# Justice Vinod Chandra Misra v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 10 ILRA 166
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-10-16
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 7743 of 2019
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh, Donadi Ramesh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/justice-vinod-chandra-misra-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54644
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

A. Service Law - UP St. Law Commission
Act, 2010 - Section 4 - UP St. Law
Commission (Salaries and Allowances and
Conditions of Service of Chairperson)
Rules, 2011 - Rules 4, 5 & 14 - Pension -
Retired from the post of Chairman of UP
St. Law Commission - Entitlement of
interest on delayed payment - Held,
payment of pension is a statutory right
arising from services rendered. That right
existed from before. Since there was no
conduct offered by the petitioner as may
have
delayed
the
computation
and
payment of higher pension to which he
was entitled and since there never existed
any legal impediment or doubt in that
payment, we find the stand of the St.
Government untenable insofar as interest
has not been paid on arrears of correct
pension computed with delay. The St.
must compensate for the loss of time in
making the due payment - High Court
issued direction to pay interest @ 8%.
(Para 22 and 42)

B. Service Law - High Court Judges
(Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act,
1954 - Sections 2(g), 2(gg) & 17A -
Family pension - Entitlement of the
spouse
of
retired
Chairman
of
Law
Commission - Held, under the Judges Act
and the Judges Rules 'family pension' is
included
in
'pension'
entitlement
-
'Pension' payable to a Chairperson of a St.
of Law Commission necessarily includes
within it the 'family pension' that may
become payable to the spouse of such
Chairperson, if that contingency arises -
Held further, while the petitioner demitted
office as a Judge of this High Court, he
became entitled to receive and is receiving
higher pension than payable to a retired
Judge of a High Court by virtue of his
having served as a Chairperson of the St.
Law Commission, upon application of
Section 4(5) of the Act read with Rules
4(5) of the Rules read with the Judges Act
and the Judges Rules - Spouse of the
petitioner may not be treated differently
with respect to the payment of family
10 All. Justice Vinod Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
167
pension - High Court issued direction to
make necessary provision in the Pension
Payment Order of the petitioner with
respect to the family pension entitlement
in favour of the spouse of the petitioner.
(Para 33, 35, 38 and 42)

C. Interpretation of Statute - Rule of
purposive construction - No word of the
legislature may be interpreted by Courts
as may render the same meaningless or
otiose. (Para 27)

D. Interpretation of Statute - Literal Rule
- Golden rule of construction - Each word
and phrase used by the legislature must
first be given its natural meaning and that
natural meaning must always be given full
effect, unless the context may otherwise
require. (Para 29)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,869 of 43,341. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39869 for what follows._

166 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
deceased employee. Strictly this claim
cannot be upheld on the touchstone of
Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of
India. However, such a claim is considered
as reasonable and permissible on the basis
of sudden crisis, occurring in the family of
such employee who has served the State
and dies while in service. That is why it is
necessary for the authorities to frame rules,
regulations or to issue such administrative
orders which can stand the test of Articles
14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate
ground cannot be claimed as a matter of
right.....High Courts and Administrative
Tribunals
cannot
confer
benediction
impelled by sympathetic considerations to
make
appointments
on
compassionate
grounds when the regulations framed in
respect
thereof
do
not
cover
and
contemplate such appointments."

17. Accordingly we do not find any
infirmity in the impugned orders dated
24.5.2024 and 6.12.2022. The petition
being devoid of merits is dismissed.
----------
(2024) 10 ILRA 166
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.10.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE DONADI RAMESH, J.

Writ A No. 7743 of 2019

Justice Vinod Chandra Misra ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Prakash Chandra Shukla, Sri V.K. Singh, Sr.
Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - UP St. Law Commission
Act, 2010 - Section 4 - UP St. Law
Commission (Salaries and Allowances and
Conditions of Service of Chairperson)
Rules, 2011 - Rules 4, 5 & 14 - Pension -
Retired from the post of Chairman of UP
St. Law Commission - Entitlement of
interest on delayed payment - Held,
payment of pension is a statutory right
arising from services rendered. That right
existed from before. Since there was no
conduct offered by the petitioner as may
have
delayed
the
computation
and
payment of higher pension to which he
was entitled and since there never existed
any legal impediment or doubt in that
payment, we find the stand of the St.
Government untenable insofar as interest
has not been paid on arrears of correct
pension computed with delay. The St.
must compensate for the loss of time in
making the due payment - High Court
issued direction to pay interest @ 8%.
(Para 22 and 42)

B. Service Law - High Court Judges
(Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act,
1954 - Sections 2(g), 2(gg) & 17A -
Family pension - Entitlement of the
spouse
of
retired
Chairman
of
Law
Commission - Held, under the Judges Act
and the Judges Rules 'family pension' is
included
in
'pension'
entitlement
-
'Pension' payable to a Chairperson of a St.
of Law Commission necessarily includes
within it the 'family pension' that may
become payable to the spouse of such
Chairperson, if that contingency arises -
Held further, while the petitioner demitted
office as a Judge of this High Court, he
became entitled to receive and is receiving
higher pension than payable to a retired
Judge of a High Court by virtue of his
having served as a Chairperson of the St.
Law Commission, upon application of
Section 4(5) of the Act read with Rules
4(5) of the Rules read with the Judges Act
and the Judges Rules - Spouse of the
petitioner may not be treated differently
with respect to the payment of family
10 All. Justice Vinod Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
167
pension - High Court issued direction to
make necessary provision in the Pension
Payment Order of the petitioner with
respect to the family pension entitlement
in favour of the spouse of the petitioner.
(Para 33, 35, 38 and 42)

C. Interpretation of Statute - Rule of
purposive construction - No word of the
legislature may be interpreted by Courts
as may render the same meaningless or
otiose. (Para 27)

D. Interpretation of Statute - Literal Rule
- Golden rule of construction - Each word
and phrase used by the legislature must
first be given its natural meaning and that
natural meaning must always be given full
effect, unless the context may otherwise
require. (Para 29)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. Smt. Bhagwanti Vs U.O.I.; (1989) 4 SCC 397

2. Surana Steels (P) Ltd. Vs CIT; (1999) 4 SCC 306:
(1999) 237 ITR 777 : 1999 SCC OnLine SC 443

3. Aswini Kumar Ghose Vs Arabinda Bose;
(1952) 2 SCC 237

4. Jugalkishore Saraf Vs Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.,
1955 SCC OnLine SC 26: (1955) 1 SCR 1369:
AIR 1955 SC 376

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal
Singh, J.
&
Hon'ble Donadi Ramesh, J.)

1. Heard Shri V.K. Singh, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Nand Lal,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms.
Kritika Singh, learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel for the State.

2. Present petition has been filed to
assail part of the order dated 15.11.2017
passed
by
the
Principal
Secretary,
Department of Law, Government of Uttar
Pradesh. That order arose on an earlier
direction issued by the writ Court in Writ A
No.20593 of 2015 decided on 15.04.2015.
Therein it was observed as below:-

"Consequently, in the facts of the
case, we proceed to direct the Chief
Secretary, Government of U.P. Lucknow to
look into the matter and thereafter take
appropriate decision in the matter, in
accordance with law, preferably within
period of next two months from the date of
production of certified copy of this order.
For the said purpose, Chief Secretary
should call all the concerned officials who
have a role to play, in the said fixation in
question and in respect of other benefits".

3.
While
dealing
with
the
representation
thus
filed,
the
State
Government took an informed decision
sanctioning pension equivalent to that
payable to a retired Chief Justice of a High
Court. That decision is based on the own
understanding of the State Government- of
Section 4(5) of the Uttar Pradesh State Law
Commission Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act) read with Rule 5 of the Uttar
Pradesh State Law Commission (Salaries
and Allowances and Conditions of Service
of Chairperson) Rules, 2011 (hereinafter
referred to as the Rules).

4. For ready reference Section 4(5) of
the Act reads as below:-

"(5) The allowances and pension,
if any payable to, and other conditions of
service of the Chairperson or a Full-time
Member shall be such as may be
prescribed:

Provided that in prescribing the
salary, allowances and pension payable to
168 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and other conditions of service of the
Chairperson, regard shall be had to the
salary, allowances and pension payable to
and other conditions of service, of the Chiet
Justice of High Court.

Provided further that if the
Chairperson or a Full-time Member at the
time of his appointment is in receipt of a
pension (other than a disability or wound
pension) in respect of any previous service
under the Government of India or under the
Government of a State, his salary in respect
of services as the Chairperson or, a Fulltime Member as the case may be, shall be
reduced-

(a) by the amount of that pension;
and

(b) if he has, before such
appointment, received in lieu of a portion
of the pension due to him in respect of such
previous service the commuted value
thereof, by the amount of that portion of the
pension; and

(c) if he has, before such
appointment, received a retirement gratuity
in respect of such previous service, by the
pension equivalent of that gratuity:

Provided also that the salary,
allowances and pension, if any, payable to,
and other conditions of service of the
Chairperson or a Full-time Member shall
not be varied to his disadvantage after his
appointment."

5. Also, Rule 4(5) of the Rules, reads
as below:-

"5. Pension shall be admissible to
the Chairperson, equivalent to the pension
which would be admissible to the Chief
Justice of a High Court under the High
Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of
Service) Act, 1954 and relevant Rules
including Rule 2 of the High Court Judges
Rules, 1956 read with the All India
Services (Death-cum Retirement Benefits)
Rules, 1958, for the period of service
rendered as Chairperson, in addition to the
pension he may be entitled to, in respect of
any previous service under the Central
Government or any State Government:

Provided
that
the
pension,
payable to the Chairperson under this rule
together with the amount of pension,
including commuted portion of pension, if
any, admissible to him under the Central or
State Government prior to his appointment
in the Commission shall not exceed rupees
forty five thousand per mensum or rupees
five lac forty thousand per annum as
admissible to the Chief Justice of a High
Court under para 2.1.1(iii) of the order no.
L-11017/IX 2008-Jus., dated May 11, 2009
issued by the Ministry of Law and Justice,
Government of India:

Provided further that such ceiling
shall be subject to further revision
according to that applicable to the Chief
Justice of High Court from time to time:

Provided also such pension shall
be payable to the Chairperson if he has put
in minimum two years of service in the
Commission."

6. Here, we may also take note of the
Rule 14 of the Rules, which reads as
below:-

"14.
Other
allowances
and
conditions of service of the Chairperson
provisions wherefor have not expressly
been made in the Act or these Rules, shall
be such as are applicable to the serving
Chief Justice of a High Court."

7. Since much reliance has been
placed on the High Court Judges (Salaries
and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954
(hereinafter referred to as the Judges Act)
and the Rules framed thereunder, we also
10 All. Justice Vinod Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
169
consider it proper to take note of Section
2(g) and Section 2 (gg) of the Judges Act.
They read as below:-

"2. .........."

(g). 'Judge' means a Judge of a
High Court and includes the Chief Justice,
[an acting Chief Justice, an additional
Judge and an acting Judge of the High
Court;

(gg). 'Pension' means a pension
of any kind whatsoever payable to or in
respect of a Judge, and includes any
gratuity or other sum or sums so payable
by way of death or retirement benefits);]"

8. Then, Section 17A of the Judges
Act, reads as below:-

"17-A.
Family
pensions
and
Gratuities.[(1) Where a Judge who, being
in service on or after the commencement of
the High Court and Supreme Court Judges
(Conditions of Service) Amendment Act,
1986, dies, whether before or after
retirement in circumstances to which
Section 17 does not apply, calculated at the
rate of [Fifty percent of his salaries plus
fifty per cent of his dearness pay's] on the
date of his death shall be payable to the
person or persons entitled thereto and the
amount so payable shall be paid from the
day following the date of death of the Judge
for a period of seven years or for a period
up to the date on which the Judge would
have attained the age of Sixty Five Years,
had he survived, whichever is earlier, [and
thereafter at the rate of thirty per cent of
his salary]

[Provided that in no case the
amount of family pension calculated under
this sub-section shall exceed the pension
payable to the judge under this Act.]

Explanation- For the purposes of
determining the person or persons entitled
to family pension under this sub-section,-

(i) in relation to a Judge who
elects or is eligible to receive pension
under Part-I of the First Schedule, the
rules, notifications and orders for the time
being in force with regard to the person or
persons entitled to family pension in
relation to an officer of the Central Civil
Services, Group-A, shall apply;

(ii) in relation to a judge who
elects to receive pension under Part-III of
the First Schedule, the ordinary rules of his
service if he had not been appointed a
Judge with respect to person or persons
entitled to family pension shall apply and
his service as a Judge being treated as
service therein."

[2] Where any Judge, who has
elected to receive the pension payable to
him under Part-III of the First Schedule,
retires, or dies in circumstances to which
Section 17 does not apply, gratuity, if any,
shall be payable to the person or persons,
entitled thereto under the ordinary rules of
his service if he had not been appointed a
Judge, his service as a Judge being treated
as service therein for the purpose of
calculating that gratuity.]

(3) The rules, notifications and
orders for the time being in force with
respect
to
the grant
of death-cumretirement gratuity benefit to or in relation
to an officer of the Central Civil Services
Class I (including the provisions relating to
deduction from pension for the purpose)
shall apply to or in relation to the grant of
death-cum-retirement gratuity benefit to or
in relation to a Judge who being in service
on or after the Ist day of October, 1974,
retires or dies in circumstances to which
Section 17 does not apply, subject to the
modifications that-
170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i)
the
minimum
qualifying
service for the purpose of entitlement to the
gratuity shall be two years and six months;

(ii) the amount of gratuity shall
be calculated on the basis of [twenty days]
salary for [each completed six months
period] of service as Judge;

Explanation.- In [sub-section 3]
the expression 'Judge' has the same
meaning as in Section 14."

9. It is in that statutory context that the
impugned decision has been made by the
State Government. It has accepted the base
contention of the petitioner that he is
entitled to be paid pension equivalent to
that payable to a retired Chief Justice of a
High Court. However, no interest has been
paid on the arrears of such pension paid
under the impugned order. The further
claim of the petitioner that his spouse may
remain entitled to claim 'family pension'
equivalent to that payable to a spouse of a
retired Chief Justice of a High Court,
should that need arise, has been rejected on
the following reasoning contained in the
impugned order:-

" चूाँकक उत्तर प्रिेश राज्य ववधि
आयोग (अध्यक्ष के वेतन ित्ते और सेवा
की शतड) ननयमावली, 2011 में पाररवाररक
पेंशन की कोई व्यवस्था नहीं है और
मा०उच्च त्यायालय द्वारा श्री समश्र को
पाररवाररक पेंशन की अनुमन्यता के
सम्बन्ि में कोई आिेश िी पाररत नहीं
ककये गये हैं, के दृजटटगत उक्त पेंशन
िुगतान आिेश दिनांक 15-06-2015 में
पाररवाररक पेशन की िनरासश का
उल्लेख ककये जाने का कोई औधचत्य
नहीं है, क्योंकक उन्हें पाररवाररक पेंशन
ननयमानुसार अनुमन्य नहीं है। "

10. Thus the present petition has been
filed seeking two reliefs:-

(i) the petitioner be awarded
interest on the delayed computation and
payment of entitled pension.

(ii) direction be issued to command
the respondent to make necessary provision
to pay 'family pension' to the spouse of the
petitioner at the rate at which such pension
may be payable to a spouse of a retired
Chief Justice of a High Court, should that
eventuality arise.

11. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the
present petition are that the petitioner
demitted office as a Judge of this Court on
29.01.2008.
On
30.01.2008
he
was
appointed as Chairman of State U.P. Law
Commission. At that time, the Act and the
Rules had not been framed. However, it is a
fact that the Act was enforced in the year
2010 and the Rules were enforced in the
year 2011. On 11.09.2012, after serving for
almost five years as Chairman of the U.P.
State Law Commission, the petitioner
demitted office.

12. At that stage, the petitioner
claimed pension entitlement in terms of the
Act and the Rules. However, the State
Government rejected his claim. That led to
the filing of Writ A No.20593 of 2015
(noted above). Upon certain directions
being issued in that writ petition, first,
pension was sanctioned on 27.07.2015. The
arrears were computed and paid thereafter.
It is an admitted case between the parties,
since then the petitioner is being paid
pension equivalent to that payable to a
retired Chief Justice of a High Court. The
10 All. Justice Vinod Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
171
only dispute in that regard is non-payment
of interest.

13. Though the petitioner demitted
office
as
Chairman
of
State
Law
Commission on 11.09.2012, the pension
claimed was first approved by the State
Government by means of the impugned
order, almost four years thereafter on
27.05.2015. Hence, the petitioner claims
entitlement to interest on that delayed
payment. According to learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner, no legal
impediment ever existed as may justify the
delay in computation and payment of
correct pension. Interest being accretion on
capital,
normally,
the
State
must
compensate the petitioner by paying
appropriate interest for delay caused by its
inaction in payment of pension earned by
the petitioner.

14. As to the entitlement of 'family
pension' being claimed by the petitioner,
that claim has been declined by the State
Government by the impugned order.
Referring to Section 4(5) of the Act read
with Rule 4(5) of the Rules read with
Section 2(g) and 2(gg) of the Judges Act
read with Section 17A of the Judges Act, it
has been vehemently urged that the spouse
of the petitioner would be fully entitled to
'family pension', should that eventuality
arise. The phrases "pension of any kind",
"payable to or in respect of a Judge" and
"other sum or sums so payable by way of
death or retirement benefits" appearing in
Section 2(gg) of the Judges Act clearly
include 'family pension' (provided under
Section 17A of the Judges Act). They leave
no doubt that 'family pension' provided
under Section 17A of the Judges Act is
included within the meaning of that term
defined under Section 2(gg) of the Judges
Act.

15. By virtue of that inclusion of
'family pension' as a type of pension and
the phrase "payable to a Judge or in respect
of a Judge", necessarily, 'family pension' is
a pension payable arising from the status of
the petitioner as a former Chairperson of
the State Law Commission, by virtue of the
express provision of Rule 4(5) of the Rules.

16.
Alternatively,
learned
Senior
Counsel for the petitioner has also referred
to Rule 14 of the Rules to submit that in
any case 'family pension' being an
allowance or part of the conditions of
service of a Chief Justice of a High Court,
the same would necessarily apply to a
Chairperson of the State Law Commission.
Even though, it ('family pension') may not
have been expressly provided for under the
Rules, that right exists on the strength of
legislation by reference.

17.
On
principle,
the
above
submission have been bolstered on the
strength of a decision of the Supreme Court
in Smt. Bhagwanti Vs. Union of India
(1989) 4 SCC 397, wherein, it has been
observed as below :-

"9. Pension is payable, as pointed
out in several judgments of this Court, on
the consideration of past service rendered
by the government servant. Payability of
the family pension is basically on the
selfsame consideration. Since pension is
linked with past service and the avowed
purpose of the Pension Rules is to provide
sustenance in old age, distinction between
marriage during service and marriage after
retirement appears to be indeed arbitrary."

18. On the other hand, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel states
that there is no specific provision for
payment of 'family pension', either under
172 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Act or the Rules. Specifically, Section
4(5) of the Act and Rule 4(5) of the Rules
do not provide for 'family pension'. Insofar
as the Act and the Rules only provide for
payment of pension to the Chairperson, that
compliance has been made. No further
entitlement exists in favour of the petitioner
or his spouse to claim 'family pension'
either under the Act or the Rules, in any
circumstances.

19. Second, it has been objected
'family pension' can only be granted under
one rule i.e. the Judges Rules. Therefore,
the entitlement of 'family pension' being
claimed by the petitioner may arise only in
terms of the Judges Rules and not other
Rules. Those Rules do not provide for
'family pension' to be paid to the spouse of
a retired Chairperson of the State Law
Commission. Here, it has been further
submitted that under the general Rules
governing
employees
of
the
State
Government, the entitlement of 'family
pension' may arise only to families of
employees who may have served at least
for 10 years. Since the petitioner never
served for that duration of time, the claim
of 'family pension' is wholly unfounded.
According to the State-respondents, the
petitioner had served on the post of
Chairperson of State Law Commission for
a period of less than two years from the
date of enforcement of the Act. Therefore,
he may never claim entitlement to 'family
pension'. At the same time, on query made,
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
could not dispute the fact that the petitioner
is being paid pension in respect to service
rendered as a Chairperson of the State Law
Commission.

20. Since 'family pension' is described
to be a separate right conferred under a
separate statute, the petitioner is not
entitled to raise such claim in absence of
that statutory right either under the Act or
the Rules or any other Rule applicable to
State employees.

21. As to claim made for payment of
interest on delayed payment of due
pension, it has been contended, the delay
was bonafide. Payment has been made in
compliance to the judicial order passed in
that regard. Therefore, no claim of interest
may arise.

22. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the record,
in the first place, it cannot be denied that
there is statutory provision contained under
the Act or the Rules to provide for payment
of pension to a retired Chairperson of the
State Law Commission. Specifically and
directly, the Act and the Rules provide for
payment of pension. Whereas the petitioner
demitted office on 11.09.2012, that pension
is being paid to the petitioner since the
decision was taken in that regard by the
State Government, after more than two
years on 27.05.2015. It has been computed
equivalent to the pension payable to a
retired Chief Justice of a High Court. The
only dispute surviving in that regard is with
respect to computation of interest. Insofar
as the statute was never in doubt and
insofar as the State Government has itself
reached a conclusion that the petitioner was
entitled to payment of higher pension
equivalent to that payable to a retired Chief
Justice of a High Court, we find, no reason
why interest may not be paid on the arrears
amount of pension. The judicial decision
referred to by the learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel was not a decision
adjudicating that right. Rather, it was an
order requiring the State Government to
take a decision in that regard that the State
Government was otherwise obligated to
10 All. Justice Vinod Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
173
make. Payment of pension is a statutory
right arising from services rendered. That
right existed from before. Since there was
no conduct offered by the petitioner as may
have delayed the computation and payment
of higher pension to which he was entitled
and since there never existed any legal
impediment or doubt in that payment, we
find the stand of the State Government
untenable insofar as interest has not been
paid
on
arrears
of
correct
pension
computed with delay. The State must
compensate for the loss of time in making
the due payment.

23. As to the entitlement of 'family
pension', though the Act and the Rules do
not make a specific/ direct provision for
payment of 'family pension', at the same
time provision of Rule 4(5) of the Rules. It
clearly provides that the pension admissible
to a Chairperson shall be equivalent to the
pension admissible to the Chief Justice of a
High Court under the Judges Act read with
the Judges Rules. Therefore, it is not open
to the State-respondent to contend that for
the purpose of examination of entitlement
to pension we may look at the Judges Act
and the Judges Rules but for determining
the entitlement to 'family pension', we may
not look at the Judges Act or the Judges
Rules.

24. That reasoning would be self
conflicted. Once the State admits, that for
the purpose of pension payable to the
petitioner the Judges Act and the Judges
Rules are applicable and therefore the
petitioner is entitled to higher pension
equivalent to that payable to a retired Chief
Justice of a High Court, there is no inherent
reason or logic to not read the Judges Act
and the Judges Rules for the purpose of
determining the entitlement to 'family
pension'. Once the legislation by reference
made under the Judges Act and the Judges
Rules and the provisions thereof are
applicable to the petitioner for the purpose
of payment of pension, we must necessarily
look at the provision of the Judges Act and
the Judges Rules to decide the issue of
entitlement of 'family pension' as well.

25. In Surana Steels (P) Ltd. v. CIT,
(1999) 4 SCC 306: (1999) 237 ITR 777
1999 SCC OnLine SC 443, it has been
observed as under:-

"11. Section 115-J explanation
clause (iv), is a piece of legislation by
incorporation. Dealing with the subject,
Justice G.P. Singh states in Principles of
Statutory Interpretation (7th Edn., 1999)?

"Incorporation of an earlier Act
into a later Act is a legislative device
adopted for the sake of convenience in
order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the
provisions of the earlier Act into the later.
When an earlier Act or certain of its
provisions are incorporated by reference
into a later Act, the provisions so
incorporated become part and parcel of the
later Act as if they had been 'bodily
transposed
into
it'.
The
effect
of
incorporation is admirably stated by Lord
Esher, M.R.: 'If a subsequent Act brings
into itself by reference some of the clauses
of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as
has often been held, is to write those
sections into the new Act as if they had
been actually written in it with the pen, or
printed in it.' (p. 233)."

26. Specifically, extracted above, by
virtue of Section 2(gg) of the Judges Act,
pension includes within the meaning of that
term (i) "pension of any kind", (ii) "pension
payable to or in respect of a Judge" and (iii)
"other sum or sums" so payable by way of
death or retirement benefits. Thus, for the
174 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
purpose of the Judges Act, there can be no
doubt that 'family pension' (provided under
Section 17A of the Judges Act) is a variety
of pension contemplated under that Act.

27. No counter implication may ever
arise in view of that definition clause. It is
so, because, if the 'family pension' were to
be excluded from the scope of the
definition of the term 'pension' under
Section 2(gg) of the Act and 'pension' were
to be restricted to any amount payable to a
retired Judge during his lifetime alone and
if it were to be read to exclude any amount
payable thereafter, the words "of any kind",
"in respect of a Judge" and the words
"other sum or sums" payable by way of
death appearing in that definition clause
would be rendered otiose. It is a settled
principle in interpretation of statutes that no
word of the legislature may be interpreted
by Courts as may render the same
meaningless or otiose.

28. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v.
Arabinda Bose, (1952) 2 SCC 237, it has
been observed as below:-

"26. Much ado was made on both
sides about the comma occurring just
before the word "or" in the non obstante
clause,
the
petitioner
stressing
its
importance as showing that the adjectival
clause "regulating the conditions, etc."
does not qualify the words "Indian Bar
Councils Act" which are separated by the
comma and that, therefore, the whole of
that Act is superseded, while the learned
counsel for the respondents insisted that in
construing a statute, punctuation marks
should be left out of consideration. Nothing
much, we think, turns on the comma, as it
seems grammatically more correct to take
the adjectival clause as qualifying "law".
Having regard to the words "anything
contained" and the preposition "in" used
after the disjunctive "or", the qualifying
clause cannot reach back to the words "Bar
Councils Act". But, whichever way we take
it, it must be admitted that, in framing the
non obstante clause, the draftsman had
primarily in mind those provisions which
stood in the way of an Advocate not
enrolled in any particular High Court
practising in that Court. It does not,
however, necessarily follow that Section 2
is concerned only with the right of
Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise
in the High Courts in which they are not
enrolled. The true scope of the enacting
clause must, as we have observed, be
determined on a fair reading of the words
used in their natural and ordinary
meaning, and in the present case, there is
not much room for doubt on the point. The
words "every Advocate" and "whether or
not he is an Advocate of that High Court"
make it plain that the section was designed
to apply to the Advocates of the Supreme
Court not only in relation to the High
Courts of which they are not Advocates but
also in relation to those High Courts in
which they have been already enrolled. The
learned Judges below dismissed the words
"whether or not, etc." with the remark that
"they are not very apposite", as "no one
who is an Advocate of a particular High
Court requires to be an advocate of the
Supreme Court in order to practise in that
Court". While it may be true to say that
Section 2 does not give Advocates of many
of the High Courts any additional right in
relation to their own courts, it would,
according to the petitioner's contention,
give at least to the Advocates of the
Calcutta and Bombay High Courts some
additional right in the Original Side of
those Courts, and that may well have been
the purpose of using those words. It is not a
sound principle of construction to brush
10 All. Justice Vinod Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
175
aside words in a statute as being inapposite
surplusage, if they can have appropriate
application in circumstances conceivably
within the contemplation of the statute."
(emphasis supplied)

29. On the contrary each word and
phrase used by the legislature must first be
given its natural meaning and that natural
meaning must always be given full effect,
unless the context may otherwise require.

30. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw
Cotton Co. Ltd., 1955 SCC OnLine SC
26: (1955) 1 SCR 1369: AIR 1955 SC
376, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:-

"6. ................. The cardinal rule
of construction of statutes is to read the
statute literally, that is by giving to the
words used by the legislature their
ordinary,
natural
and
grammatical
meaning. If, however, such a reading leads
to absurdity and the words are susceptible
of another meaning the court may adopt the
same.
But
if
no
such
alternative
construction is possible, the court must
adopt
the
ordinary
rule
of
literal
interpretation. In the present case a literal
construction of the rule leads to no
apparent absurdity and, therefore, there
can be no compelling reason for departing
from
that
golden
rule
of
construction.................."

31. Here, by virtue of Section 17A of
the Judges Act, specifically 'family pension'
has
been
provided
under
that
Act.
Therefore there can never arise any
argument
of
any
contrary
intention
expressed under the Judges Act vis a vis
the entitlement of the spouse of a Judge of
a High Court to receive 'family pension'
being 'pension'. Thus, it has to be
recognized that 'family pension' payable to
a Judge of a High Court is a variety of
pension payable to a Judge that being
pension of a 'kind' of pension payable "with
respect of a Judge" and may ever otherwise
be included as "other sum" "payable by
way of death benefit" to the surviving
entitled heir of a person who may have
served as a Judge of a High Court.

32. Once that is recognized, what
survives for our consideration is whether
by virtue of the provision of the Act and the
Rules that entitlement would extend to a
Chairperson of the State Law Commission.
Here, we note that the term "pension" is not
defined either under the Act or the Rules.
Section 4(5) only provides that allowances
and pension payable to a Chairperson shall
be as may be prescribed. The first proviso
thereto itself makes clear that in fixing the
salary allowances and pension payable to a
Chairperson of State Law Commission
regard shall be had to salary allowances
pension payable to and other conditions of
service of the Chief Justice of a High
Court. At the same time, the Rule 4(5) of
the Rules clearly prescribes that the
pension admissible to a Chairperson of a
State Law Commission shall be 'equivalent'
to the pension which would be admissible
to the Chief Justice of a High Court under
the High Court Judges (Salaries and
Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 and the
relevant Rules including Rule 2 of the High
Court Judges Rules, 1956.

33. Therefore the prescription made
under the Rules necessarily adopts the
entitlement, the method of computation and
payment of pension admissible to a retired
Chairperson of the State Law Commission-
as provided to a Chief Justice of a High
Court in terms of the Judges Act and the
Judges Rules. As noted above, under the
Judges Act and the Judges Rules 'family
176 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
pension'
is
included
in
'pension'
entitlement. For that reason the payment of
'family pension' to the spouse of a retired
Chairperson of the State Law Commission
would remain included in the 'pension'
admissible to a retired Chairperson of the
State Law Commission.

34. If there may exist any doubt, the
same stands cured by the express provision
of Rule 14 of the Rules. Thus, if for any
reason it were to be considered that 'family
pension' payable to the spouse of a
Chairperson of a State Law Commission
may not be included in the term "pension
payable to a Chairperson", then in that case,
by virtue of all other allowances and
conditions of service of the current Chief
Justice of a High Court being applicable to
the Chairperson of State Law Commission,
by necessary implication, on that (second)
legislation
by
reference
made
all
allowances and conditions of service as
may come to be conferred to a serving
Chief Justice of a High Court would
become applicable to a Chairperson of the
State Law Commission as well. Insofar as
there is no doubt that the spouse of Chief
Justice of a High Court remains entitled to
a family pension, where that contingency
arises, there is no available reason to deny
that parity to the spouse of a Chairperson of
the State Law Commission either. To
accept the objection being raised by the
State would be to curtail the plain effect of
law arising from legislation by reference
made both under Rule (4)5 of the Rules and
Rule 14 of the Rules.

35. Thus in our view, in the first place
'pension' payable to a Chairperson of a
State of Law Commission necessarily
includes within it the 'family pension' that
may become payable to the spouse of such
Chairperson, if that contingency arises.
Alternatively, even if 'family pension' were
not included in the term 'pension' payable
to the Chairperson of the State Law
Commission, that entitlement would arise
by virtue of Rule 14 of the Rules read with
the Judges Act and the Judges Rules.

36. Therefore, the fact that there exists
no specific/ direct provision in the Act and
the Rules itself to provide for family
pension to the spouse of a retired
Chairperson of the State Law Commission
is of no consequence. By virtue of
legislation by reference made both under
Rule 4(5) of the Rules and Rule 14 of the
Rules, the objection being raised by the
State is of no consequence.

37. The further objection that there can
be only one rule for grant of 'family
pension' is misconceived and it cannot be
accepted. Though on principle it may not
be denied that 'family pension' is not to be
paid twice, yet that statutory protection
exists in Rule 4(5) itself, under the proviso
thereto. Once we have found that 'family
pension' was included in the pension
payable to the Chairperson of the State Law
Commission under Section 4(5) of the Act
read with Rule 4(5) of the Rules and in any
case that entitlement arises by virtue of
Rule 14 of the Rules read with Judges Act
and the Judges Rules, it cannot be gain said
that there exists no rule for payment of that
'family pension', should that contingency
arise. In that event, the spouse of the
petitioner may only claim 'family pension'
equivalent to that payable to the spouse of a
Chief Judge of the High Court. Here, we
note
the
State
does
not
object
to
computation and payment of pension to the
petitioner equivalent to that payable to a
retired Chief Justice of a High Court as
provided under the Act and the Rules read
with the Judges Act and the Judges Rules.
10 All. Justice Vinod Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
177

38. Thus, while the petitioner demitted
office as a Judge of this High Court, he
became entitled to receive and is receiving
higher pension than payable to a retired
Judge of a High Court by virtue of his
having served as a Chairperson of the State
Law Commission, upon application of
Section 4(5) of the Act read with Rules
4(5) of the Rules read with the Judges Act
and the Judges Rules. For reasons noted
above we find no reason why the spouse of
the petitioner, may be treated differently,
with respect to the payment of family
pension, should that eventuality arise.

39. As to the reference made by the
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
to State Rules that provide for qualifying
service of ten years for payment of 'family
pension', we find that objection raised is
wholly mis-conceived. In face of the specific
statutory provision of the Act and the Rules
read with the Judges Act and the Judges Rules
and in view of our reasoning noted above, the
entitlement to pension and 'family pension'
being claimed in the present facts has no
dependence on the general provisions made by
the State Government for its other employees.
In face of specific provision under the Act and
the Rules providing for entitlement to full
pension as a Chairperson of the State Law
Commission- equivalent to pension payable to
a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, upon
completion of two years of service as
Chairperson of the State Law Commission, the
general rule/ principle of qualifying service of
ten years has no application. No provision has
been shown to us either under the Act or the
Rules or otherwise as may allow us to consider
that objection any further. In short, that
objection has no legs to stand. It is wholly
imaginary and unreal.

40. As to the further objection that the
petitioner did not complete two years of
service as a Chairperson of the State Law
Commission and that the State Law
Commission itself was abolished by the
State Government, we find absolutely no
merit in the same. In the first place, the
petitioner did serve for the length much
more than two years and second, the
objection is not available to the State in
view of its admission that higher pension is
being paid to the petitioner equivalent to
that payable to a retired Chief Justice of a
High Court as he was found entitled to it.

41. As to the further objection that the
petitioner may never be entitled to claim
two pensions, that case does not exist. The
petitioner has never claimed two pensions.
He is only receiving the differential amount
of higher pension (from the State) on the
principle of equivalence with a retired
Chief Justice of a High Court. Same
principle would govern the payment of
higher
'family
pension',
should
that
contingency arise. That statutory protection
is available under Rule 4(5) of the Rules,
itself.

42.