# Javed & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1736
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-16
- **Case number:** Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 781 of 2025
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir, Sanjiv Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/javed-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54711
- **Pages:** 16

## Text

_Characters 0–39,976 of 56,106. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39976 for what follows._

1736 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
12. Accordingly, it is directed that both parents shall be entitled to visit the corpus, either
jointly or individually, once every month, in a congenial and non-disruptive environment within the
premises of the school. The Headmaster of Bishop Cotton School, Shimla, is hereby directed to
facilitate such visitation without any obstruction or inconvenience. The parties are at liberty to
bring to the notice of this Court, any grievance in this regard, for appropriate directions.

13. The parties are further directed to ensure that the corpus is duly admitted to Bishop
Cotton School, Shimla, on 26.04.2026. A copy of this order shall be transmitted to the Headmaster
of the said institution for information, compliance, and necessary action by the Registrar
Compliance.

14. It is further clarified that during school vacations, the custody of the corpus shall be
equally shared between the parents, subject to the wishes, comfort, and well-being of the minor,
ensuring that his emotional and psychological needs are duly respected. 15. In view of the above,
the present habeas corpus petition is disposed of.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1736
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
THE HON'BLE SANJIV KUMAR, J.

Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 781 of 2025

Javed & Anr. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Whether the detaining authority has not applied his mind, making the detention order mechanically and
arbitrarily on the recommendation of the Sponsoring Authority, and the grounds of detention are not proper
and the detention is based on speculation; not reality and whether offences attributed to the petitioner are
such that these would constitute no more than violation of the law and order

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226 (Habeas Corpus); The National Security Act, 1980-
Section 3(3)- The petitioner was found indulging in a particular kind of an offence that
spontaneously arouses religious passions amongst a large section of the community, inciting
them to indulge in violence with the imminent likelihood of vitiation of public order in the locale.
They have slaughtered a cow, which, like always, led to frayed tempers and violent emotions
displayed by members of the public, agitating and blockading the road, and throwing life out of
gear in the locale. It is not a case, where for a simple violation of law and order or an irrelevant
consideration, like past instances of violations of law and order were taken into consideration by
the detaining Authority to infer that the detenue, if released on bail, would indulge in similar
acts, that would lead to public order being prejudicially affected.
4 All. Javed & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1737
No representation made by the petitioner against his detention, either to the State Government
or the Advisory Board, which might have been considered and decided by these two Authorities
under the NSA before confirming the petitioner's detention-It is not disputed by the petitioner
that the Advisory Board heard him in person before they advised the State Government to
confirm the detention order.

Held- No infirmity in the order impugned, ordering the petitioner's detention under the NSA.
Petition dismissed. (E-15)

(Para 34, 41 & 43)
Case Law Cited
Sameer and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2026:AHC:83732-DB;

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The National Security Act, 1980

List of Keywords
Habeas Corpus ;Section 3(3); NSA; Committed offence; Arouses religious passions; Not simple violation of
law; Detenue if released on bail; Would indulge in similar acts

Case Arising From
Detenue under the National Security Act, 1980, has petitioned this Court for the grant of a writ in the nature
of habeas corpus, declaring his detention pursuant to the order dated 05.06.2025, passed by the District
Magistrate, Shamli, illegal and with a prayer that the rule be made absolute, ordering him to be set at liberty.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for the Petitioners : Brijesh Kumar Yadava, Narendra Kumar
Counsel for the Respondents : Arvind Kumar Goswami, G.A., Shiv Kumar Pal

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. Javed, a detenue under the National Security Act, 1980, has petitioned this Court for the
grant of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, declaring his detention pursuant to the order dated
05.06.2025, passed by the District Magistrate, Shamli, illegal and with a prayer that the rule be
made absolute, ordering him to be set at liberty.

2. The case against the petitioner, on the foot of which he has been detained vide order
dated 05.06.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Shamli under Section 3(2) of the National
Security Act, 1980 (for short, 'the NSA'), is copiously set out in the grounds of detention, upon
which the order of detention is founded.

