# Kailash Prasad Tewari v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 3 ILRA 423
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-24
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 53996 of 2012
- **Bench:** Suneet Kumar, Rajendra Kumar-Iv
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kailash-prasad-tewari-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49841
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

C.S.C., Sri Abhinava Krisha Srivastava, Sri
Saroj
Yadav,
Smt.
Chandra
Kala
Chaturvedi, Sri Vivek Verma

A. Ceiling Law - UP Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act 1976 - Section 6(1) -
424 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Surplus land - No objection was filed
within the stipulated time from the date of
receipt of the notice u/s 8(3) - Order u/s
8(4) declaring land in excess of the ceiling
limit was passed - Pursuant to notice u/S
10(5), the possession of the land was
taken - Land owner at no stage had
protested implying thereby that he waived
his right to do so - Effect - Plea of being
in possession over the surplus land -
Permissibility - Held, only stand taken is
based on a bald St.ment that he is in
possession of the surplus land. But,
petitioner is silent as to whether any
objection at any point of time on being
dispossessed, the land owner had filed
objection/protest before the authorities.
(Para 18 and 19)

B. Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Writ - Maintainability - Laches - Writ
petition was filed after 13 years from the
Repeal Act, and after a lapse of over three
decades (36 years) since the notice under
Section 10(5) - Effect - Held, equitable
doctrine, namely, "delay defeats equity"
has its fullest application in the matter of
grant of relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The discretionary relief can
be had provided one has not by his act or
conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity
favours a vigilant rather than an indolent
litigant and this being the basic tenet of
Law. (Para 13)

Writ petition dismissed . (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

3 All. Kailash Prasad Tewari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
423
would have no bearing on the right of the
petitioner. The transfer of the surplus land
by the erstwhile owner, in the eye of law
being nullity i.e. void ab-initio would not
confer any right or title upon the petitioner.
The possession of the petitioner after the
proceedings concluding under the Act,
upon the State taking possession, would
merely be a case of encroachment of State
land. The Repeal Act would not come to
the assistance of the petitioner, rather, the
case of the petitioner would not fall within
the ambit and scope of the Repeal Act
being subsequent purchaser of the surplus
land after notification under Section 10(1) /
10(3) of the Act.

23. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, petitioner lacks
locus, and any case, the proceedings came to
be set up belatedly by the petitioner in 2006
by approaching this Court and filing a
petition, being Writ Petition No. 14698 of
2006, which came to be disposed of directing
the Collector to take a decision. Pursuant
thereof, the impugned order came to be
passed on 27.04.2011, whereby, the second
respondent after recording the facts arrived at
a conclusion that the transfer of the land by
the erstwhile owner, declared surplus, vesting
in the State, is a void document and does not
confer any right and title upon the petitioner.
The erstwhile tenure holder (Khelai), had no
title or ownership to transfer the land, the
petitioner on the strength of alleged
possession on State land cannot agitate his
dispossession in view of Repeal Act. The
surplus land vested with the State upon
notification under Section 10(3) followed by
dispossession of the erstwhile owner of the
land (Khelai) under Section 10(5) way back
in 1981. The owner never protested or
agitated
his
dispossession
before
any
authority or Court. In the circumstances, the
subsequent buyer (Petitioner) cannot raise
challenge to the procedure of dispossession at
belated stage on the strength of a sale deed
being void ab-initio.

24. The writ petition being devoid
of merit, is accordingly, dismissed."

19. For the reasons aforestated and
also in view of the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Bhaskar
Jyoti
Sharma
(supra),
Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra) and a
coordinate Bench decision of this Court in
the case of Shiv Ram Singh (supra), we do
not find any merit in the writ petition. This
writ petition is also highly time barred and
no reason for the inordinate delay has been
given in the writ petition.

20. Consequently, the writ petition is
dismissed.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 423
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

Writ C No. 53996 of 2012

Kailash Prasad Tewari ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.V. Goswami, Sri Pradeep Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Abhinava Krisha Srivastava, Sri
Saroj
Yadav,
Smt.
Chandra
Kala
Chaturvedi, Sri Vivek Verma

A. Ceiling Law - UP Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act 1976 - Section 6(1) -
424 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Surplus land - No objection was filed
within the stipulated time from the date of
receipt of the notice u/s 8(3) - Order u/s
8(4) declaring land in excess of the ceiling
limit was passed - Pursuant to notice u/S
10(5), the possession of the land was
taken - Land owner at no stage had
protested implying thereby that he waived
his right to do so - Effect - Plea of being
in possession over the surplus land -
Permissibility - Held, only stand taken is
based on a bald St.ment that he is in
possession of the surplus land. But,
petitioner is silent as to whether any
objection at any point of time on being
dispossessed, the land owner had filed
objection/protest before the authorities.
(Para 18 and 19)

B. Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Writ - Maintainability - Laches - Writ
petition was filed after 13 years from the
Repeal Act, and after a lapse of over three
decades (36 years) since the notice under
Section 10(5) - Effect - Held, equitable
doctrine, namely, "delay defeats equity"
has its fullest application in the matter of
grant of relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The discretionary relief can
be had provided one has not by his act or
conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity
favours a vigilant rather than an indolent
litigant and this being the basic tenet of
Law. (Para 13)

Writ petition dismissed . (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of U.P. Vs Hari Ram; 2013 (120) RD 241

2. Ram Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2020 (147)
RD 1

3. Ikrar & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2020 (2)
AWC 1288

4. St. of U.P. Vs Jagdish Chandra; 2014 (1) AWC
864

5. St. of Assam Vs Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma & ors.;
(2015) 5 SCC 321 (Paras-16, 17 and 19)

6. Shiv Ram Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2015
(7) ADJ 630

7. Shivgonda Anna Patil Vs St. of Mah.; (1999) 3
SCC 5

8. Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs Shah
Hyder Beig; (2000) 2 SCC 48

9. Kapilaben Ambalal Patel & ors. Vs St. of Guj.;
2021 (12) SCC 95

10. Civil Appeal No. 3032 of 2010; U.A. Basheer
Thr. G.P.A. Holder Vs St. of Karnataka & anr.
decided on 17 February, 2021

(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.
&
Hon'ble Rajendra Kumar-IV, J.)

1. Heard Shri P.K. Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Manisha
Chaturvedi holding brief of Ms. Chandra
Kala Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing
for the State-respondents and Shri Abhinav
Krishna
Srivastava,
learned
counsel
appearing for the Development Authority.

2. Petitioner by the instant writ
petition, inter alia, seeks direction to the
State-respondent not to interfere in the
peaceful possession of Plot Nos. 1356,
1723, 1112, 1104 and 1163, situated in
Village- Bara Sirohi, Tehsil and DistrictKanpur Nagar. Petitioner has also sought
quashing of the order dated 27 July 2011,
passed
by
District
Judge/Appellate
Authority, Kanpur Nagar, in Misc. Appeal
No. 20/70 of 1999 (Kailash Prasad Vs.
Competent Authority).

3. The facts of the instant case, briefly
stated, is that the predecessor in interest of
the petitioner filed statement/return under
Section 6(1) of U.P. Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act 1976 (for short 'Act'),
giving details of his land/property being
3 All. Kailash Prasad Tewari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
425
case
No.
8683.
Upon
survey,
the
land/property, admeasuring 5758.81 square
meter, was found in excess of the ceiling
limit in possession of the petitioner.

4. Consequently, a draft statement
came to be served upon the land owner
under Section 8(3), along with notice dated
04 August 1979. Petitioner did not respond
to
the
notice
by
filing
objection,
consequently, order under Section 8(4)
came to be passed on 26 March 1983,
declaring 5758.81 square meter of land in
excess of the ceiling limit under the Act.
On completion of proceedings under
Sections 9 and 10(1) of the Act, on
receiving no objection from the land owner
or any other interested person under
Section 10(2) of the Act, a notification
under Section 10(3) of the Act was issued
on 31 October 1985, duly published in the
Official Gazette on 15 January 1986,
vesting the surplus vacant land in the State.
Thereafter, a notice under Section 10(5) of
the Act was issued on 16 December 1986,
pursuant, thereof, the authorized person of
the
competent
authority
had
taken
possession of the surplus land on 12
November 1991.

5. It appears that later on, one Ashok
Kumar Kushwaha, son of Shri Babu, filed a
representation on 1 April 2006, requesting
that Plot No. 1192, declared surplus was
not owned by the petitioner. It appears that
the representation was accepted by the
competent authority vide order dated 13
July 2006, consequently, the Plot No. 1192,
was released in favour of Ashok Kumar
Kushwaha and his name was duly mutated
in the revenue record.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that petitioner is in possession of
the plots even after repeal of the principal
Act, w.e.f. 18 March 1999. It is urged that
at
this
stage,
petitioner
cannot
be
dispossessed
from
the
land
declared
surplus. Reliance has been placed on the
decisions rendered by Supreme Court in
State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram1, as well as,
decisions rendered by this Court in Ram
Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others2,
Ikrar & Others Vs. State of U.P. and
Others3 and State of U.P. Vs. Jagdish
Chandra4.

7. It is not the case of the petitioner
that the land owner at any stage had
protested with the declaration of surplus
land or had objected before the authorities
with regard to dispossession not being in
accordance with the law.

8. It appears that an appeal being
appeal no. 20/70 of 1999, came to be filed
by the petitioner before the District Judge
on 18 February 1999. The cause of action
set up in the appeal is that on 30 December
1998, the Kanpur Development Authority
was demarcating the land. Thereafter,
petitioner approached the Lekhpal on 4
January 1999, and on perusal of the
revenue record, it transpired that the name
of the Kanpur Development Authority was
mutated in the revenue record. Thereafter,
petitioner contacted his lawyer and got
inspected the file pertaining to urban
ceiling and obtained copy of the order
dated 6 March 1982, on 12 February 1999,
thereafter, instituted the appeal. In the
memo of appeal, it was pleaded that Plot
Nos. 1356, 1723, 1104, 1112 and 1163,
predecessor in interest of the petitioner was
the land owner. On perusal of the pleadings
set up in the writ petition, as well as, memo
of appeal instituted on 18 February 1999, it
is not the case of the petitioner that the
petitioner or the predecessor in interest of
the
petitioner
at
any
stage
of
the
426 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings under the Act had protested
their
dispossession
or
declaration/acquisition of land declared in
excess of the ceiling limit.

9. The Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short
''Repeal Act'), came into effect on 18 March
1999,
on
the
said
date
pending
proceedings/appeal
stood
abated.
Consequently, the appeal instituted by the
petitioner stood abated by operation of law
and the order dated 27 July 2012, passed on
the
said
appeal
rejecting
the
delay
condonation application of the petitioner is
nullity being void ab initio.

10. In State of Assam vs. Bhaskar
Jyoti Sharma and others5, the Supreme
Court was of the view that any grievance
based on Section 10(5) ought to have been
made
within
a
reasonable
time
of
dispossession and the land owner in not
doing so must be deemed to have waived
his right under Section 10(5) of the Act.
Paragraph 16, 17, and 19 is extracted:

"16. The issue can be viewed
from another angle also. Assuming that a
person in possession could make a
grievance, no matter without much gain in
the ultimate analysis, the question is
whether such grievance could be made
long after the alleged violation of Section
10(5). If actual physical possession was
taken over from the erstwhile land owner
on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the
present case any grievance based on
Section 10(5) ought to have been made
within
a
reasonable
time
of
such
dispossession. If the owner did not do so,
forcible taking over of possession would
acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time.
In any such situation the owner or the
person in possession must be deemed to
have waived his right under Section 10(5)
of the Act. Any other view would, in our
opinion, give a licence to a litigant to
make a grievance not because he has
suffered any real prejudice that needs to
be redressed but only because the
fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act
tempted him to raise the issue regarding
his dispossession being in violation of the
prescribed procedure.

17. Reliance was placed by the
respondents upon the decision of this
Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That
decision does not, in our view, lend much
assistance to the respondents. We say so,
because this Court was in Hari Ram's
case (supra) considering whether the word
'may' appearing in Section 10(5)gave to
the competent authority the discretion to
issue or not to issue a notice before taking
physical possession of the land in question
under
Section
10(6).
The
question
whether breach of Section 10(5)and
possible
dispossession
without
notice
would vitiate the act of dispossession itself
or render it non est in the eye of law did
not fall for consideration in that case. In
our opinion, what Section 10(5)prescribes
is an ordinary and logical course of action
that ought to be followed before the
authorities
decided
to
use
force
to
dispossess the occupant under Section
10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's
version regarding dispossession of the
erstwhile owner in December 1991 is
correct, the fact that such dispossession
was without a notice under Section 10(5)
will be of no consequence and would not
vitiate or obliterate the act of taking
possession for the purposes of Section 3 of
the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb
Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any
grievance based on breach of Section 10(5)
at any stage during his lifetime implying
3 All. Kailash Prasad Tewari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
427
thereby that he had waived his right to do
so.

19. In support of the contention
that the respondents are even today in
actual physical possession of the land in
question reliance is placed upon certain
electricity bills and bills paid for the
telephone connection that stood in the
name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was
contended that said Mr. Sanatan Baishya
was none other than the caretaker of the
property of the respondents. There is,
however, nothing on record to substantiate
that assertion. The telephone bills and
electricity bills also relate to the period
from 2001 onwards only. There is nothing
on record before us nor was anything
placed before the High Court to suggest
that between 7th December, 1991 till the
date the land in question was allotted to
GMDA in December, 2003 the owner or his
legal heirs after his demise had continued
to be in possession. All that we have is rival
claims of the parties based on affidavits in
support thereof. We repeatedly asked
learned counsel for the parties whether
they can, upon remand on the analogy of
the decision in the case of Gyanaba
Dilavarsinh Jadega (supra), adduce any
documentary evidence that would enable
the High Court to record a finding in
regard to actual possession. They were
unable to point out or refer to any such
evidence. That being so the question
whether actual physical possession was
taken over remains a seriously disputed
question of fact which is not amenable to
a satisfactory determination by the High
Court in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution no matter the High Court
may in its discretion in certain situations
upon such determination. Remand to the
High Court to have a finding on the
question of dispossession, therefore, does
not appear to us to be a viable solution."
 (Emphasis supplied by us)

11. In Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra)
followed by a coordinate Bench of this
Court in Shiv Ram Singh vs. State of U.P.
and others6, the writ petition was
dismissed on the ground of laches,
observing as under:

"We must also advert to another
aspect of the matter particularly having
regard to the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma
(supra). The petitioner moved the first writ
petition in 2002 nearly three years after the
Repeal Act had come into force. After the
earlier writ petition was disposed of by
directing the District Magistrate to pass an
order
on
the
representation
of
the
petitioner, an order was passed by the
District Magistrate on 10 May 2007. The
petitioner thereafter waited for a period of
over two years until the present writ
petition was filed in July 2009. If the
petitioner had been dispossessed of the
land without due notice under Section
10(5), such a grievance could have been
raised at the relevant time. As a matter of
fact, it has been the case of the State all
along that a notice under Section 10(5)
was, in fact, issued in the present case
which would be borne out from the original
file which has been produced before the
Court. The issue is whether such a
grievance could be made long after, before
the Court. The petitioner had waited for
nearly three years after the Repeal Act
came into force to file the first writ
petition and thereafter for a period of over
two years after the disposal of the
representation despite the finding of the
District Magistrate that possession was
taken over on 25 June 1993. In our view,
such a belated challenge should not, in
any event, be entertained."
428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 (Emphasis supplied by us)

12. In Shivgonda Anna Patil Vs.
State of Maharashtra, 7wherein, the
Supreme Court while dealing with Section
10 of the Act held that the writ petition
under Article 226 for reopening the
proceedings on the ground that the
competent authority had not taken into
consideration certain facts, filed after ten
years, after the excess land was vested in
the
State
Government
was
rightly
summarily dismissed by the High Court.

13. While deciding the question of
delay and laches in preferring the petition
under Article 226, Supreme Court in
Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs.
Shah Hyder Beig8, held that the equitable
doctrine, namely, "delay defeats equity" has
its fullest application in the matter of grant
of relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The discretionary relief can
be had provided one has not by his act or
conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity
favours a vigilant rather than an indolent
litigant and this being the basic tenet of
law.

14. Recently, in Kapilaben Ambalal
Patel and Others Vs. State of Gujarat9,
Supreme Court declined to accept the pleas
setup by the legal heirs/representatives of
the original land holder on the ground of
inordinate delay. The Court noted the
submission of the land owner:

"Feeling
aggrieved,
the
landowners have approached this Court. It
is urged that there is no tittle of evidence to
substantiate the fact asserted by the
respondent State that physical possession
of the land in question has been taken over
on 20-3-1986. It was merely a paperpossession in the form of possession
panchnama. According to the appellants,
de facto possession of the subject land as
on the date of the Repeal Act is crucial and
entails in abatement of all the actions of the
State authorities under the 1976 Act. Mere
issuance of notification under Section 10(3)
of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting
of the land in the State is not enough for the
purposes of the Repeal Act. Reliance has
been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar
Vs. Collector & Competent Authority,
(2012) 4 SCC 718, State of U.P. Vs. Hari
Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280, Gajanan Kamlya
Patil vs. Additional Collector & Competent
Authority (ULC) (2014) 12 SCC 523 and
Mangalsen Vs. State of U.P. (2014) 15
SCC 332. The consistent view of this Court
is that physical possession must be taken by
the State authorities, failing which the
proceedings shall abate on account of the
Repeal Act. The appellants have relied on
revenue records to show that the continued
possession
remained
with
the
appellants/landowners
even
after
the
possession panchnama was made on 20-31986. The revenue entries have presumptive
value and the respondent State had failed to
rebut the same."

15. In Paragraph 25 of Kapilaben
Ambalal Patel (supra), the Court noted the
delay and declined to interfere with the
order of the High Court. Relevant portion
reads thus:

"Furthermore, in the grounds all
that is asserted is that the High Court erred
in holding that there was delay of 14 years
in filing of writ petition and in not
appreciating that the notice under Section
10(5) of the 1976 Act dated 23-1-1986, was
not served upon Ambalal Parsottambhai
Patel as he had already expired on 31-121985 and notice sent to him was returned
bacy on 2-2-1986 unserved with remark
3 All. Kailash Prasad Tewari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
429
"said owner has expired". Further, the legal
heirs of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel
ought to have been served with the said
notice.........Be that as it may, we are not
inclined to reverse the conclusion recorded
by the Division Bench of the High court
that the writ petition filed by the appellants
was hopelessly delayed and suffered from
laches. That is a possible view in the facts
of the present case."

16. The decisions relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner rendered
by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court is
based on the decision of the Supreme Court
in Hari Ram (supra). The Supreme Court
in Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra), on
considering Hari Ram (supra), was of the
view that the word ''may' appearing in
Section 10(5) gave the competent authority
the discretion to issue or not to issue a
notice before taking physical possession of
the land in question under Section 10(6).
The question whether breach of Section
10(5) and possible dispossession without
notice
would
vitiate
the
act
of
dispossession itself or render it non est in
the eye of law did not fall for consideration
in Hari Ram (supra). Thereafter, the Court
proceeded that even taking a case of the
appellant regarding dispossession was
without a notice under Section 10(5) will
be of no consequence and would not vitiate
or obliterate the act of taking possession for
the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.
That is because the erstwhile land owner
had not made any grievance based on
breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during
his lifetime implying thereby that he had
waived his right to do so.

17. As per the Scheme of the Act, the
excess land beyond the ceiling limit is to be
determined on the date when the Act came
into force, requiring every person holding
vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file
statement of his holding (Section 6). The
other
persons/third
party/subsequent
purchasers have no locus or authority to file
objection until then. The provisions of
Section 8 and Section 9 of the Act, make it
incumbent on the competent authority to
issue notice to or provide opportunity to be
heard only to the ''person concerned', i.e.,
person who has filed the statement under
Section 6 of the Act, (Refer paragraph 14 of
U.A. Basheer Thr. G.P.A. Holder Vs.
State of Karnataka and Another10). It is
only after notification under Section 10(1)
of
the
Act,
the
claim
of
other
persons/subsequent purchasers are to be
considered.

18. As per the record, it is not in
dispute that notice under Section 8(3) along
with draft statement dated 4 August 1979,
was duly served upon the land owner. No
objection was filed within the stipulated
time from the date of receipt of the notice,
thereafter, an order under Section 8(4) of
the Act came to be passed on 26 March
1982, declaring land in excess of the
ceiling limit. The final statement under
Section
9
followed,
thereafter
by
notification under Sections 10(1) and 10(3)
of the Act, duly published in the Official
Gazette. Thereafter, pursuant to notice
under Section 10(5), the possession of the
land was taken. The land owner at no stage
had protested implying thereby that he
waived his right to do so.

19. The instant writ petition has been
filed after 13 years from the Repeal Act,
and after a lapse of over three decades (36
years) since the notice under Section 10(5).
The question of possession is being raised
for the first time in writ jurisdiction. The
petitioner has not pleaded all the relevant
facts, rather, suppressed material facts
430 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
brought on record in the counter affidavit
filed by the State-respondent. The only
stand taken is based on a bald statement
that he is in possession of the surplus land.
But, petitioner is silent as to whether any
objection at any point of time on being
dispossessed, the land owner had filed
objection/protest before the authorities.
Neither, it is the case of the petitioner in the
memo of appeal filed in 1999, that
petitioner is in possession of the surplus
land, nor, that his predecessor in interest
had not voluntary surrendered the surplus
vacant land or had protested the State
action.

20. Further, the name of Development
Authority, after possession was duly
mutated in the revenue record as per the
case setup by the petitioner. The issue of
possession/dispossession being a question
of fact cannot be raised belatedly after 13
years in writ jurisdiction.

21. In view thereof, the writ petition
being devoid of merit is, accordingly,
dismissed.

22. No cost.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 430
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.12.2022
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ C No. 58897 of 2012

State of U.P. & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Komal Yadav @ Ram Komal & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Anoop Kumar Srivastava, Sri Amit
Manohar (Addl. C.S.C.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Chandra Bhan Gupta, S.C., Sri Shyam
Narain, Sri Sudhanshu Narain

A. Labour Law - Constitution of India -
Article
226
-
Award
-
Scope
of
interference - Reference - Limitation,
how far come in the way thereof -
Workman' right to get adjudication - How
far liable to be protected - Held, a
workman
working
in
a
government
department if retiring from his services,
cannot be in a bargaining position -
Matter
if
remained
pending
with
Conciliation Officer and St. took its own
time in making reference, the workman
concerned
should
not
be
denied
adjudication
only
for
delay,
more
especially in the circumstances when no
time
limit
is
prescribed
for
making
reference - High Court denied to interfere
with
the
award
under
equitable
jurisdiction under Article 226. (Para 17)

B. Labour Law - Industrial Dispute Act,
1947
-
Sections
6N,
6P
&
6Q
-
Retrenchment - Award - ReinSt.ment
with backwages - Forest department -
Engagement of worker on daily wages -
Principle for payment of backwages -
Applicability - Held, in the department of
forest, there is a practice of engaging
people for the forest work on a daily wage
basis - Where neither the department
could
dispute
the
working
of
the
petitioner with it, nor could produce any
witness to dispute the testimony of a
fellow workman who had deposed in his
favour, the approach of the department
was rightly held to be unLawful in firing
the
workman
suddenly
on
one
fine
morning - High Court held interest part of
award upon backwages unsustainable.
(Para 18, 22 and 25)

Writ petition partly allowed . (E-1)

List of Cases cited :-