# Jai Prakash Verma v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 1359
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-29
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 235 of 2004
- **Bench:** Amitabh Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jai-prakash-verma-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54034
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

1 All. Jai Prakash Verma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1359

10. Upon applicability of the aforesaid judgement in the present case and considering the facts
and circumstances of this case, it is quite evident that re-fixation of pay scale, therefore, is clearly
against verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Singh (supra) not to
mention the Government order dated 16.1.2007.

11. The aforesaid aspect has also been considered in the case of Sushil Kumar Singhal
(supra) in the following manner:-

"7. Upon perusal of the aforestated G.O. and the submission made by the learned counsel
appearing for the Appellant, it is not in dispute that the Appellant had retired on 31st December, 2003 and at
the time of his retirement his salary was Rs. 11,625/- and on the basis of the said salary his pension had been
fixed as Rs. 9000/-. Admittedly, if any mistake had been committed in pay fixation, the mistake had been
committed in 1986, i.e. much prior to the retirement of the appellant and therefore, by virtue of the
aforestated G.O. dated 16th January, 2007, neither any salary paid by mistake to the Appellant could have
been recovered nor pension of the Appellant could have been reduced. "

"11. The submission made on behalf of the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent that the
Appellant would be getting more amount than what he was entitled to cannot be accepted in view of the
policy laid down by the Government in G.O. dated 16th January, 2007. If the Government feels that mistakes
are committed very often, it would be open to the Government to change its policy but as far as the G.O.
dated 16th January, 2007 is in force, the Respondent-employer could not have passed any order for
recovery of the excess salary paid to the Appellant or for reducing pension of the Appellant. "

12. Considering aforesaid pronouncements, it is evident that the impugned orders are clearly against
the dictum enunciated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments. In view thereof, the
impugned order(s) is/are hereby quashed by issuance of writ in the nature of Certiorari. Further a writ in
the nature of Mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to determine pension and pensionary
benefits admissible to petitioner on the basis of the last pay drawn. Any recovery made from petitioner
shall be refunded within six weeks from the date certified copy of this order.

13. Resultantly, the petition succeeds and is allowed.
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(2026) 1 ILRA 1359
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AMITABH KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ A No. 235 of 2004

Jai Prakash Verma ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
1360 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(i) Whether the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the punishment of removal from service were vitiated
for non-compliance of Rule 55 of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and
principles of natural justice;
(ii) Whether the punishment order could be sustained where no oral enquiry was conducted and the
disciplinary authority differed from the enquiry report without affording opportunity of hearing.

Headnotes
Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Major penalty - Non-holding of oral enquiry -
Violation of Rule 55 of 1930 Rules:

Held: In disciplinary proceedings involving major penalty, compliance with Rule 55 of the U.P. Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 is mandatory - Even where the delinquent does not
specifically demand oral enquiry, it is incumbent upon the Enquiry Officer to fix a date and conduct enquiry by
examining oral and documentary evidence in support of charges - Where no oral evidence was recorded and
the enquiry was concluded merely on the basis of reply to charge-sheet, the proceedings stand vitiated -
Such enquiry is non-est in the eyes of law. [Paras 17-18, 23]

Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Proof of charges - Requirement of evidence:

Held: Mere production of documents is not sufficient and contents thereof must be proved by examining
witnesses - Even in ex parte enquiry, the Enquiry Officer is required to assess whether the evidence adduced
is sufficient to prove the charges - In absence of any oral evidence, findings of guilt cannot be sustained.
[Paras 19-21]

Service Law - Disciplinary authority - Disagreement with enquiry report - Opportunity of
hearing:

Held: Where the disciplinary authority differs from the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it is mandatory to record
reasons for disagreement and to furnish the delinquent employee with an opportunity to represent against
such tentative conclusions - Failure to do so vitiates the punishment order - The order of removal passed
without such opportunity is illegal. [Paras 24-26]

Service Law - Punishment - Removal from service - Validity:

Held: The punishment order dated 02.08.1995 passed in violation of principles of natural justice and statutory
rules was liable to be quashed - Consequently, the order rejecting representation for re-employment also
could not survive. [Paras 27-28]

Service Law - Relief - Back wages - Continuity of service - Acquittal on benefit of doubt:

Held: Considering that acquittal in criminal case was on benefit of doubt and the petitioner challenged the
removal belatedly, arrears of salary were restricted to 25% and confined from the date of filing of writ petition
- The petitioner was entitled to continuity of service and consequential benefits including pensionary
benefits. [Paras 29-30]
Writ petition allowed. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 - relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 - relied on; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat, (2013)
4 SCC 301 - relied on; Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 - relied on;
Lav Nigam v. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd., (2006) 9 SCC 440 - relied on.

