# Kamal Kant Dubey v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 803
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-11
- **Case number:** Writ - A No. 16686 of 2025
- **Bench:** Vikas Budhwar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kamal-kant-dubey-v-u-o-i-ors-52757
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A.S.G.I., Shiv Kumar Pal

Issue for Consideration
Permissibility of relying upon the favourable
medical report of other hospitals, when the
petitioner was found medically unfit during
medical examinations for selection on the post
of Sub-Inspector.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Recruitment - Post of
Sub-Inspector - Medical examination -
Judicial review - Scope of interference -
After clearing Physical Standard Test and
Paper
II
examination,
the
petitioner
appeared in medical examination - He
was found unfit due to 'Gynecomastia'
during
Detailed
Medical
Examination
(D.M.E.) and Review Medical Examination
(R.M.E.)
-
Re-conduct
of
medical
examination sought - Report of Sir Sundar
Lal Chikitsalaya, Kashi and Pandit Deen
Dayal
Upadhyay
Government
Hospital
relied upon - Permissibility.
Held : Any report so pressed into service by the
writ petitioner as claimed herein cannot be a
ground to negate the conclusions drawn in
D.M.E. and R.M.E. - In Naomi Neijoujam
Haokip's case, the issue akin to the present
controversy came up for consideration - The
suitability of the candidates to function as a
member of the Force, given the medical
condition from which the candidate suffers, has
to be entirely left to the members of the Force
to assess the candidate, as they alone are
aware of the nature of the work that the
candidate,
if
appointed,
would
have
to
undertake, and the capacity of the candidates to
undertake the said work. In other words, once
the Court finds that the decision that the
804 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
candidate concerned suffers from a particular
ailment does not merit judicial interference, the
matter must rest there. The Court cannot
proceed one step further and examine whether
the ailment is such as would render the
candidate unfit for appointment as a member of
the concerned Force. [Paras 8 and 9] (E- 1)

Case Law Cited
Rupesh Kumar v. Union of India and others,
2020 (9) ADJ 555; Special Appeal No. 1076 of
2024, Shivansh Singh Vs. Union of India and 3
others decided on 16.12.2024; W.P. (C) No.
15804/2025 & CM Appl. No. 64751/2025, Naomi
Neijoujam
Haokip
Vs.
Staff
Selection
Commission and Ors. (Delhi High Court) decided
on 14.10.2025 - referred to.

List of Keywords
Recruitment; Physical Standard test; Paper II
examination; Medically unfit; Detailed Medical
Examination
(D.M.E.);
Review
Medical
Examination (R.M.E.); Re-conduct of medical
examination.

Case Arising From
Declaring the petitioner medically unfit on
account of 'Gynecomastia' during medical
examination.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner : Jadu Nandan Yadav,
Agnivesh, Pranvesh
Advs. For the Respondent : Shiv Kumar Pal

## Text

11 All. Kamal Kant Dubey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
803
for correction of his wife's name in
the service records, if were required.

14. Such functioning of responsible
authorities alike in the present case not only
causes hardships and difficulties to the
dependents of deceased employee who are
in penury and pitiable condition but also
becomes cause of a number of litigation
which piles up cases before the Courts.
Authorities concerned should proceed in
such matters within due course of time in
accordance with law. They are not expected
to sit tight over the applications for years
without passing any order with the
assumption that infirmities will become set
right without information to the concerned
employee.

15. In view of the above, interest of
justice requires that a direction be issued
upon respondent no. 4 to consider the claim
of the petitioner in accordance with law,
keeping in mind the observations as made
in the judgement in Rafat Naaz (supra), in
case the petitioner approaches along with
relevant documents as placed in the writ
petition, and pass appropriate orders for
payment of post retiral benefits to the
petitioner of her late husband after
verifying that Smt. Shanti Devi and Smt.
Sukh Devi are one and the same person,
expeditiously, preferably within a period of
one month from the date of production of a
certified copy of this order. The writ
petition is disposed of with the said
directions.