3. According to the grounds of detention, on the 15th of March, 2025, Sub-Inspector
Gyanendra Singh, Chowki In-charge Chausana, Police Station Jhinjhana, District Shamli, had left
the Chowki along with his companion policemen in the official vehicle for the purpose of
maintaining law and order, doing inquiries and serving processes etc. The Sub-Inspector had left
his Chowki at 10:10 a.m. vide G.D. Entry No.14. When the police party reached the jungle of
Village Lavvadaudpur, they received information that in the same locale in the sugarcane filed of
one Sandeep son of Aval Singh, some remains of the cows progeny lying strewn. The police party
reached the spot, that is to say, the sugarcane field owned by Sandeep and found all around the
1738 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
place, remains of the cows progeny were lying. There were eleven dismembered feet, four tails,
parts of the head, besides parts of skin and a wooden block. For the purpose of inspecting these, the
Sub-Inspector summoned Dr. Imran Ansari, a Veterinary Medical Officer, calling him over his
mobile number. The doctor, upon arrival at the spot, inspected the remains and identified these as
ones belonging to the cows progeny. Apparently, these remains of the cows progeny showed that
unknown man/ men had slaughtered cows and left these remains behind. The remains were taken
into custody by the Police, and according to the Veterinary Doctor's instructions, in order to
prevent foul stench from spreading and proliferation of infectious disease, buried them at an
appropriate place, after digging up earth. The wooden block was marked with a chit and seized.
Since this happened at the time of Holi, members of the Hindu community had frayed tempers. A
memorandum was drawn up by Sub-Inspector Gyanendra Singh, which was read out to his
companions and got signed by them.

4. The police party along with the recovery in hand returned to the police station and on the
basis of the memorandum drawn up at the spot, Crime No. 99 of 2025, under Section 3/8 of the
Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 (for short, 'the Act of 1955'), P.S. Jhinjhana,
District Shamli, was registered against unknown men vide G.D. No. 17 on 15.03.2025. The
investigation was assigned to Sub-Inspector Pramod Kumar. The Investigating Officer proceeded
to the spot, that is to say, Sandeep's sugarcane field, located in the jungle of Village Lavvadaudpur,
where he found a crowd gathered, amongst whom were members of the Hindu community, who
were much enangered. Their feelings had to be assuaged and the men persuaded to keep calm. An
I-surveillance team and an S.O.G. team were also present at the spot, who were already about their
task. The Investigating Officer undertook the necessary steps while commencing investigation, the
chief amongst which was to ascertain the identity of the offenders.

5. Upon hearing of this occurrence, the Inspector In-charge, P.S. Jhinjhana, himself, along
with a companion force, arrived at the spot only to witness a large crowd gathered there. The
members of this crowd had tempers running high over this incident of cow slaughter. This crowd
had amongst them members of various organizations, including the Hindu organizations, such as
the Rashtriya Bajrang Dal, the Pashchimi Uttar Pradesh Sanyukt Udyog Vyapar Mandal, the Shiv
Sena Mandal Saharanpur Unit, and the Akhil Bharatiya Pradhan Sangthan. These men were raising
slogans, demanding arrest of the accused, who were involved in the crime. This crowd blockaded
the Jhinjhana-Thana Bhawan Road, leading to a long queue of vehicles on both sides of the
blockade. The wayfarers and the travellers were put to much trouble on this count. This jamming of
the road on account of the blockade lasted for long hours, in consequence of which public order in
the area was torn asunder.

6. Upon receipt of information, the Circle Officer, Kairana, along with his companion
police force, also arrived and made attempts to pacify the agitated members of the crowd, who had
blockaded the public road. In the meantime information of this occurrence was sent to adjoining
police stations and additional forces summoned to the spot. The forces, that were called, were from
Police Stations Thana Bhawan, Garhipukhta, Babri. The additional forces were deployed on the
spot and the agitated residents of the villages assured about their security and that of their animals.
The police force had to patrol for a number of days in villages Naya Gaon, Dathaida, Gangarampur
Khedki, Lavvadaudpur, Shamli-Shamla, Panthupura, Jijaula, Ballamajra, Toda, Khodsama and
4 All. Javed & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1739
Laxmipura. These efforts had to be undertaken by the police force, that was summoned in order to
restore peace, where public order had been disturbed.

