# Janki Prasad v. Sanjay

- **Citation:** (2022) 1 ILRA 973
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-12-24
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 247 of 2015
- **Bench:** Salil Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/janki-prasad-v-sanjay-47495
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code (5 of
1908) - O.41 R.17(1) Expln. - Appeal -
counsel refuses to argue - Court has no
jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits

If counsel for the appellant, though physically
present in the Court when the appeal is called
on for hearing but refuses to argue the appeal
or for any other reason is not able to address
the Court - Held - in such situations appellate
Court has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on
merits - Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17 CPC
applies in cases (Para 20)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1 All. Janki Prasad Vs. Sanjay Kumar & Ors.
973

53. It has been consistently held that
the tenant is required to comply with the
requirements of Order XV Rule 5 CPC and
make the deposits strictly in accordance
with the procedure contained therein, and
any deposit not made in consonance with
the said rule cannot enure the benefit of the
tenant. Also, the amount to be deposited by
the tenant during the continuation of the
suit is required to be deposited in the court
where the suit is filed failing which the
court may strike off the defence of the
tenant since the deposits made by the tenant
under Section 30 after the first hearing of
the suit cannot be taken into consideration.

54. The provisions under Order XV
Rule 5(2) provides a locus poenitentiae to
the
defaulting
tenant
to
make
a
representation, which must be made within
ten days of the first hearing or within a
week from the date of accrual of rent as the
case may be, and if the representation is not
made within the specified time the court
has no jurisdiction to consider a time barred
representation or condone the delay or
extend
time.
Apart
from
the
aforementioned provision of filing a
representation there is no provision wherein
exemption can be claimed from complying
the conditions under Order XV Rule 5."

 (Emphasis by Court)

20. The holding in Pushpa Gupta clearly
shows that the finding on the question of law has
become final inter partes, andthat the Court has no
jurisdiction to condone the delay in depositing rent
under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code, if the tenant
were to represent her case about the deposit to be
made on the first date of hearing beyond ten days
of that date. It has been held that the Court has no
power to condone the delay beyond ten days in
the case of deposit of accrued rent due on the first
date of hearing, or beyond one week in the case of
rent that accrues from month to month. This Court
has clearly held inter partes that the Court has
no power to condone delay in making good the
deposit of rent under Order XV Rule 5 of either
kind beyond the specified period of time
envisaged under Order XV Rule 5(2) of the Code.
Here, the prayer in the application clearly shows
that the tenant has sought to condone the delay
much after the first date of hearing, losing all the
time in pursuing the first application that was
made seeking exemption from deposit under
Order XV Rule 5 of the Code, up to this Court in
Revision. It is not the tenant's case that the first
date of hearing in the suit had not gone by or that a
period of ten days of the first date of hearing not
elapsed, until time when the application bearing
paper no.42-C was made. Clearly, the application
is now beyond the condonable limit of delay
available to the Court to exercise its discretion, a
legal position that has been finally settled inter
partes by this Court in Pushpa Gupta.

21. This Court is, therefore, of clear opinion
that the tenant's application bearing paper no.42-C
could not have been granted by the Trial Court. It
has rightly been rejected.

22. In the result this Revision fails and is
dismissed. The interim order dated 17.12.2019 is
hereby vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.
----------
(2022)01ILR A973
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 24.12.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SALIL KUMAR RAI, J.

Second Appeal No. 247 of 2015

Janki Prasad ...Appellant
Versus
Sanjay Kumar & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
974 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
S. Mohd Kazim

Counsel for the Respondents:
Pratap Krishan

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code (5 of
1908) - O.41 R.17(1) Expln. - Appeal -
counsel refuses to argue - Court has no
jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits

If counsel for the appellant, though physically
present in the Court when the appeal is called
on for hearing but refuses to argue the appeal
or for any other reason is not able to address
the Court - Held - in such situations appellate
Court has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on
merits - Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17 CPC
applies in cases (Para 20)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ghanshyam Das Gupta Vs Makhan Lal 2012
(30) LCD 1806

2. Mohammad Khalil Vs Kamaruddin (1996) 5
SCC 625

3. Smt. Binda Bau & ors. Vs Board of Revenue &
ors. AIR 2007 ALLAHABAD 10

4. Babu Ram Vs Bhagwan Din & anr. AIR 1966
All 1 (FB)

5. St. of J&K Vs Enquiry Officer and ors., (1998)
9 SCC 387

6. M.S. Khalsa Vs Chiranji Lal (AIR 1976 All 290)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Salil Kumar Rai, J.)

