# Jai Pal v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 1128
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-26
- **Case number:** Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 731 of 2019
- **Bench:** Manoj Misra, Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jai-pal-v-union-of-india-ors-44568
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. National Security Act, 1980 - Preventive
Detention - Grounds of detention do not
indicate that the mob was organized by the
petitioners or that there was anything done
by the petitioners - Solitary incident-
Satisfaction to be recorded on the basis of
cogent material that the detenu on being
released on bail is likely to indulge in
activity prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order- Absence of such materialPreventive detention of the petitioners is
not justified and is liable to be set aside.
 (Para 12 & 13)

The incident reflected a mob activity triggered by
a road accident in which a person had died. It is
not the case in the grounds of detention that the
petitioners had with a view to embarrass the
administration planned or organized the mob
action. The grounds though reflect petitioners'
participation in the mob but do not indicate that
the mob was organized by the petitioners or that
there was anything distinguishable done by the
petitioners in that mob action than what was
done by other participants.

There is no cogent material on the basis of
which, based on a solitary incident of the nature
cited in the grounds of detention, satisfaction
could be drawn that the petitioners on being
released on bail would indulge in activity that
would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order. As it is well settled that to preventively
detain a person, who is already in judicial
custody, satisfaction, amongst others, is also to
be recorded on the basis of cogent material that
the detenu on being released on bail is likely to
indulge in activity prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order, in absence of existence of such
material, the preventive detention of the
petitioners is not justified and is liable to be set
aside.

Consequently, all the three habeas corpus
petitions are allowed. The detention orders,
dated 16th April, 2019, passed by District
Magistrate, Etah against the aforesaid three
petitioners
are
hereby
quashed.
The
petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith
unless wanted in any other case.

Habeas Corpus Petitions allowed (E-3)

Case law relied upon/discussed: -

## Text

1128 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
entertaining this appeal, the appellant was
directed to deposit the entire amount. The
interim relief shall stand vacated.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 1128

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.09.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 731 of 2019
&
Habeas Corpus Writ Petition Cases No.
732 of 2019 & 734 of 2019

Jai Pal ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Upendra Upadhyay

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri S.K. Srivastava, Sri Deepak
Mishra (A.G.A.)

A. National Security Act, 1980 - Preventive
Detention - Grounds of detention do not
indicate that the mob was organized by the
petitioners or that there was anything done
by the petitioners - Solitary incident-
Satisfaction to be recorded on the basis of
cogent material that the detenu on being
released on bail is likely to indulge in
activity prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order- Absence of such materialPreventive detention of the petitioners is
not justified and is liable to be set aside.
 (Para 12 & 13)

The incident reflected a mob activity triggered by
a road accident in which a person had died. It is
not the case in the grounds of detention that the
petitioners had with a view to embarrass the
administration planned or organized the mob
action. The grounds though reflect petitioners'
participation in the mob but do not indicate that
the mob was organized by the petitioners or that
there was anything distinguishable done by the
petitioners in that mob action than what was
done by other participants.

There is no cogent material on the basis of
which, based on a solitary incident of the nature
cited in the grounds of detention, satisfaction
could be drawn that the petitioners on being
released on bail would indulge in activity that
would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order. As it is well settled that to preventively
detain a person, who is already in judicial
custody, satisfaction, amongst others, is also to
be recorded on the basis of cogent material that
the detenu on being released on bail is likely to
indulge in activity prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order, in absence of existence of such
material, the preventive detention of the
petitioners is not justified and is liable to be set
aside.

Consequently, all the three habeas corpus
petitions are allowed. The detention orders,
dated 16th April, 2019, passed by District
Magistrate, Etah against the aforesaid three
petitioners
are
hereby
quashed.
The
petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith
unless wanted in any other case.

Habeas Corpus Petitions allowed (E-3)

Case law relied upon/discussed: -

1. Attorney General for India Vs Amratlal
Prajivandas & ors. reported in 1994 (5) SCC 54
2. Surya Prakash Sharma Vs St. of U.P. & ors.
1994 (Supp.) (3) SCC 195
3. Yogendra Murari Vs St. of U.P.& ors. (1988)
4 SCC 559
(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Misra, J. &
Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Mishra, J.)

