# Kailash Nath & Ors v. State of U.P.& Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 1246
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-30
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Review Application No. 102 of 2023
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kailash-nath-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53994
- **Pages:** 20

## Text

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1246 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Provided that the search conducted under
this section shall be recorded through
audio-video electronic means preferably
by mobile phone.

18. This court came across number of cases where independent witness could not be found
regarding recovery of any article and even then audio video recording through E-Sakshya portal or
other audio, video electronic means was not conducted by the police which gives benefit to the
criminals during bail as well as trial.

19. Therefore, this Court directs the Director General of Police, U.P., Lucknow to issue
detailed SOP as required by Rules 18(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Rules,
2024 for mandatorily conducting audio video recording of search, seizure or possession of property
or other incriminating material including the preparation of list of articles or property seized as well
as signature of witnesses on E-Sakshya portal and uploading the same or through other audio, video
electronic means including mobile phone of police officers on duty and direction may also be
issued that failing to comply mandatory requirement of Section 105 of BNSS read with Rule 18 of
the the Uttar Pradesh Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Rules, 2024 may attract disciplinary proceeding
against the concerned police officer so that on the one hand it would save innocent persons from
false implication by showing false recovery of property or articles and on the other hand to prepare
foolproof evidence against the criminals for hearing the bail application as well as during trial.

20. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to send a copy of this order to the Director General of
Police, U.P., Lucknow for necessary compliance.
----------
(2026) 1 ILRA 1246
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Civil Misc. Review Application No. 102 of 2023

Kailash Nath & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P.& Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
Whether while passing the judgment under review the relief clauses (f) & (h), though noted in para-2 of the
impugned judgment have escaped the consideration of this Hon'ble Court which has resulted in miscarriage of
justice to the Petitioner

Head Notes
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Section 114 & Order 47 Rule 1;The Uttar Pradesh Absorption
of Surplus Employees of Uptron India Ltd. in Government Service Rules 2011- Rule 3 (1)- Power
1 All. Kailash Nath & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1247
of review exists to ensure that justice is not defeated on account of inadvertent omission or nonconsideration of a material issue- Rule 3(1) of the 2011 Rules gives overriding effect to the
absorption scheme to the extent of inconsistency with existing service rules and authorises
issuance of a Government Order prescribing the manner and conditions of absorption- The
Government Order dated 20.12.2011, issued in exercise of powers under Rule 3(1), provides that
surplus employees of Uptron India Ltd. are to be absorbed by treating them as employees
working in the concerned Government department itself-The concept of absorption, postulates
that upon absorption, the employee becomes part and parcel of the absorbing department,
subject to the conditions prescribed by the governing rules- The petitioners have also raised a
grievance of differential treatment vis-à-vis similarly situated Uptron employees absorbed
earlier and granted protection of last pay drawn. No cogent justification has been placed on
record by the respondents to demonstrate a rational basis for such distinction under the same
policy framework.
Held-Review application allowed- Respondents shall re-fix the pay of the petitioners by taking into account
the regular service rendered by them in U.P. Uptron India Ltd. and the service rendered by way of adjustment
in the U.P. Civil Secretariat prior to absorption, strictly in accordance with the Government Order dated
20.12.2011 and the 2011 Rules- Consequential service benefits arising out of such re-fixation shall be
extended to the petitioners within a period of three months -Pensionary benefits, if any, shall be governed by
the applicable statutory rules and binding judicial precedents. (Para 19, 22, 23, 25, 28 & 31) (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Kantaru Rajeevaru Vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association and others [2020 (9) SCC 121];S. Nagraj and other
Vs. State of Karnataka and another [1993 Supp (4) SCC 595];K.H. Nazar Vs. Mathew K. Jacob and others
[2020 (14) SCC 126];Urmila Dixit Vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit and others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2];State of Himachal
Pradesh Vs. Nirmal Kaur and others [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 866];New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Minosha India
Ltd. [(2022) 8 SCC 384];Government of India and other Vs. ISRO Drivers Association [(2020) 8 SCC 657];V.
Prakash alias G.N.V. Prakash Vs. P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu and sons' Charities and others [(2022) 9 SCC
36];Geetha V.M. and others Vs. Rethnasenan K. and others [(2025) 1 SCR;K. Madhavan and another Vs.
Union of India and others [1987 (4) SCC 566;State of Haryana Vs. Deepak Sood and others [SLP (C)
No.14099 of 2006];Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India and others [(1981) 1 SCC 618];State of Punjab and
others Vs. Jajit Singh and others [(2017) 1 SCC 148];Somesh Thapliyal and another etc Vs. Vice Chancellor,
H.N.B. Garhwal University and another [(2021) 10 SCC 116];S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8
SCC 279.;Anukul Prakash vs State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Pichchada Varg Kalyan Lko WRIT -A No. -
2001647 of 2015 judgment dated 18.05.2023;Pooran Singh Manral Vs. State of U.P. [2016 SCC OnLine All
4225].;S.C. Chandra and others Vs. State of Jharkhand and others [(2007) 8 SCC 279]