1. Heard the counsel for the appellant
and the counsel for the respondents.

2. The present Second Appeal has
been filed against the judgment and decree
dated 23.9.2015 passed by the Special Jude
(Prevention of Corruption Act), Court No.
2/Additional
District
Judge,
Lucknow
(hereinafter in short referred to as ''lower
appellate Court') dismissing the Regular
Civil Appeal No. 5000248 of 2013 (Janki
Prasad vs. Sanjay Kumar and others) filed
by the appellant. The records of the case
indicate that the appeal has not yet been
admitted for final hearing. By order dated
4.12.2015, the records of the case were
summoned and have been received by this
Court. In the circumstances, with the
consent of the counsel for the parties, the
Court proceeded to hear the present Second
Appeal on admission and also for final
hearing.

3. The facts relevant for the decision
of the Second Appeal are that the
respondents instituted Original Suit No. 36
of 2010 praying for a decree of permanent
prohibitory
injunction
restraining
the
appellant from interfering in their peaceful
possession over the suit-property. The
respondents were the plaintiffs in the Suit
and the appellant was the defendant in the
Suit. The Trial Court i.e., the Additional
Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.
35, District Lucknow vide its judgment and
decree dated 29.8.2013 decreed Original
Suit No. 36 of 2010. Against the judgment
and decree dated 29.8.2013 passed by the
Trial Court, the defendant-appellant filed
Regular Civil Appeal No. 5000248 of
2015. The records of the lower appellate
Court show that by order dated 18.8.2015
passed by the District Judge, Lucknow the
case was transferred to the Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act), Court No.
2/Additional District Judge, Lucknow and
the same was received by the said Court on
25.8.2015. The appeal was called out for
hearing on 8.9.2015 on which date the
hearing of the appeal was adjourned on the
request of the counsel for the appellant and
15.9.2015 was fixed for hearing. On
15.9.2015, the lower appellant Court
recorded, on its order-sheet, that the
1 All. Janki Prasad Vs. Sanjay Kumar & Ors.
975
counsel for the parties were present but
despite repeated requests they were not
arguing the case and the judgment in the
appeal was reserved to be delivered on
23.9.2015. By order dated 15.9.2015, the
lower appellate Court also permitted the
parties to argue the case on any date till two
days
before
the
pronouncement
of
judgment. The order-sheet does not show
that the case was argued by the parties as
permitted by order dated 15.9.2015. Vide
its judgment dated 23.9.2015, the lower
appellate Court dismissed the appeal on
merits. In its judgment dated 23.9.2015 also
the lower appellate Court has recited the
fact that the counsel for the parties were
present on the date fixed for hearing of the
case but despite repeated requests they did
not argue the case. The judgment also
recites the fact that the records of the Trial
Court had been received by the lower
appellate Court and the same were perused
by the lower appellate Court.

4. The lower appellate Court framed
point for determination in appeal and after
considering the appeal on merits held
against the appellant. In its impugned
judgment, the lower appellate Court has
extensively referred to the evidence and
pleadings of the parties filed in the Trial
Court.

5. The following substantial question
of law arises in the present appeal and the
appeal was heard on the said question of
law:

"Whether the Explanation to Order
XLI Rule 17 CPC would apply in a case
where, when the appeal is called out for
hearing by the appellate Court, the counsel
for the appellant though physically present
in the Court, refuses to argue the same for
any reason and whether in such
circumstances, the appellate Court has the
power to decide the appeal on merits after
considering the records of the case?"