7. On 16.03.2025, Sub-Inspector Pramod Kumar left the station for Village Lavvadaudpur
and arriving there, he summoned a police informer and spoke to him. The informer gave him
information that in Village Basi Chundyari, there was much talk and information of the fact that
residents of that village, Iqbal son of Rashid, Jaane Alam son of Sagir, along with his companions,
Javed son of Islam (the petitioner), Wasim alias Gullu son of Salim, and Sameer son of Shamshad,
had together committed the offence of cow slaughter under investigation. The informer said that he
was gathering further details, which he would post the Investigating Officer with as soon as he had
them. The Investigating Officer proceeded along with his companions to Village Basi Chundyari,
visiting the houses of Iqbal and Jane Alam, one after the other looking. The two were not found at
home and their family members could not tell the Police about their whereabouts. Next, the
Investigating Officer proceeded to Village Mundet Khadar, looking for the petitioner, where he too
was not found at home. The petitioner's family did not disclose the details of his whereabouts.
Inquiries were made by the Police in the neighbourhood after taking them into confidence, who
disclosed that the petitioner these days was spending a lot of money and in the evenings outsiders
too come to visit him. It was revealed that the petitioner was not in the village since the day before.

8. On 16.03.2025, various police teams were going about their duties, including checking
of vehicles. Information came through a secret informer that the offenders, who were involved in
the incident of cow slaughter in Village Lavvadaudpur on 15.03.2025, would be proceeding from
Chausana to Mundet Khadar and they would be armed. The Police, which included an S.O.G.
Team, intensified their checking of vehicles. After passage of a short time, a motorcycle with two
pillion riders three in all were seen to approach from the side of Chausana. They were
attempted to be stopped, but the rider accelerated it, turning it to the left in a bid to escape.
However, this led the two wheeler being dis-balanced and it slipped, throwing the rider and the
pillions down. The three men riding it attempted to escape. Seen themselves surrounded by a police
party, they opened fire employing the illicit firearms they were carrying. The Police sustained no
injury and one of the offenders was hit by a bullet. They were overpowered. One of them was the
petitioner, who disclosed his name as Javed son of Islam. Upon the search of his person a 0.315
bore country-made pistol was recovered, which had an empty in its chamber. The others, who were
apprehended, were Iqbal and Raeesh son of Mumtaj.

9. Shorn of unnecessary details, upon apprehension, the petitioner along with the two
others, during investigation gave out the names of the remainder of their two companions and
confessed to the cow slaughter done in the sugarcane field, situate in the jungle of Village
Lavvadaudpur in the night intervening 12/ 13.03.2025. They confessed that they had slaughtered
two calves and a cow, who were roaming untethered and homeless. They revealed that the flesh
from the cows they sold fetched them Rs.20,000/-. Out of the proceeds, Iqbal purchased a mobile
handset of POCO Make for a sum of Rs.5,999/-. The balance of the proceeds were equally divided
amongst the five men involved. The petitioner along with the two others are said to have confessed
to the fact that they were on the lookout for more stray cows, when apprehended by the Police. The
petitioner and Iqbal had been shot in their lower limbs and there was blood loss. A ligature was tied
to prevent further loss of blood and both of them were conveyed to the CHC for initial medical aid.
1740 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Later, in the police lock too, after receiving treatment, the petitioner confessed to their crime in
association with others and corroborated the story that he had narrated at the time of his arrest. The
other two were also apprehended in due course, but facts relating to them, that are also detailed in
the grounds of detention in order to disclose the entire circumstances, bearing on the conduct of the
petitioner and the co-accused, leading to the detention order, need not be narrated here.

