# Jitendra Pratap Singh v. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors. 436 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 435
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-26
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 12083 of 2019
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jitendra-pratap-singh-v-upsanchalak-chakbandi-sultanpur-camp-lucknow-ors-436-53907
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

Issue for consideration
Whether an incumbent, who otherwise has
interest in property, loses his right in the
property in question and stands ousted from the
property merely because he has not at all
participated in the proceedings in question?

Headnotes
A. Property Law - U. P. Consolidation of
Holdings, Act, 1953: Ss. 4(2), 9, 49;
Limitation Act: Section 17 - The revenue
court while dealing with the suit for
declaration can, on coming to the finding
that the entries made by the consolidation
authorities were procured by fraud and
were wrong, declare the plaintiff's right as
tenure holder and direct that the entries
be corrected accordingly. (Para 44)

In present case, the plaintiff's case was that
the plot in dispute was purchased through a
registered sale deed dated 17.3.1969, both
by
the
plaintiff
and
defendant
(writ
petitioner), who was a co-sharer. The case
of the plaintiff further was that it was the
defendant petitioner who was looking after
the cases in the court, and the plaintiff, who
was living in the forest, being Gaderiya
looking after his goats, was duped by the
defendant in removing his name from the
revenue record. The plaintiff has also
claimed that after the sale deeds, both
parties came in possession. A co-sharer
who claim to be in possession of the
property
and
whose
name
is
not
recorded
in
the
consolidation
proceeding
is
not
debarred
from
bringing a suit u/s 229-B for correcting
the entries and recording his name, also
if the allegation is that his name was
removed by practising fraud on him. (Para
45)

B. When the name of a co-tenure holder
could not be recorded by practising fraud,
the entries in consolidation proceeding
can be challenged and bar of Section 49
would not at all come into place since
fraud vitiates even the most solemn
proceeding. (Para 46)

The U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not
deal with the grant of authority to grant
substantive rights to a tenure holder, rather it is
only empowered to recognize the existing rights
of tenure holder and in the said direction a fullfledged mechanism has been provided for. (Para
48)

C. Landed property be it individually,
jointly, or based on co-sharer confers
rights over the property in question and
the said rights in question can be defeated
or be taken away only in accordance with
law. (Para 49)

A right of property is a human right and
also a constitutional right and the same
cannot
be
taken
away
except
in
accordance with law. Article 300-A of the
Constitution protects such a right and as far as
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 is
concerned, the purpose of the aforementioned
Act is not at all to divest an incumbent of such
right keeping in view the provisions of Article
300-A of the Constitution of India as its
paramount object is to see that agricultural
activity is to be carried out in one area and in
case at the point of time of constituting one
compact are, in respect of one compact area in
case anyone has to raise any issue, he can
come forward. (Para 50)

D.
Section
49
of
the
1953
Act
contemplates a bar to the jurisdiction of
the Civil or Revenue Court for the grant of
a declaration or adjudication of rights of
tenure holders in respect of land lying in
an
area
for
which
consolidation
proceedings
have
commenced.
The
Supreme Court has further held that
Section 49 of the 1953 Act is a provision
of transitory suspension of jurisdiction of
the Civil or Revenue Court only during the
period when consolidation proceedings
are pending. (Para 55)

Notably, such suspension of jurisdiction of these
Courts through the non obstante provision is
only with respect to the declaration and
adjudication of rights of tenure holders. In other
9 All. Jitendra Pratap Singh Vs. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors.
437
words, unless a person is a pre-existing tenure
holder, Section 49 does not come into
operation. (Para 56)

E. The object of the 1953 Act is to prevent
fragmentation of the land holdings and
consolidate them in such a

## Text

_Characters 0–39,810 of 73,157. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39810 for what follows._

9 All. Jitendra Pratap Singh Vs. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors.
435
issue with regard to validity of Will
allegedly executed in favour of petitioners.
Only two issues, i.e., "whether name of Kamla
Kant alias Lallan was wrongly recorded in
Khata No. 40 and 130" and "what would be
the share of parties in land in dispute", were
framed. No objection was raised by petitioners
at relevant stage, i.e., before Consolidation
Officer and they have led evidence only on
basis of aforesaid two issues and accordingly
the Consolidation Officer passed order
whereby objections filed by petitioners were
rejected.

10. Admittedly, petitioners are not part of
family of Kadedeen, therefore, a doubt that
said Kadedeen could execute a Will in favour
of strangers, would be a natural doubt,
specifically when all three authorities have
returned a finding that family members of
Kadedeen have cordial relations amongst each
other. The execution of Will, therefore,
surrounds with suspicious circumstances.