List of Acts
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; The Uttar Pradesh Absorption of Surplus Employees of Uptron India Ltd. in
Government Service Rules 2011

List of Keywords
Rule 3 (1); The Uttar Pradesh Absorption of Surplus Employees of Uptron India Ltd. in Government Service
Rules 2011; Government Order dated 20.12.2011; Surplus employees of Uptron India Ltd; Absorbed; by
treating them as employees working in the concerned Government department

Case Arising From
Review application has been filed against the order dated 03.08.2023 passed in Writ - A No. 962 of 2010 -
"Ram Kishan and Ors. vs State of UP"

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Applicant(s) Lalta Prasad Misra,
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Lalta Prasad Misra,
1248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.

1. Heard Dr. L.P. Misra, learned counsel for the applicants alongwith Sri Tarun Mishra,
Advocate and Sri Pankaj Khare, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. This review application has been filed against the order dated 03.08.2023 passed in Writ - A
No. 962 of 2010 - "Ram Kishan and Ors. vs State of UP".

3. The grounds taken by the petitioners are as follows :

(i) while passing the judgment under review the relief clauses (f) & (h), though noted in para-2
of the impugned judgment have escaped the consideration of this Hon'ble Court which has resulted
in miscarriage of justice to the Petitioners.

(ii) the petitioners were absorbed as class IV employees in the establishment of U.P. Civil
Secretariat vide order dated 04.04.2012 (Annexure 47 to the writ petition brought on record
through amendment) in consequence of the "U.P. Absorption of Surplus Employees of Uptron
India Ltd. in Government Service Rules 2011" enforced w.e.f. 20.12.2011 and the consequential
Government order dated 20.12.2011 notified vide notification dated 20.12.2011 issued in exercise
of empowerment flowing from these Rules specifying the procedure and conditions of absorption
but the judgement under review has proceeded on the assumption as if the writ petitioners were yet
to be absorbed.

(iii) the government order issued vide gazette notification dated 20.12.2011 in exercise of the
powers under "U.P. Absorption of Surplus Employees of Uptron India Ltd. in Government Service
Rules 2011" hereinafter referred to 2011, Rules specifically provided that the employees of the
erstwhile Uptron India Ltd. were to be absorbed in the service of the Government department
concerned by treating them as the employees having been working in the concerned Government
department where they were to be absorbed-"उस पवभाग में कायतरत मानते हुए समायोजित करने के
सलए सम्बजन्र्त पवभाग र्नयमावली को अपने यहां अंगीकृत (adopt) कर ले।"

Accordingly, the Absorption of the Petitioners ought to have been made by treating them as if
they have been working in the department of U.P. Civil Secretariat. That is to say, all the service
rendered by the Petitioners in the eratwhile service of Uptron, which undisputedly was regular
service and the service rendered by them as a major of adjustment in U.P. Civil Secretariat against
the duly sanctioned post up to the date of their absorption ought to have been added towards their
period of service while fixing and re-fixing their salary as a result of absorption in the U.P. Civil
Secretariat together with all other service benefits.

(iv) the "U.P. Absorption of Surplus Employees of Uptron India Ltd. in Government Service
Rules 2011" vide Rule 3(1) have been given an overriding effect over the operative service rules
prevalent at the point of time of enforcement of these Rules and this Rule 3(1) further envisages
that the relevant service rules shall be deemed to be superseded to the extent of the provisions
contemplated in the notified Government order under Rule 3(1). Thus it is the case of the
1 All. Kailash Nath & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1249
Petitioners that once it is provided in the Government Order dated 20.12.2011 issued in furtherance
of 2011, Rules that for the purpose of Absorption the Petitioners sought to be absorbed shall be
treated as if they have been working in the establishment of U.P. Civil Secretariat itself and,
therefore, all the services rendered by them in the establishment of the erstwhile U.P. Uptron India
Ltd. and U.P. Civil Secretariat before absorption should be treated as service rendered in the
establishment of U.P. Civil Secretariat for all service benefits.

(v) the petitioners have been subjected to discrimination vis a vis the other retrenched
employees of Uptron absorbed much before 01.04.2005 in various departments/ Government
owned corporations etc. by protecting their last pay drawn in Uptron.

4. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioners were initially appointed as class IV
employees on regular basis w.e.f. the date of their joining ranging from the period 18.12.1978 to
16.10.1999 on different dates. When UP Uptron India Ltd. was declared a sick unit, the state
government vide policy decision directed to adjust the surplus employees of UP Uptron India Ltd.
and post them as Class IV employees in the UP Civil Secretariat against the regular sanctioned
posts. It was provided that the employees of sick unit shall be paid salary by the sick unit on such
salary amount being made available to the sick unit by the concerned department.

5. The demand of petitioners for absorption was initially rejected vide order dated 11.05.2010.
However, during the pendency of writ petition, the petitioners were absorbed vide order dated
20.12.2011.

6. Thereafter, Writ - A No. 962 of 2010 preferred by petitioners was disposed of vide
impugned order dated 03.08.2023 which is as follows:

"In the aforesaid writ petition, this Court issued direction to the State-respondents to treat the
petitioners to be absorbed employees of the Basic Education Department on a suitable post in
terms of the notified order dated 20.12.2011 and to pay them their salary of their respective posts
w.e.f. the respective dates. It was further ordered that both the petitioners shall be allowed to join
on suitable posts forthwith in the Department and they shall be allowed to continue in service till
they attain the age of superannuation i.e. at the age of 60 years and be also paid salary"

7. Thereafter, petitioners filed the present review application against the impugned order dated
03.08.2023 on the ground that while passing the judgement under review the relief clauses (f) &
(h), though noted in para-2 of the impugned judgment have escaped the consideration of this Court
which has resulted in miscarriage of justice to the petitioners.

8. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon the following judgments :-

(i) Kantaru Rajeevaru Vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association and others [2020 (9) SCC
121]. Relevant paragraph 27 is being quoted below :-

"27. No matter is beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court of record unless it is
expressly shown to be so, under the provisions of the Constitution. In the absence of any express
1250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
provision in the Constitution, this Court being a superior court of record has jurisdiction in every
matter and if there is any doubt, the Court has power to determine its jurisdiction [Delhi Judicial
Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406] . It is useful to reproduce from Halsbury's
Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 10, Para 713, relied upon in the aforementioned judgments, which
states as follows:

"713. ... Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior
court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior
court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within
the cognizance of the particular court."

Undoubtedly there is no bar on the exercise of jurisdiction for referring questions of law
in a pending review petition. Therefore, the reference cannot be said to be vitiated for lack of
jurisdiction. This Court has acted well within its power in making the reference."

(ii) S. Nagraj and other Vs. State of Karnataka and another [1993 Supp (4) SCC 595].
Relevant paragraphs 18 and 19 are being quoted below :-

"18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor
technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to
anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative
Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction
exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds that the order
was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous
assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice
then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid
reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification,
depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid
injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court.
In Administrative Law the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of the
injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order. Here
as explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did commit an error in
placing all the stipendiary graduates in the scale of First Division Assistants due to State's failure
to bring correct facts on record. But that obviously cannot stand in the way of the Court correcting
its mistake. Such inequitable consequences as have surfaced now due to vague affidavit filed by the
State cannot be permitted to continue.

19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic
philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the
courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly
made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental
mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were
framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the
courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi
Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai [AIR 1941 FC 1, 2 : 1940 FCR 78 : (1941) 1 MLJ Supp 45]
the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to
review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy
Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council
1 All. Kailash Nath & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1251
in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh [(1836) 1 Moo PC 117 : 2 MIA 181 : 1 Sar 175] that
an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered:

"... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been
introduced, these Courts possess, by Common law, the same power which the Courts of record and
statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... The House of Lords exercises a
similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must
possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected
mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest
defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have
reconciled inconsistencies."

Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:

"It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to
the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort,
where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been
inadvertently made as if the party had been heard."

Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above
all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was
framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically
provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical
wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to
review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145
permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order
may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to
review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil
Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an
expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of
circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL
Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may
be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus
not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so
for sake of justice."

(iii) K.H. Nazar Vs. Mathew K. Jacob and others [2020 (14) SCC 126]. Relevant
paragraphs 11 to 14 are being quoted below :-

"11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with a purpose-oriented
approach. [Kerala Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food, (1995) 4 SCC 341] The Act
should receive a liberal construction to promote its objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v.
ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya
Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] Also, literal construction of the provisions of
a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the court's duty to discern the intention of the
legislature in making the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a
purposeful or functional interpretation [Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2
SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335] .
1252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
12. In the words of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. [Workmen v. American Express International Banking
Corpn., (1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940] , the principles of statutory construction of
beneficial legislation are as follows: (Workmen case [Workmen v. American Express International
Banking Corpn., (1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940] , SCC p. 76, para 4)

"4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes
of liberal import such as 'social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put
in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the
imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be
recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the "colour", the "content" and
the "context" of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in
Prenn v. Simmonds [Prenn v. Simmonds, (1971) 1 WLR 1381 : (1971) 3 All ER 237 (HL)] ). In the
same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal
interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which
they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of
the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cumLabour Court [Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
(1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] , we had occasion to say: (Surendra Kumar Verma case
[Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC
443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] , SCC p. 447, para 6)

'6. .... Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of "bread and butter"
statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is
designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making
etymological excursions.' "

13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed to
remedy should first be identified and then a construction that suppresses the problem and advances
the remedy should be adopted. [Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10
SCC 161 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 55] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial or social
welfare legislations should be given strict construction [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram
Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] . It was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram
Kowshik [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] that the
exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a wide
amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds.
Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council
[Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council, 2008 HCA 48 :
(2008) 237 CLR 285] , Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive construction to
beneficial legislations mandates that exceptions in such legislations should be construed narrowly.

14. There is no dispute that the Act is a beneficial legislation. The extent of land that can
be held is fixed and any land in excess has to be surrendered to the Government, which is
distributed in favour of the landless people in the State. The interpretation of the provisions of the
Act should be in a manner which promote the said object."

(iv) Urmila Dixit Vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit and others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2]. Relevant
paragraphs 8 to 14 are being quoted below :-
1 All. Kailash Nath & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1253

"8. To answer the issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court to discuss the rules of
interpretation to be applied when interpreting a beneficial legislation akin to the Act at hand.
While dealing with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court in Brahampal v.
National Insurance Co. [Brahampal v. National Insurance Co., (2021) 6 SCC 512 : (2021) 3 SCC
(Civ) 693 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 67] , observed that a beneficial legislation must receive a liberal
construction in consonance with the objectives that the Act concerned seeks to serve.

9. This Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob [K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, (2020)
14 SCC 126] reiterated the above expositions and stated that : (SCC pp. 135-36, paras 11 & 13)

11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with a purpose-oriented
approach. [Kerala Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food, (1995) 4 SCC 341] The Act
should receive a liberal construction to promote its objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v.
ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya
Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] Also, literal construction of the provisions of
a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court's duty to discern the intention of the
legislature in making the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a
purposeful or functional interpretation. [Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2
SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335]

13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed to
remedy should first be identified, and then a construction that suppresses the problem and
advances the remedy should be adopted. [Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia,
(2015) 10 SCC 161 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 55] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial
or social welfare legislations should be given strict construction. [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai
Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] It was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai
Shantram Kowshik [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] that
the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a
wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive
grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land
Council [Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council, 2008
HCA 48 : (2008) 237 CLR 285] , Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive
construction to beneficial legislations mandates that exceptions in such legislations should be
construed narrowly."

(emphasis supplied)

10. More recently, in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd.
[Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 140 : (2024) 3 SCC
(Civ) 809] , this Court held the definition of a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
to include a company or corporate person in view of the beneficial purpose of the Act.

11. While considering the provisions of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, this
Court in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi) [X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433] , reiterated
that interpretation of the provisions of a beneficial legislation must be in line with a purposive
construction, keeping in mind the legislative purpose. Furthermore, it was stated that beneficial
legislation must be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries when it is possible to take two views.
1254 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12. It is in the above background that we must proceed to examine the Act. The Statement
of Objects and Reasons of the Act indicates the purpose behind the enactment, as relied upon by
this Court in S. Vanitha v. Commr. [S. Vanitha v. Commr., (2021) 15 SCC 730] , is:

"Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the
elderly. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not
being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women
are now forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to
lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major social
challenge and there is a need to give more attention to the care and protection for the older
persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
the procedure is both time-consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have simple,
inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for parents."

13. The Preamble of the Act states that it is intended towards more effective provisions
for maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens, guaranteed and recognised under the
Constitution.

14. Therefore, it is apparent, that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, aimed at
securing the rights of senior citizens, in view of the challenges faced by them. It is in this backdrop
that the Act must be interpreted and a construction that advances the remedies of the Act must be
adopted."

(v) State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Nirmal Kaur and others [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 866].
Relevant paragraphs 79 and 80 are being quoted below :-

"79. Recently, a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Hira Singh v. Union of
India16, while answering a reference with regard to the correctness of the view taken by this Court
in the case of E. Micheal Raj v. Narcotics Control Bureau17, to the effect that, when any narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance is found mixed with one or more neutral substance for the purpose
of imposition of punishment, it is the content of narcotic drug or psychotropic substance which
would be taken into consideration, the Court held thus:

"10.1.In Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan [Directorate of Enforcement v.
Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 785], it is observed by this Court that every
law is designed to further ends of justice but not to frustrate on the mere technicalities. It is further
observed that though the intention of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate,
nonetheless the legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve the difficulties in the implementation of
its intention and the spirit of the law. It is the duty of the Court to mould or creatively interpret the
legislation by liberally interpreting the statute. In the said decision this Court has also quoted (at
SCC pp. 453-54, para 25) the following passage in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn.
p. 229:

"25. ... Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical
construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to
some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction
may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.
... Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by
1 All. Kailash Nath & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1255
the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute
intractability of the language used.'"

Thereafter, it is further observed that to winch up the legislative intent, it is permissible
for courts to take into account the ostensible purpose and object and the real legislative intent.
Otherwise, a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of the legislative intent
devoid of concept of purpose and object will render the legislature inane. It is further observed that
in given circumstances, it is permissible for courts to have functional approaches and look into the
legislative intention and sometimes it may be even necessary to go behind the words and enactment
and take other factors into consideration to give effect to the legislative intention and to the
purpose and spirit of the enactment so that no absurdity or practical inconvenience may result and
the legislative exercise and its scope and object may not become futile."

[emphasis supplied]

80. It could thus be seen that it is more than a settled principle of law that, while
interpreting the provisions of the statute, the court has to prefer an interpretation which advances
the purpose of the statute."

(vi) New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Minosha India Ltd. [(2022) 8 SCC 384]. Relevant
paragraph 26 is being quoted under :-

"26. The principles of interpretation of statutes have been invoked in the varying contexts
and are to be applied on the basis of the facts of the case, the nature of the law and a host of
principles. Undoubtedly, the golden rule of interpretation is the interpretation which thrives on the
ordinary meaning of the words as they are used. This principle of literal interpretation of statutes
has over a period of time indeed yielded to an interpretation which is purposive or which seeks to
accommodate the object of the law giver. Suffice it to say that if the words of a statute are not
ambiguous, the scope of interpretation dwindles. It is not for the Court to rewrite a statute. There
may be occasions where the Court may even go to the extent of leaving out a word or not giving
effect to certain part in order to give full meaning to the law by way of gleaning and giving effect to
the intention of the legislature. The principle that literal meaning must be accepted is undoubtedly
subject to the principle that it will make way when such interpretation will lead to an absurdity or
grave injustice which a law giver could not have contemplated."

(vii) Government of India and other Vs. ISRO Drivers Association [(2020) 8 SCC 657].
Relevant paragraph 31 is being quoted below :-

"31.The Latin maxim noscitur a sociis states this contextual principle, whereby a word or
phrase is not to be construed as if it stood alone but in the light of its surroundings -Bennion on
Statutory Interpretation, Fifth Edn. Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover
[Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, 1957 AC 436 : (1957) 2 WLR 1 (HL)] ,
Viscount Simonds has opined that "a word or phrase in an enactment must always be construed in
the light of the surrounding text...words and particularly general words, cannot be read in
isolation, their colour and their content are derived from their context."
1256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(viii) V. Prakash alias G.N.V. Prakash Vs. P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu and sons' Charities
and others [(2022) 9 SCC 36]. Relevant paragraphs 75 and 76 are being quoted below :-

"75. While not approving the approach of the High Court in this matter, particularly in
relation to the construction of the terms of SoA, we may observe a little further. The words and
expressions in the deeds or statutes are preferably provided their contextual and contemporary
meaning. In this process of construction, the words and expressions are not viewed as fossil
remains; rather they retain the organic character and do take their meaning from all the
surroundings. For that matter, a particular word like "resides" could carry multiple different
connotations with reference to the time or period of its interpretation; and connotations may be
different than those understood about 100 years back. When a particular word or expression in any
document is to be operated and applied, all the relevant characteristics available in praesenti have
to be kept in view for a meaningful and purposeful construction. Of course, that meaning should
not do violence to the real intent and purpose.

76. In order to buttress its reasoning, the High Court has even gone to the extent of
suggesting a proposition in para 26 of the impugned judgment [P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu & Sons
Charities v. V. Prakash, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 14032] which, to say the least, does not stand to
logic. The High Court has observed that if the construction of sentence or words was to be made
with reference to the present-day scenario, sometime later some Judge might think that restricting
the trusteeship to male member was against gender justice and it should be read to include female
too. With respect, we are unable to endorse this approach. The hypothesis as suggested by the High
Court is of the process of altering the term of a document. The question at hand is of assigning a
logical, contextual and contemporary meaning to a particular expression. It is one thing to alter
the term of a document and cannot be equated with the process of assigning a purposeful meaning
to a particular expression. In the true rules of construction, the words are always assigned the
meaning which stand in tandem with their context, while assuring that the assigned meaning serves
the purpose."

(ix) Geetha V.M. and others Vs. Rethnasenan K. and others [(2025) 1 SCR]. Relevant
paragraph 48 is being quoted below :-

"48. In the fact situation of the present case, the judgment of Full Bench of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in the case of 'Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1989 SCC OnLine P&H
482', is relevant. The Full Bench in a similar situation while dealing with the issue of seniority of
Patwaris working in the State's Consolidation Department who were absorbed into the Revenue
Department held that the employees of Consolidation Department after absorption into the
Revenue Department, will have the benefit of length of service in the Consolidation Department, on
the new post. While concurring the view, in the separate note, Justice M.M. Punchhi, expressed his
view that absorption is akin to amalgamation, in the sense that, an employee becomes part and
parcel of the department absorbing him and partakes the same colour and character of the existing
employees of the department, classified as promotees, direct appointees or transferees. In the facts
discussed in detail above, definition of absorption which was based on option and the definition of
request discussed above, we concur with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court by
the said Full Bench."
1 All. Kailash Nath & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1257

(x) K. Madhavan and another Vs. Union of India and others [1987 (4) SCC 566]. Relevant
paragraph 21 is being quoted below :-

"21. We may examine the question from a different point of view. There is not much difference
between deputation and transfer. Indeed, when a deputationist is permanently absorbed in the CBI,
he is under the rules appointed on transfer. In other words, deputation may be regarded as a
transfer from one government department to another. It will be against all rules of service
jurisprudence, if a government servant holding a particular post is transferred to the same or an
equivalent post in another government department, the period of his service in the post before his
transfer is not taken into consideration in computing his seniority in the transferred post. The
transfer cannot wipe out his length of service in the post from which he has been transferred.