10. It is then said in the grounds of detention that the petitioner was remanded in Crime No.
99 of 2025, under Section 3/5A/8 of the Act of 1955 and Crime No. 104 of 2025, under Section
109(1) B.N.S. and Section 3/25/27 Arms Act, both relating to P.S. Jhinjhana, District Shamli, and
he was in judicial custody, incarcerated in the District Jail, Muzaffar Nagar.

11. Noting this fact, the detaining Authority has remarked in the grounds of detention that
the petitioner was consistently attempting to ensure his release from prison on bail. He had moved
the learned Magistrate's Court for bail, but failed there. Next, he moved the learned Sessions Judge
for bail, but again failed. He then applied for bail to this Court, which was granted. This fact was
clearly within the cognizance of the detaining Authority, besides the fact that notwithstanding the
grant of bail, the petitioner was still detained in the Muzaffar Nagar District Jail, awaiting release.
The detaining Authority has remarked that his release from jail is close at hand. It is then observed
by the detaining Authority that considering the petitioner's criminal propensity, there was the
likelihood that once released from prison, he would commit offences of a kind in the local limits of
P.S. Jhinjhana and adjoining areas, that would prejudicially affect public order.

12. The basis of the detaining Authority's satisfaction that once released from prison on
bail, the petitioner would again indulge in the same kind of offences, is based on three different
items of material: The first is an information sent back home from jail by the petitioner that he
would be released on bail pursuant to orders of this Court, and once released, he would carry on
with slaughtering cows because it was his livelihood. This material figured in a Beat Constables'
report, jointly submitted by two members of the police force, a Head Constable and a Constable,
who heard about it in their beat on 16.05.2025 and made an entry of it upon return to the police
station vide G.D. No.28 at 19.40 hours.

13. The second item of material is the report of Sub-Inspector Pramod Kumar, who
inquired into the truth of this Beat Constables' report and found that the contents of G.D. No. 28
dated 16.05.2025 were correct and he made his report that was entered vide G.D. Entry No. 10
dated 17.05.2025 at 10.30 hours.

14. In addition, the third item of material, that was taken into consideration, is a report of
the Local Intelligence Unit dated 29.04.2025, affirming the fact of the petitioner having conveyed
such intentions of his to his associates upon being released from prison.

15. It is on all this basis that the District Magistrate said that he was subjectively satisfied
that upon release from jail, the petitioner would indulge in repetition of offences, that would
prejudicially affect public order. In order to prevent the petitioner from committing offences that
would prejudicially affect public order, it was necessary to detain him on a preventive basis,
invoking the provisions of the NSA.
4 All. Javed & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1741
16. The grounds of detention, that were served upon the petitioner, state that he had a right
under Section 8 of the NSA to represent his case to the detaining Authority as also the State
Government. It was clarified that if the petitioner wanted to exercise his right to represent as
aforesaid to the District Magistrate, he could do so within twelve days of the detention order or
before approval of the order by the State Government. The right could be exercised by submitting a
representation through the Superintendent of the Jail, where he was detained. It was further
mentioned in the grounds that in order to represent to the State Government, he could address his
representation to the Secretary, Department of Home, Government of U.P., Lucknow and submit it
through the Superintendent of the Jail, where he was detained.

17. It was then conveyed through the grounds that under Sections 9 and 10 of the NSA, the
petitioner had a right to represent his case before the Uttar Pradesh Advisory Board, Lucknow and
the representation had to be addressed to the Registrar, Uttar Pradesh Advisory Board, Lucknow.
The representation aforesaid could be submitted through the Superintendent of the Jail, where he
was detained. The grounds also say that under Section 10 of the NSA, his case would be placed
before the Advisory Board within three weeks of his detention, and if the petitioner's representation
was received belatedly, it would not be considered. The petitioner was also informed of his right to
be heard personally before the Advisory Board, in case he elected to do so, demanding that right
through his representation to be submitted to the State Government through the Superintendent of
the Jail, where he was detained.