11. Surya Narain son of Kadedeen, died
in 1945, when Kadedeen was alive and in
normal circumstances it could not be believed
that Kadedeen would disassociate his minor
grandson, when there was no evidence that
there was uncordial relationship between
father and son. Settlement Officer of
Consolidation has also upheld said findings.
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
has
considered the issue of Will at length that it
was dated 07.05.1951 and though he referred
that a 20 years old document, if submitted
from a genuine custody, could be considered a
genuine document, however, still a finding
was returned that petitioners have failed to
prove the Will in accordance with law as well
as upheld the suspicious circumstances.

12. Aforesaid concurrent findings were
based on material and at this belated stage the
Court cannot reopen the issue of Will, since all
the authorities under Act, 1953 have put a
doubt on the manner of execution of Will,
which are legally valid also.

13.
Consolidation
proceedings
were
commenced in the year 1977, i.e., 48 years ago
and this writ petition was filed against concurrent
findings of all three authorities under Act, 1953
in the year 1980, i.e., about 45 years ago. The
prayer for stay was already rejected by this
Court, therefore, at this stage even if the Court
considers argument of learned counsel for
petitioners that issue of Will could be decided,
however, the matter cannot be remitted to
Consolidation Officer. Otherwise also, the Court
is of the view that concurrent findings cannot be
disturbed since the same are not perverse.

14. The Court also takes note of a
judgment passed by this Court in Satish
Chandra Sharma vs. State of U.P. and
others,
2023:AHC:233235
wherein
the
manner to prove a Will was discussed at length
and since admittedly petitioners have failed to
prove Will in accordance with law, therefore,
also no case of interference is made out in the
concurrent orders passed by all three authorities
under Act, 1953.

15. The writ petition is accordingly
dismissed.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 435
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 26.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ B No. 12083 of 2019

Jitendra Pratap Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp
Lucknow & Ors. ...Respondents
436 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Petitioner:

Counsel for the Respondents:

Issue for consideration
Whether an incumbent, who otherwise has
interest in property, loses his right in the
property in question and stands ousted from the
property merely because he has not at all
participated in the proceedings in question?

Headnotes
A. Property Law - U. P. Consolidation of
Holdings, Act, 1953: Ss. 4(2), 9, 49;
Limitation Act: Section 17 - The revenue
court while dealing with the suit for
declaration can, on coming to the finding
that the entries made by the consolidation
authorities were procured by fraud and
were wrong, declare the plaintiff's right as
tenure holder and direct that the entries
be corrected accordingly. (Para 44)

In present case, the plaintiff's case was that
the plot in dispute was purchased through a
registered sale deed dated 17.3.1969, both
by
the
plaintiff
and
defendant
(writ
petitioner), who was a co-sharer. The case
of the plaintiff further was that it was the
defendant petitioner who was looking after
the cases in the court, and the plaintiff, who
was living in the forest, being Gaderiya
looking after his goats, was duped by the
defendant in removing his name from the
revenue record. The plaintiff has also
claimed that after the sale deeds, both
parties came in possession. A co-sharer
who claim to be in possession of the
property
and
whose
name
is
not
recorded
in
the
consolidation
proceeding
is
not
debarred
from
bringing a suit u/s 229-B for correcting
the entries and recording his name, also
if the allegation is that his name was
removed by practising fraud on him. (Para
45)

B. When the name of a co-tenure holder
could not be recorded by practising fraud,
the entries in consolidation proceeding
can be challenged and bar of Section 49
would not at all come into place since
fraud vitiates even the most solemn
proceeding. (Para 46)

The U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not
deal with the grant of authority to grant
substantive rights to a tenure holder, rather it is
only empowered to recognize the existing rights
of tenure holder and in the said direction a fullfledged mechanism has been provided for. (Para
48)

C. Landed property be it individually,
jointly, or based on co-sharer confers
rights over the property in question and
the said rights in question can be defeated
or be taken away only in accordance with
law. (Para 49)

A right of property is a human right and
also a constitutional right and the same
cannot
be
taken
away
except
in
accordance with law. Article 300-A of the
Constitution protects such a right and as far as
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 is
concerned, the purpose of the aforementioned
Act is not at all to divest an incumbent of such
right keeping in view the provisions of Article
300-A of the Constitution of India as its
paramount object is to see that agricultural
activity is to be carried out in one area and in
case at the point of time of constituting one
compact are, in respect of one compact area in
case anyone has to raise any issue, he can
come forward. (Para 50)