List of Acts / Statutes
1 All. Jai Prakash Verma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1361
U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (Rule 55); Public Servants Inquiries Act,
1850; Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section 409).

List of Keywords
Disciplinary proceedings; Oral enquiry; Natural justice; Rule 55; Major penalty; Proof of charges;
Disagreement with enquiry report; Removal from service; Back wages; Continuity of service.

Case Arising From
Punishment order dated 02.08.1995 removing the petitioner from service as Collection Amin and order dated
27.11.2003 passed by District Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri rejecting representation for re-employment.

Appearance for Parties
For the Petitioner: Sri Mohammad Ali, Sri Avinash Chaturvedi, Ms. Mansi Singh, Sri Mohan Singh,
Sri Rahul Singh, Sri Ravindra Singh, Sri Saket Gupta, Sri Vishal Singh
For the Respondents: Learned C.S.C.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Amitabh Kumar Rai, J.)

1. Heard Sri Rahul Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri Nitin Mathur, learned
Additional Standing Counsel for the State-respondent.

2. The instant writ petition has been filed seeking quashing of the punishment order of
removal from service dated 02.08.1995 from the post of Collection Amin, as well as the order dated
27.11.2003 passed by the District Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri, whereby the representations of the
petitioner dated 20.03.2002 and 18.03.2003 seeking re-employment in service were rejected.

3. The brief facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are that the petitioner was initially appointed
to the post of Collection Amin in the year 1988 in Tehsil Dhauraha, District Lakhimpur Kheri. The
petitioner was charge-sheeted and placed under suspension vide order dated 19.01.1994 on three
charges; firstly, that during the period from 01.11.1993 to 31.12.1993, he made a recovery of only
Rs.1,328/- against the outstanding main dues of Rs.46,436/- and a recovery of only Rs.495/- against
miscellaneous dues amounting to Rs.2,45,565/-, which was much below the prescribed norms;
secondly, that he failed to prepare the list of defaulters in respect of development tax dues
amounting to Rs.6,446/- in his assigned area along with the statement of outstanding amounts; and
thirdly, that he did not remain present on the fixed dates for filing of returns. In the meantime,
criminal proceedings were also initiated against the petitioner and he was arrested by the police on
01.02.1994 and was later released on bail in April 1994.

4. The charge-sheet dated 19.01.1994 was served upon the petitioner on 01.02.1994.
Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his reply to the charges vide letter dated 09.04.1994 and also
filed Writ Petition No. 1941 (S/S) of 1994 challenging the order of suspension. The said writ
petition was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 26.04.1994, whereby a timeline was fixed
for completion of the disciplinary proceedings, failing which it was directed that the suspension
order would stand revoked. The petitioner served a copy of the order dated 26.04.1994 passed in
the aforesaid writ petition upon the authorities vide letter dated 06.05.1994.
1362 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

5. The Enquiry Officer, thereafter, on the basis of the reply submitted by the petitioner to the
charges, submitted an enquiry report dated 20.09.1994. In the meantime, an additional charge-sheet
dated 27.05.1994, containing four additional charges, was also issued to the petitioner and was
served upon him by the District Magistrate, Kheri. Charge nos. 4 and 5 pertained to allegations of
misappropriation of amounts of Rs. 4,181/- and Rs. 1,360/- respectively; Charge no. 6 related to
delay on the part of the petitioner in depositing an amount of Rs. 45/- in the Sub-Treasury; and
Charge no. 7 alleged that during the period of his suspension, the petitioner failed to hand over the
documents in his possession to any other officer or employee, as a result whereof the department
faced difficulty in effecting recovery of the said amounts from the concerned persons. In support of
the aforesaid charges, reliance was placed upon the report of the Naib Tahsildar, Firozabad dated
06.05.1994 and the report of the Tahsildar, Dhauraha dated 17.05.1994 along with the related
records, and the petitioner was directed to submit his written reply to the said charges on or before
08.06.1994.

