# Jakson Engineers Ltd v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 915
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-11
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 29625 of 2025
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Kunal Ravi Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jakson-engineers-ltd-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54807
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Anjali Upadhyay,C.S.C., Shivam Yadav

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the letter dated 10.07.2025 demanding
default amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/-
was legally justified in view of the fact that the
respondent no.2 had accepted one time lease
rent payment without demur; whether the
action of respondent no.2 was in accordance
with the principles of natural justice; and
whether the issuance of the letter dated
10.07.2025 was in violation of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of
legitimate expectation in light of issuance of "No
Objection Certificates" dated 27.07.2010 and
31.07.2020.

HEADNOTE
Constitution of India, Article 14, Article 226 -
Writ petition challenging letter dated 10.07.2025
demanding default amount of lease rent of
Rs.2,08,40,858/- Lease deed dated 06.01.2006
executed between petitioner and respondent
no.2 - Annual lease rent fixed at Rs.13,50,360/-
Policy permitting deposit of one time lease rent
equivalent to 11 instalments - One time lease
rent
of
Rs.1,48,53,960/-
deposited
on
08.01.2007 and accepted without demur - "No
Objection Certificates" issued on 27.07.2010 and
31.07.2020 stating that no premium or lease
rent is pending - Permission to mortgage issued
on 14.02.2024 - No show cause notice or
default notice issued from year 2007 to 2025 -
Impugned letter issued without quantification of
principal or rate of interest - Authority having
accepted one time lease rent and issued No
Objection Certificates estopped from raising
fresh demand after 18 years - Principle of
waiver applicable - Violation of principles of
natural
justice
-
Doctrine
of
legitimate
expectation and doctrine of promissory estoppel
attracted - Action arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 - Impugned letter quashed - Direction
to process applications for permission to
mortgage - Writ petition allowed. (E-5)
HELD:
Respondent no.2 having accepted the one time
lease rent without any demur and thereafter
having issued "No Objection Certificates" on
27.07.2010 and 31.07.2020 and permission to
mortgage on 14.02.2024, clearly acknowledged
that no amount of premium or lease rent remained
due. No objection or demand was raised in the
intervening period from the year 2007 to 2025.
Impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 was issued
without issuing any show cause or default notice
and without quantification of principal or rate of
interest. Action of the respondent no.2 held to be
arbitrary, unjust, against the principles of natural
justice, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India and hit by the doctrine of legitimate
expectation as well as doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Impugned letter dated 10.07.2025
quashed. No amount of lease rent was due from
the petitioner. Respondent nos.2 and 3 directed to
process the applications for permission to
mortgage dated 08.10.2024 and 02.01.2025 within
six weeks. Writ petition allowed. (Paras 14-27)

CASE LAW CITED
State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, 1967 SCC
OnLine SC 15;
916 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ITC Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, (2011) 7
SCC 483;
Sivanandan C.T. and others v. High Court of
Kerala and others, (2024) 3 SCC 799;
Union of India v. Hindustan Development
Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988;
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409.

List of Acts
Constitution of India

List of Keyword
Lease rent - One time lease rent - No
Objection Certificate - Demand letter - Waiver
- Principles of natural justice - Doctrine of
legitimate expectation - Doctrine of promissory
estoppel - Article 14 - Arbitrary action -
Permission to mortgage.

CASE ARISING FROM
Letter dated 10.07.2025 issued by Greater Noida
Industrial Development Authority demanding
default amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/-
.

Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Shashi Nandan, Senior
Advocate; Ankit Prakash
Advs For Respondents: Devesh Vikram, Addl.
Chief Standing Counsel; M.C. Chaturvedi, Senior
Advocate; Shivam Yadav

## Text

11 All. Jakson Engineers Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
915

8.3. The competent civil court, if and
when approached by the petitioners, shall
decide the application on its own merits in
accordance with law and without being
influenced by any observations made in
this order.

8.4. There shall be no order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 915
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE KUNAL RAVI SINGH, J.

Writ - C No. 29625 of 2025

Jakson Engineers Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Ankit Prakash

Counsel for the Respondents:
Anjali Upadhyay,C.S.C., Shivam Yadav

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the letter dated 10.07.2025 demanding
default amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/-
was legally justified in view of the fact that the
respondent no.2 had accepted one time lease
rent payment without demur; whether the
action of respondent no.2 was in accordance
with the principles of natural justice; and
whether the issuance of the letter dated
10.07.2025 was in violation of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of
legitimate expectation in light of issuance of "No
Objection Certificates" dated 27.07.2010 and
31.07.2020.

