# Kafeel v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 1955
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-03-20
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 3982 of 2021
- **Bench:** Karunesh Singh Pawar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kafeel-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50301
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Criminal law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Section 482- Entire proceedings
under Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986-challenged-FIR
lodged under Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the
Uttar
Pradesh
Prevention
of
Cow
Slaughter
Act,
1955-
e
accusedapplicant has been apprehended while
he was standing and holding 2 kg meat
in his right hand- no allegation in the
entire prosecution case that the alleged
offence has been committed to make
undue economic gain, to perpetrate
some terror or to continue any such
criminal activities which by and large
are
detrimental
to
the
safety
and
security of the society-Section 2(b) of
the Gangster Act-definition of gangword "otherwise" used in Section 2(b) of
the Act-used ejusdem generis- absence
of allegation of violence, threat or show
of violence or intimidation or coercion or
otherwise-conditions
for
imposing
Gangster
Act
not
fulfilled-entire
proceedings and chargesheet quashedApplication allowed. (Paras 10, 11, 12,
13 and 14)

HELD:

It is admitted case of the prosecution that the
accused-applicant
has
been
apprehended
while he was standing and holding 2 kg meat
in
his
right
hand.
The
main
accused
Shahnawaj @ Shanu is admittedly a licensed
butcher and was having a shop in the area.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
entire
prosecution case that the alleged offence has
been committed to make undue economic
gain, to perpetrate some terror or to continue
any such criminal activities which by and large
are detrimental to the safety and security of
the society. (Para 10)

A perusal of the definition of the gang shows
that it is, a group of persons, who acting either
singly or collectively by causing violence or
threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or
coercion, or otherwise with the object of
disturbing public order or of gaining any undue
temporal,
pecuniary,
material
or
other
advantage for himself or any other person.
(Para 11)
1956 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
A perusal of the entire prosecution case depicts
that it is not the case of the prosecution that the
accused has committed any violence, or
extended any threat or has intimidated or has
done coercion with the object of disturbing
public order or the offence has been done for
gaining any undue temporal pecuniary material
or other advantage either for himself or any
other person indulged in antisocial activities
which are defined in Section 2(b)(1) of the
Gangsters Act. The word or otherwise used in
Section 2(b) of the Act has to be interpreted in
context of the preceding words such as
violence, threat, show of violence, intimidation
or coercion, it cannot be assigned general
meaning in order to invoke the Gangsters Act.
In order to invoke the gangster in the case in
hand, it has to be seen what was the object of
the offence or the motive behind it. If the
motive
was
of
gaining
undue
temporal
pecuniary or material advantage then the case
is different. From the material gathered by the
prosecution, it cannot be said that the accused
had the aforesaid motive to interpret the
general word used in section 2(d) of the Act i.e.
'other advantage'. The rule of 'Ejusdem Generis'
has to be invoked. (Para 12)

It is settled that for a solitary case, the gangster
can be imposed against the accused persons, if
the offence is found to have been committed for
any of the antisocial activity mentioned in
Section 2(b) of the Act. It is not the case here.
In the present case, there is nothing on the
record to suggest that the charge sheet has
been filed for any of the antisocial activities
mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act as
discussed above. The accused may commit such
kind of offence just once or he may commit
several offences and could face more than one
F.I.R.s in that connection, the numbers of the
F.I.R.s are irrelevant. The motive behind the
offence and the object has to be seen in order
to arrive at a conclusion whether the provision
of the gangsters act can be

## Text

5 All. Kafeel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1955
this Court on 24.11.2014 and 26.11.2014 in
respective writ petitions and stay orders were
subject to the condition that the petitioners
shall deposit the entire amount ordered to be
paid thereunder, but there is nothing on record
to demonstrate whether the said deposits have
been made or not, it is hereby provided that in
the event petitioners have not deposited under
the order of this Court initially passed and the
petitioners want interim stay on the order
passed by the Stamp Authority during
pendency of appeal, they may deposit 1/3rd of
the disputed amount as provided for under the
provisions and in the event they deposit the
said amount within a period of four weeks
from the date of this order, appropriate order
on their stay application shall be passed by the
appellate authority within a further period of
two weeks.