6. In relation to the aforesaid additional charges, the petitioner submitted an application before
the District Magistrate, Kheri dated 06.06.1994, stating therein that he had not been supplied with
the report of the Naib Tahsildar, Firozabad dated 06.05.1994, the report of the Tahsildar, Dhauraha
dated 17.05.1994, or the related records, on the basis of which the allegations had been levelled
against him in the charge-sheet served upon him, and he accordingly requested that the said
documents be furnished to him so as to enable him to submit an appropriate and effective reply to
the charges.

7. The petitioner did not receive any reply from the District Magistrate, Kheri on the abovemade application and proceeded to file his reply to the additional charge-sheet on 24.06.1994,
wherein he submitted that the total amount of Rs. 5,541/- alleged to have been misappropriated
under Charge nos. 4 and 5 had already been deposited by him on 16.04.1994 through different
vouchers in compliance with the order dated 05.04.1994 passed by the learned District Judge on his
bail application; with respect to Charge no. 6, it was stated that the collection charges amounting to
Rs. 735/-, which were required to be deposited on 10.12.1993, were in fact deposited on
21.12.1993, the delay having occurred due to his sudden illness; and as regards Charge no. 7
relating to non-deposit of his documents in the Tehsil, the petitioner explained that he was arrested
on 01.02.1994 and remanded to judicial custody on 02.02.1994, while the suspension order was
served upon him only on 01.02.1994, that he remained in jail for about two months, and that he
received the order of the Tehsildar only on 17.05.1994 directing him to hand over charge to Shri
Ravindra Kumar, who had been appointed in his place, pursuant to which Shri Ravindra Kumar
met him on 20.05.1994 and the charge was duly handed over; it was specifically asserted that the
delay in handing over charge was neither deliberate nor willful but occurred due to the aforesaid
circumstances.

8. Oblivious to the petitioner's reply dated 24.06.1994, the Enquiry Officer proceeded to
conclude the enquiry ex parte and submitted an enquiry report dated 26.09.1994, concluding that all
seven charges against the petitioner, contained in the two charge sheets dated 19.01.1994 and
27.05.1994, stood proved. The enquiry report dated 26.09.1994 was forwarded to the District
Magistrate by the Enquiry Officer (Sub-Divisional Magistrate), who, taking note of the reply dated
24.06.1994 to the additional charge-sheet passed order dated 08.10.1994, remitting the enquiry
1 All. Jai Prakash Verma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1363
back to the Enquiry Officer for submission of fresh enquiry report after taking into consideration
the reply submitted by the petitioner.

9. In the meantime, as per the directions of the Hon'ble High Court in Writ Petition No. 1941
(S/S) of 1994; the District Magistrate passed an order dated 22.05.1995 revoking the suspension
and reinstating the petitioner in the services as the enquiry could not be completed within the time
framed fixed by the Court. It was also mentioned in the said order that as additional charge-sheet
was also issued against the petitioner containing serious charges, hence enquiry proceedings would
continue against him.

10. Subsequently, the petitioner was served with a fresh enquiry report dated 05.05.1995
submitted by the Enquiry Officer, wherein Charge Nos. 1 and 3 to 7 were held to be partly proved
against the petitioner, while Charge No. 2 was found not proved. The said findings were forwarded
to the District Magistrate for consideration. The District Magistrate did not concur with the findings
of the Enquiry Officer insofar as Charge Nos. 1 and 3 to 7 were concerned, though he concurred
with the finding that Charge No. 2 was not proved. Accordingly, a show-cause notice dated
09.06.1995 was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to explain as to why his services should
not be terminated and requiring him to submit his reply within 14 days from the date of receipt of
the notice. No reply to the show cause notice was submitted by the petitioner, though it was
received by the petitioner on 13.06.1995. Thereafter, the District Magistrate passed punishment
order of removal dated 02.08.1995 terminating the service of the petitioner.

11. It is also noteworthy that the petitioner did not immediately challenge the order of
removal, as a criminal case relating to the charges of embezzlement/misappropriation of
government funds had also been instituted against him. In the said criminal case, the petitioner was
arrested on 01.02.1994 and was granted bail in April, 1994. Ultimately, the petitioner was acquitted
in Criminal Case No. 1803 of 2000 under Section 409 IPC vide judgment and order dated
02.03.2002, granting him the benefit of doubt. After his acquittal, the petitioner submitted
representations dated 20.03.2002 and 18.10.2003 seeking re-employment.