D.
Section
49
of
the
1953
Act
contemplates a bar to the jurisdiction of
the Civil or Revenue Court for the grant of
a declaration or adjudication of rights of
tenure holders in respect of land lying in
an
area
for
which
consolidation
proceedings
have
commenced.
The
Supreme Court has further held that
Section 49 of the 1953 Act is a provision
of transitory suspension of jurisdiction of
the Civil or Revenue Court only during the
period when consolidation proceedings
are pending. (Para 55)

Notably, such suspension of jurisdiction of these
Courts through the non obstante provision is
only with respect to the declaration and
adjudication of rights of tenure holders. In other
9 All. Jitendra Pratap Singh Vs. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors.
437
words, unless a person is a pre-existing tenure
holder, Section 49 does not come into
operation. (Para 56)

E. The object of the 1953 Act is to prevent
fragmentation of the land holdings and
consolidate them in such a fair and
equitable manner that each tenure holder
gets nearly equivalent land rights in the
same revenue estate, and that the duty of
a Consolidation Officer u/s 49 of the 1953
Act is to prevent fragmentation and
consolidate the different parcels of land of
a tenure holder.

The power u/s 49 of the 1953 Act cannot be
exercised to take away the vested title of a
tenure
holder.
No
such
jurisdiction
is
conferred upon a Consolidation Officer or
any other Authority under the 1953 Act. The
power to declare the ownership in an
immovable property can be exercised only by
a Civil Court save and except when such
jurisdiction
is
barred
expressly
or
by
implication under a law. Section 49 of the
1953 Act does not and cannot be
construed as a bar on the jurisdiction of
the
Civil
Court
to
determine
the
ownership rights. (Para 57)

In present case, petitioner is claiming his rights
through Smt Kulvanta Devi, his mother, on the
basis
of
a
registered
sale
deed
dated
19/03/1959.
Therefore,
even
before
the
consolidation proceedings, Smt Kulvanta Devi
was the joint owner of the property, and such
rights cannot be taken away during the
consolidation proceedings.

F. The delay was duly explained and no
objections
were
ever
filed
by
the
respondents
and
in
the
peculiar
circumstances of the case, where the
order impugned was based on fraud, the
benefit of section 17 of the Limitation Act
would accrue to the petitioner, and
accordingly, the delay ought to have been
condoned. (Para 60)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and
another Vs. Mst. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC
107 (Para 22)

2. G. Ramegowda, Major and others Vs. Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2
SCC 142 (Para 23)

3. G. Ramegowda, Major and others Vs. Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2
SCC 142 (Para 24)

4. State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and others
(Para 245)

5. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shanti Misra
(Para 25)

6. N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (Para
25)

7. State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and
Special Tehsildar (Para 25)

8. Land Acquisition Vs. K.V. Ayisumma (Para
25)

9. Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited
Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation
and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 (Para 26)

10. Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar
Singh and others, AIR 2010 SC 228 (Para 27)

11. Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and
others, (2010) 8 SCC 685 (Para 28)

12. Union of India Vs. Ram Charan, AIR 1964
SC 215 (Para 28)

13. P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala,
(1997) 7 SCC 556 (Para 28)

14. Katari Suryanarayana Vs. Koppisetti Subba
Rao, AIR 2009 SC 2907 (Para 28)

15.
Maniben
Devraj
Shah
Vs.
Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC
1629 (Para 29)

16. Vedabai Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil,
(2001) 9 SCC 106 (Para 29)
438 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
17. V. Papayya Sastry and others Vs. Govt. of
A.P. and others, (2007) 4 SCC 221 (Para 34)

18. Prashant Singh and others Vs. Meena and
others, (2024) 6 SCC 818 (Para 35)

19.
Esha
Bhattacharjee
Vs.
Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and
others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 (Para 36)

20. Vijay Narayan Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation and 6 others, Writ-B No.218 of
2022 (Para 36)

21. Nanda Vs. DDC Ghaziabad and others, WritB No.9205 of 2001 (Para 36)

22. Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY L.R.'s and
Others Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (L.A.)
SLP (Civil) No.31248 of 2018 (Para 36)

23. Raj Kishore Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation and others, C.M.W.P. No.3372 of
1999 (Para 36)

24. Jagdish Ram Vs. DDC, Barabanki and others,
2025 AHC-LKO 16108 (Para 36)

25. Gafoor and another Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation and others, AIR 1975 SC 1716
(Para 37)

26. Smt. Kiran Devi Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Ghaziabad, 2008 (1) RJ 643 (Para
37)

27. Randhir Singh Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Saharanpur and 5 others, Writ-B
No.23936/2017 decided on 14.7.2017 (Para 37)