HEADNOTE
Constitution of India, Article 14, Article 226 -
Writ petition challenging letter dated 10.07.2025
demanding default amount of lease rent of
Rs.2,08,40,858/- Lease deed dated 06.01.2006
executed between petitioner and respondent
no.2 - Annual lease rent fixed at Rs.13,50,360/-
Policy permitting deposit of one time lease rent
equivalent to 11 instalments - One time lease
rent
of
Rs.1,48,53,960/-
deposited
on
08.01.2007 and accepted without demur - "No
Objection Certificates" issued on 27.07.2010 and
31.07.2020 stating that no premium or lease
rent is pending - Permission to mortgage issued
on 14.02.2024 - No show cause notice or
default notice issued from year 2007 to 2025 -
Impugned letter issued without quantification of
principal or rate of interest - Authority having
accepted one time lease rent and issued No
Objection Certificates estopped from raising
fresh demand after 18 years - Principle of
waiver applicable - Violation of principles of
natural
justice
-
Doctrine
of
legitimate
expectation and doctrine of promissory estoppel
attracted - Action arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 - Impugned letter quashed - Direction
to process applications for permission to
mortgage - Writ petition allowed. (E-5)
HELD:
Respondent no.2 having accepted the one time
lease rent without any demur and thereafter
having issued "No Objection Certificates" on
27.07.2010 and 31.07.2020 and permission to
mortgage on 14.02.2024, clearly acknowledged
that no amount of premium or lease rent remained
due. No objection or demand was raised in the
intervening period from the year 2007 to 2025.
Impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 was issued
without issuing any show cause or default notice
and without quantification of principal or rate of
interest. Action of the respondent no.2 held to be
arbitrary, unjust, against the principles of natural
justice, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India and hit by the doctrine of legitimate
expectation as well as doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Impugned letter dated 10.07.2025
quashed. No amount of lease rent was due from
the petitioner. Respondent nos.2 and 3 directed to
process the applications for permission to
mortgage dated 08.10.2024 and 02.01.2025 within
six weeks. Writ petition allowed. (Paras 14-27)

CASE LAW CITED
State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, 1967 SCC
OnLine SC 15;
916 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ITC Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, (2011) 7
SCC 483;
Sivanandan C.T. and others v. High Court of
Kerala and others, (2024) 3 SCC 799;
Union of India v. Hindustan Development
Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988;
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409.

List of Acts
Constitution of India

List of Keyword
Lease rent - One time lease rent - No
Objection Certificate - Demand letter - Waiver
- Principles of natural justice - Doctrine of
legitimate expectation - Doctrine of promissory
estoppel - Article 14 - Arbitrary action -
Permission to mortgage.

CASE ARISING FROM
Letter dated 10.07.2025 issued by Greater Noida
Industrial Development Authority demanding
default amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/-
.

Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Shashi Nandan, Senior
Advocate; Ankit Prakash
Advs For Respondents: Devesh Vikram, Addl.
Chief Standing Counsel; M.C. Chaturvedi, Senior
Advocate; Shivam Yadav

(Delivered by Hon'ble Kunal Ravi Singh, J.)

[1] Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ankit
Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner;
learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel Sri
Devesh Vikram for the State-respondent
and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior
Advocate assisted by Sri Shivam Yadav,
learned
counsel
for
Greater
Noida
Industrial Development Authority.

[2] The present petition has been filed
against
the
letter
dated
10.07.2025,
whereby the Greater Noida Industrial
Development
Authority
(hereinafter
referred to as GNIDA) i.e. respondent no.2
had demanded default amount of lease rent
as on 10.04.2025 at Rs.2,08,40,858/-.
Further prayer has been made to issue a
writ of mandamus directing the respondents
to issue permission to mortgage forthwith.