6. It was argued by the counsel for the
appellant that the recital dated 15.9.2015 in
the order-sheet of the appeal and in the
judgment dated 23.9.2015 to the effect that
the counsel for the parties had not argued
the case despite repeated requests, amounts
to refusal by the counsel to argue the case
and, in the circumstances the lower
appellate Court had no jurisdiction to
decide the appeal on merits but in light of
the Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter in short referred to as ''CPC)
could have only dismissed the appeal in
default. It was argued that the appearance
of the counsel referred in Order XLI Rule
17 CPC means ''appearance to argue the
appeal' and if the counsel for the appellant
refuses to argue the case or does not argue
the case, even though physically present in
the Court when the case is called on for
hearing, the appellate Court has no
jurisdiction to consider and decide the
appeal on merits. It was argued that for the
aforesaid reason the judgment dated
23.9.2015 passed by the lower appellate
Court is without jurisdiction and liable to
be set-aside. In support of his arguments,
the counsel for the appellant has relied on
the judgment of the Supreme Court
reported in Ghanshyam Das Gupta versus
Makhan Lal; [2012 (30) LCD 1806].

7. Rebutting the arguments of the
counsel for the appellant, the counsel for
the plaintiffs-respondents has argued that
from the recitals in the order-sheet as well
as in the judgment of the lower appellate
Court, it was evident that the counsel for
976 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the appellant was physically present and
appeared when the appeal was called out
for hearing on 15.9.2015 but did not argue
the appeal, therefore, the Explanation to
Order XLI Rule 17 CPC was not applicable
because the provision does not prohibit the
Court from considering and deciding the
appeal on merits if the counsel for the
appellant is present but does not argue the
case.
It
was
argued
that
in
the
circumstances the appellate Court was not
bound to dismiss the appeal in default, but
had a discretion to either dismiss the appeal
in default or pass any other order, including
an order deciding the appeal on merits. In
support of his contentions, the counsel for
the respondents relied on the judgment of
the Supreme Court reported in Mohammad
Khalil versus Kamaruddin; (1996) 5 SCC
625 and the judgment of this Court reported
in Smt. Binda Bau & Ors versus Board of
Revenue & Ors; AIR 2007 ALLAHABAD
10.

8. I have considered the rival
submissions of the counsel for the parties
and perused the records.

9. Before proceeding further, it would
be apt to reproduce Order XLI Rule 17
CPC:

"ORDER XLI APPEALS FROM
ORIGINAL
DECREES.
Rule
17.
Dismissal of appeal for appellant's
default.--(1) Where on the day fixed, or
on any other day to which the hearing
may be adjourned, the appellant does not
appear when the appeal is called on for
hearing, the Court may make an order
that the appeal be dismissed.

[Explanation.--Nothing in this subrule shall be construed as empowering
the Court to dismiss the appeal on the
merits.]

(2) Hearing appeal ex parte.--Where
the appellant appears and the respondent
does not appear, the appeal shall be
heard ex parte."

10. The Explanation to Order XLI
Rule 17 (1) CPC which provides that
nothing in the sub-rule shall be construed
as empowering the Court to dismiss the
appeal on merits was added by Act No.
104 of 1976. Before 1976, there was a
difference of opinion between the High
Courts regarding the powers of the
appellate Court under Order XLI Rule 17
(1) CPC. Certain High Courts were of the
opinion that if the counsel for the parties
were not present when the appeal is
called on for hearing, the appellate Court
did not have the jurisdiction to decide the
appeal on merits but could only dismiss
the same in default or adjourn the case,
while some High Courts were of the
opinion that under Order XLI Rule 17
CPC, the appellate Court had a discretion
to either dismiss the appeal in default or
to decide the same on merits in the
absence of the appellant and his counsel.
The Allahabad High Court subscribed to
the second view and in this context
reference is made to the Full Bench
decision of the Allahabad High Court in
Babu Ram versus Bhagwan Din and
another; AIR 1966 All 1 (FB).