28. Ashok Kumar Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Allahabad Camp and others, 2009
(9) ADJ 32 (Para 38)

29. Sita Ram Vs. Chhota Bhondey, AIR 1991 SC
249 (Para 40)

30. Amar Singh Vs. State of U.P., 2008 (104) RD
421 (Para 42)

31. Smt. Sudama Vs. Hansraj, 1981 R.D. 116
(Para 44)

32. Karbalai Begum Vs. Mohd. Sayeed and
others, AIR 1981 SC 77 (Para 45)

33. N. Padmamma Vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy,
AIR 2008 SC 2834 (Para 50)

34. Rajiv Sarin Vs. State of U.K., 2011 (8) SCC
708 (Para 51)

35. Amar Nath Vs. Kewla Devi and another, AIR
SCW 3110 (Para 54)

36. Prashant Singh and others Vs. Meena and
others, (2024) 6 SCC 818 (Para 55)

List of Acts
U. P. Consolidation of Holdings, Act, 1953;
Limitation Act; U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950.

List of Keywords
sufficient
cause,
consolidation,
delay,
Condonation, fragmentation, fraud.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner: Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma
For Respondent: Standing Counsel for the
State-respondents and Sri Upendra Nath Mishra,
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Amit Kumar
Singh for the private respondents

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma,
learned counsel for the petitioner, as well
as learned Standing counsel for the Staterespondents and Sri Upendra Nath Mishra,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Amit
Kumar
Singh
for
the
private
respondents.

2. The petitioner, being aggrieved by
the rejection of his claim with regard to the
property situated at Khata no.26 in village
Adharkhera, Parghana Mahona, Tehsil
Bakshi Ka Talab, District Lucknow, from
Jagan, which was purchased jointly by his
mother, Smt Kulwanta Devi, and Lalta
Singh, has assailed the orders dated
9 All. Jitendra Pratap Singh Vs. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors.
439
02/03/1960
passed
by
the
Assistant
Consolidation
Officer,
order
dated
11/03/2015 passed by the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation, and order dated
16/02/2019 passed by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation.

3. According to the petitioners, the
disputed land was purchased vide a
registered sale deed on 19/03/1959 by Sri
Kamta Singh, the father of the petitioner,
who paid the consideration for the purchase
of the said land, which was registered in the
name of Smt. Kulwanta Devi, his wife, and
Lalta Singh, his brother. Lalta Singh moved
an application for mutation based on the
aforesaid Sale dated 19/03/1959 before the
Assistant Consolidation Officer, and the
land was mutated only in the name of Lalta
Singh.

4. It is the case of the petitioners that
the said land continued to be in joint
possession of the mother of the petitioner
and a younger brother-in-law (Devar), and
she was not aware that Lalta Singh had got
the land mutated in his own name only,
even though, as per the sale deed, the land
was jointly purchased.

5. It was submitted that in the
meantime, the consolidation operation had
been held in the said village twice, the 1st
proceedings were conducted between 1960
and 1966, and secondly from 1996 to 2002.
The mother of the petitioner, namely Smt.
Kulwanta Devi has died in the meantime.
The petitioner stated that he is the son and
legal heir, along with the party No. 2 of
Smt. Kulwanta Devi, and that they came to
know about the mutation of the disputed
land in the name of Lalta Singh, only on
23/09/2013 from inspection of the record,
and after taking legal opinion, challenged
the order of mutation dated 02/03/1960 by
filing an appeal before the Settlement of the
Consolidation, Lucknow.

6. The appeal was decided and
rejected on 11/03/2015, thereby declining
to condone the delay in filing the said
appeal. Before the appellate authority, it
was the case of the petitioner that the entire
sale consideration for the sale of the
disputed property was given by their father,
Sri Kamta Singh, while the sale deed was
executed in favour of Smt. Kulwanta Devi
and Lalta Singh. The father of the
petitioner, Kamta Singh, was working in
the police department and was posted in
Moradabad. He superannuated from service
in 1971 from Sitapur, and the appellant was
living with him all along and therefore was
not aware of the mutation proceedings
having been carried out by Lalta Singh.
After his retirement, his father started
living in the village Teghna Mau and died
in 1990, and during this period, the
appellant could hardly visit Lucknow or
find out about the disputed land. It was
further stated that the petitioner and his
brother got involved in the agricultural
work in the disputed land jointly with the
successor in interest of Lalta Singh, and
there was therefore never any doubt about
their ownership, nor did they suspect any
wrongdoing that Lalta Singh would have
got the land mutated in his name only to the
exclusion
of
Smt.
Kulwanta
Devi
fraudulently
had
further
categorically
denied that the Smt. Kulwanta Devi had
entered into any sort of compromise or
agreement with Lalta Singh before the
consolidation officer so that the land could
be mutated in his name alone.