18. It was next enumerated in the grounds that the petitioner also had a right to represent
his case to the Central Government. That right the petitioner could exercise by addressing his
representation to the Secretary, Ministry of Home, Government of India through the Deputy
Secretary (Security), Security Division, Centre-II Building, Jai Singh Road, Near Royal Park,
Jantar Mantar, New Delhi, which too had to be submitted through the Superintendent of the Jail,
where he was detained.

19. The detention order dated 05.06.2025 was confirmed by the State Government on
14.06.2025 under Section 3(4) of the NSA, and finally by an order made on 29.07.2025, after
receipt of report from the Advisory Board for the entire duration of twelve months.

20. Aggrieved, this petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been filed.

21. This petition was instituted on 27.08.2025 and came up before the Division Bench on
29.08.2025. A notice of motion was issued on 27.08.2025, requiring parties to exchange affidavits.
On 07.10.2025, rule nisi was granted and the petition directed to come up for hearing on
28.10.2025.

22. Heard Mr. Brijesh Kumar Yadav, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Deepak
Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate-I appearing on behalf of the State and Mr.
Arvind Kumar Goswami, learned Central Government Counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of
India.
1742 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
23. A perusal of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining Authority shows that
the petitioner was arrested on 16.03.2025 in two cases, to wit: (1) Case Crime No. 99 of 2025,
under Section 3/5A/8 of the Act of 1955, P.S. Jhinjhana, District Shamli; and, Case Crime No. 104
of 2025, under Section 109(1) B.N.S. and Section 3/25/27 Arms Act, P.S. Jhinjhana, District
Shamli. In both these matters, the petitioner was remanded by the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Shamli, to judicial custody on 17.03.2025. He was served with the detention order
passed under Section 3(2) of the NSA on 05.06.2025, while still in jail in connection with the
aforesaid crimes. The detaining Authority has taken the stand that the petitioner was served with
the grounds of detention and other materials through the Jail Authorities on 05.06.2025 together
with the detention order. The detaining Authority sent the order of detention to the State
Government for their approval on 05.06.2025 through a special messenger. The State Government
approved the order of detention on 16.06.2025, which was forwarded to the Jail Authorities for its
service upon the petitioner.

24. The detaining Authority has taken the stand that the petitioner did not send any
representation to the U.P. Advisory Board through the Jail Authorities, a fact which the petitioner
has denied in paragraph no. 6 of the rejoinder affidavit filed in answer to the counter affidavit filed
on behalf of the detaining Authority. He has asserted that a representation to the Advisory Board
was sent. However, no date of the representation finds mention, much less evidence or a copy
thereof annexed to the rejoinder. The stand of the State Government is also the same that is that no
representation was submitted by the petitioner to the Advisory Board against his detention. Be that
as it may.

25. The Advisory Board sent a communication dated 07.07.2025 to the effect that the date
of hearing fixed before them was 09.07.2025. The petitioner was sent to attend before the Advisory
Board, that is to say, for a personal hearing on the date fixed. The petitioner appeared before the
Advisory Board on the said date. The Advisory Board submitted a report, favouring confirmation
of the detention order. The State Government then passed orders on 29.07.2025, confirming the
detention order, on the basis of the Advisory Board's report for the entire period of twelve months.
The fact that the petitioner was personally heard before the Advisory Board is not denied in the
rejoinder put in to the detaining Authority's counter affidavit. The State Government's counter
affidavit is consistent with the detaining Authority's return.

26. There is a counter affidavit also filed on behalf of the Superintendent, District Jail
Muzaffar Nagar. In paragraph no. 8 of the counter affidavit, it is asserted that the petitioner did not
submit any representation to the Authorities at the District Jail Muzaffar Nagar. No rejoinder has
been filed in answer to the Jail Superintendent's counter affidavit with the result that the assertion
in paragraph no. 8 of the counter affidavit aforesaid remains unrebutted.