11. Subsequently, by Act No. 104 of
1976,
CPC
was
amended
and
the
Explanation was added in Order XLI Rule
17 (1) CPC and now, the appellate Court
has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on
merits if the counsel for the appellant is not
present when the appeal is called on for
hearing. However, the question involved in
the present appeal is as to whether the
Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17 (1) CPC
would apply when the counsel for the
1 All. Janki Prasad Vs. Sanjay Kumar & Ors.
977
appellant, even though physically present
in the Court while the appeal is called on
for hearing, either refuses or for any other
reason, does not argue the appeal on merits.

12. For all practical purposes, there is
no difference between the counsel for the
appellant being not present in the Court
when the case is called on for hearing and,
even though physically present when the
case is called on for hearing, but refusing to
argue the appeal. In both situations the
appellant, i.e., the litigant in the case, fails
to avail the opportunity of hearing given to
him. In both the situations, the appellate
Court is deprived of the assistance provided
by the counsel as required under Order XLI
Rule 16 CPC. It is the assistance given by
the counsel which helps the appellate Court
in framing the points for determination
stipulated in Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. The
fact that there is no difference between the
physical absence of the counsel for the
appellant when the appeal is called on for
hearing and his refusal to argue, even
though physically present, was also noted
by the Full Bench of this Court in Babu
Ram (supra). In this context, the relevant
observations of this Court in paragraph no.
20 are reproduced below:

"20. The above observations make it
clear that a provision enjoining that the
appellant shall be heard is complied with if
the appellant has been afforded an
opportunity to be heard, and it cannot be
said that he has not been heard merely
because he has not availed of the
opportunity given to him. The force of these
observations is in no way lessened by the
fact that the appellant in that case was
present at the hearing but was not prepared
to address the Court, because it should
make no difference in principle whether
the failure to avail of the opportunity
consists in the absence of the appellant or
in his refusal or inability to address the
Court in support of the appeal. The
essence of the matter is that opportunity to
be heard has been given but has not been
availed of. If the requirement of hearing is
to be deemed to be fulfilled by giving the
appellant who is present an opportunity to
be heard it should be regarded as equally
fulfilled even in the case of an appellant
who has chosen to be absent in spite of
having been given an opportunity to be
heard. The principle laid down by the
Supreme Court with reference to Order
XLI, Rule 16 applies with equal force to
Order XLI, Rule 30 as well and it must
likewise be held that what Order XLI, Rule
30 requires is not that the parties or their
pleaders be actually heard but that they
should be given the opportunity of being
heard. The requirement of Order XLI, Rule
30 must, therefore, be considered as having
been satisfied if the opportunity so given is
not availed of, whether the failure to do so
consists in the absence of the parties and
their pleaders or in their refusal or
inability to address the Court. ....... "
 (emphasis supplied)

13. The Full Bench of this Court in
Babu Ram (supra), while interpreting
Order XLI Rule 17 (as it stood before
1976) held that an appeal Court has the
jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits
even if the appellant and his counsel are
absent when the appeal is called on for
hearing. The proposition decided by the
Full Bench is no more the law in view of
the Explanation added to Order XLI Rule
17 CPC. The Full Bench has been referred
as a precedent only to show that, in
principle, there is no difference between the
two situations, i.e., when the counsel is
978 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
physically not present when the appeal is
called on for hearing and when the counsel
refuses to argue the appeal, though
physically present, when the appeal is
called on for hearing. In the circumstances,
the
prohibition
prescribed
in
the
Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17 (1) CPC
shall also be applicable in cases where the
counsel for the appellant is physically
present in the Court when the appeal is
called on for hearing but does not address
the Court on merits or refuses to argue the
appeal.