FACTS:-

[3] In brief, facts leading to the present
petition are that the petitioner i.e. M/s
Jakson Engineers Ltd., with an objection of
expanding its industrial operations, applied
for allotment of an industrial plot under the
Scheme floated by respondent no.2. In light
of the application, the petitioner was
allotted plot nos.25 & 26, Ecotech-III,
Udyog Kendra, Greater Noida. Thereafter,
consequent to the allotment, lease deed
dated 06.01.2006 was executed between the
petitioner
and
respondent
no.2
and
possession memo was also given to the
petitioner on 06.01.2006. The terms and
conditions of the lease deed required the
petitioner to pay an annual rent of lease of
Rs.13,50,360/- for the first ten years and
thereafter lease rent may be enhanced after
every ten years from the date of execution
of the lease deed by paying an amount not
exceeding 50% of the annual lease rent
payable at the time of such enhancement.
The annual lease rent was to be deposited
by 6th day of January every year. The lease
deed also provided that in the event of
default of payment of lease rent, interest @
17% per annum compounding every half
yearly would be chargeable for the delayed
period.

[4] Before the execution of the lease
deed on 06.01.2006, the respondent no.3 in
the year 2005, demanded an annual lease
rent of Rs.13,50,360/- by letter dated
22.12.2005 which was deposited by the
petitioner on 28.12.2005. Thereafter, the
respondent
no.2
further
demanded
11 All. Jakson Engineers Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
917
Rs.2,47,37,826/-
towards
one
time
premium of the leased plot. The said
amount was deposited by the petitioner in
its entirety on 07.12.2006. This payment
constituted 50% of the premium as the
balance 50% had already been paid by the
petitioner at the time of execution of the
lease deed. The petitioner, thereafter
towards payment of annual lease rent for
the year 2007, instead of depositing the
annual
lease
rent
of
Rs.13,50,360/-,
deposited one time lease rent equivalent to
11
instalments
i.e.
an
amount
of
Rs.1,48,53,960/- which was received by the
Authority on 08.01.2007. After deposit of
the one time lease rent equivalent to 11
instalments, the petitioner requested for
issuance of No Dues Certificate by
means
of
letter
dated
28.04.2009.
Thereafter, in pursuance of a letter dated
23.07.2010, the respondent no.3 by means
of letter dated 27.07.2010 intimated the
petitioner that no premium/lease rent is due
against the petitioner. Accordingly, on
27.07.2010, No Dues Certificate was issued
by the respondent no.2 in favour of the
petitioner.

[5]. In the year 2020, the petitioner
again requested for No Dues Certificate for
the leased plot from respondent no.2 vide
letter dated 04.07.2020 in order to seek
permission to mortgage from respondent
no.2.

[6]
In
light
of
the
online
application dated 04.07.2020 moved by the
petitioner, respondent no.2 issued a letter
on 31.07.2020 clearly stating that with
regard to the leased plot nos.25 & 26,
Ecotech-III, Udyog Kendra, Greater Noida,
no premium and lease rent is pending as
per
the
records
available
with
the
Authority.
Thereafter,
on
14.02.2024,
permission to mortgage was issued in
favour of the petitioner by respondent no.2.
The petitioner again applied for permission
to mortgage on 08.10.2024. However, no
reply was received by the petitioner. The
petitioner again on 02.01.2025, sent a letter
to the Chief Executive Officer, Greater
Noida for granting permission to mortgage
annexing all the relevant documents
including payment challans. By that time,
petitioner
was
verbally
informed
by
respondent no.2 that there are dues
amounting
to
Rs.2,00,52,000/-.
On
10.07.2025 respondent no.2 issued the
impugned letter to the petitioner stating that
there was a default amount of lease rent as
on
10.04.2025,
amounting
to
Rs.2,08,40,858/-. The said letter has been
challenged by the petitioner in the instant
petition with a further prayer of issuance of
mandamus to respondent no.2 for issuing
the permission to mortgage.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
PETITIONER:-

[7] Sri Shashi Nandan, learned
Senior Advocate argued that the lease deed
was executed on 06.01.2006 in favour of
the petitioner and prior to its execution,
lease rent for the year 2005-06 was
deposited on 28.12.2005 by the petitioner
for
an
amount
of
Rs.13,50,360/-.
Thereafter, when the lease rent became due
for the next year i.e. 2006-07, the
petitioner, instead of choosing to deposit
the annual lease rent, chose to deposit
eleven instalments as one time lease rent as
per the policy prevalent with the Authority.
The petitioner deposited Rs.1,48,53,960/-
(Rs.13,50,360/- x 11 times) as one time
lease rent on 08.01.2006.