27. A counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the Union of India, where in
paragraph no. 5, it is asserted that no representation either from the detenue or on his behalf has
been received in the Section concerned of the Ministry of Home Affairs so far. There is no
rejoinder in answer to the aforesaid counter affidavit.
4 All. Javed & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1743
28. Mr. Brijesh Kumar Yadav, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has urged that the
detaining Authority has not applied his mind, making the detention order mechanically and
arbitrarily on the recommendation of the Sponsoring Authority, that is to say, the Police. It is next
argued that the grounds of detention are not proper and the detention is based on speculation; not
reality. The next submission is that the offences attributed to the petitioner are such that these
would constitute no more than violation of the law and order, even if established at the trial. These
can never constitute violation of public order, on the basis of which the petitioner can be
preventively detained. There is no material to show that the offences attributed to the petitioner
could or did lead to vitiation of public order. Since there is no case, more than that of a violation of
the law and order, the prosecution launched against the petitioner would test his guilt or prove him
innocent. There is absolutely no basis to invoke the NSA and detain the petitioner without trial. It is
next argued that the petitioner's right to represent against the detention order, which is not only a
statutory right under the NSA, but a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 22 of the
Constitution, has been infringed, inasmuch as the petitioner sent his representation through the Jail
Superintendent, Muzaffar Nagar to the Secretary (Home), Government of U.P., Lucknow and the
Uttar Pradesh Advisory Board, but the same remained pending, while his detention order was
confirmed without considering the petitioner's representation, either by the State Government or the
Advisory Board.

29. Mr. Deepak Mishra, learned A.G.A., has refuted the submissions advanced on behalf of
the petitioner and submitted that the detention order has been made well within the requirements of
the law. He has taken us through the various affidavits and the material, upon which the order of
detention is founded.

30. So far as the submission that the impugned order is one made without application of
mind is concerned, we do not think that, that is the case. A perusal of the grounds of detention
show that there is a copious consideration not only of the crime disclosed in the FIR, giving rise to
Crime No.99 of 2025, but the circumstances of the occurrence and its impact in the locale, where
the offence was committed, vis-a-vis the issue of public order. This is not a case, where there is a
mechanical recital of the fact alone that the offence constitutes a violation of public order, but
shows due application of mind to the offence and its impact in the locale on the maintenance of
public order. It is also not the case that the detaining Authority has proceeded to pass the detention
order without application of mind to the requirements of the law, after describing the ramifications
of the offence in the locale. The Authority has held it to be an act that vitiated public order. It is
also remarked by the Authority on the basis of material before it that it was subjectively satisfied
that the petitioner was attempting to secure his release on bail and that the petitioner has moved this
Court for bail, which had been granted, but for the present, the petitioner was still incarcerated in
jail. It is further remarked that in this manner his release from jail would soon take place. It is then
said that looking to the petitioner's criminal propensities, it is evident that once released from jail,
he is likely to indulge in the commission of such criminal offences, which would prejudicially
affect public order within the local limits of P.S. Jhinjhana and the local limits of the adjoining
police stations, that look over the rural areas. All these features, which figure in the grounds of
detention, make it evident that this is not a case, where it can be said that the order of detention has
been passed without application of mind. The first point urged by the learned Counsel for the
petitioner is, therefore, negatived.
1744 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
31. The matter does not end here. What we notice is that the detaining Authority has done a
careful consideration of all matters relevant to the question of passing a detention order under the
NSA.

32. There is a detailed description of the events of the day beginning with discovery of
remains of the cow and its progeny by the police party in the sugarcane field, located in the jungle
of Village Lavvadaudpur. The events that unfolded thereafter are amply recorded with movement
of police party, deployment of police force, protest by the public, blockade of the road and
dislocation of life on the day in the locale, where it all happened. In the circumstances, to say that
the grounds of detention are not proper and the detention based on speculation, is stated to be
rejected.

