# Juvenile-X Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 1262
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-08
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 6662 of 2024
- **Bench:** Siddharth
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/juvenile-x-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53870
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

G.A.

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Juvenile Justice Board and the
Appellate Court erred in holding that the
offences alleged against the revisionist under
Sections 363, 366 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
constituted
"heinous
offences"
under
the
Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection
of
Children) Act, 2015, thereby justifying trial of
the juvenile as an adult under Section 15 of the
Act, notwithstanding the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of
Delhi).

Headnotes
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 - ss.2(33), 14, 15, 19
- Penal Code, 1860 - ss.363, 366 -
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
s.3(2)(v) - Juvenile in conflict with law -
Heinous offence - Minimum sentence of
seven years - "Fourth category" of
offences - Serious offence - Trial as
adult - Orders set aside.

Held:
Under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2015, an offence can be
categorised as a "heinous offence" only if it
prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years
or more. Offences which provide for a maximum
sentence exceeding seven years but do not
prescribe a minimum sentence, or prescribe a
minimum sentence of less than seven years, fall
in the "fourth category" identified by the
Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of
9 All. Juvenile-X Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1263
Delhi) and are required to be treated as "serious
offences". [Paras 6-7]

A plain reading of Sections 363 and 366 IPC
shows that neither provision prescribes any
minimum sentence. Section 363 IPC provides
punishment which may extend to seven years,
while Section 366 IPC provides punishment
which may extend to ten years. Consequently,
offences under these provisions cannot be
treated as heinous offences within the meaning
of Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015. [Para 8]

Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act applies only
where the offence is committed with the
knowledge that the victim belongs to a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and
where the underlying offence is punishable
with imprisonment of ten years or more.
From the FIR and the statement of the
victim, it was evident that the revisionist did
not commit the alleged acts with knowledge
of the victim's caste, and the victim herself
admitted to a consensual relationship. In
absence of the essential ingredients of
Section 3(2)(v), the said provision was not
attracted. [Para 9]

In view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in Shilpa Mittal (supra), the offences
alleged against the revisionist fell in the fourth
category and were liable to be treated as
serious
offences,
not
heinous
offences.
Consequently, the Juvenile Justice Board was
not justified in invoking Section 15 of the Act of
2015 and directing trial of the revisionist as an
adult. [Paras 7, 9]

The impugned orders of the Juvenile Justice
Board and the Appellate Court were set aside.
The matter was remitted to the Juvenile Justice
Board for conducting the trial of the revisionist
as a juvenile accused of a serious offence, in
accordance with Section 14(5)(e) of the Act of

## Text

1262 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
alleged harassment was of such nature,
which left no other option for the deceased
except to commit suicide.[See: Amalendu
Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal
(2010) 1 SCC 707].

39. In case at hand, however, as per
prosecution, due to matrimonial dispute
revisionists used to harass the deceased but
from the entire evidence available on
record, it could not be reflected that except
to commit suicide, he was not having any
other option, therefore, from this point of
view also offence under Section 306 IPC is
not made out.

40. Therefore, from the discussion
made above, it reflects, no prima facie
offence under Section 306 IPC is made out
against the revisionists and court concerned
without properly analyzing the evidence
available on record dismissed the discharge
application filed by revisionists and,
therefore, committed illegality.

41. Therefore, considering the facts
and circumstances of the case discussed
above, in considered view of this Court
while dismissing the discharge application
of the revisionists trial court committed
illegality
and
impugned
order
dated
19.10.2023 is illegal.

42. Accordingly, impugned order
dated 19.10.2023 passed by the court
concerned is hereby set aside.

43.
The
instant
revision
stands
allowed.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1262
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.09.2025

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH, J.

Criminal Revision No. 6662 of 2024

Juvenile-X ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Ashwani Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Juvenile Justice Board and the
Appellate Court erred in holding that the
offences alleged against the revisionist under
Sections 363, 366 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
constituted
"heinous
offences"
under
the
Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection
of
Children) Act, 2015, thereby justifying trial of
the juvenile as an adult under Section 15 of the
Act, notwithstanding the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of
Delhi).

Headnotes
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 - ss.2(33), 14, 15, 19
- Penal Code, 1860 - ss.363, 366 -
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
s.3(2)(v) - Juvenile in conflict with law -
Heinous offence - Minimum sentence of
seven years - "Fourth category" of
offences - Serious offence - Trial as
adult - Orders set aside.