[8] Learned Senior Advocate next
contended that even though, the deposit
was to be made on 6th day of January every
918 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
year, but actual one time lease rent was
deposited on 08.01.2007 as 6th January of
that year was Saturday and 7th January
being Sunday. Learned Senior Advocate
further submitted that in any case, if the
lease rent had become due, then interest @
17% compounded half year would be
applicable for the default period. He further
submits that in fact, the petitioner had paid
an extra instalment of lease rent, as the
lease rent for the year 2005-06 was
deposited on 28.12.2005 i.e. prior to the
execution of the lease deed in favour of the
petitioner. On the said basis, it was
contended that lease rent has been paid
completely by the petitioner and no lease
rent is now due from the petitioner. So far
as demand notice is concerned, it is
contended that there was neither any showcause nor any notice was issued to the
petitioner with regard to any default from
the year 2007 till the issuance of the
impugned letter. Therefore, the said letter is
against the principles of natural justice and
is liable to be quashed on this ground alone
apart from other grounds so raised.

[9]
Learned
Senior
Advocate
further submitted that even in the demand
notice, there is no calculation to show as to
how the said amount was calculated and the
petitioner cannot be put to such liability
without being informed the basis upon
which the calculation was made while as
per calculation of the petitioner, the entire
lease rent was already paid. Furthermore,
the respondent authority having issued no
objection certificate twice i.e. 27.07.2010
& 31.07.2020, which clearly stated that
there are no dues with regard to the
premium or lease rent, cannot be permitted
go back and say that there is a default of
lease rent as the same has never been raised
in the intervening period before issuance of
No Dues Certificates. The petitioner
having
acted
upon
the
No
Dues
Certificates given by the respondent no.2,
is now protected by the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of
legitimate expectation and the actions of
respondent no.2 are illegal and arbitrary
and the impugned notice/letter deserves to
be quashed.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
RESPONDENT AUTHORITY:-

[10]
Per
contra,
Sri
M.C.
Chaturvedi,
learned
Senior
Advocate
argued that the demand notice is justified
and in accordance with the terms and
conditions
of
lease
agreement.
He
contended that the lease rent became
payable immediately after 06.01.2007 and
the petitioner having deposited one time
lease rent on 08.01.2007 was in default of
its instalment of Rs.13,50,360/-. He further
contended that the policy for payment of
one time lease rent clearly stipulated that
all previous annual lease rents have to be
paid and it is only thereafter that one time
lease rent could be deposited. Furthermore,
any default from the timeline of the
payment would attract liability of interest
to be paid over such payments. Since the
annual lease rent, which became due for the
year 2006-07, was not paid before the due
date and an amount to the tune of
Rs.13,50,360/- was left unpaid therefore
the amount along with interest calculation
as stated in the impugned letter was given
to the petitioner for its payment.

[11] In reply to the submissions
made by Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
respondent
no.2,
the
learned
Senior
Advocate for the petitioner contented that
the
respondents
having
themselves
accepted the one time lease rent without
11 All. Jakson Engineers Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
919
any objections, therefore, the petitioner had
complied with the terms and conditions of
the lease deed and had discharged its
liability. The respondent no.2 was estopped
from alleging any subsequent default or
delay in payment on account of acceptance
of one time lease rent.

[12] Learned Standing Counsel for
the State adopted the arguments made on
behalf of respondent Authority.

ISSUES :-

[13] In light of the submissions
advanced at bar, the following issues arise
for determination of present dispute:-

 (i) Whether the impugned letter
dated
10.07.2025
demanding
default
amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/- is
legally justified in view of the fact that the
respondent no.2 had accepted one time
lease rent payment without demur?

 (ii)
Whether
the
action
of
respondent no.2 is in accordance with the
principles of natural justice?

 (iii) Whether the actions of
respondent no.2, in issuing the letter dated
10.07.2025 is in violation of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of
legitimate expectation in light of issuance
of No Objection Certificates dated
27.07.2010 & 31.07.2020 ?