33. The next point that arises for consideration is, if the act attributed to the petitioner or
the offence committed by him is no more than violation of law and order or these go way beyond it
to constitute a violation of public order. We must notice here that we have dealt with this point in
our judgment of date, arising out of the same incident in Sameer and another v. State of U.P. and
others, 2026:AHC:83732-DB. There we have held:

 "27. This takes us to the next submission that the crime reported against the petitioner, on
the foot of which the impugned order of detention has been passed, is no more than an instance of
the violation of law and order; not an incident, which prejudically affects public order, so as to
entitle the respondents to detain the petitioner without trial, invoking the provisions of the NSA.

 28. We must remark here that in the genesis of every event, that is an infraction of the
public order or its vitiation, there is some crime punishable by law, which can always be termed as
a violation of law and order. The violation of law and order is, of course, to be punished in
accordance with law after prosecuting the offender, but this does not mean that every infraction of
the law and order, that spins out of its trouble spot and widely affects the even tempo of life, is to
be regarded as a violation of law and order alone. Whether a violation of the law and order would
be just that and no more or have a cascading effect, unsettling the even tempo of life in the locale,
or even far and wide, is dependent upon the circumstances, the time, the place and the situation,
where the infraction is committed. The point is well elucidated in the celebrated decision of the
Supreme Court in Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1966 SC 740, where
their Lordships of the Constitution Bench held:

 "54. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules which
permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the
apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but
disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most
serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of
disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law
and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead
to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards
quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers
4 All. Javed & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1745
to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public
order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise
communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of
public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order
but before if can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large.
A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action
under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District
Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but
not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.

 55. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited)
was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and
order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to
imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the
next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then
easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public
order but not security of the State. By using the expression "maintenance of law and order" the
District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of
India Rules."

 29. The point is again considered in Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98,
where the concept of public order, as distinguished from law and order, has been eloquently
explained by their Lordship thus:

 "3. The submission of the counsel is that these are stray acts directed against individuals
and are not subversive of public order and therefore the detention on the ostensible ground of
preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order was not justified. In support of
this submission reference is made to three cases of this Court: Dr Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of
Bihar [(1966) 1 SCR 709]; Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of W.B. [WP No. 179 of 1968, decided on
November 7, 1968: (1969) 1 SCC 10] and Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commissioner of Police,
Calcutta [WP No. 102 of 1969, decided on August 4, 1969: (1969) 2 SCC 426]. In Dr Ram
Manohar Lohia case [(1966) 1 SCR 709] this Court pointed out the difference between
maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its
disturbance. Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public
order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a
specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against
individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public
tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its affect upon the life of the community in a locality
which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for
instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the
community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another
case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community.
This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of
life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of
the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the
1746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ
from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of assault on girls. A
guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them
and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a
fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and
order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his
activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their
ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential
quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its affect upon the
public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely
places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public
order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of
their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely
committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It
means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or
has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and
the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public
order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognised as
meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ
Petition No. 179 of 1968 drew a line of demarcation between the serious and aggravated forms of
breaches of public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large from
minor breaches of peace which do not affect the public at large. He drew an analogy between
public and private crimes. The analogy is useful but not to be pushed too far. A large number of
acts directed against persons or individuals may total up into a breach of public order. In Dr Ram
Manohar Lohia case examples were given by Sarkar and Hidayatullah, JJ. They show how similar
acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the
other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its affect upon the community. The question
to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a
disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the
society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by
which one case can be distinguished from another."

 30. There are some issues, where the community is sensitive to the extent that if these
surface, there is an inherent potentiality of creating widespread ripples in society that would affect
the even tempo of life. One of them is cow slaughter. The slaughtering of a cow, whenever reported
or detected, spontaneously evokes strong emotions and violent reactions for obvious injury to
religious beliefs of a large section of the society. History is replete with instances of profusion of
emotions and violence that an incident of this kind entails. And, it is not that these are matters of
historical record to be read in books or fancied about in contemporary world. Violent reactions at
the happening of cow slaughter are so well reputed that no one can feign ignorance of the fact,
violation of the law apart. Public order is after all not about what the intention of the individual
was, or what law he has violated. It is about the impact that his act generates.