# Kalu Ram v. D.D.C. And Others

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 1046
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-07-18
- **Case number:** Writ - B No. 9003 of 1997
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kalu-ram-v-d-d-c-and-others-44398
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

C.S.C., Deepika Sharma, Sri Hriday Raj
Tripathi, Sri Manoj Kumar Rajvanshi, Sri
Sankatha Rai, Sri Sudhir Malhotra, Sri V.K.
Rai, Sri Vikrant Rana, Sri Y.D. Sharma,
N.C. Rajvanshi, Sri P.K. Shukla, Sri Sudhir
Mehrotra

A. Fraud would vitiate a solemn
transaction recorded in howsoever
solemn proceedings.
Issue required to be decided by the D.D.C
while deciding revision- whether the
compromise which the D.D.C verified on
24.10.1985 was indeed a fraudulent
compromise
or
a
genuine
compact
between parties - instead he recorded
findings, that are irrelevant and nongermane
to
this
principle
issue
alone(Paras 11 to 16). Fraud would vitiate
a
solemn
transaction
recorded
in
howsoever solemn proceedings (Paras 18
to 19). Impugned order passed by DDC is
manifestly
illegal,
and
cannot
be
sustained

Writ Petition allowed (E-6)

## Text

1046 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J

Writ - B No. 9003 of 1997

Kalu Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C. And Others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri R.K. Asthana, Sri Amit Malik, Sri Ashish
Gopal, Sri B. Malik, Sri P.K. Asthana, Sri
P.K.
Srivastava,
Sri
Pawan
Kumar
Srivastava, Sri S.C. Pandey, Sri S.K.
Dubey, Sri Sanjay Mishra, Sri Satyam
Shah, Sri Siddharth Pandey.

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Deepika Sharma, Sri Hriday Raj
Tripathi, Sri Manoj Kumar Rajvanshi, Sri
Sankatha Rai, Sri Sudhir Malhotra, Sri V.K.
Rai, Sri Vikrant Rana, Sri Y.D. Sharma,
N.C. Rajvanshi, Sri P.K. Shukla, Sri Sudhir
Mehrotra

A. Fraud would vitiate a solemn
transaction recorded in howsoever
solemn proceedings.
Issue required to be decided by the D.D.C
while deciding revision- whether the
compromise which the D.D.C verified on
24.10.1985 was indeed a fraudulent
compromise
or
a
genuine
compact
between parties - instead he recorded
findings, that are irrelevant and nongermane
to
this
principle
issue
alone(Paras 11 to 16). Fraud would vitiate
a
solemn
transaction
recorded
in
howsoever solemn proceedings (Paras 18
to 19). Impugned order passed by DDC is
manifestly
illegal,
and
cannot
be
sustained

Writ Petition allowed (E-6)
(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. Heard Sri B. Malik, learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri
N.C. Rajvanshi, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Sri P.C. Shukla, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
no.3. Sri Y.D. Sharma, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent no.5,
Sri
Vikrant
Rana,
learned
counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent no.4,
and Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, learned counsel
representing the Administrator General.

2. This writ petition has been filed
by the original petitioner, one Kalu Ram
son of Sri Bhajjan, now represented by his
heirs and legal representatives, petitioner
nos.1/2/1, 1/2/2 and 1/2/3, challenging an
order
of
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation,
Ghaziabad
dated
27.02.1997, whereby he has allowed
Revision
no.507
filed
by
original
respondent no.2, Smt. Risalo, and set
aside an order dated 10.09.1990 passed by
the Consolidation Officer. By the order
last mentioned the Consolidation Officer
acting on a compromise dated 24.07.1987,
and verified by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation, had recorded shares of
parties in the Consolidation Records. Also
set aside by the impugned order is an
order, dated 03.09.1993 passed by the
Consolidation
Officer,
Ghaziabad,
rejecting an application on behalf of Smt.
Risalo to set aside the order dated
10.07.1990, by which the compromise
was implemented. The Deputy Director in
the same stroke also set at naught an order
dated
26.08.1996
passed
by
the
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation
dismissing an appeal under Section 11(1)
of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act
carried by respondent no.2 from the order
of the Consolidation Officer, refusing to
1 All. Kalu Ram Vs. D.D.C. And Others
1047
set aside his order dated 10.07.1990. The
result
of
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation's order dated 27.02.1997,
that is impugned here is that the parties
are put back to the position as it existed
prior to 10.07.1990 regarding their
respective shares recorded in the land in
dispute, which is detailed hereinafter.