37. With the aforesaid observations
and directions all the writ petitions are
disposed of.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 1955
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.03.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KARUNESH SINGH PAWAR, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 3982 of 2021

Kafeel ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Rahul Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Section 482- Entire proceedings
under Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986-challenged-FIR
lodged under Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the
Uttar
Pradesh
Prevention
of
Cow
Slaughter
Act,
1955-
e
accusedapplicant has been apprehended while
he was standing and holding 2 kg meat
in his right hand- no allegation in the
entire prosecution case that the alleged
offence has been committed to make
undue economic gain, to perpetrate
some terror or to continue any such
criminal activities which by and large
are
detrimental
to
the
safety
and
security of the society-Section 2(b) of
the Gangster Act-definition of gangword "otherwise" used in Section 2(b) of
the Act-used ejusdem generis- absence
of allegation of violence, threat or show
of violence or intimidation or coercion or
otherwise-conditions
for
imposing
Gangster
Act
not
fulfilled-entire
proceedings and chargesheet quashedApplication allowed. (Paras 10, 11, 12,
13 and 14)

HELD:

It is admitted case of the prosecution that the
accused-applicant
has
been
apprehended
while he was standing and holding 2 kg meat
in
his
right
hand.
The
main
accused
Shahnawaj @ Shanu is admittedly a licensed
butcher and was having a shop in the area.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
entire
prosecution case that the alleged offence has
been committed to make undue economic
gain, to perpetrate some terror or to continue
any such criminal activities which by and large
are detrimental to the safety and security of
the society. (Para 10)

A perusal of the definition of the gang shows
that it is, a group of persons, who acting either
singly or collectively by causing violence or
threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or
coercion, or otherwise with the object of
disturbing public order or of gaining any undue
temporal,
pecuniary,
material
or
other
advantage for himself or any other person.
(Para 11)
1956 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
A perusal of the entire prosecution case depicts
that it is not the case of the prosecution that the
accused has committed any violence, or
extended any threat or has intimidated or has
done coercion with the object of disturbing
public order or the offence has been done for
gaining any undue temporal pecuniary material
or other advantage either for himself or any
other person indulged in antisocial activities
which are defined in Section 2(b)(1) of the
Gangsters Act. The word or otherwise used in
Section 2(b) of the Act has to be interpreted in
context of the preceding words such as
violence, threat, show of violence, intimidation
or coercion, it cannot be assigned general
meaning in order to invoke the Gangsters Act.
In order to invoke the gangster in the case in
hand, it has to be seen what was the object of
the offence or the motive behind it. If the
motive
was
of
gaining
undue
temporal
pecuniary or material advantage then the case
is different. From the material gathered by the
prosecution, it cannot be said that the accused
had the aforesaid motive to interpret the
general word used in section 2(d) of the Act i.e.
'other advantage'. The rule of 'Ejusdem Generis'
has to be invoked. (Para 12)

It is settled that for a solitary case, the gangster
can be imposed against the accused persons, if
the offence is found to have been committed for
any of the antisocial activity mentioned in
Section 2(b) of the Act. It is not the case here.
In the present case, there is nothing on the
record to suggest that the charge sheet has
been filed for any of the antisocial activities
mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act as
discussed above. The accused may commit such
kind of offence just once or he may commit
several offences and could face more than one
F.I.R.s in that connection, the numbers of the
F.I.R.s are irrelevant. The motive behind the
offence and the object has to be seen in order
to arrive at a conclusion whether the provision
of the gangsters act can be invoked in a given
case or not. The motive and the object are
clearly missing, thus, the case could not have
been brought under the provision of the Act.
(Para 14)

Application allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:
1. Shraddha Gupta Vs St. of U.P., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 514

2. Asstt. Collector of Central Excise Vs Ramdev
Tobacco Co., (1991) 2 SCC 119

(Delivered by Hon'ble Karunesh Singh
Pawar, J.)

1. By this petition, the petitioner has
prayed for quashing the entire proceedings
of CNR No. UPJB010048152019 (State Vs
Shahnawaj alias Shanu & others) pending
before the Sessions Judge/Fast Track
Court-11, Amroha including Charge Sheet
No. 01/2019 dated 11.09.2019 submitted
by the Investigating Officer before the
Sessions
Judge/Fast
Track
Court-11,
Amroha in Case Crime No.0193/2019
under Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 Police Station
Amroha City, District Jyotiba Phule Nagar,
order of cognizance dated 27.09.2019
passed by the Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Court No. 4, Amroha in
CNR No. UPJB010048152019 (State Vs
Shahnawaj alias Shanu & others) as well as
Non- Bailable Warrants dated 28.08.2020,
21.10.2020 and 10.12.2020 issued by the
Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Court No. 4, Amroha against the applicant.
Further prayer has also been made for
quashing
the
approval
order
dated
19.03.2019
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate, Amroha upon the gang chart
which has been recommended by the
Superintendent of Police, Amroha on
19.03.2019 so far as it relates to the
applicant.

