# Jangal Singh ( since deceased and substituted by legal heirs) & Ors v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Deoria & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 1806
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-05-06
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jangal-singh-since-deceased-and-substituted-by-legal-heirs-ors-v-deputy-43831
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Shri A.K.Tripathi, S.C., Shri S.C.Verma, Shri Shekhar Srivastava, Shri Ved Byas Mishra, Shri Vedvyas Misra,
Shri Vishnu Dutt Ojha

Held -

Paras 1-2: Introduction & Context. The Court identifies the parties and legal counsel. The petitioners are
challenging a 1974 order by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (DDC) which overturned a 1972 order by the
Assistant Settlement Officer (ASOC).
Paras 3-5: The Dispute & Claims. Details the specific plots of land. Respondents claim the land reverted
to them as ex-zamindars after the tenant's daughter (Smt. Koshili) married in 1952. Petitioners claim Koshili
became an absolute Bhumidhar in 1950 and legally sold the land to them in 1954.
Paras 6-11: Prior Litigation. Recounts a 1954 Civil Suit. While the Trial Court initially canceled the sale
deed, the Civil Judge (Appellate Court) reversed it in 1959, declaring Koshili a Bhumidhar and the sale deed
valid. This decision was never overturned.
Para 12: Consolidation Phase. During new consolidation operations, the Consolidation Officer (CO)
ignored the Civil Court's logic, ruling that Koshili lost rights due to marriage and was a minor in 1950.
Paras 13-15: Grounds for Revision. Counsel for petitioners argues the DDC acted beyond his authority by
re-evaluating facts like an appellate court. The DDC had backed the CO's findings regarding Koshili's marriage
and minority.
Para 16: Finding on Minority. The Court holds that there is no evidence on record to prove Koshili was a
minor in 1950. The CO and DDC findings were based on "no material."
Para 17: Finding on Admission/Marriage. The Court rules that Koshili's alleged admission of leaving the
village (made in 1955) is inadmissible against petitioners because she had already sold her interest in the
property by 1954.
Para 18: Finding on Absolute Rights. The Court holds that once Bhumidhari rights were acquired in 1950,
they became absolute. Marriage or re-marriage does not extinguish these rights.
Para 19: Jurisdictional Error. The Court finds that the DDC committed a "manifest error" by re-assessing
evidence and facts, which is not permitted under revisional jurisdiction.
Paras 20-21: Final Order. The Court sets aside the DDC's order and restores the ASOC's judgment. The
writ petition is allowed.

Writ Petition Allowed.

Case Laws Cited:-

Ramji Dixit Vs. Bhirgunath, AIR 1968 SC 1058.
Raghuraji and another Vs. Board of Revenue, 1962 ALJ 596
Ram Udit Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and others, 2016 All.C.J. 14

## Text

1806 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
will not have the effect of re-writing events which have already occurred and if certain interests and
rights have transferred from one person to another, the same would not stand nullified. The effect of
notification under Section 49 (1) would be, moreover, prospective only and not retrospective. The
land once taken and divested in State and the Board, will not stand divested and notification under
Section 49 cannot have such effect.

23. Same argument was raised in Laxmi Devi Vs State of Bihar and Others (2015) 10 SCC
241 arising from Act 1894 and the Court said "once land has vested in State, the question of revesting its possession in the erstwhile land owners is no longer available as an option to the State".
The Court further said by giving a restricted interpretation to the decision in Satendra Prasad Jain
Vs State of U.P. (1993) 4 SCC 369 that " the State is not empowered to withdraw from the
acquisition once it has taken possession of the said land".

24. Learned counsel appearing for respondents could not show any provision or binding
authority to this Court to support their stand that once scheme is annulled by issuing notification
under Section 49 of Act 1965, all exercise done earlier including vesting of land in State etc. Would
stand nullified and the land would stand reverted to erstwhile owners.

25. We have no hesitation on observing that once land is vested in State it shall not be
divested and reverted to erstwhile owners. Hence right of owners of acquired land to claim
compensation under the award already given would subsist and is enforceable in law.