Held:
Under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2015, an offence can be
categorised as a "heinous offence" only if it
prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years
or more. Offences which provide for a maximum
sentence exceeding seven years but do not
prescribe a minimum sentence, or prescribe a
minimum sentence of less than seven years, fall
in the "fourth category" identified by the
Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of
9 All. Juvenile-X Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1263
Delhi) and are required to be treated as "serious
offences". [Paras 6-7]

A plain reading of Sections 363 and 366 IPC
shows that neither provision prescribes any
minimum sentence. Section 363 IPC provides
punishment which may extend to seven years,
while Section 366 IPC provides punishment
which may extend to ten years. Consequently,
offences under these provisions cannot be
treated as heinous offences within the meaning
of Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015. [Para 8]

Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act applies only
where the offence is committed with the
knowledge that the victim belongs to a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and
where the underlying offence is punishable
with imprisonment of ten years or more.
From the FIR and the statement of the
victim, it was evident that the revisionist did
not commit the alleged acts with knowledge
of the victim's caste, and the victim herself
admitted to a consensual relationship. In
absence of the essential ingredients of
Section 3(2)(v), the said provision was not
attracted. [Para 9]

In view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in Shilpa Mittal (supra), the offences
alleged against the revisionist fell in the fourth
category and were liable to be treated as
serious
offences,
not
heinous
offences.
Consequently, the Juvenile Justice Board was
not justified in invoking Section 15 of the Act of
2015 and directing trial of the revisionist as an
adult. [Paras 7, 9]

The impugned orders of the Juvenile Justice
Board and the Appellate Court were set aside.
The matter was remitted to the Juvenile Justice
Board for conducting the trial of the revisionist
as a juvenile accused of a serious offence, in
accordance with Section 14(5)(e) of the Act of
2015. Criminal revision allowed. [Paras 10-12]
(E-14)

Case Law Cited
Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR
2020 SC 405 - relied on.

List of Acts / Statutes
Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection
of
Children) Act, 2015; Indian Penal Code, 1860;
Scheduled
Castes
and
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

List of Keywords
Juvenile in conflict with law; Heinous offence;
Serious offence; Minimum sentence; Fourth
category of offences.

Case Arising From
Judgment and order dated 14.11.2024 passed
by the Appellate Court / Additional Sessions
Judge / Special Judge, POCSO Act, Jhansi in
Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 2024, affirming the
order dated 09.05.2023 passed by the Juvenile
Justice Board, Jhansi in Case No. 675 of 2023,
arising out of Case Crime No. 53 of 2020, Police
Station Kotwali, District Jhansi.

Appearance for Parties
For the Appellants: Sri Ashwani Kumar Mishra
Sri Anurodh Tripathi (holding brief)
For the State: Learned A.G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddharth, J.)

 1.
Heard
Sri
Anurodh
Tripathi
Advocate holding brief of Sri Ashwani
Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the
revisionist; learned A.G.A. for the State
and perused the trial court record

2. The present criminal revision has been
filed challenging the impugned judgment and
order dated 14.11.2024 passed by Juvenile
Justice Board / Additional Sessions Judge /
Special Judge, POCSO Act, Jhansi in Criminal
Appeal No. 31 of 2024 (Juvenile X vs. State of
U.P and Another) as well as order dated
09.05.2023 passed by Juvenile Justice Board,
Jhansi in Case no. 675 of 2023 (State vs. Sagar
Dheemar) under Sections- 363, 366 IPC and
Section 3(2)5 of SC/ST Act and Section 11/12
POCSO Act, arising out of Case Crime No. 53
of 2020, Police Station- Kotwali, District-
Jhansi whereby Juvenile Justice Board
1264 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
allowed application of prosecution filed under
Section 15 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.

3. The Juvenile Justice Board by the
order
dated
09.05.2023
held
that
revisionist,
whose
age
was
earlier
determined on 18.08.2020 as 17 years, 11
months and 9 days has committed heinous
offence and deserves tried as adult. The
Board further recorded finding that the
revisionist was mentally and physically
capable of committing the alleged offence
and was also able to understand the
consequences of his act as well as the
circumstances in which the offence was
allegedly committed. Relying upon the
questioning of the revisionist by the Board
and
the
report
submitted
by
the
psychologist, the Board directed that the
case of the revisionist be transmitted to the
Children's Court for his trial as an adult.
The aforesaid order dated 09.05.2023,
passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, was
challenged by the revisionist before the
Children's Court by way of an appeal.

4.
The
Appellate
Court,
upon
consideration, held that since the revisionist
stands implicated under Sections 363 and
366 of the Indian Penal Code as well as
Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, the offences alleged against
him fall within the category of heinous
offences. Accordingly, forwarding of his
case to the Children's Court by the Juvenile
Justice Board for trial of the revisionist as
an adult was found to be justified.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the
present revision has been preferred before
this Court.