2. Brief facts of the case are that an
F.I.R. dated 13.08.2018 was lodged under
Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the Uttar Pradesh
Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 at
Police Station Amroha City, District
5 All. Kafeel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1957
Jyotiba Phule Nagar which was registered
as Case Crime No. 0492/2018. The
prosecution version as contained in the
First Information Report dated 13.08.2018
is being translated into English and quoted
as under:-

"The police party in its regular
check and patrolling reached Kakar Saral
Mod where a tip was received that in
Mohalla Moti Shah one Shahnawa) allas
Shanu son of Shafeek and others are selling
cow meat after slaughtering it, if they
immediately reach, the accused can be
nabbed. No one agreed to be a prosecution
witness and therefore, the police party
reached the house of Shahnawaj alias
Shanu. It was a two-storied house. The tip
informed that Shahnawaj alias Shanu was
slaughtering the cow and selling its meat,
thereafter the tip went away. Three persons
were arrested; one of them disclosed his
Identity as Shahnawaj alias Shanu from
whom a knife was recovered. Another
person named Naeem was also arrested
from whom another knife recovered. Third
person named Kafeel (applicant) was
arrested from whom two Kilogram of cow
meat was recovered from his right hand in
a polythene bag. 60 kilogram cow meat
was lying on floor. Shahnawaj and Naeem
told that they have procured the cow meat
with the help of another accused person
Rafi
Ahmad.
Veterinary
Doctor
was
contacted on phone, who arrived at the
crime scene. The Veterinary Doctor prima
facie expressed his opinion of cow meat on
Inspection of the meat lying on floor. Two
knives, two gandasa, and iron hook, one
large needle and a wooden plank were
recovered".

3. Learned counsel for the applicant
submits that the co-accused Shahnawaj @
Shanu has a slaughter license under Food
Safety and Standard Authority of India which
is on record as Annexure No. 7 to the
petition.

4. It is further submitted on behalf of
the applicant that from perusal of the license,
it is apparent that Shahnawaj @ Shanu is a
valid license holder and is a licensed butcher
having a shop in the name and style of
Shahnawaj Buffalo Meat Shop. As per the
prosecution case, knifes were recovered from
the possession of Shahnawaj @ Shanu. It is
also submitted that since he is licensee
butcher, therefore, the recovery of knife
shown from him is nothing but a police
heroic.
The
investigating
officer
has
investigated the case and the statements of
the witnesses were recorded which are on
record as annexure No. 8. He further submits
that from perusal of the statements, it is
evident that there is no independent witnesses
to the incident. Charge sheet in the aforesaid
crime No. 0492/2018 came to be filed on
11.10.2018 before the CJM, Amroha against
the four named accused persons including the
applicant, upon which the cognizance was
taken on 12.10.2018 and the accused persons
were summoned before the trial court.

5. It is further submitted on behalf of
the applicant that from the prosecution case
in the police report, it is evident that the
only allegation against the applicant is that
he was caught with 2 kg of meat in his right
hand in the polythene. It is also submitted
that there is no independent witness to
testify the alleged crime as the F.I.R.
explicitly states that none was ready to be
witness of the said raid. All the
prosecution witnesses are members of the
police party who raided the house of
Shahnawaj @ Shanu who is a licensed
butcher. It is next submitted that the
alleged recovery of 2 kg meat from the
applicant is planted.
1958 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

6. Learned counsel for the applicant
further submits that there is no material
collected by the Investigating Officer to
invoke the Gangsters Act. The gang chart has
been prepared in cyclostyle manner which
shows total non-application of mind. In the
gang chart, only one case of cow slaughter
has been shown. The applicant has no
criminal history except the sole case i.e. case
crime No. 492/2018, under Sections 3/5/8 of
the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act,
1955. There is no input in the police report
and no material at all to bring this offence
under the definition of gang. No subjective
satisfaction has been recorded by the District
Magistrate, Amroha. Gang chart has been
prepared and recommended by the various
authorities in a very short time in a
mechanical manner without there being any
subjective satisfaction.