1. These three habeas corpus
petitions question detention orders, dated
2 All. Jai Pal Vs Union of India & Ors.
1129
16th April, 2019, separately passed
against the petitioners by the District
Magistrate, Etah in exercise of powers
under Section 3(2) read with Section 3(3)
of the National Security Act, 1980 (for
short the Act, 1980).

2. Today, counter affidavit of
respondents 2 and 4 have been filed by
the learned AGA in each of the three
petitions, which have been taken on
record. The learned counsel for the
petitioners stated that he does not wish to
file reply to those affidavits and has
prayed that the petitions be heard finally.

3. As the petitioners are co-accused
and the detention order separately passed
against them are based on identical
grounds, with the consent of learned
counsel for the parties, these petitions are
being decided by a common judgment and
order.

4. We have heard Sri Upendra
Upadhyay for all three petitioners; Sri
Deepak Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the
State as well as the other state-officers
including the detaining authority; Sri S.K.
Srivastava for the Union of India in
Habeas Corpus Petition No. 731 of 2019;
Sri Surendra Nath Chauhan for the Union
of India in Habeas Corpus Petition No.
732 of 2019; and Sri Kameshwar Singh
for the Union of India in Habeas Corpus
Petition No. 734 of 2019; and have
perused the record.

5. A perusal of the record would
reveal that detention orders dated 16th
April, 2019 were separately passed
against the petitioners by the District
Magistrate,
Etah
(the
Detaining
Authority) in exercise of power under
Section 3(2) read with Section 3(3) of the
Act, 1980 with a view to prevent the
petitioners from indulging in activity that
might be prejudicial to the public order.
The grounds of detention, which are
common to all the petitioners, reflect that
the detention order has been passed with
reference to the activity of the petitioners
in the company of several other accused
persons in an incident dated 22nd March,
2019 which gave rise to case crime
No.0056 of 2019 at police station
Awagarh, district Etah, under Sections
147, 148, 149, 341, 307, 332, 353, 427,
336, 436 and 188 IPC and Section 7
Criminal Law Amendment Act. The
record reflects that prior to that incident,
in a road accident, a person had died. This
resulted in mass protest by the public
including road blockade. To remove the
road blockade, police force was deployed.
The allegation is that a large gathering of
persons comprising 12 named accused
including the petitioners with 100 odd
other persons attacked the police force
and damaged / burnt police vehicle. It is
stated that the petitioners were duly
identified along with twenty-thirty others
and their participation in the incident was
substantiated from statement of the
witnesses. It is alleged that the said road
blockade and mob activity disturbed the
public order. By citing that the petitioners
have applied for bail in the said case and
are likely to be released on bail, with a
view to prevent the petitioners from
acting in a manner prejudicial to the
public order, the detention order was
passed.

6. The contention of learned counsel
for the petitioners is that the petitioners
have no previous criminal history; that
from a solitary incident of the nature
which has given rise to Case Crime
No.0056 of 2019 it cannot be presumed
1130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that the petitioners on being released on
bail would repeat such activity that would
be prejudicial to the public order therefore
the order of preventive detention is not
legally sustainable. It has been submitted
that the purpose of preventive detention is
to prevent the detenu from indulging in
activity
that
is
prejudicial
to
the
maintenance of public order or security of
the State or maintenance of essential
services and civil supplies. It has been
urged that since it is to prevent a person
from repeating such activity, the past
activity has to be considered for the
purpose of ascertaining the propensity of
that person whether he would repeat such
activity. It has been submitted that
admittedly there were 12 named accused
including the petitioners in the first
information report. The list of names,
after investigation, expanded to twentythirty persons. Otherwise, more than 100
persons
were
there,
who
allegedly
participated in the incident of road-block
and arson, but the detention order has
been passed only against three persons,
namely, the petitioners, whereas no
detention order was passed against the
rest of the accused, which clearly suggests
that from the nature of the incident it
could not have been logically inferred that
the persons involved were likely to repeat
such act. It was urged that the incident, as
narrated in the first information report,
did not disclose an organized criminal
activity, rather, it appeared to be a mob
reaction to an accident. Hence, from such
an incident it could not have been inferred
that the petitioners had mental predisposition to repeat such acts. It has been
submitted
that
mob
psychology
is
spontaneous and such incidents are not
planned and there is nothing on record
that
the
incident
was
planned
or
orchestrated by the petitioners. More
over, the first information report and the
other material attributes common role to
all. In the alternative it has been
contended that even if the detention was
justified for a limited period in view of
the forthcoming elections, its extension is
not justified, post the elections. It has
been submitted that the detention order
after confirmation was initially for three
months only but, unnecessarily, it has
been extended up to six months.