16. No order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 803
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.11.2025

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VIKAS BUDHWAR, J.

Writ - A No. 16686 of 2025

Kamal Kant Dubey ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Jadu Nandan Yadav, Pranvesh

Counsel for the Respondent:
A.S.G.I., Shiv Kumar Pal

Issue for Consideration
Permissibility of relying upon the favourable
medical report of other hospitals, when the
petitioner was found medically unfit during
medical examinations for selection on the post
of Sub-Inspector.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Recruitment - Post of
Sub-Inspector - Medical examination -
Judicial review - Scope of interference -
After clearing Physical Standard Test and
Paper
II
examination,
the
petitioner
appeared in medical examination - He
was found unfit due to 'Gynecomastia'
during
Detailed
Medical
Examination
(D.M.E.) and Review Medical Examination
(R.M.E.)
-
Re-conduct
of
medical
examination sought - Report of Sir Sundar
Lal Chikitsalaya, Kashi and Pandit Deen
Dayal
Upadhyay
Government
Hospital
relied upon - Permissibility.
Held : Any report so pressed into service by the
writ petitioner as claimed herein cannot be a
ground to negate the conclusions drawn in
D.M.E. and R.M.E. - In Naomi Neijoujam
Haokip's case, the issue akin to the present
controversy came up for consideration - The
suitability of the candidates to function as a
member of the Force, given the medical
condition from which the candidate suffers, has
to be entirely left to the members of the Force
to assess the candidate, as they alone are
aware of the nature of the work that the
candidate,
if
appointed,
would
have
to
undertake, and the capacity of the candidates to
undertake the said work. In other words, once
the Court finds that the decision that the
804 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
candidate concerned suffers from a particular
ailment does not merit judicial interference, the
matter must rest there. The Court cannot
proceed one step further and examine whether
the ailment is such as would render the
candidate unfit for appointment as a member of
the concerned Force. [Paras 8 and 9] (E- 1)

Case Law Cited
Rupesh Kumar v. Union of India and others,
2020 (9) ADJ 555; Special Appeal No. 1076 of
2024, Shivansh Singh Vs. Union of India and 3
others decided on 16.12.2024; W.P. (C) No.
15804/2025 & CM Appl. No. 64751/2025, Naomi
Neijoujam
Haokip
Vs.
Staff
Selection
Commission and Ors. (Delhi High Court) decided
on 14.10.2025 - referred to.

List of Keywords
Recruitment; Physical Standard test; Paper II
examination; Medically unfit; Detailed Medical
Examination
(D.M.E.);
Review
Medical
Examination (R.M.E.); Re-conduct of medical
examination.

Case Arising From
Declaring the petitioner medically unfit on
account of 'Gynecomastia' during medical
examination.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner : Jadu Nandan Yadav,
Agnivesh, Pranvesh
Advs. For the Respondent : Shiv Kumar Pal

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vikas Budhwar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Agnivesh (Advocate Roll
No.A/A1074/2017), Advocate holding brief
of Sri Pranvesh, learned counsel for the
writ petitioner as well as Sri S.K. Pal,
learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The case of the writ petitioner is
that an advertisement came to be published
by the Staff Selection Commission on
04.03.2024 for recruitment through open
competitive examination for the post of
Sub-Inspector in Delhi Police and Central
Armed Police Forces (CAPF). The writ
petitioner appeared in Paper-I which was
held at Varanasi and the same was
computer based exam and the petitioner
qualified the same and become eligible for
appearing
in
Physical
Standard
Test
(PST)/Physical Endurance Test (PET) and
the writ petitioner appeared in the said
examination, clear the same and became
eligible to appear in Paper-II and thereafter
he appeared in Paper-II and the centre was
at 13302- Dewa Mahila Mahavidyalaya,
Varanasi. The writ petitioner also cleared
Paper-II
examination
and
after
post
declaration of result, the Deputy Director
(Central Region) of the Commission issued
a letter to the writ petitioner calling for
Detailed Medical Examination (DME)
intimating
the
date
of
Medical
Examination. The writ petitioner appeared
before
the
Medical
Examination
Committee wherein he was declared unfit
on
the
ground
that
he
is
having
'Gynecomastia'
The
writ
petitioner
thereafter preferred an appeal for Review
Medical Examination which was conducted
by the 4th respondent, wherein again he
was
found
unfit
on
account
of
'Gynecomastia.'