7. It is further submitted on behalf of
the applicant that there is no report of any
veterinary doctor and no sampling of the
alleged recovered meat has been sent for
the
forensic
science
laboratory.
The
ingredients to invoke of Section 2(d) of the
Act are absent. In support of his contention,
learned counsel for the applicant has relied
on the judgments of this High Court passed
in the case of Tej Singh and others Vs.
State of U.P., in Application U/S 482 No.
3239/2005, Arjun Vs. State of U.P. in Writ
Petition No. 642 of 2021 and Pankaj Singh
Vs. State of U.P. in criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 5707/2021.

8. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has
opposed the petition submitting that on
the basis of a solitary case, gangster can
be invoked. In support of his contention,
he has relied on the judgment of the Apex
Court passed in the case of "Shraddha
Gupta v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 514".

9. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant and learned A.G.A. for the
State.

10. It is admitted case of the
prosecution that the accused-applicant
has been apprehended while he was
standing and holding 2 kg meat in his
right hand. The main accused Shahnawaj
@ Shanu is admittedly a licensed butcher
and was having a shop in the area. There
is no allegation in the entire prosecution
case that the alleged offence has been
committed to make undue economic gain,
to perpetrate some terror or to continue
any such criminal activities which by and
large are detrimental to the safety and
security of the society. The definition of
the gang has been provided under Section
2(b) of the Gangsters Act which is
reproduced as under:-

..........2. Definitions. - In this
Act,-

(a) "Code" means the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of
1974);

(b) "Gang" means a group of
persons, who acting either singly or
collectively, by violence, or threat or show
of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or
otherwise with the object of disturbing
public order or of gaining any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other
advantage for himself or any other person,
indulge in anti-social activities, namely-

(i) offences punishable under
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter
XXII of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45
of 1860), or

(ii) distilling or manufacturing or
.storing or transporting or importing or
exporting or selling or distributing any
liquor, or intoxicating or dangerous drugs,
or other intoxicants or narcotics or
5 All. Kafeel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1959
cultivating any plant, in contravention of
any of the provisions of the U.P. Excise
Act, 1910 (U.P. Act No. 4 of 1910), or the
Narcotic
Drugs
and
Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (Act No. 61 of 1985),
or any other law for the time being in force,
or

(iii)
occupying
or
taking
possession
of
immovable
property
otherwise than in accordance with law, or
setting-up
false
claims
for
title
or
possession of immovable property whether
in himself or any other person, or

(iv) preventing or attempting to
prevent any public servant or any witness
from discharging his lawful duties, or

(v) offences punishable under the
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women
and Girls Act, 1956 (Act No. 104 of 1956),
or

(vi) offences punishable under
Section 3 of the Public Gambling Act, 1867
(Act No. 3 of 1867), or

(vii) preventing any person from
offering bids in auction lawfully conducted,
or tender, lawfully invited, by or on behalf
of any Government department, local body
or public or private undertaking, for any
lease or rights or supply of goods or work
to be done, or

(viii) preventing or disturbing the
smooth running by any person of his lawful
business, profession, trade or employment
or any other lawful activity connected
therewith, or

(ix) offences punishable under
Section 171-E of the Indian Penal Code
(Act No. 45 of 1860), or in preventing or
obstructing any public election being
lawfully held, by physically preventing the
voter from exercising his electoral rights,
or

(x) inciting others to resort to
violence to disturb communal harmony, or

(xi) creating panic, alarm or
terror in public, or

(xii) terrorising or assaulting
employees or owners or occupiers of public
or private undertakings or factories and
causing mischief in respect of their
properties, or

(xiii) inducing or attempting to
induce any person to go to foreign
countries on false representation that any
employment, trade or profession shall be
provided to him in such foreign country, or

(xiv) kidnapping or abducting any
person with intent to extort ransom, or

(xv)
diverting
or
otherwise
preventing any aircraft or public transport
vehicle from following its scheduled
course;

[(xvi) offences punishable under
the Regulation of Money Lending Act,
1976;

(xvii)
illegally
transporting
and/or smuggling of cattle and indulging in
acts in contravention of the provisions in
the Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955
and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Act, 1960;

(xviii)
human
trafficking
for
purposes
of
commercial
exploitation,
bonded
labour,
child
labour,
sexual
exploitation,
organ
removing
and
trafficking, beggary and the like activities.