DISCUSSION:-

[14] We have examined the rival
contentions as well as records of the case.
From the perusal of the record, it is
apparent that the lease deed was executed
in favour of the petitioner by respondent
no.2 for Plot No.25 & 26 ad-measuring an
area of 40090.82 sq. mts. Admittedly,
before execution of the lease deed on
06.01.2006, the petitioner vide demand
notice dated 22.12.2005, deposited an
amount of Rs. 13,50,059/- and Rs.301/-
(total
amount
of
Rs.13,50,360/-)
on
28.12.2005 and 06.01.2006 respectively.
Thereafter, the petitioner in terms of the
prevalent policy of respondent no.2 with
regard to the payment of one time lease
rent
deposited
an
amount
of
Rs.1,48,53,960/-
(Rs.13,50,360/-
x
11
times) on 08.01.2007 which was accepted
by the authority and no objection with
regard to the payment of the same was ever
raised by the Authority to the petitioner.
Having accepted the payment of one time
lease rent, the Authority then proceeded to
issue No Objection Certificates on
27.07.2010
and
31.07.2020
to
the
petitioner.

[15] It is an admitted fact that the
respondent no.2 did not raise any objection
with regard to any default of lease rent due
by the petitioner before issuance of both No
Objection Certificates. In fact, respondent
no.2 also proceeded to issue the permission
to mortgage vide letter bearing no.
Industry/2024/480 on 14.02.2024 to the
petitioner. Such action on behalf of
respondent no.2 clearly indicates that
respondent no.2 was fully satisfied with the
one time lease rent deposited by the
petitioner and the petitioner was not in
default with regard to any payments due
towards the annual lease rent. The principle
of waiver would be fully applicable in the
present scenario as respondent no.2 was
fully aware of the terms and conditions of
the lease deed as well the conditions with
regard to payment of one time lease rent.

[16] Furthermore condition (1) of
lease deed stipulates the lease rent would
920 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
be Rs. 13,50,360/- annually for the first 10
years chargeable from the date of execution
of the lease deed and would be payable
within 10 days from the execution of the
lease deed, without waiting for any demand
notice or reminder therefore. Thus the
lease rent would be payable within ten days
from the execution of lease deed i.e. 6th
day of January every year without waiting
for any demand notice/reminder. The lease
rent would therefore be payable by 16th
January of each year and the default period
would start from 17th January of each year.
In the light of the above, the deposit and
acceptance of the one time lease rent on
08.01.2007 by respondent no.2 would be
well within the time limit prescribed for
payment of lease rent and as such, there is
no delay in payment of lease rent which
would attract the penalty clause.

[17] As regarding the alleged
default in payment of lease rent for two
days, it would be appropriate to refer
Clause No.(1) of the lease deed which
states that "in case of default in payment of
lease rent, interest @ 17% per annum
compounded every half yearly would be
chargeable for the delayed period." The
said clause in the lease agreement clearly
stipulates that in case there is any default in
payment toward annual lease rent, interest
@ 17% compounded every half yearly
would be applicable on the petitioner for
the said default days. The contract having
clearly stipulated such a condition, the
respondent no. 2 was bound by the same as
the contract was a concluded contract and
there could be no deviation from the same.
Once a concluded contract comes into
existence, it is axiomatic that such rights
and obligations of the parties are governed
by the terms and conditions thereof.
Therefore, respondent no.2 could have
issued
a
demand
notice
for
the
compounded interest @ 17% for delay in
payment of one time lease rent but since no
such demand notice was ever raised by the
Authority in the intervening period from
the year 2007 till 2025. Therefore, we have
no hesitation to hold that the Authority had
consciously accepted that the petitioner had
discharged
its
obligations
under
the
contract and had deposited the entire
annual lease rent via one time lease rent
and no further amount was due on the part
of the petitioner with regard to lease rent
payable.

[18] Once the petitioner utilized the
prevailing policy of the Authority to
deposit the one time lease rent, which is
equivalent to 11 instalments of lease rent
on 08.01.2007, the Authority then would be
under an obligation to examine whether
one time lease rent was in compliance of
the prevailing policy of the respondents.
Having failed to do so in the intervening
period i.e. 2007-2025, the Authority would
now be estopped from raising any demand
relying upon the clause in the agreement
which required that no reminder shall be
submitted as it was not a case with regard
to payment of lease rent but payment of
one time annual lease rent which was
governed by a different policy of the
respondents. As such, having accepted the
deposit of one time lease rent without
demur, any fresh demand notice after a
period of 18 years would be completely
unjustified.