12. The representations dated 20.03.2002 and 18.10.2003 were rejected by the District
Magistrate, Kheri, vide order dated 27.11.2003. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present
writ petition challenging both the order of rejection dated 27.11.2003 and the removal order dated
02.08.1995.

13. The petitioner had not challenged the punishment order of removal dated 02.08.1995
immediately, but waited for acquittal in the criminal case and thereafter sought re-employment on
the basis of acquittal, which was rejected vide order dated 27.11.2003. The petitioner was also not
honorably exonerated in the criminal trial; rather, the benefit of doubt was given, as the charges
could not be proved against him.

14. A bare perusal of the enquiry report dated 05.05.1995 reveals that the entire disciplinary
proceeding was conducted in utter violation of the statutory provisions contained in the U.P. Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules,
1930"). The enquiry report was prepared solely on the basis of the reply of the petitioner to the
1364 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
charges and no personal hearing was granted to the petitioner by fixing any date, time or place for
such hearing.

15. The procedure laid down in Rule 55 of the Rules, 1930 has to be followed before any order
of punishment inflicting dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank is passed. It also provides for
holding an oral enquiry. Rule 55 of the Rules, 1930 is reproduced hereinbelow:

55. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act. 1850, no
order (other than an order based on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal court or by
a Court Martial) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower
post or, time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale but exclude the reversion to a lower post of a
person who is officiating in a higher post) shall be passed on a person who is member of a Civil
Service or holds a civil post under the State unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds
on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending
himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of definite
charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be so clear
and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and
circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time to put in a written
statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if
the autho-rity concerned so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the
allegations as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring
officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to
give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer
conducting the enquiry may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a
witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the
findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the enquiry may also separately from
these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the
charged Government servant.

(2) Where the punishing authority itself inquiries into any charge or appoints an
inquiring officer for holding an enquiry into such charge, the punishing authority, if it considers it
necessary to do so, may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be
known as 'Pre-senting Officer' to present the case on its behalf in support of the charge.

(3) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Gov-ernment servant to
present the case on his behalf, but not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the
presenting officer appointed by the punishing authority is a legal practitioner or the punishing
authority having regard to the circumstance of the case, so permits.

(4) This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is
for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule
may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, be waived, where there is difficulty in
observing exactly the requirements of the rule and those requirements can in the opinion of the
inquiring officer be waived without injustice to person charged.

(5) This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of
either temporary Government servant or of a probationer whether during or at the end of the
period of probation, In such cases a simple notice of termination, which in the case of a temporary
Government servant, must conform to the conditions of his service, will be sufficient.
1 All. Jai Prakash Verma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1365

16. It is made clear that Rule 55 of the Rules, 1930 has been made applicable to the members
of the subordinate services vide Rule 1-A(5), vide Notification No. 2627/11-264 dated 08.08.1932,
issued under Rule 54 of the Rules, 1930.

17. The requirement under Rule 55 of the Rules, 1930 for an oral enquiry is that if the
delinquent employee so desires, or if the concerned authority so directs, an oral enquiry shall be
held in respect of such allegations as are not admitted.

18. In the instant case, the charge-sheet dated 19.01.1994 specifically posed a question to the
petitioner as to whether he required any oral enquiry and examination/cross-examination of any
witness, and if so, the same was to be informed through his reply to the charge-sheet. The
additional charge-sheet dated 20.05.1994 also poses the same question. However, the reply to the
charge-sheet filed by the petitioner on 24.06.1994 does not reflect that the petitioner, at any stage,
requested an oral enquiry. It appears that the Enquiry Officer, in the absence of any such request by
the petitioner, proceeded with the departmental enquiry relying upon the reply submitted by the
petitioner to the charges. Such approach of the Enquiry Officer in helding the oral enquiry cannot
be appreciated. Even if the delinquent employee does not request for personal hearing the burden of
proving the charges normally being upon the department, the enquiry officer was under obligation
to fix a date for such enquiry, with information to the delinquent and to conduct enquiry wherein he
was required to examine documentary as well as oral evidence, if any, in support of the charges.