(xix) offences punishable under
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1966:

(xx) printing, transporting and
circulating of fake Indian currency notes;

(xxi) involving in production, sale
and distribution of spurious drugs;

(xxii) involving in manufacture,
sale and transportation of arms and
ammunition in contravention of Sections 5,
7 and 12 of the Arms Act, 1959;

(xxiii) felling or killing for
economic gains, smuggling of products in
1960 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contravention of the Indian Forest Act,
1927 and Wildlife Protection Act, 1972;

(xxiv) offences punishable under
the Entertainment and Betting Tax Act,
1979;

(xvv) indulging in crimes that
impact security of State, public order and
even tempo of life.]

(c) "gangster" means a member
or leader or organiser of a gang and
includes any person who abets or assists in
the activities of a gang enumerated in
clause (b), whether before or after the
commission of such activities or harbours
any person who has indulged in such
activities;

(d) "public servant" means a
public servant as defined in Section 21 of
the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of
1860), or any other law for the time being
in force, and includes any person who
lawfully assists the police or other
authorities of the State, in investigation or
prosecution or punishment of an offence
punishable under this Act, whether by
giving information or evidence relating to
such offence or offender or in any other
manner;

(e) "member of the family of a
public servant" means his parents or
spouse and brother, sister, son, daughter,
grandson, granddaughter or the spouses of
any of them, and includes a person
dependent on or residing with the public
servant and a pen on in whose welfare the
public servant is interested;

(f) words and phrases used but
not defined in this Act and defined in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the
Indian Penal Code shall have the meanings
respectively assigned to them in such
Codes.

11. A perusal of the definition of the
gang shows that it is, a group of persons,
who acting either singly or collectively by
causing violence or threat or show of
violence, or intimidation, or coercion, or
otherwise with the object of disturbing
public order or of gaining any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other
advantage for himself or any other person.

12. A perusal of the entire prosecution
case depicts that it is not the case of the
prosecution that the accused has committed
any violence, or extended any threat or has
intimidated or has done coercion with the
object of disturbing public order or the
offence has been done for gaining any
undue temporal pecuniary material or other
advantage either for himself or any other
person indulged in antisocial activities
which are defined in Section 2(b)(1) of the
Gangsters Act. The word or otherwise used
in Section 2(b) of the Act has to be
interpreted in context of the preceding
words such as violence, threat, show of
violence, intimidation or coercion, it cannot
be assigned general meaning in order to
invoke the Gangsters Act. In order to
invoke the gangster in the case in hand, it
has to be seen what was the object of the
offence or the motive behind it. If the
motive was of gaining undue temporal
pecuniary or material advantage then the
case is different. From the material
gathered by the prosecution, it cannot be
said that the accused had the aforesaid
motive to interpret the general word used in
section 2(d) of the Act i.e. 'other
advantage'. The rule of 'Ejusdem Generis'
has to be invoked. The Coordinate Bench
of this Court while relying on the judgment
of the Apex Court passed in the case of
"Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v.
Ramdev Tobacco Co., (1991) 2 SCC 119"
and while invoking the rule of Ejusdem
Generis has interpreted the word 'other
advantage' which finds place in Section 2
5 All. Kafeel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1961
of the Act and has held that the phrase
'other advantage' must take its hue from the
accompanying words which immediately
precede the same and which have a
qualifying effect. The relevant part of the
judgment of Tej Singh (supra), is extracted
below:-

After having perused the record,
this Court finds itself in agreement with the
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the applicants that though the accused
are facing the allegations of having
committed murder but they cannot be said
to have committed the crime because they
were gangsters. There was no motive of
making any wrongful economic gains. This
Court also does not see any material on the
basis of which it may be held that the prime
object behind committing the crime in
question was so as to disturb the public
order. Whenever some grave crime is
committed
it
always
leads
to
a
consequential result of some kind of
disturbance
in
society.
Such
normal
disturbance in society and disturbing the
public order or creating panic or terror are
different species. Ordinary law and order
problems
can
not
be
clubbed
with
phenomenon of break of public order. The
crime in question does not appear to have
been committed with the object of gaining
any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or
other similar kind of advantage for itself or
for any other person indulged in anti-social
activities.