26. The view, we have taken does not make it necessary for us to quash the notification dated
14.09.2001 issued under Section 49 of Act 1965, but we make it clear, that petitioners shall be at
liberty to take steps for claiming compensation by execution of award dated 19.09.1988 whereby
compensation of land which was acquired by respondents is payable.

27. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions/observations and in the
manner as above.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Writ B No.- 6919 Of 1974

Jangal Singh ( since deceased and substituted by legal heirs) & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Director of Consolidation, Deoria & Ors. ...Respondents
5 All. Jangal Singh ( since deceased and substituted by legal heirs) & Ors. Vs Deputy Director
 Of Consolidation, Deoria & Ors.

1807
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Shri A.N. Singh, Shri R.B. Tripathi, Shri R.K. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Shri A.K.Tripathi, S.C., Shri S.C.Verma, Shri Shekhar Srivastava, Shri Ved Byas Mishra, Shri Vedvyas Misra,
Shri Vishnu Dutt Ojha

Held -

Paras 1-2: Introduction & Context. The Court identifies the parties and legal counsel. The petitioners are
challenging a 1974 order by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (DDC) which overturned a 1972 order by the
Assistant Settlement Officer (ASOC).
Paras 3-5: The Dispute & Claims. Details the specific plots of land. Respondents claim the land reverted
to them as ex-zamindars after the tenant's daughter (Smt. Koshili) married in 1952. Petitioners claim Koshili
became an absolute Bhumidhar in 1950 and legally sold the land to them in 1954.
Paras 6-11: Prior Litigation. Recounts a 1954 Civil Suit. While the Trial Court initially canceled the sale
deed, the Civil Judge (Appellate Court) reversed it in 1959, declaring Koshili a Bhumidhar and the sale deed
valid. This decision was never overturned.
Para 12: Consolidation Phase. During new consolidation operations, the Consolidation Officer (CO)
ignored the Civil Court's logic, ruling that Koshili lost rights due to marriage and was a minor in 1950.
Paras 13-15: Grounds for Revision. Counsel for petitioners argues the DDC acted beyond his authority by
re-evaluating facts like an appellate court. The DDC had backed the CO's findings regarding Koshili's marriage
and minority.
Para 16: Finding on Minority. The Court holds that there is no evidence on record to prove Koshili was a
minor in 1950. The CO and DDC findings were based on "no material."
Para 17: Finding on Admission/Marriage. The Court rules that Koshili's alleged admission of leaving the
village (made in 1955) is inadmissible against petitioners because she had already sold her interest in the
property by 1954.
Para 18: Finding on Absolute Rights. The Court holds that once Bhumidhari rights were acquired in 1950,
they became absolute. Marriage or re-marriage does not extinguish these rights.
Para 19: Jurisdictional Error. The Court finds that the DDC committed a "manifest error" by re-assessing
evidence and facts, which is not permitted under revisional jurisdiction.
Paras 20-21: Final Order. The Court sets aside the DDC's order and restores the ASOC's judgment. The
writ petition is allowed.

Writ Petition Allowed.

Case Laws Cited:-

Ramji Dixit Vs. Bhirgunath, AIR 1968 SC 1058.
Raghuraji and another Vs. Board of Revenue, 1962 ALJ 596
Ram Udit Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and others, 2016 All.C.J. 14

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. Heard Sri R.B. Tripathi, Advocate, for petitioners, Sri Vishnu Dutt Ojha, Advocate,
appearing for legal heirs of respondents 3 and 5 and perused the record. Sri Ved Byas Mishra,
1808 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Advocate, has put in appearance on behalf of legal heirs of respondent no. 4 and adopted arguments
advanced by Sri Vishnu Dutt Ojha, Advocate.

2. Petitioners, Jangal Singh, Sheo Prasad and Kali Charan (now all deceased and
substituted by legal heirs), have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution assailing
the order dated 28.10.1974 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Deoria (hereinafter
referred to as "DDC") allowing Revision No. 14/282 under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1953") and setting aside order of Assistant
Settlement Officer (Consolidation) (hereinafter referred to as "ASOC") dated 14.08.1972, has
restored order dated 01.02.1972 passed by Consolidation Officer (hereinafter referred to as "CO").