7. Before the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation, the opposite parties Nos. 1
and 2 accepted the fact that the sale deed
was jointly in the name of Lalta Singh and
440 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Smt. Kulvanta Devi and there was no legal
basis for having the land recorded in the
name of only Lalta Singh to the exclusion
of Kulvanta Devi.

8.
The
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation considered the fact that in
the
second
round
of
consolidation
notification under Section 52 had already
been issued on 22.8.2003 and was of the
view that once the first consolidation
proceedings had been concluded, then the
petitioner lost any right to file an appeal
with regard to orders passed in the second
consolidation proceedings. In the said
circumstances, the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation found that the delay of 53
years is an extremely long length of time
and no satisfactory explanation has been
given by the petitioner, apart from which
the consolidation proceedings have been
conducted twice, and such a long delay
cannot be condoned and thereby dismissed
the appeal filed by the petitioner.

9. The petitioner, being aggrieved by
the order of the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation dated 11.3.2015, filed a
revision before the Deputy Director of
Consolidation.
Before
the
revisional
authority, it was submitted that the
petitioners had duly explained the delay in
filing the said appeal, apart from which the
opposite party had not filed any objection,
and accordingly stated that the delay in
filing the appeal ought to have been
condoned.
The
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation examined the entire factual
controversy and the grounds taken by the
petitioner,
and
also
considered
the
objection of the opposite parties and upheld
the order of the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation. He has further taken into
consideration that the brother of the
petitioner, Yogendra Pratap Singh, has not
joined him in filing the appeal and has been
made the respondent in the revision.

10. Considering the aforesaid facts, he
found that the delay of 53 years is not liable
to be condoned and accordingly rejected
the same.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner
assailing
the
impugned
orders
has
submitted that there is no dispute with
regard to the fact that, as per the sale deed
dated 19.3.1959, the land was purchased
jointly in the name of Lalta Singh, son of
Babu Madhav Singh and the mother of the
petitioner, namely Kulvanta Devi. He
further submitted that any order of
mutation passed on the basis of the
aforesaid registered sale deed ought to have
been made jointly in the name of Kulvanta
Devi and Lalta Singh, but by exercising
undue pressure and with collusion of
revenue authorities, Lalta Singh got the
land mutated only in his own name in
proceedings under Section 9 of U. P.
Consolidation of Holdings, Act. He submits
that in the appeal, he had given adequate
reasons so that the appellate authority could
set aside the delay, much as the father of
the petitioner, who was working in the
police department, served in various
districts, and the petitioner, who was a
student, had been accompanying his father
wherever he was posted. He further submits
that his father superannuated from service
in 1971 from Tigahana Mau and died in
1990. It is further stated that the petitioner
and
his
brother
started
agricultural
activities along with his relatives on the
disputed land, and it is only in 2013 that he
came to know that the land had been
recorded exclusively in the name of Lalta
Singh. They inspected the record and filed
an appeal. It was stated that the delay has
been satisfactorily explained, and there is
9 All. Jitendra Pratap Singh Vs. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors.
441
no finding that the grounds given by the
petitioner were false or incorrect, or that
they had any knowledge about the order
dated 02/03/1960.

12. It was vehemently submitted that
there is no dispute that the predecessor-ininterest of the respondents had fraudulently
got the entire land mutated in the name of
Lalta Singh and accordingly in such
circumstances benefit of Section 17 of the
Limitation Act was available to the
petitioners and any solemn act which has
been done fraudulently cannot be sustained
and, therefore, in the peculiar facts of the
present case the revision preferred by the
petitioner ought to have been allowed.

13. The petitioners have further
submitted that any order which has been
obtained by fraud is a nullity and non-est in
the eyes of the law, and if that being the
case, the order obtained by fraud can be
challenged in any court at any time or even
in collateral proceedings. The basis of the
aforesaid arguments is that Lalta Prasad
had got the land mutated clandestinely
without
disclosing
this
fact
to
the
predecessor of the interest of the petitioner
exclusively in his name, even though the
said mutation was made based on the sale
deed dated 19.3.1959.