14. The view that the appeal Court
has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on
merits if the counsel for the appellant is
physically present in the Court when the
appeal is called on for hearing but refuses
to argue it is also supported by the
observations of the Supreme Court in
paragraph 5 of its judgment reported in
State of J&K versusl Enquiry Officer and
others;
(1998)
9
SCC
387.
The
observations of the Supreme Court in
paragraph 5 of the said judgment are
reproduced below:

"5. The appeal was dismissed for this
reason: ".... a request for adjournment
sought by the Government Advocate, Mr.
Geelani, is rejected and this appeal is
dismissed for non-prosecution". That the
High Court was right in declining the
adjournment is not in dispute, but it was
then necessary for it to hear the appeal and
come to a conclusion on its merits. If for
any reason the appellant's advocate
declined to argue the appeal, that is what
the High Court should have recorded and
should then have dismissed the appeal on
the ground of non-prosecution. There was
no justification for dismissing the appeal
only on the ground that the appellant's
application for adjournment had been
rejected." (emphasis supplied)

15. At this stage, it would be relevant
to consider the judgments relied upon by
the counsel for the respondents. In
Mohammad Khalil (supra), there were four
appellants before the second appellate
Court i.e., the High Court and the counsel
for one of the appellants had initially
argued the matter on behalf of other
appellants
also
and,
therefore,
the
Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17 CPC
was not applicable in the case.

16. In Smt. Binda Bau & Ors.
(supra), the counsel for the appellant had
appeared and moved an application for
adjournment which had been rejected and
consequently
the
Board
of
Revenue
proceeded to decide the case on merits. The
facts of the case as reported in Smt. Binda
Bau & Ors (supra) show that the counsel
for the appellant was physically present in
the Court when the appeal was called for
hearing but the facts as reported do not
indicate that the counsel for the appellant
had either refused to argue the case or did
not for any other reason address the Court.
The judgment is clearly not applicable in
the facts of the present case.

17. It is also relevant to note that the
judgment in Smt. Binda Bau and Ors
(supra) relies on the Full Bench judgment
of this Court in M.S. Khalsa vs. Chiranji
Lal (AIR 1976 All 290). The Full Bench in
M.S.
Khalsa
(supra)
held
that
an
application for adjournment was within the
purview
of
the
Explanation
to
the
Allahabad amendment in Order XVII Rule
2 CPC. Order XVII Rule 2 CPC along with
Allahabad
amendment
is
reproduced
below:
1 All. Janki Prasad Vs. Sanjay Kumar & Ors.
979

"Order XVII Rule 2. Procedure if
parties fail to appear on day fixed--Where,
on any day to which the hearing of the suit
is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail
to appear, the Court may proceed to
dispose of the suit in one of the modes
directed in that behalf by Order IX or make
such other order as it thinks fit.

[Explanation.--Where the evidence or
a substantial portion of the evidence of any
party has already been recorded and such
party fails to appear on any day to which
the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the
Court may, in its discretion, proceed with
the case as if such party were present.]

High Court Amendments

ALLAHABAD.--Add the following:
"Where the evidence, or a substantial
portion of the evidence, of any party has
already been recorded, and such party fails
to appear on such day, the Court may in its
discretion proceed with the case as if such
party were present, and may dispose of it
on the merits.
Explanation.--No party shall be deemed to
have failed to appear if he is either present or
is represented in Court by an agent or
pleader, though engaged only for the purpose
of making an application."(28-5-1943)

18. Order XVII prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the Court in
trial of Suits. The procedure to be followed
by appeal Court while hearing an appeal is
prescribed in Order XLI CPC. The
Explanation to Order XVII Rule 2
(Allahabad amendment) only clarifies or
explains the phrase ''the parties or any of
them fail to appear' in Order XVII Rule 2.
Explanation added to a particular provision
in an enactment cannot be treated as an
illustration to define a similar situation or
concept in a different provision in the
same
enactment.
The
role
of
an
Explanation is to explain the meaning and
effect of the main provision to which, it is
an explanation and to clear up any doubt or
ambiguity in it'. [Dattatraya Govind
Mahajan
and
Ors.
vs.
State
of
Maharashtra and Ors (1997) 2 SCC 548;
Government of Andhra Pradesh vs.
Cooperative Bank (2007) 9 SCC 55]. The
Explanation to Order XVII Rule 2
(Allahabad amendment) cannot be read in
Order XLI Rule 17 (1) CPC to interpret the
phrase ''the appellant does not appear when
the appeal is called on for hearing'. The
phrase has to be interpreted independently
of the Explanation to Order XVII Rule 2
CPC.