3. The background of the dispute
leading to this writ petition according to the
petitioners is that one, Vishram was the
original recorded tenure holder of the property
in dispute. He was survived by two sons,
Bhajjan and Chhotia. Risalo was Chotia's wife
and the couple were issueless. Half share in
the land in dispute upon Vishram decease
went to Chhotia, and upon his death to Risalo
as his widow. Bhajjan had two sons, Kalu and
Jagmal. Kalu is the original writ petitioner
here. He survived by his heirs, Satish,
Santram, Jeetram and Baleshwar, all of whom
are Kalu's grandsons, and arrayed here as
petitioners. The widow of Chhotia, Risalo
remarried, post inheritance, one Bahodu. In
course of time, Bahodu also died and Risalo
survived him. However, Risalo's name
continued to be recorded in the land in
dispute, that she had inherited from her first
husband, the late Chhotia.

4. According to the petitioners' case,
Kalu, who represents the branch of
Bhajjan, upon Risalo's remarriage, put
forward a case based on reversionary
rights under Section 172 of the U.P. Z.A.
& L.R. Act claiming that all that she had
inherited from Chhotia, her first husband,
upon remarriage would revert back to the
branch of Bhajjan. This is what has given
rise to the dispute leading to the present
writ petition.

5. It appears that upon notification
of consolidation proceedings, this claim
based on reversion was put forward by
Kalu,
but
before
the
Assistant
Consolidation Officer, a compromise was
claimed to have been recorded on
20.10.1983 between Kalu and Risalo.
This compromise was challenged by
means of five appeals to the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation being Appeal
nos.449, 447, 442, 450 and 448, all of
which came to be decided by the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation vide
judgment and order dated 02.06.1984.
These appeals came to be dismissed as
time barred, though with some remarks on
merits also.

6. Aggrieved by this order dated
02.06.1984, Kalu went up in Revision to
the Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Ghaziabad vide Revision no.880 of 1984,
arraying as parties, Smt. Risalo and
Jagmal son of Bhajjan (Kalu Ram's
brother). In the said revision, again a
compromise was recorded on 24.10.1985,
where parties including Kalu and Smt.
Risalo (the latter thumb marked) were
identified by their respective counsel.
This compromise after verification by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation was
sent
by
a
detailed
order
to
the
Consolidation Officer, after setting aside
the orders under challenge in Revision
no.880 of 1984 with a direction that the
Consolidation Officer may carry out the
order.
This
order
was
passed
on
24.10.1985, and reads thus (in Hindi
vernacular):

"उपरोक्त भििेिनम के अनुसमर भनगरमनी स्िीकमर की
जमती है। अिीनस्थ न्यमयमलयों द्वमरम पमररत आिेश भनरस्त भकये जमते
हैं।

पत्रमिली भिद्वमन िकबांिी अभिकमरी के न्यमयमलय में
भनयममनुसमर भनस्तमरण हेतु प्रत्यमिभतात की जमती हैं।"

7. The Consolidation Officer before
whom
the
compromise
went
in
1048 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
compliance
with
the
order
dated
24.10.1985 passed by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation, carried out the terms of
the compromise in the Consolidation
Records, as already said hereinbefore vide
order dated 10.07.1990. The parties were
recorded in the Consolidation Records in
terms of the aforesaid compromise.

8. Once again hostilities erupted
between parties, with Risalo filing an
application to the Consolidation Officer
claiming that the compromise that has
been recorded before the Deputy Director
of Consolidation, was fraudulent and does
not
bear
her
signatures.
The
said
application for restoration made by
Risalo, was rejected by the Consolidation
Officer vide order dated 03.09.1993.

9. Aggrieved by the order dated
03.09.1993, an appeal was carried to the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation, who
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
order last mentioned, passed by the
Consolidation Officer.