5. Learned counsel for the revisionist has
submitted that the following punishment has
been provided for committing the offences
under Sections- 363, 366 IPC and Section
3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act :-

363. Punishment for kidnapping.-
Whoever kidnaps any person from [India] or
from lawful guardianship, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.

366. Kidnapping, abducting or
inducing woman to compel her marriage,
etc.- Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman
with intent that she may be compelled, or
knowing it to be likely that she will be
compelled, to marry any person against her
will, or in order that she may be forced or
seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to
be likely that she will be forced or seduced to
illicit intercourse, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine; [and whoever, by means of
criminal intimidation as defined in this Code
or of abuse of authority or any other method of
compulsion, induces any woman to go from
any place with intent that she may be, or
knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced
or seduced to illicit intercourse with another
person shall also be punishable as aforesaid].

Section 3(2)(va) in The Scheduled
Castes
and
the
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
commits any offence specified in the
Schedule, against a person or property,
knowing that such person is a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such
property belongs to such member, shall be
punishable with such punishment as specified
under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for
such offences and shall also be liable to fine;

6. Reliance has been placed in the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Shilpa Mittal vs. State of NCT of Delhi
reported in AIR 2020 SC 405. In
9 All. Juvenile-X Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1265
paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment of
the Apex Court has framed the relevant
question as follows :-

"Whether an offence prescribing
a maximum sentence of more than 7 years
imprisonment
but
not providing any
minimum
sentence,
or
providing
a
minimum sentence of less than 7 years, can
be considered to be a 'heinous offence'
within the meaning of Section 2(33) of The
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015?" is the extremely
important and interesting issue which
arises in this case."

7. The aforesaid issue was considered
by the Apex Court. The Apex Court has
answered this question after discussions
from paragraph nos. 30 to 36 which are as
follows :-

30.
We
must
also
while
interpreting an Act see what is the purpose
of the Act. The purpose of the Act of 2015 is
to ensure that children who come in
conflict with law are dealt with separately
and not like adults. After the unfortunate
incident of rape on December 16, 2012 in
Delhi, where one juvenile was involved,
there was a call from certain sections of the
society that juveniles indulging in such
heinous crimes should not be dealt with like
children. This incident has also been
referred to by the Minister in her
introduction. In these circumstances, to say
that the intention of the Legislature was to
include all offences having a punishment of
more than 7 years in the category of
'heinous offences' would not, in our opinion
be justified. When the language of the
section is clear and it prescribes a
minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment
while dealing with heinous offences then
we cannot wish away the word 'minimum' .

31. No doubt, as submitted by Mr.
Luthra there appears to be a gross mistake
committed by the framers of the legislation.
The
legislation
does
not
take
into
consideration the 4 th category of offences.
How and in what manner a juvenile who
commits such offences should be dealt with
was something that the Legislature should
have clearly spelt out in the Act. There is
an unfortunate gap. We cannot fill the gap
by saying that these offences should be
treated as heinous offences. Whereas on the
one hand there are some offences in this
category which may in general parlance be
termed as heinous, there are many other
offences which cannot be called as heinous
offences. It is not for this Court to legislate.
We may fill in the gaps but we cannot enact
a
legislation,
especially
when
the
Legislature itself has enacted one. We also
have to keep in mind the fact that the
scheme of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that
children should be protected. Treating
children as adults is an exception to the
rule. It is also a well settled principle of
statutory interpretation that normally an
exception has to be given a restricted
meaning.

32. We may add that the High
Courts of Bombay 9, Patna10, and Punjab
and Haryana11, have taken a view that the
category of 'heinous offences' cannot
include offences falling within the 4 th
category. No contrary view has been
brought to our notice. We see no reason to
take a different view.

33. It was urged by Mr. Luthra
that while defining 'heinous offences' the
word 'includes' has been used which would
mean that the definition is an inclusive
definition
and
includes
things
not
mentioned in the definition. We are not
impressed with this argument since the
definitions of 'petty offences' and 'serious
1266 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
offences' also use the word 'includes'. In
fact the word 'includes' is a surplusage. The
word 'includes' in the three definition 9
Saurabh Jalinder Nangre & Ors. vs. State
of Maharashtra, 2019 (1) Crimes 253
(Bom). 10 Criminal (SJ)No.1716 of 2018
titled Rajiv Kumar vs. State of Bihar.
Judgment dated 18.09.2018 11 CRR 1615
of 2018 titled Bijender vs. State of Haryana
and another, judgment dated 21 st May,
2018. clauses does not make any sense.
There is nothing else to be included. The
definition is complete in itself.

34. From the scheme of Section
14, 15 and 19 referred to above it is clear
that the Legislature felt that before the
juvenile is tried as an adult a very detailed
study must be done and the procedure laid
down has to be followed. Even if a child
commits a heinous crime, he is not
automatically to be tried as an adult. This
also clearly indicates that the meaning of
the words 'heinous offence' cannot be
expanded by removing the word 'minimum'
from the definition.