3. The dispute relates to Plots No. 526, 818, 819 and 1482 of Khata No. 15 and Plot No.
1115 of Khata No. 23.

4. The aforesaid land was recorded in basic year in the name of petitioners as Bhumidhar.
Respondents 3 to 5, i.e. Randhir Singh, Badri Mishra and Harihar Singh filed objections before CO
stating that they were Zamindar in Khewat to which plots in dispute pertain. One Ram Gulam was
tenant in the plots in dispute. He died in 1940. His daughter Km. Koshili then was recorded as
occupancy tenant in revenue record of 1359 Fasali. She married on 06.05.1952 to a person of
another village as such her rights extinguished and opposite parties being ex-zamindar took over
possession and became Khudkasht holder. They attained rights of bhumidhar under Section 18
(1)(a) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act, No. 1 of 1951)
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1950"). Respondents then requested CO to expunge names of
petitioners in basic year entry.

5. Petitioners contested the matter stating that Ram Gulam died in 1940 whereupon his
daughter Km. Koshili was recorded as occupancy tenant as provided under Section 35 of U.P.
Tenancy Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1939") and her name was recorded in 1359
fasali revenue record. She deposited ten times revenue on 20.05.1950 for declaration under Section
6 of United Provinces Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 (hereinafter
referred to as "Act, 1949"). Declaration was accordingly made in 1950. After enactment of Act,
1950, she became Bhumidhar on the date of deposit in view of Section 18(2) of Act, 1950. She
executed a sale-deed on 21.07.1954 in favour of petitioners and thereupon names of petitioners
were recorded as Bhumidhar. It is said that for this reason, her name was rightly mentioned in the
basic year entry.

6. It appears that a suit, i.e., Original Suit No. 4044 of 1954 was filed by Harihar Singh and
others against present petitioners, i.e., Kali Charan and two others. Therein sale-deed dated
21.07.1954 was challenged and a decree for cancellation thereof was prayed. Plaintiffs also sought
a decree of delivery of possession as an alternative relief. The suit was filed vide plaint dated
07.09.1954. Plaint case was that plaintiffs and defendants 5 to 17 were Zamindar in Khewat to
which the plot in suit pertained. Ram Gulam was tenant of plot in suit. He died in 1940 and after
his death, his daughter Smt. Koshili came in possession. She was married in 1952 and abandoned
5 All. Jangal Singh ( since deceased and substituted by legal heirs) & Ors. Vs Deputy Director
 Of Consolidation, Deoria & Ors.

1809
the plots. Her tenancy rights got extinguished. Plaintiffs and other co-shares entered into possession
and on the enforcement of Act, 1950 they became Zamindar. Due to existing wrong entries in the
basic year revenue record, defendants 1 to 3, i.e., petitioners in this writ petition got a sale-deed
executed from Smt. Koshili on 21.07.1954 though she had no right, interest or authority to execute
the same.

7. Defendants (present petitioners) contested the suit taking the same plea as has been taken
before Revenue Courts below and in this writ petition.

8. The suit was decided vide judgment and decree dated 09.07.1957 by Sri G.D. Chaturvedi
-II, Additional Munsif, Deoria and he held that Smt. Koshil married in 1952, hence lost her rights
in father's land and land in question stood restored to plaintiffs. Smt. Koshili, thus, has no right to
execute sale-deed in 1954 and consequently suit was decreed and sale-deed dated 21.07.1954 was
declared illegal and consequently cancelled. Learned Munsif also declared plaintiffs as Bhumidhar
and in possession over suit land.

9. Defendants Kali Charan Koeri and others (Petitioners in the present writ petition) filed
Civil Appeal No. 507 of 1956. It came to be decided by Sri S.S.Bose, Civil Judge, Deoria. He
framed following two points for determination:

"1. Whether Kaushali defendant no.4 was the bhumidhar of the plots in suit and as
such was entitled to execute the sale deed in question?