10. Aggrieved by both these orders,
Revision no.507 was filed by Risalo,
which has come to be allowed by the
impugned order.

11. Before proceeding to consider
the merits of the petitioners' challenge to
the impugned order dated 27.02.1997
passed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation, it would be necessary to
place developments during the course of
pendency of this writ petition where a
number of parties have been substituted,
and/ or impleaded.

12. Omdev Singh, Bhajjan and
Ramdev son of Raj Kumar, have been
impleaded as respondent nos.5, 6 & 8 to
the petition on the basis of a registered
will dated 05.12.1990 executed by Smt.
Risalo, respondent no.2, bequeathing her
entire estate in favour of aforesaid three.
They have been impleaded vide order
dated
16.05.2018.
Likewise,
Vinod
Kumar has been impleaded as respondent
no.3 on the basis of a will dated
18.05.1999, executed in his favour, also
by Risalo, bequeathing her entire estate to
him. Then respondent no.4 has also been
impleaded under orders of this Court,
dated 16.05.2018, claiming a right also
from Risalo based on an agreement to
sell, dated 31.12.1986. The Court has
proceeded to implead all these parties
who claim to represent the estate of
deceased Risalo, not in the sense that their
claims to title have been accepted, but
only for the purpose of prosecuting this
litigation. The Court also considering the
fact that there is no heir or legal
representative left by Smt. Risalo as per
report of the Consolidation Officer, has
proceeded
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of Order XXII Rule 4A CPC to
appoint the Administrator General, U.P.
to represent the estate of the deceased,
Risalo.

13. This Court must place on record
the fact that the Court is assured, in the
midst of much unsurety about what claim
is made by which party and to what extent
it is right, that the estate of Risalo is more
than well represented here.

14. A perusal of the impugned order
passed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation shows that after remand
post verification of the compromise, the
papers were laid for orders before the
Consolidation Officer, who issued notice
to Smt. Risalo on 09.01.1990, returnable
on 23.01.1990. He has further perused the
1 All. Kalu Ram Vs. D.D.C. And Others
1049
record and held that it reveals that no
process, in fact, was issued to Smt.
Risalo, and nobody appeared on her
behalf before the Consolidation Officer. It
has been held that on 10.07.1990, the
order passed against Smt. Risalo was ex
parte, and that by the said order the
compromise
dated
24.10.1987
(sic
24.10.1985) was accepted; and on its
basis the settlement of rights of parties
was made. He has further recorded a
finding that the Consolidation Officer
without bestowing any consideration to
the application made by Risalo to set
aside the order dated 10.07.1990, has
rejected the same. The Deputy Director of
Consolidation has recorded a further
finding that he is in agreement with the
submission
of
the
learned
counsel
appearing for Risalo that it was necessary
to get the compromise dated 24.10.1987
set aside. He has also said that he has
while setting out the controversy in the
body of his order noticed that the claim of
Kalu Ram as regards Khata nos.13 and 14
is barred by res judicata, and so far Khata
no.252 is concerned, Kalu Ram has not
put forward any convincing evidence to
establish his claim. He has then proceeded
to set aside the various orders passed by the
authorities below refusing to disturb the
compromise recorded between parties and
given effect to vide order dated 10.07.1990.
It must be remarked at once that the Deputy
Director of Consolidation was required to
see in the Revision pending before him
whether the compromise which the Deputy
Director of Consolidation verified on
24.10.1985 was, indeed, a fraudulent
compromise or a genuine compact between
parties. This the Deputy Director of
Consolidation has not done at all. Instead,
he has recorded findings, that are all
irrelevant and non-germane to this principal
issue alone, which the Deputy Director of
Consolidation was required to determine.
The Deputy Director of Consolidation has
commented much on the fact that notice to
Risalo was not issued by the Consolidation
Officer before he passed the order dated
10.07.1990 implementing the compromise
arrived at between parties, that was verified
by the Deputy Director of Consolidation.