3.
Questioning
the
result
dated
20.09.2025 issued by respondent No.4 and
the result dated 16.09.2025 issued by
respondent No.5 and seeking mandamus
directing the respondent Nos.3 and 4 to reconduct the Medical Examination of the
petitioner and other medical centre of the
group centre, the present writ petition has
been preferred.

4. Learned counsel for the writ
petitioner has sought to argue that the
conclusions so drawn in Detailed Medical
Examination (D.M.E.) and Review Medical
Examination (R.M.E.) is not accurate and
further there happens to be a report of the
11 All. Kamal Kant Dubey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
805
writ petitioner from Sir Sundar Lal
Chikitsalaya, Kashi Hindu Vishwavidalaya
(page-58 of the paper book) wherein the
said discrepancy/deficiency is not there
followed by of Pandit Deen Dayal
Upadhyay Government Hospital (page-59
of the paper book).

5. Submission is that once the writ
petitioner
possesses
report
from
a
government hospital and that too a reputed
one from B.H.U. then the writ petitioner is
right in questioning the conclusions drawn
by Detailed Medical Examination (D.M.E.)
and
Review
Medical
Examination
(R.M.E.). He seeks to rely upon the
decision of this Court in Rupesh Kumar
Vs. Union of India and others, 2020 (9)
ADJ 555.

6. Countering the said submission, Sri
S.K. Pal, learned counsel for the respondent
while countering the submission so made by
the learned counsel for writ petitioner has
sought to argue that none of the contentions so
raised have any leg to establish for simple
reason that the case of the writ petitioner stood
tested twice one by D.M.E. and second by
R.M.E. and further he cannot insist that a
report of any other hospital or medical institute
should be considered ignoring the conclusions
drawn by D.M.E. and R.M.E. He seeks to rely
upon Division Bench judgment of this Court
in Special Appellate judgment in Special
Appeal No.1076 of 2024 (Shivansh Singh
Vs. Union of India and 3 others) decided on
16.12.2024 and a decision of Delhi High Court
passed in W.P. (C) No.15804/2025 & CM
Appl. No.64751/2025 (Naomi Neijoujam
Haokip Vs. Staff Selection Commission and
Ors.) decided on 14.10.2025.

7. I have heard the submissions so
made across the bar and perusal of the
record.

8. Apparently, the writ petitioner was
subjected to Medical Examination at two
levels i.e. D.M.E. and R.M.E. which goes
to the route of the making the writ
petitioner unsuitable came to be surfaced.
However, the writ petitioner relies upon
certain
reports
of
Sir
Sundar
Lal
Chikitsalaya, Kashi Hindu Vishwavidalaya
and
Pandit
Deen
Dayal
Upadhyay
Government Hospital. In the opinion of the
Court, any report so pressed into service by
the writ petitioner as claimed herein cannot
be a ground to negate the conclusions
drawn in D.M.E. and R.M.E. In Shivansh
Singh (supra), the Special Appellate
Bench had the occasion to consider the said
aspect of the matter and has observed in
paragraph Nos.11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 as
under:

"11. The law with regard to the
scope of interference in matters relating to
the assessment of fitness by the medical
board constituted for the purpose of
recruitment under the relevant statutory
rules, in exercise of powers under writ
jurisdiction, is fairly well settled. In this
regard, we may place reliance upon the
observations made in Md. Arshad Khan
General
(Male)
Category,
(Roll
No.00186474),
Registration
No.10209488956 vs. State of UP and
others1, wherein it was observed as
follows:

"6. The scope of interference in
matters relating to assessment of fitness by
a Medical Board constituted under the
statutory rules in exercise of powers under
writ jurisdiction, in our opinion, would be
extremely limited.