[19] As regards to the arguments
that the actions of the Authority are in
violation of principles of natural justice we
find that before issuance of the impugned
letter dated 10.07.2025, neither any showcause nor any default notice was served
upon the petitioner during the intervening
period from the year 2007-2025. Nothing
11 All. Jakson Engineers Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
921
has been placed before us to show that any
letter or show cause notice was issued to
the petitioner before passing the impugned
demand letter dated 10.07.2025.

[20].
Furthermore,
from
the
pleadings it is apparent that the amount so
stated in the impugned letter, has also not
been quantified i.e. neither the principal
amount nor the rate of interest applicable to
the said amount is stated, therefore, the
quantification of the said amount is also
arbitrary and illegal. It is trite law that if
there is power to decide and determine to
the prejudice of a person, duty to act
judicially is implicit in the exercise of such
power. Even otherwise if an administrative
order involves civil consequences then the
order inflicting civil consequences must be
made by observing rules of natural justice
[vide State of Orrisa vs. Binapani Dei 1;
2ITC Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and others].
Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the amount as calculated by the
respondent no.2, cannot be recovered from
the petitioner. Therefore, we have no
hesitation in holding that before the
impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 was
issued for an amount of Rs.2,08,40,858/-,
the petitioner was never given any
opportunity to explain as to how the
conditions of the lease deed were not
complied by the petitioner.

[21] With regard to the arguments
advanced on the violation of doctrine of
promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of
legitimate
expectations,
it
would
be
worthwhile to note that the respondent no.2
issued No Objection Certificates to the
petitioner on 27.07.2010 and 31.07.2020.
Furthermore, on 14.02.2024, permission to
mortgage was also granted to the petitioner
vide
letter
No.
Industry/2024/480,
therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be
accorded the benefit of doctrine of
legitimate expectation as the petitioner,
upon
issuance
of
No
Objection
Certificates
and
the
permission
to
mortgage, was under the bonafide belief
that no amount of lease rent remained due
and the permission to mortgage would be
processed in favour of the petitioner. The
Authority having accepted the one time
lease rent without any demur and thereafter
issuing the No Objection Certificates as
well as the permission to mortgage, clearly
acted in an illegal and arbitrary manner in
issuing the impugned demand letter. The
said action of the Authority is clearly
against
the
doctrine
of
legitimate
expectation as the Government authorities
are expected to deal with fairness and nonarbitrariness as enshrined under Article 14
of the Constitution of India. Principles of
good administration would require that the
decisions of the Authority i.e. respondent
no.2 must withstand the test of consistency,
transparency and predictability to avoid of
being termed as arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

[22] In the present case, respondent
no.2 has failed the test of consistency,
transparency and predictability thereby the
issuance of the impugned letter is clearly
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of
Constitution of India. The respondent no.2,
in the present case, has also failed to
demonstrate that the issuance of impugned
letter was in public interest to frustrate the
applicability of the doctrine of legitimate
expectation. Therefore, we are of the
considered opinion that the impugned letter
dated
10.07.2025
demanding
default
amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/- is
clearly against the doctrine of legitimate
expectation and is violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India and is liable to be
quashed. [vide 3Sivanandan C.T. and
922 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
others Vs. High Court of Kerala and
others, 4Union of India Vs. Hindustan
Development Corporation].

[23] From the perusal of the record,
it is also clear that the Authority had issued
No Objection Certificates on 27.07.2010
and 31.7.2020 and thereafter, proceeded to
issue
permission
to
mortgage
on
14.02.2024. The Authority having once
issued
No
Objection
Certificates
without any notice for default in the
intervening period, would not be entitled to
issue
demand
notice
amounting
to
Rs.2,08,40,858/-, as the actions of the
Authority would also attract doctrine of
promissory estoppel. The Authority having
issued No Objection Certificates clearly
acknowledged that no amount of premium
or lease rent remained due to be paid by the
petitioner. Therefore, any demand letter in
the year 2025 would be in clear violation of
the status created while issuing two No
Objection Certificates. Such action of the
Authority is against equitable jurisprudence
as the Authority having once accepted the
position of no dues from the petitioner,
cannot be allowed to resile from the same.
The action of the Authority is a clear
violation of doctrine of promissory estoppel
and equitable jurisprudence and as such,
the impugned letter is liable to be quashed.
[vide 5Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. Vs. State of U.P.].