14. The petition has been vehemently
opposed by Sri Upendra Nath Mishra,
Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Amit
Kumar Singh as well as Learned Counsel
for respondent no.6. It was stated that a
family settlement was arrived at between
the parties where it was stated that both the
brothers had resolved that they shall keep
their lands separately whereas Kamta
Prasad shall relinquish his rights in favour
of Lalta Prasad in the disputed land. It was
stated that it is on the basis of the said
compromise that by means of an order
dated 02.03.1960, his land came to be
recorded only in the name of Kamta
Prasad. It was further stated that as the
village fell into consolidation operations
from 1960-66, where no objections were
filed by the petitioner, and Smt Kulwanta
Devi died in 1980, and during her lifetime,
no objections were filed against the order
dated 02.03.1960. It was submitted that the
second consolidation proceedings were
initiated in 1996 and concluded in 2003,
and no dispute was raised by the petitioner
or his brother, and accordingly supported
the order passed by the Settlement Officer
of
Consolidation
in
the
second
consolidation proceedings. He submits that
such inordinate delay in initiating legal
proceedings cannot be condoned.

15. It was further submitted that as the
petitioner had not filed any objection under
Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, they were precluded from
invoking the provisions of Section 11 of the
1953 Act and, therefore, the appeal
preferred by the petitioner itself was not
maintainable.

16. It was further submitted that all the
disputes relating to title are decided in
consolidation
proceedings
and
no
objection/appeal or revision was preferred
by
the
petitioner
during
the
first
consolidation proceedings and in allowing
the statutory prohibition provided for under
Section 49, the appeal filed by the
petitioner was not maintainable accordingly
it was submitted that there is no infirmity in
the impugned orders dated 2.3.1960,
11.3.2015 and 16.2.2019 and prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition.

17. Considering the rival contentions,
it is noticed that there is no dispute with
442 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
regard to the essential facts in issue. The
dispute in the present case relates to the
property situated at Khata No. 26 in Village
Adharkhera, Parghana Mohana, Tehsil
Bakshi Ka Talab, District Lucknow, which
was jointly purchased by means of a
registered sale deed dated 19.3.1959 in the
name of Smt. Kulvanta Devi and Lalta
Singh. On the basis of the application given
by Lalta Singh, aforesaid property came to
be recorded exclusively in the name of
Lalta Singh by means of order dated
2.3.1960 passed by Assistant Consolidation
Officer after a delay of nearly 53 years the
appeal has been filed by the petitioner
challenging the order dated 2.3.1960 which
has been rejected on the ground of
limitation by means of order dated
11.3.2015 and even Deputy Director of
Consolidation has rejected the revision by
his order dated 16.2.2019.

18. The appellants in the said case had
pleaded that the orders passed by the
competent
authority
under
the
Consolidation of Holdings Act had attained
finality and Kamta Singh and Smt Kulvanta
Devi had lost their right, title, and interest
in the subjected land and further that the
appeal was filed hopelessly time barred
and, therefore, the Deputy Director of
Consolidation also rejected the revision
preferred by the petitioner.

19.
Per
contra,
the
petitioners/respondents had contended that
neither Section 49 of the Act of 1953 nor
the Consolidation Officer was competent to
interfere with the ancestral rights as tenure
holder on the subject land of Kamta Singh.
It was further urged that Smt Kulvanta
Devi was a co-tenure holder of the subject
land along with Kamta Singh or his
successor, and the possession of the land
continued in favour of all the co-tenure
holders, and even if one of them was in
actual
physical
possession,
the
said
possession was permissible on behalf of all
the co-owners. It was submitted that the
initial order was passed during the first
consolidation proceedings by the Assistant
Consolidation Officer on 02/03/1960.

20. In the present dispute, the
appellate authority has already noticed that
neither the sale deed is controverted, nor
the fact that the property ought to have
been mutated in the joint name of Lalta
Singh and Smt Kulvanta Devi.

21. Before we delve into the factual
scenario and the defensibility of the order
condoning delay, it seems prudent to state
the obligation of the court when dealing
with an application for condonation of
delay and the approach to be adopted while
considering the grounds for condonation of
such a substantial delay.

22. In Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and
others (1987) 2 SCC 107, a two-Judge
Bench observed that the legislature has
conferred power to condone delay by
enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation
Act of 1963 to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing of
matters
on
merits.
The
expression
"sufficient
cause"
employed
by
the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice,
for that is the life-purpose for the existence
of the institution of courts. The learned
Judges emphasized the adoption of a liberal
approach
while
dealing
with
the
applications for condonation of delay, as
ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late, and
refusal to condone delay can result in a
9 All. Jitendra Pratap Singh Vs. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors.
443
meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold and the cause of justice
being defeated. It was stressed that there
should not be a pedantic approach, but the
doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that
the matter has to be dealt with in a rational
common-sense
pragmatic
manner
and
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred over the technical considerations.
It was also ruled that there is no
presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately or on account of culpable
negligence and that the courts are not
supposed to legalise injustice on technical
grounds, as it is the duty of the court to
remove injustice. In the said case the
Division Bench observed that the State,
which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigantnon-grata status and the courts are required
to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of
interpretation of the expression "sufficient
cause".

23. In G. Ramegowda, Major and
others v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142
Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then
was), speaking for the Court, has opined
thus:-

"The contours of the area of
discretion of the courts in the matter of
condonation of delays in filing appeals are
set out in a number of pronouncements of
this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[3] ;
Shakuntala
Devi
Jain
v.
Kuntal
Kumari[4] ; Concord of India Insurance
Co. Ltd. V. Nirmala Devi[5] ; Lala Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan[6] ; Collector, Land
Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true,
no general principle saving the party from all
mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence,
deliberate or gross inaction, or lack of bona
fide on the part of the party or its counsel,
there is no reason why the opposite side
should be exposed to a time-barred appeal.
Each case will have to be considered on the
particularities of its own special facts.
However, the expression 'sufficient cause' in
Section 5 must receive a liberal construction
so as to advance substantial justice and
generally delays in preferring appeals are
required to be condoned in the interest of
justice where no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is
imputable to the party seeking condonation of
the delay."

24. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir
Singh (dead) and others, AJR (1984) 4
SCC 60, the Supreme court was dealing with
a fact-situation where the interim order
passed by the court of first instance was an
interpolated
order,
and
it
was
not
ascertainable as to when the order was made.
The said order was under appeal before the
District Judge, who declined to condone the
delay, and the said view was concurred with
by the High Court. The Court, taking stock of
the facts, came to hold that if such an
interpolated order is allowed to stand, there
would be a failure of justice and, accordingly,
set aside the orders impugned therein,
observing that the appeal before the District
Judge deserved to be heard on the merits.

25. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO
and others, the Court, after referring to
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti
Misra,
N.
Balakrishnan
v.
M.
Krishnamurthy, State of Haryana v.
Chandra Mani and Special Tehsildar,
Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma,
came to hold that adoption of strict
standard of proof sometimes fails to
protect public justice and it may result in
public mischief.
444 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

26. In this context, we may refer with
profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma
Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat
Industrial Development Corporation and
another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 where a twoJudge Bench of the Supreme Court has
observed that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy. The legislature
does not prescribe limitation with the
object of destroying the rights of the
parties, but to ensure that they do not resort
to dilatory tactics and seek remedies
without delay. The idea is that every legal
remedy must be kept alive for a period
fixed by the legislature. To put it
differently, the law of limitation prescribes
a period within which a legal remedy can
be availed for redress of the legal injury. At
the same time, the courts are bestowed with
the power to condone the delay if sufficient
cause is shown for not availing the remedy
within the stipulated time. Thereafter, the
learned Judges proceeded to state that this
Court has justifiably advocated adoption of
a liberal approach in condoning the delay
of short duration and a stricter approach
where the delay is inordinate.

27.
In
Improvement
Trust,
Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others,
AIR 2010 SC 228, it has been held that
while considering an application for
condonation of delay, no straitjacket
formula is prescribed to come to the
conclusion if sufficient and good grounds
have been made out or not. It has been
further stated therein that each case has to
be weighed from its facts and the
circumstances in which the party acts and
behaves.

28. A reference to the principle stated
in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh
and others, (2010) 8 SCC 685 would be
quite fruitful. In the said case the Court
referred to the pronouncements in Union of
India v. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 SC 215,
P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala,
(1997)
7
SCC
556
and
Katari
Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao,
AIR 2009 SC 2907 and stated thus:-

"25. We may state that even if the
term "sufficient cause" has to receive
liberal construction, it must squarely fall
within the concept of reasonable time and
proper conduct of the party concerned. The
purpose of introducing liberal construction
normally is to introduce the concept of
"reasonableness" as it is understood in its
general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a
substantive
law
and
has
definite
consequences on the right and obligation of
a party to arise. These principles should be
adhered to and applied appropriately
depending on the facts and circumstances
of a given case. Once a valuable right has
accrued in favour of one party as a result
of the failure of the other party to explain
the delay by showing sufficient cause and
its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to
take away that right on the mere asking of
the applicant, particularly when the delay
is directly a result of negligence, default or
inaction of that party.

Justice must be done to both
parties equally. Then alone the ends of
justice can be achieved. If a party has been
thoroughly negligent in implementing its
rights and remedies, it will be equally
unfair to deprive the other party of a
valuable right that has accrued to it in law
as a result of his acting vigilantly."

29. In the case of Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corporation of
Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629 the
9 All. Jitendra Pratap Singh Vs. Upsanchalak Chakbandi Sultanpur Camp Lucknow & Ors.
445
Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the
pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram
Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 wherein
it has been opined that a distinction must be
made between a case where the delay is
inordinate and a case where the delay is of
few days and whereas in the former case
the consideration of prejudice to the other
side will be a relevant factor, in the latter
case
no
such
consideration
arises.
Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled
thus: -

"23.
What
needs
to
be
emphasized is that even though a liberal
and justice-oriented approach is required
to be adopted in the exercise of power
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and
other similar statutes, the courts can
neither become oblivious of the fact that the
successful litigant has acquired certain
rights on the basis of the judgment under
challenge and a lot of time is consumed at
various stages of litigation apart from the
cost.

24. What colour the expression
"sufficient cause" would get in the factual
matrix of a given case would largely
depend on the bona fide nature of the
explanation. If the court finds that there
has been no negligence on the part of the
applicant and the cause shown for the
delay does not lack bona fides, then it may
condone the delay. If, on the other hand,
the explanation given by the applicant is
found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it
would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
not to condone the delay." Eventually, the
Bench, upon perusal of the application for
condonation of delay and the affidavit on
record, came to hold that certain necessary
facts
were
conspicuously
silent
and,
accordingly, reversed the decision of the
High Court which had condoned the delay of
more than seven years."

30. Considering the submissions of the
petitioner, it is found that the act of moving
the
application
before
the
Assistant
Consolidation Officer, and having the
property recorded exclusively in the name of
Lalta Singh on the basis of the sale deed
dated 19/03/1959 was an act of fraud on Smt
Kulvanta Devi, and therefore in such
circumstances the said order itself was nonest, illegal and arbitrary, and further that the
said fact was concealed from Smt Kulvanta
Devi and her legal heirs who were the joint
property holders, which also amounted to
fraud.
Further,
the
order
obtained
fraudulently is liable to be set aside, and any
delay caused in filing the appropriate
application ought to have been condoned.
Undoubtedly, on the execution of the sale
deed, Lalta Singh and Kulwant became the
joint owners of the property, and accordingly,
the property ought to have been registered
jointly in their names. Merely because Lalta
Singh got the property mutated in his name
alone in the revenue records would not
deprive Kulvanta Devi of the benefits of
ownership of the said property. The
respondents could not offer any defence
regarding the said aspect that the property
ought to have been recorded in the joint
names.

31. Though before the Deputy Director
of Consolidation, a vain attempt was made to
justify the order dated 02/03/1960 on the
ground that the property was purchased by
Lalta Singh out of his own funds, and Smt.
Kulvanta Devi had entered into a settlement
before the Assistant Consolidation Officer.
No document was filed in this regard, and in
the said circumstances, both the authorities
below did not accept the aforesaid argument
and rejected the same.
446 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

32. This court, after considering the
rival contentions, is of the considered view
that the disputed property ought to have
been recorded in the joint names of Lalta
Singh and Smt. Kulvanta Devi, when the
application for mutation was based on the
sale deed dated 19/03/1959, which clearly
shows that the property was jointly
purchased. We see no reason as to why the
land was recorded only in the name of
Lalta
Singh
and
therefore
have
no
hesitation in holding that Lalta Singh had
fraudulently got the land recorded in his
name, to the exclusion of Smt Kulvanta
Devi, in collusion with the authorities. We
also take note of the provisions of section
17 of the Limitation Act, which is
reproduced here under:_

17. Effect of fraud or mistake.-

(1) Where, in the case of any suit
or application
For which a period of limitation is
prescribed by this Act,-

(a) The suit or application is
based upon the fraud of the defendant or
respondent or his agent; or

(b)the knowledge of the right or
title on which a

Suit or application is founded is
concealed by the

Fraud of any such person as
aforesaid; or

(c) the suit or application is for
relief from the consequences of a mistake;
or

(d)
where

any
document
necessary to establish the

 right of the plaintiff or
applicant has been

fraudulently concealed from him,
the period of

 limitation shall not begin to
run until plaintiff

 or applicant has discovered the

fraud or the mistake or could,
with reasonable

diligence, have discovered it; or
in the case of a

 concealed document, until the
plaintiff or the

applicant first had the means of
producing the

concealed

document

or
compelling its production:

33. Accordingly, in case Section 17 is
applied, then the period of limitation would
commence from the date of discovery of
fraud. In the present case, the reasons for
the delay have been duly considered by the
Settlement Officer Consolidation, where it
was stated that the father of the petitioner,
who was working in the police department,
served in various districts, and the
petitioner, who was a student, had been
accompanying his father wherever he was
posted. He further submits that his father
superannuated from service in 1971 from
Tigahana Mau and died in 1990.