19. Evidently, the judgments in
Mohammad Khalil (supra) and Smt. Binda
Bau & Ors (supra) are not applicable in the
present
case
and
do not
help
the
respondents.

20. The substantial question of law
framed by this Court is decided in favour of
the appellant and it is held that the
Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17 CPC
also applies in cases where the counsel for
the appellant, though physically present in
the Court when the appeal is called on for
hearing, refuses to argue the appeal or for
any other reason is not able to address the
Court and in such situations the appellate
Court has no jurisdiction to decide the
appeal on merits. For the aforesaid reason,
the lower appellate Court had exceeded its
jurisdiction in deciding the appeal on
merits vide its judgment dated 23.9.2015
and the appeal is to be allowed.

21. The question that remains to be
decided is regarding the order to be passed
980 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
by this Court. By virtue of Section 107
CPC the appellate Courts have the same
power as are conferred on Courts of
Original jurisdiction in respect of Suits
instituted therein. Order XLI Rule 33 CPC
provides that the appellate Court shall have
the power to pass any order which ought to
have been passed and to pass such further
other orders as the case may require. A
similar situation arose before the Division
Bench of this Court in Nasir Khan versus
Itwari & Ors.; AIR 1924 All 144 and the
Division Bench while allowing the Second
Appeal passed order which the first
appellate Court should have passed. The
Division Bench dismissed the appeal of the
Court below for default and permitted the
appellant
to
file
an
application
for
restoration of appeal which was to be
decided by the lower appellate Court on
merits.

22. Following the Division Bench
judgment of this Court in Nasir Khan
(supra), the present Second Appeal is
allowed, the judgment and decree of the
lower appellate Court is set aside and the
Regular Civil Appeal No. 5000248 of 2013
(Janki Prasad vs. Sanjay Kumar and
others) filed by the appellant is dismissed
in default. The appellant shall have the
liberty to file an application for restoration
of the said appeal before the lower
appellate Court which, if filed, shall be
decided by the lower appellate Court in
accordance with law.

22. With the aforesaid observations,
the Second Appeal is allowed.
----------
(2022)01ILR A980
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.11.2021

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Second Appeal No. 280 of 2018

Suraj Prasad ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Vandana Pitariya ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Anuj Dayal

Counsel for the Respondents:
Vipul Gupta, Mohd. Aslam Khan

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 26 -
Rectification of instrument - power of the
Court to rectify an instrument - Held -
rectification to a sale deed can be ordered
to express the real intention of parties
about identity of the property sold, but
incorrectly described in the sale deed due
to fraud or a mutual mistake - All that is to
be
seen
is
whether
the
instrument
embodies the true intention of parties; or
it does not - If it does not, it has to be
examined whether the error is the result
of fraud or a mutual mistake - In case, it is
caused
by
either
of
the
two,
the
instrument has to be rectified, though the
result of it may be an alternation in the
identity
of
the
property
sold
-
consequences
of
rectification
are
absolutely foreign to the exercise of the
power under Section 26(1) (Para 23, 25)

In the sale deed, executed by defendant, suit
property correctly described with reference to its
plot number, but village incorrectly mentioned
as Udaipur Maheva instead of Chhauchh -
plaintiff requested defendant to get mistake
rectified - defendant declined - plaintiff brought
suit seeking a rectification to the registered sale
deed - defendant admits plaintiff's case, in his
W.S. & in his testimony in the examination-inchief
 &
in
cross-examination,
 that
the
property, in respect whereof the sale deed,
subject matter of rectification, was executed, is
situate in Village Chhauchh & not in Village
Udaipur Maheva - by a mutual mistake village
came to be incorrectly described as Udaipur
Maheva instead
of Chhauchh
with other
particulars of the property correctly mentioned -