7. The Courts have, time and
again, emphasised the need for caution
when candidates seek to assail the
806 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
correctness of the findings of a Medical
Board constituted under a recruitment
process adopted by the State authorities.

8. We may observe that although
the powers of the Court under Article 226
are wide enough to issue directions in
appropriate cases but such powers are
required to be wielded with caution and
circumspection. Matters relating to the
medical evaluation of candidates in a
recruitment
process
involve
expert
determination
and
the
Court
should
exercise caution in supplanting the process
adopted by the recruiting agency and
substituting it by a Court mandated further
medical evaluation.

9. Any such exercise in acceding
to requests of candidates who are not found
to be medically fit for reassessment on the
basis of procedures other than those
envisaged by the recruiting agency under
the relevant rules would result in the
recruitment process being derailed, which
would ordinarily be not permissible."

12. A similar view had also been
taken in another judgment of this Court in
Vivek Kumar S/o Mool Chandra vs. State of
UP & Others2, wherein it was held that
matters relating to medical evaluation of
candidates in a recruitment process involve
expert determination and it may not be
desirable
to
supplant
the
procedure
prescribed therefor as laid down under the
relevant recruitment rules and taking any
other view may have the effect of derailing
the recruitment process.

13. In the present case, where
recruitment process has been carried out
as
per
the
prescribed
procedure
whereunder
the
medical
fitness
of
candidates has been tested by a duly
constituted Medical Board, the report of
the Medical Board is not to be normally
interfered with, and that too, solely on the
basis of a claim sought to be set up by the
appellant-petitioner on the basis of some
subsequent report procured by him from
another medical practitioner.

14. It is no where the case of the
petitioner that the decision taken by the
Medical Board was arbitrary or not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed
for the recruitment in question.

15. We are of the view that a
claim sought to be set up on the basis of a
subsequent medical report produced by the
candidate would not have the effect of
overriding or setting at naught the expert
opinion of the Medical Board set up as per
procedure in a recruitment process."

9. In Naomi Neijoujam Haokip
(supra) the issue akin to the present
controversy came up for consideration
wherein the following was observed in
paragraph Nos.8, 9 & 10:

8. In this context, reference may
be made to the observations made by a
Division Bench of this Court in Staff
Selection Commission v Aman Singh6,
authored by one of us (C Hari Shankar, J),
wherein a similar issue was examined and
the Court observed that medical officers
are the most competent to assess whether a
prospective candidate meets the prescribed
medical standards for the post and the
scope of judicial interference in such cases
being limited. The relevant extract of the
observations
made
are
reproduced
hereinbelow: "10.38 In our considered
opinion, the following principles would
apply: (i) The principles that apply in the
case of recruitment to disciplined Forces,
11 All. Kamal Kant Dubey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
807
involved with safety and security, internal
and external, such as the Armed and
Paramilitary Forces, or the Police, are
distinct and different from those which
apply to normal civilian recruitment. The
standards of fitness, and the rigour of the
examination
to
be
conducted,
are
undoubtedly higher and stricter. (ii) There
is no absolute proscription against judicial
review of, or of judicial interference with,
decisions of Medical Boards or Review
Medical Boards. In appropriate cases, the
Court can interfere. (iii) The general
principle is, however, undoubtedly one of
circumspection. The Court is to remain
mindful of the fact that it is not peopled
either
with
persons
having
intricate
medical knowledge,or were aware of the
needs of the Force to which the concerned
candidate
seeks
entry.
There
is
an
irrebuttable presumption that judges are
not medical men or persons conversant
with
the
intricacies
of
medicine,
therapeutics or medical conditions. They
must, therefore, defer to the decisions of the
authorities in that regard, specifically of
the Medical Boards which may have
assessed the candidate. The function of the
Court can only, therefore, be to examine
whether the manner in which the candidate
was assessed by the Medical Boards, and
the conclusion which the Medical Boards
have arrived, inspires confidence, or
transgresses any established norm of law,
procedure or fair play. If it does not, the
Court cannot itself examine the material on
record to come to a conclusion as to
whether the candidate does, or does not,
suffer from the concerned ailment, as that
would amount to sitting in appeal over the
decision of the Medical Boards, which is
not permissible in law.