15. This Court thinks that before the
Consolidation Officer, there was hardly
any necessity of notice to any of the
parties inasmuch as the matter had been
sent to Consolidation Officer for giving
effect to the compromise, that had been
verified by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation in Revision no.880 of 1984
vide
order
dated
24.10.1985.
The
Consolidation
Officer
was
only
an
executing agency and while he may have
had some adjustment to make in the rights
of parties in calculating their precise
entitlement
and
delivering
on
spot
possession, he had nothing more to do. If
grievances had arisen to parties relating to
execution of the compromise, absence of
notice to Risalo would have mattered; but
that is not the issue. The issue is about
genuineness of the compromise, which
was recorded and verified by the Deputy
Director of Consolidation, and this was
sent down to the Consolidation Officer for
giving effect to it.

16. In this context, the findings of the
Deputy Director of Consolidation as regards
the absence of notice to Risalo are
completely out of place and irrelevant.
Likewise, the findings in the impugned
order regarding Kalu Ram's claim to Khata
nos.13 & 14 being barred by res judicata, or
the failure of Kalu Ram to produce any
convincing evidence as to his claim
regarding Khata no.252, are equally
irrelevant. What is relevant, to emphasize
1050 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
time over again is to judge the genuineness
of compromise that the Deputy Director of
Consolidation recorded on 24.10.1987. This
exercise
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation has not at all undertaken. The
order, which he had made could only be
made in the event the Deputy Director of
Consolidation had come to a conclusion that
the compromise that was recorded before
him was based on a fraud practiced upon
Risalo, and the resultant compromise was
the result of this fraud. No other finding,
given the background in which the parties
have already compromised and adjusted
their rights can justify the order made by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation under
challenge here. The fact that fraud does
vitiate all solemn transactions is eloquently
dealt with by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court in the context of a
compromise in Banwari Lal vs. Smt.
Chando
Devi
(through
L.R.)
and
another, (1993) SCC 581, where in
paragraph 14 of the report, it has been held:

"14. The application for exercise of
power under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23
can be labelled under Section 151 of the Code
but when by the amending Act specifically
such power has been vested in the Court
before which the petition of compromise had
been filed, the power in appropriate cases has
to be exercised under the said proviso to Rule
3. It has been held by different High Courts
that even after a compromise has been
recorded, the court concerned can entertain an
application under Section 151 of the Code,
questioning the legality or validity of the
compromise. Reference in this connection
may be made to the cases Tara Bai (Smt) v.
V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao [AIR 1985 Kant 270
: ILR 1985 Kant 2930]; S.G. Thimmappa v. T.
Anantha [AIR 1986 Kant 1 : ILR 1985 Kant
1933]; Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary v.
Debendra Pd. Singh [AIR 1958 Pat 618 :
1958 BLJR 651]; Mangal Mahton v. Behari
Mahton [AIR 1964 Pat 483 : 1964 BLJR 727]
and Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas
Shaw [AIR 1982 Cal 12] where it has been
held that application under Section 151 of the
Code is maintainable. The court before which
it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged
compromise that no such compromise had
been entered between the parties that court has
to decide
whether the agreement or
compromise in question was lawful and not
void or voidable under the Indian Contract
Act. If the agreement or the compromise itself
is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void
within the meaning of the explanation to the
proviso to Rule 3 and as such not lawful. The
learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly
justified in entertaining the application filed on
behalf of the appellant and considering the
question as to whether there had been a lawful
agreement or compromise on the basis of
which the court could have recorded such
agreement or compromise on February 27,
1991. Having come to the conclusion on the
material produced that the compromise was
not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3, there
was no option left except to recall that order."
(Emphasis supplied)

17. To the same end is another
decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi
Development Authority vs. Bankmens
Co-Operative Group Housing Society
Ltd. & others, (2017) 7 SCC 636, where
it has been held in paragraphs 16, 17, 18
& 21 of the Report thus:

"16. It is further urged by Shri
Ranjit Kumar that the revival of the
Societies was a fraudulent act and he
submits that fraud vitiates all decisions
and in this regard, he made reference to
the judgment of this Court in Bhaurao
Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra
[Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of
1 All. Kalu Ram Vs. D.D.C. And Others
1051
Maharashtra, (2005) 7 SCC 605] ,
relevant portions of which read as
follows: (SCC pp. 611-12, paras 9-11)