2. Whether the plaintiffs were bhumidhars of the plots in suit?"

10. Appellate Court found that Trial Court decided the matter in the light of a compromise
between Smt. Koshili and plaintiffs on 04.08.1955, i.e. after execution of sale-deed. The said
compromise was not binding on defendants 1 to 3 since defendant 4, i.e., Smt. Koshili lost her
rights in the suit property after execution of sale-deed and any admission or compromise
subsequent to the sale-deed having adverse effect upon rights of defendants 1 to 3 was not binding
on them and Trial court committed grave error in relying on the said compromise. Relying on
Section 18 of Indian Evidence Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1882"), Appellate Court
held that admission was not made during subsistence of interest in disputed property by defendant
4, Smt. Koshili, hence that admission cannot be said to be a valid admission binding on persons
who have acquired interest before, in property in dispute. It also found that plaintiffs have not
stated anywhere that plots in suit have been cultivated by them before enforcement of Act, 1950
and that being so they cannot be said to be Khudkasht of disputed land since cultivation is essence
of Khudkasth rights. Lastly it said that Revenue entries of 1359 fasali is presumed to be correct,
unless shown otherwise, and in absence of anything to show otherwise, it was not liable to be
altered. Ultimately, it answered issue-1 in affirmative, i.e., in favour of appellants and issue-2 in
negative, i.e. against the plaintiffs-respondents, hence allowed appeal vide judgment dated
05.05.1959, set aside judgment of Trial Court dated 09.07.1957 and dismissed the suit with cost to
defendants 1 to 3.
1810 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
11. It is said that judgment of Civil Judge was challenged before this Court by filing
Second Appeal but nothing has been brought on record to show that said judgment of Lower
Appellate Court (hereinafter referred to as "LAC") has been reversed.

12. Thereafter again, when consolidation operations commenced in Village in
question, similar issue was raised by respondents 3 to 5 before CO. CO held that the
proceedings in Civil Court abated due to commencement of consolidation proceedings. He
further held that due to marriage of Smt. Koshili in 1952, she lost her rights in property in
dispute and further consideration in sale-deed was not adequate and ten times deposit made
by Smt. Koshili in 1950 was not valid since she was minor at that time. Consequently, he
allowed objections vide order dated 01.02.1972 and directed expunction of names of
petitioners in revenue record and directed to make entry of names of defendants 3 to 5.
Petitioners, then preferred Appeal No. 1342 before ASOC who allowed the appeal and
reversed order of CO but in the revision, DDC has restored order of CO. Hence, this writ
petition.

13. Counsel for petitioners submitted that DDC has proceeded on certain assumptions
and has examined the matter like an appeal, though it was not open to it to sit in appeal since
he was exercising only revisional jurisdiction. He further said that DDC has proceeded on
certain conjectures and surmises observing that Smt. Koshili failed to prove that she obtained
possession after marriage and that she was minor when she deposited ten times Lagan, hence
would not acquire any right.

14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents sought to support impugned
order for the reasons stated therein.

15. CO and DDC both have proceeded to decide the matter in favour of respondents
3, 4 and 5 on the basis of following observations:

(i) Smt. Koshili was minor in 1950 when she deposited ten times lagan, hence
did not get any right due to said deposit after enforcement of Act, 1950.

(ii) She left the village after marriage in 1952 and has not placed anything to
show that land continued to be cultivated by her or through any agent or servant etc.

(iii) Nothing could be shown that respondents 3 to 5 did not enter into
possession of disputed land after marriage of Smt. Koshili from 06.05.1952 till date of
execution of sale-deed.

16. Having gone through the record, I find that there is nothing to show that Smt.
Koshili was minor in 1950. Neither her date of birth has been stated in any of the documents
or in the pleadings before revenue authorities nor there is otherwise any material on record to
show that she was minor in 1950. When enquired from learned counsel appearing for
5 All. Jangal Singh ( since deceased and substituted by legal heirs) & Ors. Vs Deputy Director
 Of Consolidation, Deoria & Ors.

1811
respondents 3 to 5 as to how CO and DDC could record a finding that Smt. Koshili was
minor in 1950, when she deposited ten times lagan, he could place nothing before this Court
to support the aforesaid finding. Apparently, observations and findings of CO as well as
DDC in this regard are based on no material and no evidence, hence cannot sustain.