Here in this context it may also
be seen that in the definition of 'gang' as
provided under Section -2(b) of the U.P.
Gangsters and Anti Social Activities
(Prevention)
Act,
1986
(hereinafter
referred to as Act) reference to the words
'gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary,
material or other advantage' for himself or
any other person has been given. One
might
argue
that
the
words
'other
advantage' is an all inclusive term and all
kinds and categories of advantages will
come under its title, and therefore, there is
hardly any need to see the facts of the case
with a fine class in order to find whether
the object of the gang is or was of gaining
undue temporal, pecuniary and material
advantage or not. If the violence or offence
committed was inspired to get any kind of
advantage for himself or for any other
person, the letter of definition as provided
by the Act shall stand satisfied. But in the
considered opinion of this Court such kind
of
approach
will
lead
to
complete
misinterpretation of the Statute. If the
Legislature in its wisdom has used a
number of qualifying words with regard to
Anti Social Activity as has been referred to
and contemplated in the Act, then its whole
purpose shall stand defeated by providing
such an all sweeping meaning to the words
'other advantage' as has been used in the
definition. If the term 'other advantage' was
meant to include all advantages or was
meant to include any kind of advantage
whatsoever where was the need to use
different
other
defining
words
like
'temporal, pecuniary and material' which
immediately precede the words 'or other
advantage' ! It is self evident that the use of
the preceding words have a qualifying
effect and must be seen lending its
complexion to the subsequently used words
'other
advantage'.
The
words
'other
advantage' has got to be seen in the context
and perspective and with reference to the
preceding aforesaid words and must be
understood in the same light. Just as a man
is often known by the company he keeps,
the import of words in Statute also are
often to be seen and understood by the
company of the words in which they
appear. In this regard this Court deems it
appropriate to keep in perspective the rule
1962 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of 'Ejusdem Generis' in order to correctly
appreciate the scope and the actual ambit
of the general words which follow the
aforesaid specific words used in the
Statute. The Court is of the view that the
aforesaid
preceding
words
'temporal,
pecuniary and material' are constituting a
genus and the words 'other advantage' has
to be read as an species of the same.
Though ordinarily the general words must
be provided to bear their natural and
larger meaning but they have to be
confined Ejusdem generis to the class of
things previously enumerated by certain
specific words because it is not difficult to
see clearly the intention of the Statute
which it spells out by using a specific class
and category of qualifying words. This
Court sees reasons and therefore feels
persuaded to limit the scope of the meaning
of the general words 'other advantage'
because if we provide to it a larger all
embracing meaning it is likely to lead to
absurd and unforeseen results. The general
expression has to be read contemplating to
imply the things of the same kind which
have been referred to by the preceding
specific class of things constituting a genus.
If we do not adhere to this rule and do not
impute specific complexion to the general
words in the light of the preceding words
the blatant misuse and plain absurdity to
which it shall lead is that the administrative
executives and the police would feel free to
impose the provisions of this Act upon
anybody and everybody who is facing the
charge of committing any sort of offence or
any breach of law howsoever trivial it be
because hardly any violence or threat or
show of violence or intimidation or
coercion is done without having the object
of gaining some kind of advantage himself
or for any other person. The word
'advantage' has an all sweeping natural
meaning and may include material and
psychological both kinds of advantages. In
that view of the matter the use of the words
'other advantage' will bring in its mischief
everything under the sun. It is therefore
very expediently needed to read these
words in right perspective and read them
Ejusdem generis with the things or words
previously enumerated by the Statute. In
order to substantiate its view this Court
finds strength from the pronouncement
given by the Apex Court in the case of
Assistant Collector of Central Excise,
Guntur vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company,
1991 AIR (SC) 506. In this case the
principle
of
Ejusdem
generis
was
expatiated upon at some length and was
also brought into application while giving
interpretation to the issues involved in the
case with which it was dealing. It would be
profitable to extract the relevant portion of
the pronouncement which reads as under:-

"5. But the question is whether
the issuance of a show cause notice and the
initiation of the consequential adjudication
proceedings can be described as `other
legal proceedings' within the meaning of
sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act? If
the said departmental action falls within
the expression `other legal proceeding'
there can be no doubt that the action would
be barred as the same indisputably was
initiated six months after the accrual of the
cause action. So the crucial question is
whether the issuance of the show cause
notice dated August 30, 1972 and the
passing
of
the
impugned
order
in
adjudication
proceedings
emanating
therefrom
constitutes
`other
legal
proceeding' within the meaning of section
40 (2) of the Act to fall within the mischief
of that sub-section which bars such
proceedings if commenced after a period of
six months from the accrual of the cause of
action. The learned Additional Solicitor
General submitted that the expression
5 All. Kafeel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1963
`other legal proceeding' must be read
ejusdem
generis
with
the
preceding
expressions `suit' and `prosecution' and if
so read it becomes crystal clear that the
department's action cannot come within the
purview of `other legal proceeding'. How
valid is this contention is the question
which we are called upon to answer in the
present appeal.