"9. By "fraud" is meant an
intention to deceive; whether it is from
any expectation of advantage to the party
himself or from ill will towards the other
is immaterial. The expression "fraud"
involves two elements, deceit and injury
to
the
person
deceived.
Injury
is
something other than economic loss, that
is, deprivation of property, whether
movable or immovable, or of money and
it will include any harm whatever caused
to any person in body, mind, reputation or
such others. In short, it is a non-economic
or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or
advantage to the deceiver, will almost
always cause loss or detriment to the
deceived. Even in those rare cases where
there is a benefit or advantage to the
deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the
deceived,
the
second
condition
is
satisfied. ...

10. A "fraud" is an act of
deliberate deception with the design of
securing something by taking unfair
advantage of another. It is a deception in
order to gain by another's loss. It is a
cheating intended to get an advantage. ...

11. "Fraud", as is well known,
vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and
justice never dwell together. Fraud is a
conduct either by letters or words, which
induces the other person or authority to
take a definite determinative stand as a
response to the conduct of the former,
either by words or letters. It is also well
settled
that
misrepresentation
itself
amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent
misrepresentation may also give reason to
claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent
misrepresentation is called deceit and
consists in leading a man into damage by
wilfully or recklessly causing him to
believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud
in law if a party makes representations,
which he knows to be false, and injury
ensues therefrom although the motive
from which the representations proceeded
may not have been bad. An act of fraud
on court is always viewed seriously. A
collusion or conspiracy with a view to
deprive the rights of others in relation to a
property would render the transaction
void ab initio. Fraud and deception are
synonymous. Although in a given case a
deception may not amount to fraud, fraud
is anathema to all equitable principles and
any affair tainted with fraud cannot be
perpetuated or saved by the application of
any equitable doctrine including res
judicata."

17. We have heard the learned
counsel for the respondents and they have also
filed their written submissions. It would be
pertinent to mention that the counsel for the
respondents
have
not
countered
the
submission of the learned Solicitor General
that the revival of the Societies was illegal and
fraudulent. The main submission is that the
new
members
were
validly
granted
membership in Bankmens CGHS. They are
not at fault and hence, they should not be
made to suffer. It is also urged that the
allegation that Rs 67,38,800 was paid out of
the funds of builders is incorrect and, in fact,
this amount was paid out of the funds of the
Society.

18.

In
Safdarjung
CGHS,
additional grounds have been taken that DDA
had not, in fact, challenged the orders dated
27-2-2012 [Safdarjung Coop. Group Housing
Society Ltd. v. Registrar of Coop. Societies,
2012 SCC OnLine Del 6454] and 22-8-2012
[Safdarjung Coop. Group Housing Society
Ltd. v. Registrar of Coop. Societies, 2012
SCC OnLine Del 6456] but only after the land
which was the subject-matter of dispute in
Bankmens CGHS case [Indian Statistical
1052 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Institute Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. v.
Union of India, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 1244]
was illegally given to some third party, it was
felt by officials of DDA that contempt
proceedings may be initiated against them
and, therefore, the appeal was filed in
Safdarjung CGHS case also. Again on merits,
all that has been stated is that after revival in
the year 1999, the membership is genuine and
bona fide and that the genuine members
cannot be denied what is rightfully due to
them.

21. As repeatedly held by this
Court, when an action is based on fraud,
the same cannot withstand the scrutiny of
law. The revival of these Societies is
mired in controversy. When we talk of
revival, it would normally mean that the
Society is being revived by its original
members. As far as these two cases are
concerned, the move for revival was
started by persons who were not even
members or promoters of the original
Society. The revival of Societies was
funded by the builders. The original
members have all vanished into thin air.
There is no explanation as to how they
resigned
and
who
accepted
their
resignations. There is nothing on record to
show how Rajan Chopra, in case of
Bankmens CGHS and Mahanand Sharma,
in case of Safdarjung CGHS, were
entitled to file the application for revival.
We also cannot lose sight of the fact that
both the Societies were put under
liquidation because they could not furnish
some information to the Office of RCS.
There is not even a plea that when the
revival was done, RCS was satisfied that
the reasons for which the Societies were
liquidated no longer existed. It is also
obvious that memberships kept changing
and almost all the members of these two
Societies are persons who were granted
membership after the year 2003 i.e. after
the cut-off date referred to in Yogi Raj
Krishna CGHS case [Yogi Raj Krishna
Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. v.
DDA, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1602] . We
are, therefore, clearly of the view that the
very revival of the Societies is illegal and
that when the foundation falls, the edifice
which has been developed on the
foundation, must go."
(Emphasis by Court)