19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments has held that the recording of
evidence in a disciplinary proceeding proposing charges of a major punishment is mandatory.
Reference in this regard may be held to Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank9 and
Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat : (2013) 4 SCC 301.

20. In the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that mere
production of documents is not enough, contents of documentary evidence have to be proved by
examining witnesses. Relevant extract thereof reads as under :-

"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry
officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must
be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into
consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected
during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be
treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said
documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the
contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not
have been treated as evidence.

15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has
been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the
police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured
in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have
been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in
stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect
1366 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to
find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was
committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.

........

19. The judgment and decree passed against the respondent in Narinder Mohan Arya
case [(2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840] had attained finality. In the said suit, the enquiry
report in the disciplinary proceeding was considered, the same was held to have been based on no
evidence. The appellant therein in the aforementioned situation filed a writ petition questioning the
validity of the disciplinary proceeding, the same was dismissed. This Court held that when a
crucial finding like forgery was arrived at on evidence which is non est in the eye of the law, the
civil court would have jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. This Court emphasised that a finding
can be arrived at by the enquiry officer if there is some evidence on record. ..."

21. Same view was reiterated in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha : (2010) 2
SCC 772 wherein, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even in an ex-parte inquiry, it is the duty
of the Inquiry Officer to examine the evidence presented by the Department to find out whether the
unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. The relevant observations
made in Saroj Kumar Sinha (Supra) are as follows :-

"28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an
independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary
authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even
in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to
hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been
observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and
could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved
against the respondents.

.....

33. As noticed earlier in the present case not only the respondent has been denied access
to documents sought to be relied upon against him, but he has been condemned unheard as the
inquiry officer failed to fix any date for conduct of the enquiry. In other words, not a single witness
has been examined in support of the charges levelled against the respondent. The High Court,
therefore, has rightly observed that the entire proceedings are vitiated having been conducted in
complete violation of the principles of natural justice and total disregard of fair play. The
respondent never had any opportunity at any stage of the proceedings to offer an explanation
against the allegations made in the charge-sheet."

22. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala (Supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that evidence
recorded in a preliminary inquiry cannot be used for a regular inquiry as the delinquent is not
associated with it and the opportunity to cross-examine persons examined in preliminary inquiry is
not given. Relevant extract thereof reads as under :-
1 All. Jai Prakash Verma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1367

"42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway
[AIR 1960 SC 992], held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a
particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie,
to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings
recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take
a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be
held.

43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1854] a
Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view held that preliminary inquiry should
not be confused with regular inquiry. The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex parte, for it is
merely for the satisfaction of the Government though usually for the sake of fairness, an
explanation may be sought from the government servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage,
he has no right to be heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government as to
whether a regular inquiry must be held. The Court further held as under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12)

"12. ... There must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only
when the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the
government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the
government servant is entitled to the protection of that article [, nor prior to that]."

44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [(1997) 1 SCC 299 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 152 : AIR 1997 SC 2148] this Court dealt with the issue and held as under:
"..... a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of chargesheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated
against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses
its importance and, whether preliminary enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by
observing principles of natural justice of (sic) nor, remains of no consequence."

45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry
cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to
cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be
violative of the principles of natural justice.

23. In view of the above principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court
holds that the enquiry proceedings conducted against the petitioner pertains to charges punishable
with major penalty, stood vitiated and non-est in the eyes of law as no oral evidence was recorded
by the Enquiry Officer in support of the charges.

24. The Enquiry Officer, in his enquiry report dated 05.05.1995, has held the second charge
not proved, whereas charges Nos.1 and 3 to 7 were partially proved. However, the disciplinary
authority, while passing the order of punishment dated 02.08.1995, held charges Nos. 4 to 7 fully
proved.

25. Thus, the disciplinary authority differed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer but did
not give any opportunity to the petitioner by stating reasons for such disagreement, so as to enable
the petitioner/delinquent employee to counter the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority
before the passing of the punishment order.
1368 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the cases of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari
Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 and Lav Nigam v. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd., (2006) 9 SCC 440, has
held that in the event of a different view taken by the disciplinary authority, than that of Enquiry
officer, then in such situations, the disciplinary authority is bound to give a notice stating its
tentative conclusions to the delinquent officer so that he may have an opportunity to represent
against such findings and persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusions
of the Enquiry Officer.