6. The rule of ejusdem generis is
generally invoked where the scope and
ambit of the general words which follow
certain specific words (which have some
common characteristic and constitute a
genus) is required to be determined. By the
application of this rule the scope and ambit
of the general words which follow certain
specific words constituting a genus is
restricted to things ejusdem generis with
those preceding them, unless the context
otherwise requires. General words must
ordinarily bear their natural and larger
meaning and need not be confined ejusdem
generis to things previously enumerated
unless the language of the statute spells out
an intention to that effect. Courts have also
limited the scope of the general words in
cases where a larger meaning is likely to
lead to absurd and unforeseen results. To
put it differently, the general expression
has to be read to comprehend things of the
same kind as those referred to by the
preceding specific things constituting a
genus, unless of course from the language
of the statute it can be inferred that the
general words were not intended to be so
limited and no absurdity or unintended and
unforeseen complication is likely to result if
they are allowed to take their natural
meaning.
The
cardinal
rule
of
interpretation is to allow the general words
to take their natural wide meaning unless
the language of the statute gives a different
indication or such meaning is likely to lead
to absurd results in which case their
meaning
can
be
restricted
by
the
application of this rule and they may be
required to fall in line with the specific
things designated by the preceding words.
But unless there is genus which can be
comprehended from the preceding words,
there can be no question of invoking this
rule. Nor can this rule have any application
where the general words precede specific
words.

7. There can be little doubt that
the words `other legal proceeding' are wide
enough to include adjudication and penalty
proceedings under the Act. Even the
learned Additional Solicitor General did
not contend to the contrary but what he
said was that since this wide expression is
preceded by particular words of a certain
genus, namely, words indicating reference
to proceedings taken in courts only, the
wide words must be limited to things
ejusdem generis and must take colour from
the preceding words and should, therefore,
receive a limited meaning to exclude
proceedings of the type in question. There
can be no doubt that `suit' or `prosecution'
are those judicial or legal proceedings
which are lodged in a court of law and not
before any executive authority, even if a
statutory one. The use of the expression
`instituted' in section 40 (2) strengthens
this belief. Since this sub-section has been
construed by this Court in Raju's case
(supra) not to be confined in its application
to only Government servants but to extend
to others including the assessees and since
the words `for anything done or ordered to
be done under this Act' are found to be
comprehensive enough to include acts of
non-compliance or omissions to do what
the Act and the Rule enjoin, the limitation
prescribed by section 40(2) would
undoubtedly hit the adjudication and
penalty proceedings unless the expression
`other legal proceeding' is read ejusdem
1964 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
generis to limit its ambit to legal
proceedings initiated in a court of law.

8. The scope of section 40(2) as it
stood before its amendment pursuant to
Raju's case came up for consideration
before a Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Universal Cables
Ltd. v. Union of India, [1977 Tax LR
1825]: 1977 ELT (J92) wherein the
question raised for determination was
whether penalty proceedings taken under
Rule 173Q for the infraction of Rule 173C
with a view to evading payment of duty fell
within
the
expression
`other
legal
proceeding' used in the said sub- section.
The
High
Court
conceded
that
the
expression when read in isolation is wide
enough to include any proceeding taken in
accordance with law, whether so taken in a
court of law or before any authority or
tribunal but when read with the preceding
words `suit' or `prosecution' it must be
given a restricted meaning. This is how the
High Court expressed itself at page J 106
(at page 1838 of Tax. L.R.):

"Now the language of section
40(2) is: `no suit, prosecution or other
legal proceeding shall be instituted'. `Suit'
and `prosecution' which precede the
expression `other legal proceeding' can be
taken only in a Court of Law".

