016 and 04.05.2016,
preferred a statutory appeal to the District
Magistrate, Prayagraj on 28.06.2016. He
raised
his
grievance
about
the
establishment not proving their case by
leading evidence at the inquiry, besides
other contentions. The appeal remained
pending with the District Magistrate for
more than three years. The petitioner then
instituted
Writ-A
No.4728
of
2019,
complaining of delay in the decision of his
statutory appeal by the District Magistrate.
This Court, accordingly, disposed of WritA No.4728 of 2019 with a direction to the
District
Magistrate
'that
subject
to
verification of all facts, the pending
statutory appeal of the petitioner shall be
3 All. Jagmohan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
199
attended to and disposed of in accordance
with law, preferably within a period of two
months from the date of presentation of a
certified copy of this order.'

18. In compliance with the last
mentioned order passed by this Court, the
District Magistrate, Prayagraj decided the
petitioner's
appeal
vide
order
dated
02.03.2021, setting aside the punishment
order dated 30.04.2016, including the one
correcting it dated 04.05.2016, with a
direction to the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Koraon to pass appropriate orders afresh
after examination of records in accordance
with law. The Sub-Divisional Officer did
not comply with the order dated 02.03.2021
passed by the District Magistrate, Prayagraj
for about six months, leading the petitioner
to institute Writ-A No.17166 of 2021
before this Court, praying that a mandamus
be issued to the Sub-Divisional Officer to
pass appropriate orders in accordance with
the order dated 02.03.2021 passed by the
District Magistrate. This petition was
disposed of vide order dated 07.12.2021
with a direction to the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Koraon, Prayagraj to comply with
the order dated 02.03.2021 passed by the
District Magistrate, Prayagraj and to pass
fresh orders in accordance with law,
preferably within a period of three months
of the date of service of a certified copy of
the order passed in the last mentioned writ
petition. The order dated 07.12.2021 passed
by this Court in Writ-A No.17166 of 2021
was not complied with by the SubDivisional Officer, Koraon or the order of
the District Magistrate, which was enforced
by a mandamus of this Court. The SubDivisional Officer kept the matter pending
with him for a few more months until
28.02.2022, when the petitioner retired
from service upon attaining the age of
superannuation.
19. The petitioner, after retirement,
approached the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Koraon and also sent reminders to enforce
the District Magistrate's order, but all in
vain. He did not carry out the order dated
02.03.2021
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate.
Aggrieved
by
continued
inaction by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the
petitioner moved Contempt Application
(Civil) No.6545 of 2023 against Avinash
Yadav, the then Sub-Divisional Officer,
Koraon, Prayagraj. The said contempt
application was disposed of vide order
dated 12.09.2023, granting the contemnoropposite party to that application three
months' further time to comply with the
order dated 07.12.2021 passed by this
Court on the writ side. The Sub-Divisional
Officer did not avail that opportunity and
the petitioner would say that he deliberately
and knowingly disobeyed the orders dated
07.12.2021 passed by this Court on the writ
side and in the contempt application,
compelling
the
petitioner
to
move
Contempt Application (Civil) No.775 of
2024
against
Avinash
Yadav,
SubDivisional Officer, Koraon, a second time.
This Court in the last mentioned contempt
application, made the following order on
06.03.2024:

 "1. Instant contempt application
has been filed owing to willfully disobedient
of the order dated 07.12.2021 passed by this
Court in Writ-A No.17166 of 2021, at the
part of the opposite party who has
deliberately not reconsidered the case of the
applicant till date.
 2. Learned Standing Counsel has
filed copy of the instruction dated 05.03.2024
duly signed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Koraon, District Prayagraj today in Court,
which is taken on record. Copy of the
aforesaid instructions has been served upon
learned counsel for the applicant.
200 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 3. Learned Standing Counsel, on
the basis of instructions, states that legal
advise has been sought for from the D.G.C.
(Civil) as to whether order passed by this
Court could be complied with or not. It is
very sorry state of affairs at the part of the
officer
concerned
who
has
given
instructions that the order of this Court
could be complied with only after taking
legal advise from D.G.C. (Civil). It appears
that the authority concerned is preventing
himself superior to this Court. It amounts
second contempt in the matter in hand.
Conduct shown by the opposite party is
highly condemnatory.
 4. As a last opportunity, in the
interest of justice, one month and no more
time is granted to the opposite party, either to
comply with the order passed by this Court or
show cause as to why contempt proceeding
should not be drawn against him.
 5.
Put
up
this
matter
on
22.04.2024 in the additional cause list."

20. The petitioner's case is that
upon receipt of the aforesaid order, in haste
and without application of mind, the SubDivisional Officer, Koraon passed an order
dated 16.04.2024, reinstating the petitioner,
reducing him to his initial pay-scale. In
addition, the salary for the period that the
petitioner remained out of service was
denied. A censure was also awarded. This
order was amended by the Sub-Divisional
Officer on 30.04.2024, realizing that the
petitioner had retired from service and
could no longer be reinstated. The amended
order of punishment reads:

 "अपचारी कमजचारी श्री जगमोहन लेखपाल के
दविागीय कायजवाही में दजलादधकारी महोदय, प्रयागराज के पांत्राक -
459 / िूलेख सात 2020-21 ददनाांक 02 माचज 2021 के
अनुपालन में अधोहस्ताक्षरी के कायाजलय पत्राांक- 2914 /
एस0टी0कोराांव - 2024 ददनाांक 16. 04.2024 से दनगजत
आदेश के पृष्ठसांख्या - 02 के पैरा सांख्या-02 में आांदशक सांशोधन
करते हुए उसके स्थान पर दनम्न आदेश पाररत दकया जाता है.
 "मेरे द्वारा जाांच अदधकारी की जाांच आख्या व
अपचारी कमजचारी के उिर / जवाब व पत्रावली में सांलग्न साक्ष्यों के
अनुशीलन करने के उपरान्त मैं इस दनष्किज पर पहुाँचता ह ू दक
अपचारी कमजचारी ने जानबूझकर जीदवत खातेदार को मृतक
ददखाकर वरासत दजज दकया है, दजसके दलए अपचारी कमजचारी पूणज
रूपेण दोिी है। अपचारी कमजचारी का यह कृत्य कमजचारी आचरण
दनयमावली के दवपरीत है। अपचारी कमजचारी ददनाांक
28.02.2022 को सेवादनवृि हो चुके हैं। अपचारी कमजचारी को
पृथक काल का वेतन अदेय करते हुए दविागीय कायजवाही समाप्त की
जाती है।"

21. Aggrieved by the order dated
16.04.2024, as amended on 30.04.2024,
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Koraon, Prayagraj, the petitioner has
instituted the present writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution.

22. Notice of motion was issued by
this Court on 09.08.2024 and a counter
affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos.3 and
4 filed in Court on 05.09.2024. The learned
Counsel for the petitioner waived her right
to file a rejoinder. The petition was
admitted to hearing, which proceeded
forthwith. Judgment was reserved.

23.
Heard
Ms.
Sharda
Vishwakarma, learned Counsel for the
petitioner and Ms. Monika Arya, learned
Additional
Chief
Standing
Counsel,
appearing on behalf of the State.

24. Upon a careful consideration of
the matter, what this Court finds is that it is
true, as remarked in the opening paragraphs
of this judgment, that the Inquiry Officer,
after the Tribunal remanded the matter for a
de novo inquiry, did not follow the salutary
procedure
governing
a
departmental
inquiry, where there was likelihood of the
imposition of a major penalty. It is also a
3 All. Jagmohan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
201
case where breach of Rule 7 of the Rules of
1999 is there for the same flaw as that
which
violates
salutary
principles
governing such inquiries.

25. In paragraph Nos.43 and 44 of
the writ petition, there is a categorical case
that the Inquiry Officer did not fix a date,
time and place for holding the inquiry, nor
did he require the establishment to lead oral
evidence or examine witnesses to prove the
charges. In the counter affidavit filed on
behalf of the respondents, the assertions in
paragraph Nos. 43 and 44 have neither
been effectively denied nor has it been
shown that the procedure necessary to hold
a valid departmental inquiry in a major
penalty matter was adhered to.

26. It is imperative in a case
involving an inquiry, where a major penalty
may result that a date, time and place be
fixed for holding the inquiry, with
intimation both to the delinquent and the
establishment. The hearing before the
Inquiry Officer, that is to be held on the
appointed date, time and venue, is hearing
the establishment's evidence to prove the
charges in the first instance. The Inquiry
Officer, in doing this, must convene
himself as a formal Inquiry Tribunal,
distancing himself from the establishment,
which he may otherwise be a part of. He
must require the establishment through
their
Presenting
Officer
to
produce
evidence, both documentary and oral, that
is to say, witnesses to prove the charges
against the delinquent. After evidence in
support of the charges has been led by the
establishment, the witnesses have to be
made over to the delinquent to crossexamine them. It is in the next stage that
the delinquent may be called upon to
produce his evidence in defence, which,
again, can be both documentary and oral. If
the delinquent examines witnesses, they
would be available for cross-examination
by the establishment in the same fashion. If
the delinquent does not produce any
evidence, the Inquiry Officer cannot relieve
the
establishment
of
the
burden
of
producing evidence in support of the
charges.

27. The Inquiry Officer cannot
infer upon a reading of the charge-sheet
and the written statement, together with the
papers annexed, that the charge-sheeted
employee is guilty. The Inquiry Officer has
to require the establishment to prove the
charges, as already remarked, through
evidence both documentary and oral. In the
present case, as the record would show,
despite specific remarks by the Tribunal in
the judgment of remand dated 06.02.2015
about this breach of salutary procedure
done by the Inquiry Officer, which is
contrary to Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 as
well, in the de novo inquiry undertaken, the
Inquiry Officer did not require the
establishment
to
produce
evidence,
including witnesses at the appointed date,
time and place. Hearing at the inquiry
would mean hearing the establishment's
witnesses and their evidence. Here, what
seems is that the Inquiry Officer thought
that the charges are proof of themselves
and the petitioner by his reply has not been
able to dispel the charges. No evidence at
all was heard by the Inquiry Officer in the
manner mandatory, both by salutary
principle and the provisions of Rule 7 of
the Rules of 1999.

28. The position of the law, as
regards the salutary procedure to be
adhered to by the Inquiry Officer in holding
an inquiry, which may lead to the
imposition of a major penalty, is well
settled in view of the law laid down by the
202 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh
and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010)
2 SCC 772, Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab
National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC
570, State of Uttaranchal and others v.
Kharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236 and the
Bench decisions of this Court in State of
U.P. and another v. Kishori Lal and
another, 2018 (9) ADJ 397 (DB) (LB),
Smt. Karuna Jaiswal v. State of U.P.,
2018 (9) ADJ 107 (DB) (LB) and State of
U.P. v. Aditya Prasad Srivastava and
another, 2017 (2) ADJ 554 (DB) (LB).

29. The position of the law in this
regard that has withstood the test of time
has been recently endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Satyendra Singh v.