[24] The lease deed was executed
between the petitioner and respondent
nos.2 & 3 on 06.01.2006 with all the
relevant terms and conditions which had to
be abided by the petitioner. The petitioner
having stated that all the terms and
conditions were complied with and also
with the prevailing existing policy and one
time lease rent was not in violation of the
contract, it was upon the respondent
Authority to show by cogent evidence that
the petitioner was in default of the lease
rent and was in violation of terms and
conditions of the contract. From the
conditions enumerated in the lease deed, it
is clear that in case of any default,
Authority would be liable to impose the
interest of 17% compounded half yearly
upon any delayed payment. The respondent
no.2 having failed to initiate and invoke the
penalty against the petitioner, would now
be stopped from raising demand of
Rs.2,08,40,858/- as during the intervening
period of year 2007-2025, no such demand
ever has been raised by the respondent
Authority. Even otherwise there arose no
default in payment as 10 days time from
the execution of the lease deed was given
for payment of lease rent as per condition 1
of the lease deed. Thus the action of the
Authority in issuing the impugned letter is
clearly against the terms and conditions of
the contract and as such, the demand letter
dated 10.07.2025 is liable to be quashed.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS (i),
(ii) & (iii)

[25]
In
light
of
the
above
discussions, we find that the letter dated
10.07.2025 is arbitrary and unjust and
against the settled principles of law. This
Court also finds that the petitioner has fully
complied with the terms and conditions of
the lease deed and is not in default of any
lease amount.

RELIEFS/DIRECTIONS:

[26]
Considering
the
settled
proposition of law as noted above, we are
of the opinion that no amount of lease rent
is due from the petitioner and the impugned
letter
dated
10.07.2025
issued
by
respondent no.2 is hereby quashed. A
11 All. Sharad Roshan Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
923
direction is further issued to the
Authority i.e. respondent nos.2 and 3 to
process the applications moved by the
petitioner for permission to mortgage dated
08.10.2024 and 02.01.2025 and decide the
same within a period of six weeks from the
date of production of certificate copy of
this order.

[27]
With
the
aforesaid
observations, the present writ petition
stands allowed.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 923
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Writ - C No. 35406 of 2025

Sharad Roshan Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P.& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Ashwani Kumar Sharma

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether
the
application
filed
by
a
transgender person for change of name in
educational documents in terms of Rule
5(3)
read
with
Annexure-1
of
the
Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights)
Rules, 2020 could be rejected on the
ground that the relevant provisions and
Government Orders do not provide any
procedure for correction of name at a
belated stage, and whether the provisions
of the Transgender Persons (Protection of
Rights) Act, 2019 read with the Rules, 2020
were applicable.
HEADNOTE
Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act,
2019, Sections 6, 7 and 20 - Transgender
Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020, Rule
5(3) read with Annexure-1 and Rule 6 -
Constitution of India, Article 226 - Writ petition
by a transgender person - Subsequent surgery
to change gender - Application filed for change
of name in educational documents in terms of
Rule 5(3) - Application rejected by Madhyamik
Shiksha Parishad on the ground that no
procedure exists for correction of name at a
belated stage and that provisions of Act, 2019
read with Rules, 2020 were not applicable -
Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act,
2019 a Special Act - Section 20 provides that
provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and
not in derogation of any other law - Legal error
committed by not applying provisions of Act,
2019 - No dispute that petitioner was entitled to
file application to change gender, name and
photographs in all official documents including
educational certificates - Impugned order held
unsustainable in the eyes of law - Writ petition
allowed with directions. (E-5)
HELD:
Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act,
2019 is a Special Act. Section 20 of the Act
provides that the provisions of the Act shall be
in addition to, and not in derogation of, any
other law for the time being in force.
Respondent committed a legal error by not
applying the provisions of the Act, 2019 in
favour of the petitioner. On the basis of record,
there is no dispute that the petitioner was
entitled to file application in terms of Rule 5(3)
of the Rules, 2020 read with Annexure-1 to
change gender, name and photographs in all
official
documents
including
educational
certificates. Impugned order set aside. Writ
petition allowed and the respondents directed to
act in accordance with law and issue fresh
educational mark sheets/certificates within eight
weeks. (Paras 5-6)

CASE LAW CITED
Jane Kaushik v. Union of India and others, 2025
INSC 1248;
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of
India and others, (2014) 5 SCC 438;
Dr. Beoncy Laishram v. State of Manipur and
others, 2025 SCC OnLine Mani 430;