18. The principles adumbrated in the
aforesaid decisions of their Lordships,
which learned counsel for all parties
appearing in this case acknowledge to be
the correct position of the law, would lead
to the conclusion that fraud would vitiate
a
solemn
transaction
recorded
in
howsoever solemn proceedings. It would
also not the matter how old that fraud is
with the only practical limitation that the
fraud should not be so ancient that there is
no evidence forthcoming by which a party
can establish the fraud.

19. In the present case, a perusal of
the impugned order shows that the Deputy
Director of Consolidation has gone
completely astray, and decided the
revision
on
absolutely
irrelevant
considerations. It must also be noticed
that the parties also knocked at the wrong
door. Aggrieved by the compromise as
they were, they ought to have applied to
the Deputy Director of Consolidation,
before
whom
the
compromise
was
verified on 24.10.1987, and who accepted
it. The Consolidation Officer had the role
of an Executing Court, at best. As such,
the resort the parties took to the
Consolidation Officer to set aside the
compromise was by no means well
advised. But, that does not absolve the
Deputy Director of Consolidation of his
duty to determine the real and substantial
1 All. Baladin And Another Vs. D.D.C. And Others
1053
issue between parties, which is about the
genuineness of the compromise, by which
all those who stand against Risalo, affirm
whereas all those who stand by Risalo,
dispute.
The
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation, therefore, is required to
determine going by relevant evidence as
to whether the compromise recorded
before him on 24.10.1987 and verified by
him on the said date was genuine or not.
He was not required to go into any other
issue. As such, the impugned order passed
by the Deputy Director of Consolidation
is manifestly illegal, and cannot be
sustained.

20. In the result, this petition
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned
order dated 27.02.1997 by the Deputy
Director of Consolidation in Revision
no.507 is hereby quashed with a remit of
the matter to the Deputy Director of
Consolidation, who will decide the said
revision afresh in accordance with the
guidance in this judgment, within a period
of six months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this judgment, after
hearing all parties concerned, including
those who were parties here, in particular,
the Administrator General, U.P., who
represents the estate of Smt. Risalo. Costs
easy.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ - B No. 14352 of 1984

Baladin And Another ...Petitioners
Versus
D.D.C. And Others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Santosh Kumar, Sri Akhilesh Patel, Sri
Hausila Prasad, Sri Kanhaiya Lal, Sri
Satish Chandra Dwivedi, Sri Satya Prakash
Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C., Sri Dhruva Narayan Mishra, Sri
Kamal Srivastava, Sri Shyamji Gaur

A. Article 226 Constitution of India-
Amendment - Writ Petition pending since
1984-Amendment application filed in 2019
at the stage of Final Hearing-Rejected.
Application to postpone final hearing till
disposal of application under order IX rule
13 in O.S No. 355 of 1970. Held:- dilatory
device and is made malafidely - Rejected.
 (E-6)

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

Order on Civil Misc. Amendment
Application no.26 of 2019

This amendment application has
been made belatedly at a stage when this
writ petition has come up for final
hearing. This writ petition is one of the
year 1984 and this amendment application
has been made in the year 2019.

There is no good ground to
grant this amendment.

This amendment application is
hereby rejected.

It is directed that in cases
listed for final hearing, it shall be the
responsibility of the Section Officer
concerned that there is no application
pending for orders. If there is an
application brought subsequently, in a
final hearing matter, that matter will
not be listed for final hearing, but for
orders first. Any violation from this
direction, will be viewed seriously.

Order on Civil Misc. Application (to
postpone final hearing) no.13 of 2019