7. Learned AGA submitted that the
first information report as also the
grounds
of
detention
sufficiently
demonstrate that on account of mob
action the public order was disturbed as
police personnel were also injured and
police
vehicle
was
burnt.
He
has
submitted that such mob activity needs to
be dealt with an iron hand and therefore
the detention order is justified even
though the petitioners may not have
previous criminal history.

8. Having considered the rival
submissions, before we address the issues
raised, it would be apposite for us to
notice the legal position as to when an
order of preventive detention can lawfully
be passed on a solitary act of the detenu.
In this regard, it would be useful for us to
notice the decision of nine-judges Bench
of the Apex Court in Attorney General
For India vs Amratlal Prajivandas and
others reported in 1994 (5) SCC 54. In
paragraph 48 of the judgment, as reported,
the apex court has held as follows:-

"48. Now, it is beyond dispute
that an order of detention can be based
upon one single ground. Several decisions
of this Court have held that even one
prejudicial act can be treated as sufficient
for forming the requisite satisfaction for
2 All. Jai Pal Vs Union of India & Ors.
1131
detaining the person. In Debu Mahato v.
State of W.B. it was observed that while
ordinarily-speaking one act may not be
sufficient
to
form
the
requisite
satisfaction, there is no such invariable
rule and that in a given case one act may
suffice. That was a case of wagonbreaking and having regard to the nature
of the Act, it was held that one act is
sufficient.
The
same
principle
was
reiterated in Anil Dey v. State of W. B. It
was a case of theft of railway signal
material. Here too one act was held to be
sufficient. Similarly, in Israil SK v.
District Magistrate of West Dinajpur. and
Dharua Kanu v. State of W.B. single act
of theft of telegraph copper wires in huge
quantity and removal of railway fishplates respectively was held sufficient to
sustain
the
order
of
detention.
In
Saraswati Seshagiri v. State of Kerala , a
case arising under COFEPOSA, a single
act, viz., attempt to export a huge amount
of Indian currency was held sufficient. In
short, the principle appears to be this:
Though ordinarily one act may not be
held sufficient to sustain an order of
detention, one act may sustain an order of
detention if the act is of such a nature as
to indicate that it is an organised act or a
manifestation of organised activity. The
gravity and nature of the act is also
relevant. The test is whether the act is
such that it gives rise to an inference that
the person would continue to indulge in
similar prejudicial activity. That is the
reason why single acts of wagon-
breaking, theft of signal material, theft of
telegraph copper wires in huge quantity
and removal of railway fish- plates were
held sufficient. Similarly, where the
person tried to export huge amount of
Indian currency to a foreign country in a
planned and premeditated manner, it was
held that such single act warrants an
inference that he will repeat his activity in
future and, therefore, his detention is
necessary to prevent him from indulging
in such prejudicial activity. If one looks at
the acts the COFEPOSA is designed to
prevent, they are all either acts of
smuggling
or
of
foreign
exchange
manipulation. These acts are indulged in
by persons, who act in concert with other
persons and quite often such activity has
international ramifications. These acts are
preceded by a good amount of planning
and organisation. They are not like
ordinary law and order crimes. If,
however, in any given case a single act is
found to be not sufficient to sustain the
order of detention that may well be
quashed but it cannot be stated as a
principle that one single act cannot
constitute the basis for detention. On the
contrary, it does. In other words, it is not
necessary that there should be multiplicity
of grounds for making or sustaining an
order of detention.