17. Secondly, factum of marriage of Smt. Koshili is admitted. It is also admitted that
she married a person residing in another village, but there is nothing on record to show that
she actually left the village and stopped cultivation on the land in question. DDC has relied
on admission of Smt. Koshili dated 04.08.1955 in the alleged compromise that she left
village after marriage and has ignored to consider the fact that the said admission was
inadmissible for the reason that on the said date, Koshili having executed a sale-deed in
favour of petitioners, lost all the interest in disputed property, and, therefore, aforesaid
statement made by her after execution of sale-deed could not have been taken as an
admission which could have been relied against petitioners as binding on them. No material
has been placed on record to show that Koshili actually left village after marriage and in this
regard, findings if the aforesaid admission is excluded, is based on no evidence at all.

18. Thirdly, once deposit of ten times lagan in 1950 and conferment of right upon
Koshili on enforcement of Act, 1950 is taken to be correct, question of being such rights
extinguished in 1952 on her marriage would not arise. The basic year entry recorded in
revenue record ought not to have been discarded or held incorrect unless there are adequate
evidence to show otherwise. The rights acquired by Smt. Koshili in 1950 are absolute and
neither a life interest nor otherwise liable to forfeited or abandonment on marriage or remarriage. In taking above view, I am fortified by Apex Court's decision in Ramji Dixit Vs.
Bhirgunath AIR 1968 SC 1058 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Raghuraji
and another Vs. Board of Revenue 1962 ALJ 596.

19. I also find that the finding of fact recorded by ASOC were on the basis of
appreciation of evidence and in the absence of any perversity or misreading of evidence etc.,
DDC, in proceeding to consider the matter as if it is sitting in appeal and assessing evidence
to record a different finding of fact, has committed manifest error in exercising revisional
jurisdiction since it was not permissible. In this regard, I am fortified by a Division Bench
judgment of this Court in Ram Udit Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and
others 2016 All.C.J. 14, wherein scope of scrutiny by DDC in revision has been discussed in
detail.

20. In the entirety of facts and circumstances, I have no manner of doubt that
judgment and order of DDC questioned in this writ petition is unsustainable and has to be set
aside.

21. The writ petition is allowed. Impugned judgment dated 28.10.1974 passed by
DDC is hereby set aside and judgment dated 14.08.1972 passed by ASOC is hereby restored.
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1812 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.

Service Single No.- 9572 Of 2016

Abdullah ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shri Mahendra Bahadur Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Held -

Petitioner's Claim: The petitioner was appointed to a Group 'C' post on August 11, 2014, and joined on
August 13, 2014. While the Joint Director approved his selection on March 31, 2015, the District Inspector of
Schools (DIOS) only authorized salary payments starting from May 12, 2015. The petitioner sought arrears
from his initial joining date in 2014.
Legal Provision (Section 16FF(3)): The Court analyzed Section 16FF(3) of the Act, which explicitly
mandates that no person selected shall be "appointed" until the proposal for such appointment has been
approved by the competent authority (the Inspector or Regional Deputy Director).
Interpretation of "Prior Approval": The Court interpreted this provision to mean that "prior approval" is a
mandatory condition precedent. Consequently, a valid appointment letter can only be legally issued after the
approval is granted, rendering any appointment letter issued before that date (such as the petitioner's 2014
letter) legally untenable for salary purposes.
Determination of Salary Date: The Court held that since approval was granted on March 31, 2015, that
date must be treated as the effective date of appointment. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to his salary
from the date of approval (March 31, 2015) rather than the later date set by the DIOS or the earlier
premature joining date.
Distinguishing Precedents: The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on the Shashi Kant Singh case,
noting that the cited judgment did not consider the specific requirements of Section 16FF(3) and was decided
based on its own unique facts without establishing a general principle of law.
Final Order: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to modify the DIOS's order. The authorities
were ordered to pay the petitioner's salary starting from March 31, 2015, instead of May 12, 2015.

List of Citations
The following case law was cited in the Judgment:
Shashi Kant Singh vs. State of U.P., [1992 E.S.C. 544 (All)].

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.)