35. Though we are of the view
that the word 'minimum' cannot be treated
as surplusage, yet we are duty bound to
decide as to how the children who have
committed an offence falling within the 4th
category should be dealt with. We are
conscious of the views expressed by us
above that this Court cannot legislate.
However, if we do not deal with this issue
there would be no guidance to the Juvenile
Justice Boards to deal with children who
have committed such offences which
definitely are serious, or may be more than
serious offences, even if they are not heinous
offences. Since two views are possible we
would prefer to take a view which is in favour
of children and, in our opinion, the
Legislature should take the call in this matter,
but till it does so, in exercise of powers
conferred
under
Article142
of
the
Constitution, we direct that from the date
when the Act of 2015 came into force, all
children who have committed offences falling
in the 4th category shall be dealt with in the
same manner as children who have
committed 'serious offences'.

36. In view of the above discussion
we dispose of the appeal by answering the
question set out in the first part of the
judgment in the negative and hold that an
offence which does not provide a minimum
sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be an
heinous offence. However, in view of what we
have held above, the Act does not deal with
the 4 th category of offences viz., offence
where the maximum sentence is more than 7
years
imprisonment,
but
no
minimum
sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7
years is provided, shall be treated as 'serious
offences' within the meaning of the Act and
dealt with accordingly till the Parliament
takes the call on the matter."

8. A perusal of Section 363 IPC reveals
that no minimum sentence has been
prescribed for committing the offence
contemplated
therein.
The
provision
stipulates that the punishment may extend to
seven years along with fine. Similarly, under
Section 366 IPC, the punishment may extend
to ten years along with fine. Insofar as
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is
concerned, it applies only in cases where an
offence under the IPC is punishable with
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
and is committed against a person or property
with the knowledge that such person is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe.
The
said
provision
mandates
punishment with imprisonment for life and
fine.

9. In the present case, however, from a
plain reading of the F.I.R. as well as the
statement of the victim, it is evident that the
9 All. Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar
1267
revisionist did not commit any act against
the victim with the knowledge that she
belonged to Scheduled Caste. On the
contrary, the victim has admitted that she
was in a consenting relationship with the
revisionist. She has further not made
any allegation that the alleged act was
committed against her on account of her
caste. She has admitted knowing the
mobile
number
of
revisionist
and
talking to him. Since under Sections-
363 and 366 IPC, thereis no minimum
sentence provides and care comes in the
4th category of cases defined in Shilpa
Mittal (Supra). Hence, the revisionist
cannot be said to have committed any
heinous offence. At the most he
committed a serious offence as per the
dictum of Apex Court in the case of
Shilpa
Mittal
(Supra)
considered
hereinabove. Therefore, the trial of the
revisionist is required to be conducted
as per Section 14(5)(e) of the Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection
of
Children) Act, 2015.

10.The impugned orders are hereby set
aside.

11.The
criminal
revision
is
accordingly, allowed.

12. The record of this case shall be
sent to the Juvenile Justice Board, Jhansi
where the revisionist shall be tried as an
accused implicated for committing the
serious offence.

13. The office is directed to return the
lower court record to the court concerned
forthwith along with copy of this order.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1267
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.09.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

RERA Appeal No. 72 of 2025
Connected With
RERA Appeal No. 18 of 2025
and other connected cases

Ratan Buildtech Private Limited
 ...Appellant
Versus
Anil Kumar ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Prashant Kumar Singh, Sudeep Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal
was justified in granting delayed interest
under Section 18(1)(a) of the Real Estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016,
without conducting a separate adjudicatory
inquiry, and whether such grant of interest is
automatic and mechanical upon admitted
delay in handing over possession.
(ii)
Whether
the
Appellate
Tribunal
was
empowered, under Section 44(6) read with
Section 53(1) of the RERA Act, to itself
award interest after setting aside the order of
the Adjudicating Officer.
(iii) Whether the amount deposited by the
promoter as pre-deposit under Section
43(5)
of
the
RERA
Act
could
be
appropriated towards satisfaction of the
interest awarded, or whether it was merely a
security for maintaining the appeal.
(iv) Whether an appeal under Section 58 of
the RERA Act would lie before the High Court
against an order of the Appellate Tribunal
granting
interest
under
Section
18(1),
particularly where the facts relating to delay and
possession were admitted.

Headnotes
Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016 - ss.18(1)(a), 43(5), 44(6), 53,
58 - Delayed possession - Interest -
Nature
of
liability
-
Statutory
consequence
-
Powers
of
Appellate