(Emphasis Supplied)

9. In Surya Prakash Sharma v.
State of U.P and others : 1994 (Supp.)
(3) SCC 195, the petitioner was already in
jail in connection with a murder case. The
petitioner had no criminal history though
there was a solitary case of broad day
light murder registered against him. The
argument raised before the apex court was
that on the basis of that solitary case
against the detenu, there could be no
apprehension in the mind of the detaining
authority that the detenu on being released
would indulge in any such activity that
would be prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order. The apex court found that
there was no cogent material placed
before the court or before the detaining
authority to enable an inference that the
1132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
detenu on being released on bail would
indulge in such offence that would be a
threat to public order. The apex court,
accordingly,
quashed
the
order
of
detention and, while doing so, in
paragraphs 5 and 6, as reported, observed
as follows:

"5.The question as to whether
and in what circumstances an order for
preventive detention can be passed
against a person who is already in custody
has had been engaging the attention of
this Court since it first came up for
consideration before a Constitution Bench
in
Rameshwar
Shaw
v.
District
Magistrate, Burdwan, [1964] 4 SCR 921.
To eschew prolixity we refrain from
detailing all those cases except that of
Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v.
Union of India, AIR (1990) SC 1196
wherein a three Judge Bench, after
considering
all
the
earlier
relevant
decisions including Rameshwar Shaw
(supra) answered the question in the
following words:

"The decisions referred to
above lead to the conclusion that an order
for detention can be validly passed against
a person in custody and for that purpose it
is necessary that the grounds of detention
must show that (i) the detaining authority
was aware of the fact that the detenu is
already in detention: and (ii) there were
compelling
reasons
justifying
such
detention despite the fact that the detenu
is already in detention. The expression
"compelling reasons" in the context of
making an order for detention of a person
already in custody implied that there must
be cogent material before the detaining
authority on the basis of which it may be
satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be
released from custody in the near future
and (b) taking into account the nature of
the antecedent activities of the detenu, it
is likely that after his release from
custody he would indulge in prejudicial
activities and it is necessary to detain him
in order to prevent him from engaging in
such activities."

6. When the above principles
are applied to the facts of the instant case,
there is no escape from the conclusion
that the impugned order cannot be
sustained.
Though
the
grounds
of
detention indicate the detaining authority's
awareness of the fact that the detenu was
in judicial custody at the time of making
the order of detention, the detaining
authority has not brought on record any
cogent material nor furnished any cogent
ground in support of the averment: made
in grounds of detention that if the
aforesaid Surya Prakash Sharma is
released on bail 'he may again indulge in
serious offences causing threat to public
order", (emphasis supplied), To put it
differently,
the
satisfaction
of
the
detaining authority that the detenu might
indulge in serious offences causing threat
to public order, solely on the basis of a
solitary murder, cannot be said to be
proper and justified."

10. In Yogendra Murari v. State of
U.P. and others : (1988) 4 SCC 559, the
apex court had the occasion to deal with a
submission whether the detention order
could be considered discriminatory on the
ground of non-detention of co-accused in
the same incident. Rejecting the claim of
discrimination, raised on behalf of the
petitioner, in paragraph 9 of the judgment,
the apex court observed as follows:-

"9. There is no merit whatsoever
in
the
petitioners
grievance
of
discrimination on the ground that the
other co- accused persons have not been
2 All. Jai Pal Vs Union of India & Ors.
1133
detained. The role of the petitioner and
that of the others are not identical and the
reasonable apprehension as to their future
conduct must depend on the relevant
facts, and circumstances which differ
from individual to individual. It would
have been wrong on the part of the
detaining authority to take a uniform
decision in this regard only on the ground
that the persons concerned are all joined
together as accused in a criminal case."

11. From the decisions noticed
above, what is clear is that though
ordinarily a solitary act may not be
sufficient to sustain an order of preventive
detention but where that act is of such a
nature that it is reflective of, or has
manifestation of, an organized criminal
activity, or is so grave that it reflects the
propensity of that person to repeat such an
act, then even a solitary act could well be
made basis for passing an order of
preventive detention.