27. This Court is of the view that such an approach adopted by the disciplinary
authority/District Magistrate in passing the punishment order dated 02.08.1995, by recording
disagreement with the finding of the Enquiry Officer but not putting the delinquent employee on
notice sating its tentative conclusion is patently illegal in view of the judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court cited hereinabove. Consequently, the punishment order dated 02.08.1995, whereby
the petitioner was inflicted with the punishment of removal, is liable to be set aside and is
accordingly quashed. Normally, for such procedural defect in disciplinary proceeding, the matter is
remitted back to the disciplinary authority for holding fresh proceedings from the stage the defect
has crept in. However, in the instant case, the allegations relates to the year 1993-1994 and hence, it
would be not viable to remit the matter back for holding fresh enquiry after more than 30 years and
as such the matter is not being remitted back for holding fresh enquiry.

28. Since this Court has already quashed the removal order dated 02.08.1995, the order dated
27.11.2023 rejecting the petitioner's representation for re-engagement loses its significance.

29. Keeping in view the fact that the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal trial vide
judgment and order dated 02.03.2002 in Case Crime No. 32 of 1994 under Section 409 I.P.C.,
Police Station Dhorhara, District Kheri, in Criminal Case No.1803 of 2000, was on the basis of
benefit of doubt, it would be proper that the petitioner be allowed arrears of salary to the extent of
25 percent of salary admissible to him. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner did not
challenge the punishment order dated 02.08.1995 till his exoneration in the criminal trial, which
concluded on 02.03.2002, and thereafter challenged the punishment order by filing a writ petition
in January, 2004, this Court is of the view that the relief to the petitioner, as a consequence of the
quashing of the punishment order dated 02.08.1995, should be confined to arrears of salary from
January, 2004, when he challenged the removal order for the first time by filing the writ petition,
and not for the earlier period, i.e., from 02.08.1995 till December, 2003.

30. The services of the petitioner shall be treated as continuous, and his entire period from the
date of removal till the date of reinstatement shall be treated as qualifying service for pensionary
and other benefits. He shall be entitled to all other service benefits, including pay increments, as
admissible under the government orders issued from time to time. In case the petitioner has already
attained the age of superannuation, he shall be allowed pension along with arrears of salary by
treating him to be in continuous service from the date of removal till the date of superannuation.
The arrears of salary will be admissible in the manner as indicated in the preceding paragraph.

31. The petitioner shall be granted all the benefits as directed above within a period of three
months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.
1 All. Kuldeep Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1369

32. The writ petition stands allowed.

33. No order as to costs.

34. Before parting with, I acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Piyush Sinha, Research
Associate, who assisted the Court in research relating to the present case.
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(2026) 1 ILRA 1369
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Writ A No. 15313 of 2025

Kuldeep Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Whether the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment, rejected in the year 2010, could be
entertained in a writ petition filed after about 15 years, in absence of satisfactory explanation for delay and on
the plea of parity with similarly situated persons.

Headnotes
Service Law - Compassionate appointment - Delay and laches - Inordinate delay - Discretion
under Article 226:

Held: The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and equitable and a litigant must
approach the Court with reasonable promptitude - Where the cause of action arose in the year 2010 and the
writ petition was filed in 2025 after an unexplained delay of about 15 years, the petitioner was guilty of delay
and laches - Such inordinate delay disentitles the petitioner from any relief - The plea of continuing cause of
action is misconceived once the order has attained finality. [Para 8]
Service Law - Compassionate appointment - Object - Delay - Effect:
Held: The object of compassionate appointment is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of
the deceased employee - Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the death of the employee and the
family has survived, the very basis for grant of compassionate appointment ceases to exist - Delay in
approaching the Court militates against such claim. [Paras 9-10]

Service Law - Compassionate appointment - No vested right - Scheme based appointment:
Held: Compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of equality in public employment and
can be claimed only in accordance with the applicable scheme or rules - There is no vested right to claim
such appointment and the claim must fall strictly within the scheme - A minor at the time of death of the
employee does not acquire a right to seek appointment upon attaining majority unless permitted by the
scheme. [Para 10]

Service Law - Public employment - Article 14 - Exception - Delay: