# Juvenile X Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 2 ILRA 1475
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-12-21
- **Case number:** Crl. Revision No. 1506 of 2022
- **Bench:** Jyotsna Sharma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/juvenile-x-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49244
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 363, 366, 376, 342 & 506 -
POCSO Act, 2012 - Section 3⁄4 - SC/ST Act,
1989 - Section 3(2)5 - Juvenile Justice
Act, 2015 - Section 15 - FIR lodged
against
juvenile
and
charge-sheet
submitted under aforesaid Sections - On
application, he was declared "child in
conflict with law" on basis of his recorded
date of birth (19.04.2002 / 01.07.2003),
both showing him below 18 years, case
was transmitted to J.J.Board - Informant
thereafter sought inquiry u/s 15 JJ Act, as
juvenile was above 16 years - J.J.Board
ordered inquiry, further affirmed in appeal
- Impugned order - Challenged on ground
that Principal of institution proved date of
birth showing age 15 years 9 months;
thus, no provision to apply section of JJ
Act, inquiry was illegal and legality of
initiating inquiry under JJ Act after expiry
of prescribed period - Held, mother of
juvenile, on oath, St.d his date of birth as
16.04.2002, which remained unshaken in
cross-examination - Admission in primary
school
made
by
grandmother,
no
authentic document produced at that
time, recorded date of 01.07.2003 based
on estimation by guardian - No evidence
shown to prefer primary school record
over
date
of
birth
corroborated
by
mother's
St.ment
and
high
school
1476 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
certificate - Courts below rightly relied on
latter, corroborated by entry in High
School papers - Though Section 14(3) is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
interpreted to defeat statute's object -
Inquiries u/s 15, 17, or 18 must reach
their logical conclusion; hence, plea that
inquiry
beyond
period
prescribed
in
Section 15 is barred is untenable. (Para 3,
6, 7, 10)

Revision dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

2 All. Juvenile X Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1475
rights to point out the deficiencies, flaws or
infirmities in the prosecution case. In this
view of the matter, the Court has to act in a
narrow
purview.
The
revisionist-
Raghunath has specifically mentioned that
the witnesses of fact have given false
evidence; this is a settled position of law
that the evidence on record cannot be
evaluated in a meticulous manner at this
stage; this is not the stage to give a
categorical finding that evidence given by
the witnesses is not worthy of credit; any
such determination can only take place on
the basis of evaluation of all the material
and evidence produced by the prosecution
during the proceeding of trial; The
questions which have been raised by the
revisionist shall assume importance at the
appropriate stage of the trial i.e. at the time
of conclusion thereof.

10. In my view, the opportunity of
hearing afforded to the accused person
under the provisions of Section 227 should
be understood in a narrow compass in as
much the points raised by him must be
decided on the basis of the record/material
produced by the prosecution and nothing
more; As far as the credibility or the
reliability of the evidence given by the
witness is concerned, it can only be tested
by putting those witnesses through crossexamination and thereafter sifting the
evidence through the judicial lens; In the
light of above discussion, I do not find any
irregularity, impropriety or illegality in the
order so as to prompt this court to interfere
or to exercise its powers under Section 397
Cr.P.C.

11. Accordingly, this criminal revision
is dismissed.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1475
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.12.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JYOTSNA SHARMA, J.

Crl. Revision No. 1506 of 2022

Juvenile X ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Arvind Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Respondent:
G.A., Sri Ashok Kumar Rai

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 363, 366, 376, 342 & 506 -
POCSO Act, 2012 - Section 3⁄4 - SC/ST Act,
1989 - Section 3(2)5 - Juvenile Justice
Act, 2015 - Section 15 - FIR lodged
against
juvenile
and
charge-sheet
submitted under aforesaid Sections - On
application, he was declared "child in
conflict with law" on basis of his recorded
date of birth (19.04.2002 / 01.07.2003),
both showing him below 18 years, case
was transmitted to J.J.Board - Informant
thereafter sought inquiry u/s 15 JJ Act, as
juvenile was above 16 years - J.J.Board
ordered inquiry, further affirmed in appeal
- Impugned order - Challenged on ground
that Principal of institution proved date of
birth showing age 15 years 9 months;
thus, no provision to apply section of JJ
Act, inquiry was illegal and legality of
initiating inquiry under JJ Act after expiry
of prescribed period - Held, mother of
juvenile, on oath, St.d his date of birth as
16.04.2002, which remained unshaken in
cross-examination - Admission in primary
school
made
by
grandmother,
no
authentic document produced at that
time, recorded date of 01.07.2003 based
on estimation by guardian - No evidence
shown to prefer primary school record
over
date
of
birth
corroborated
by
mother's
St.ment
and
high
school
1476 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
certificate - Courts below rightly relied on
latter, corroborated by entry in High
School papers - Though Section 14(3) is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
interpreted to defeat statute's object -
Inquiries u/s 15, 17, or 18 must reach
their logical conclusion; hence, plea that
inquiry
beyond
period
prescribed
in
Section 15 is barred is untenable. (Para 3,
6, 7, 10)

Revision dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Barun Chandra Thakur Vs Master Bholu &
anr., Criminal Appeal No. 950 of 2022 decided
on 13.07.2022

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Jyotsna
Sharma, J.)

1. Heard Sri Arvind Kumar Mishra,
learned counsel for the revisionist, Sri
Ashok Kumar Rai, learned counsel for the
respondent no. 2 and Sri O.P. Mishra,
learned AGA for the State.

2. This Criminal Revision has been
filed on behalf of the revisionist through his
mother challenging the impugned orders
dated
10.01.2022
passed
by
learned
Additional Session Judge/Special Judge
(POCSO Act), Court No. 1, Gorakhpur in
Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 2021 as well as
impugned order dated 04.03.2021 passed
by Juvenile Justice Board, Gorakhpur in
Case Crime No. 147 of 2019, under
Sections 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 IPC,
Section 3/4 of POCSO Act and Section
3(2)5 of SC/ST Act, Police StationBarahalganj, District Gorakhpur by which a
preliminary
assessment
inquiry
was
ordered to be conducted and that order was
affirmed by the appellate court.

3. The relevant facts giving rise to this
revision are as below:

An FIR, Case Crime No. 0147 of
2019 under Sections 366 and 342 IPC, was
registered against the juvenile and after
investigation, chargesheet was submitted
under Sections 363, 366, 376, 342, 506
IPC, Section 3/4 of POCSO Act and
Section 3(2)5 of SC/ST Act; an application
was moved before the court concerned
Special Judge (POCSO Act) to declare him
''child in conflict with law' stating therein
that his recorded date of birth was
19.04.2002, therefore, he was merely 16
years 11 months and 15 days on the date of
occurrence; his mother and another witness
Ajay Kumar of Surya Bal Vidya Mandir,
Gorakhpur were examined; the court
noticed the fact that in the marksheet of
high school, his date of birth was shown as
19.04.2002; other witness who too was
examined on behalf of the juvenile deposed
that as per the record of this school, his
date of birth was 01.07.2003; the court
gave
an
opinion
that
in
both
the
contingencies, the applicant was below 18
years, therefore, he was declared a ''child in
conflict with law' and the file was
transmitted to the Juvenile Justice Board by
order dated 20.10.2020; an application by
the informant was, thereafter, moved before
the Juvenile Justice Board submitting that
the juvenile was admittedly above 16 years
of age, hence, an inquiry under Section 15
of the Juvenile Justice Act was incumbent
to be conducted. The Juvenile Justice
Board ordered for enquiry on 04.03.2021
and that order was affirmed in appeal on
10.01.2022. This revision has been filed
challenging the aforesaid orders.

4. Both the sides were heard and
perused the papers.

5. When the question of applicability
of Section-15 of the Juvenile Justice Act,
2015 was raised, the Juvenile Justice Board
2 All. Juvenile X Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1477
had to deal with his two dates of birth.
Firstly, 19.04.2002 as shown in his high
school marksheet. Secondly, 01.07.2003 as
shown in the papers of the school first
attended by him. The Juvenile Justice
Board was of the opinion that the date of
birth as given in high school certificate was
reliable and thus he was adjudged as above
16 years of age. Consequently, an order for
conducting preliminary assessment under
Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015
was passed on 04.03.2021. In the appeal
filed on behalf of the minor, the appellate
court was of the view that the genuineness
of the high school marksheet was verified
by the concerned police station and that his
mother also stated that his date of birth was
19.04.2002, hence, that date of birth should
be relied upon.

6. The impugned orders have been
challenged specifically on two grounds.

Firstly, that the Principal of the
institution which he attended first, was
examined and he proved his date of birth,
on the basis whereof his age came merely
15 years 9 months, hence, there was no
reason to apply provisions of Section-15 of
the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and conduct a
preliminary assessment; therefore, the order for
inquiry is illegal and void.

Secondly, as the provisions of law
required that preliminary assessment must be
carried out within 3 months of first production
of a ''child in conflict with law' before the court
and in case this inquiry is conducted now,
naturally the results will be very different, as he
has attained sufficient maturity by now. Any
such inquiry at this stage is bound to create
prejudice against him. Therefore, the impugned
orders are liable to be set aside.

7. I went through the papers on record
which include the copy of the statement given
by mother of the juvenile. It may be
conspicuously noted that his mother stated on
oath that his correct date of birth is 16.04.2002.
Nothing came in her cross examination to raise
any suspicion on her statement. She fairly
admitted that it was his grandmother who went
for his admission in primary school and that
neither she (mother) nor his father went for his
admission. She has declined the suggestion that
his date of birth was recorded on the basis of
guessestimate. The statement of clerk from
primary school where he admittedly studied in
Class 1st onwards is on record. He has stated
that in the papers of that school, his date of birth
was mentioned as 01.07.2003 as told by his
guardian and on the basis of how old he looked.
Admittedly, no birth certificate or any other
paper was produced before the school at the
time of his admission in Class 1st. No reliable
evidence or reasons have been unveiled before
me by revisionist to place reliance on this
particular date of birth. No grounds have been
avowed before me to justify giving precedence
to date of birth recorded in papers of his
primary school over date of birth in other
documents. In such circumstances, the courts
below cannot be faulted for relying on date of
birth given by his mother in her statement on
oath and further corroborated by the entry of
date of birth in High School papers.

8. Second contention relates to legality of
initiating the inquiry under Section 15 of the J.J.
Act after lapse of prescribed time period. It
shall be useful to reproduce the relevant
provisions of Section-15 of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 2015 which is as below:-

"(1) In case of a heinous offence
alleged to have been committed by a child,
who has completed or is above the age of
sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a
preliminary assessment with regard to his
mental and physical capacity to commit
such offence, ability to understand the
1478 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
consequences of the offence and the
circumstances in which he allegedly
committed the offence, and may pass an
order in accordance with the provisions of
subsection (3) of section 18:

Provided that for such an
assessment, the Board may take the
assistance of experienced psychologists or
psycho-social workers or other experts.

Explanation.--For the purposes
of this section, it is clarified that
preliminary assessment is not a trial, but
is to assess the capacity of such child to
commit and understand the consequences
of the alleged offence.

(2) Where the Board is satisfied
on preliminary assessment that the matter
should be disposed of by the Board, then
the Board shall follow the procedure, as
far as may be, for trial in summons case
under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974):

Provided that the order of the
Board to dispose of the matter shall be
appealable under sub-section (2) of
section 101:

Provided
further
that
the
assessment under this section shall be
completed within the period specified in
section 14."

Section 14(3) of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 2015 provides that a preliminary
assessment in case of heinous offences under
Section 15 shall be disposed of by the Board
within a period of three months from the
date of first production of the child before
the Board.

9. The contention of the revisionist, on the
basis of the above provisions of law is that as a
mandatory provision has been given as
aforesaid providing for conduct of inquiry
within the period of three months, hence, no
inquiry may proceed after lapse of above time
period. In my opinion, the language of the
above provision, undoubtedly fixes an outer
limit for conduct of inquiry and is worded in a
mandatory language, however, it is nowhere
provided in the Act that in case for some reason,
the inquiry could not proceed or concluded
within
that
period
what
can
be
the
consequences thereof. It is nowhere provided
that in such an eventuality, the proceeding shall
stand vitiated or that in such case the juvenile
shall be tried as one below 16 years of age.

10. In my view, the provisions lays stress on
the fact that as far as possible the inquiry under
Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015
shall be conducted within the above time
period. This time period, in my view has been
fixed by the legislature keeping in mind the
whole of the scheme of the Juvenile Justice Act,
2015, through which a broader vision towards
the juveniles or child in conflict with law runs.
It may also be noted that Section 14(2) of the
J.J. Act, 2015, carrying forward the same spirit,
fixes an outer limit for completion of inquiry.
Similarly time periods have been fixed for
inquiries under Sections 17 and 18 of the J.J.
Act, 2015 but it is nowhere provided that in
case such a time limit could not be adhered, the
proceedings against the juvenile shall be
dropped. In my view, the language of Section
14(3), though couched in a mandatory manner,
cannot be construed in a way so as to thwart or
defeat the very purpose of the statute. The
inquiry whether under Sections 15, 17 or
18 of the Act, have to reach to their logical
ends, hence, the arguments that inquiry
cannot be conducted beyond the statutory
time period fixed under Section 15 has no
legs to stand.

11. The second question arises is how
the court shall have to proceed in case the
inquiry
under
Section
15
is
being
conducted after a lapse of prescribed time
period or even longer. It appeals to reason
2 All. Priyanka Mall @ Mahima Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1479
that when there is a long gap probably the
juvenile may have attained sufficient
maturity. It may be noted that in Barun
Chandra Thakur vs Master Bholu and
Another in Criminal Appeal No. 950 of
2022 decided on 13.07.2022 , the Apex
Court has directed that when a preliminary
assessment under Section 15 of the J.J. Act,
2015 is undertaken, assistance of expert
psychologist/psychiatrist,
psycho
social
workers or other experts has to be taken
mandatorily. In my view, experts are the
persons, who, while examining the juvenile
for the purpose of preliminary assessment,
can take care of the fact that they have a
juvenile before them, who has added
certain months or years to his mental age
by lapse of time. No doubt the appellate
Court/Juvenile Justice Board has to tread
very carefully where such an eventuality
has arisen but it may never be taken to
mean that the preliminary assessment is a
step which can be skipped over by the
Juvenile Justice Board.

11. In view of the above, no
interference is required in the order, hence,
it is dismissed.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1479
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN
MISHRA, J.

Crl. Revision No. 2098 of 2021

Priyanka Mall @ Mahima ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Rahul Singh Dahiya

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Chandra Kumar Singh

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Section 364 - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 - Section 319 - Against summoning
order - Motive has been attributed to
respondent no. 4 that he got sale deed
executed in favour of his wife through
father of victim, of his property, which
was fraudulent transaction and victim and
many
co-villagers
alongwith
Gram
Pradhan visited office of SDM to lay their
protest
-
Victim
allured
by
accused
persons for being ride on their motorcycle
to travel for journey to her village - She
was taken to other route and perpetrators
said that they were bribed by her uncle to
kill her, she got herself rescued anyhow
and one of kidnappers chased and caught
by villagers - She St.d in FIR regarding
presence of PW-2 and PW-3 at time of her
kidnapping - Only evidence laid against
respondent no. 4 is that perpetrators of
offence told victim in course of her
kidnapping that they were bribed by her
uncle to kill her - Allegation of conspiracy
against respondent no.4 rests on alleged
extra-judicial confession of co-accused to
victim during her kidnapping - P.W.2 and
P.W.3 did not depose to any extra-judicial
confession
by
accused
implicating
respondent no.4, they only St.d having
heard that co-accused claimed to be
bribed by him to kill victim - Trial court
rightly
rejected
application
u/s
319
Cr.P.C., as parameters given in Hardeep
Singh (infra) not fulfilled, no cogent
evidence exists against respondent no.4 -
Thus, revision lacks merit, dismissed.
(Para 14, 15, 20)

Revision dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shiv Prakash Mishra Vs St. of UP, 2019(4)
CCSC 1974(SC), (Paras 9 to 11)

2. Hardeep Singh Vs St. of Punj. (2014) 3 SCC
92, (Relied on)