12. In the instant case, we find that
the incident reflected a mob activity
triggered by a road accident in which a
person had died. In this mob action
hundreds of persons had participated but
no one died. It is not the case in the
grounds of detention that the petitioners
had with a view to embarrass the
administration planned or organized the
mob action. The grounds though reflect
petitioners' participation in the mob but do
not indicate that the mob was organized
by the petitioners or that there was
anything distinguishable done by the
petitioners in that mob action than what
was done by other participants. When a
mob reacts, the action is triggered by
sudden surge of emotions which become
uncontrollable. Largely, mob actions are
unorganized and therefore by mere
participation in a mob the propensity of
its participant that he would repeat such
act cannot ordinarily be inferred. Had it
been a case in the grounds of detention
that the petitioners had organized the mob
action with a view to disrupt public order
or had committed some such act which
distinguishes their case from the rest and
is suggestive of their mental make up or
propensity to repeat such act, things
would have been different. But here the
petitioners were mere participants who,
by chance, were identified along with
twenty to thirty more persons though
hundreds of persons had participated.
Moreover, it is not a case of communal
violence. Communal violence stand on a
different footing inasmuch as it reflects
upon the mental predisposition of its
participant. Thus, looking to the facts of
the case as also that the petitioners have
no previous criminal history, we are of the
considered view that there is no cogent
material on the basis of which, based on a
solitary incident of the nature cited in the
grounds of detention, satisfaction could be
drawn that the petitioners on being
released on bail would indulge in activity
that
would
be
prejudicial
to
the
maintenance of public order. As it is well
settled that to preventively detain a
person, who is already in judicial custody,
satisfaction, amongst others, is also to be
recorded on the basis of cogent material
that the detenu on being released on bail
is likely to indulge in activity prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order, in
absence of existence of such material, the
preventive detention of the petitioners is
not justified and is liable to be set aside.

13. Consequently, all the three
habeas corpus petitions are allowed. The
detention orders, dated 16th April, 2019,
passed by District Magistrate, Etah
1134 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
against the aforesaid three petitioners are
hereby quashed. The petitioners shall be
set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in
any other case. There is no order as to
costs.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 1134

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.09.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Rent Control No. 123 of 2004

Lalji Keshwarwani ...Petitioner
Versus
IV Addl. Distt. Judge, Pratapgarh & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri G.C. Sinha, Sri A.K. Pandey Bistaul, Sri
Ashok Kumar Dwivedi, Sri Atul Kumar
Dwivedi, Sri Manish Kumar, Sri S.A. Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Niranjan Singh

A. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972-
Notice under section 106 of Transfer of
Properties Act-Section 21(1)A. of U.P. Urban
Buildings Act, 1972- application for release
of the disputed shop - 'The Tenant cannot
suggest to the landlord to run his business
from some other place'. (Para 3 &18)

The landlord offered to the tenant that after
construction of the shop, he will be provided one
shop to run his business of dentist and the
tenant refused the same and suggested to the
landlord to run his business at some other place,
which was accepted by the appellate Court.

Held:- The tenant cannot dictate to the landlord
as to how the property belonging to the landlord
should be utilized by him for the purpose of his
business. It was further recorded that the
landlord is doing business from various other
premises cannot for close his right to seek
eviction from the tenanted premises so long as
he intends to use the tenanted premises for his
own business - 'The tenant cannot suggest to
the landlord to run his business from some other
place'. (Para 16 ,17,18)

Writ petition allowed (E-7)

List of Cases Cited: -

1. Anil Bajaj & anr. Vs Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610

2. Radhey Shayam Agarwal Vs Addl. Distt. and
Sessions Judge Court No.13 Lko. Anr. 2006
(24) LCD 1141

3. Zareena Haider & anr. Vs Special Judge E.C.
Act/ADJ, LKO. & anr. 2013 (31) LCD 2396

4. Dr. Iqbal Ahmad Vs 2nd Additional Distt.
Judge, Ballia & anr. 2005 (23) LCD 221

5. Krishna Kumar Rastogi Vs Sumitra Devi
(2014) 9 SCC 309

6. B.C. Bhutada Vs G.R. Mundada and Salim Khan Vs
IVth Addl. Distt. Judge Jhansi (2006) 1 ARC 588

7.
Badrinarayan
Chunilal
Bhutada
Vs
Gonindram Ramgopal Mundad AIR 2003 SC
2713 (2003) 2 SCC 320
(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

1) Heard Sri Manish Kumar, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Atul Kumar
Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner
and to the learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel on behalf of State respondent.

2) In spite of service of notice, no
one has appeared on behalf of respondent
Nos.2 and 3.

3) Factual matrix of the case is that
the petitioner purchased a portion of the