After stating the expanse of the
ejusdem generis rule, as explained in Amar
Chandra v. Excise Collector, Tripura, AIR.
1972 SC 1863 at 1868 (Sutherland, Volume
2 pages 399-400) the High Court observed
that there was no indication in the said
sub-section or elsewhere in the Act that the
said general words were intended to
receive their wide meaning and were not to
be construed in a limited sense with the aid
of the ejusdem generis rule. A departmental
proceeding like penalty proceedings were,
therefore, placed outside the scope of the
said sub-section. This view was quoted with
approval by a learned Single Judge of the
Bombay High Court in C.C. Industries &
Others v. H.N. Ray, 1980 ELT 442 at 453.
These two cases, therefore, clearly support
the view canvassed before us by the learned
Additional Solicitor General.

9. We have given our careful
consideration to the submission made on
behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the
view expressed in the aforesaid two
decisions. In considering the scope of the
expression `other legal proceeding' we
have confined ourselves to the language of
sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act
before its amendment by Act 22 of 1973
and should not be understood to express
any view on the amended provision. On
careful consideration we are in respectful
agreement with the view expressed in the
aforesaid
decisions
that
the
wide
expression `other legal proceeding' must be
read ejusdem generis with the preceding
words `suit' and `prosecution' as they
constitute a genus. In this view of the
matter we must uphold the contention of the
learned Additional Solicitor General that
the penalty and adjudication proceedings
in question did not fall within the
expression
`other
legal
proceeding'
employed in section 40(2) of the Act as it
stood prior to its amendment by Act 22 of
1973 and therefore, the said proceedings
were
not
subject
to
the
limitation
prescribed by the said sub-section."

Illumined by the aforesaid view
adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this
Court sees good reason to hold that the use
of phrase 'other advantage' as it finds place
in the Act must take its hue from the
accompanying words which immediately
precede the same and which have a
qualifying effect.

13. Thus, in absence of allegation of
violence, threat or show of violence or
5 All. State of U.P. Vs. Ajai Mishra @ Taini & Ors.
1965
intimidation or coercion or otherwise, I am
of the view that first information report
registered against the applicant under
Section 3(1) of the Act cannot be sustained.
Further the words "or otherwise" used in
the first part of section 2(b) of the Act,
shall derive its meaning from the preceding
words and it shall not include all general
acts/offences which are trivial in nature, for
the purpose of the Section 2(b) of the Act.
So far as the contention of learned A.G.A.
that on a solitary case, the gangsters can be
invoked is concerned, there is no quarrel on
this point. The law is settled. The Apex
Court has already settled the controversy in
the case of Shraddha Gupta (supra)
wherein in para 10 it has been held that
there can be prosecution against a person
even
in
a
case
of
a
single
offence/F.I.R./charge sheet for any of the
antisocial activities mentioned in Section
2(b) of the Act provided such antisocial
activity is by violence or threat or by show
of violence or intimidation or coercion or
otherwise with the object of disturbing
public order or of gaining any undue
temporal pecuniary material or advantage
for himself or any other person. In the
present case, it is alleged that the petitioner
herein was apprehended with 2 kg meat in
his right hand. There is no allegation of any
of the antisocial activities mentioned in
Section 2 of the Act such as violence,
threat, show of violence, intimidation,
coercion etc., therefore, it cannot be said
that the said offence was committed by the
applicant for object of disturbing public
order or of gaining undue temporal
pecuniary material or other advantage for
himself or any other person.

14. It is settled that for a solitary case,
the gangster can be imposed against the
accused persons, if the offence is found to
have been committed for any of the
antisocial activity mentioned in Section
2(b) of the Act. It is not the case here. In
the present case, there is nothing on the
record to suggest that the charge sheet has
been filed for any of the antisocial activities
mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act as
discussed above. The accused may commit
such kind of offence just once or he may
commit several offences and could face
more than one F.I.R.s in that connection,
the numbers of the F.I.R.s are irrelevant.
The motive behind the offence and the
object has to be seen in order to arrive at a
conclusion whether the provision of the
gangsters act can be invoked in a given
case or not. The motive and the object are
clearly missing, thus, the case could not
have been brought under the provision of
the Act.

15. In view of the aforesaid reasons,
the entire criminal proceedings as well as
charge sheet under the Act as well as
consequential proceedings are quashed.
The application is allowed.

Let copy of this order sent to the
learned trial court forthwith
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 1965
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Government Appeal No. 1624 of 2004
AND
Criminal Revision No. 221 of 2004

State of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Ajai Mishra @ Taini & Ors.
 ...Accused-Respondents