(iv) The situations in which a
Court can legitimately interfere with the
final outcome of the examination of the
candidate by the Medical Board or the
Review Medical Board are limited, but
well-defined. Some of these may be
enumerated as under: (a) A breach of the
prescribed procedure that is required to be
followed during examination constitutes a
legitimate ground for interference. If the
examination of the candidate has not taken
place in the manner in which the applicable
Guidelines
or
prescribed
procedure
requires
it
to
be
undertaken,
the
examination, and its results, would ipso
facto stand vitiated. (b) If there is a notable
discrepancy between the findings of the
DME and the RME, or the Appellate
Medical Board, interference may be
justified. In this, the Court has to be
conscious
of
what
constitutes
a
"discrepancy". A situation in which, for
example, the DME finds the candidate to be
suffering from three medical conditions,
whereas the RME, or the Appellate Medical
Board, finds the candidate to be suffering
only from one of the said three conditions,
would not constitute a discrepancy, so long
as the candidate is disqualified because of
the presence of the condition concurrently
found by the DME and the RME or the
Appellate Medical Board. This is because,
insofar as the existence of the said
condition
is
concerned,
there
is
concurrence and uniformity of opinion
between the DME and the RME, or the
Appellate Medical Board. In such a
circumstance, the Court would ordinarily
accept that the candidate suffered from the
said condition. Thereafter, as the issue of
whether the said condition is sufficient to
justify exclusion of the candidate from the
Force is not an aspect which would
concern the Court, the candidate's petition
would have to be rejected. (c) If the
condition is one which requires a specialist
opinion, and there is no specialist on the
808 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Boards
which
have
examined
the
candidate, a case for interference is made
out. In this, however, the Court must be
satisfied that the condition is one which
requires examination by a specialist. One
may
differentiate,
for
example,
the
existence of a haemorrhoid or a skin lesion
which is apparent to any doctor who sees
the candidate, with an internal orthopaedic
deformity, which may require radiographic
examination
and
analysis,
or
an
ophthalmological impairment. Where the
existence of a medical condition which
ordinarily would require a specialist for
assessment is certified only by Medical
Boards which do not include any such
specialist, the Court would be justified in
directing a fresh examination of the
candidate by a specialist, or a Board which
includes a specialist. This would be all the
more so if the candidate has himself
contacted a specialist who has opined in
his favour. (d) Where the Medical Board,
be it the DME or the RME or the Appellate
Medical Board, itself refers the candidate
to a specialist or to another hospital or
doctor for opinion, even if the said opinion
is not binding, the Medical Board is to
provide reasons for disregarding the
opinion and holding contrary to it. If,
therefore, on the aspect of whether the
candidate does, or does not, suffer from a
particular
ailment,
the
respondents
themselves refer the candidate to another
doctor or hospital, and the opinion of the
said doctor or hospital is in the candidate's
favour, then, if the Medical Board, without
providing any reasons for not accepting the
verdict of the said doctor or hospital,
nonetheless disqualifies the candidate, a
case for interference is made out. (e)
Similarly, if the Medical Board requisitions
specialist
investigations
such
as
radiographic or ultrasonological tests, the
results of the said tests cannot be ignored
by the Medical Board. If it does so, a case
for interference is made out. (f) If there are
applicable
Guidelines,
Rules
or
Regulations governing the manner in which
Medical Examination of the candidate is
required to be conducted, then, if the DME
or the RME breaches the stipulated
protocol, a clear case for interference is
made out. (v) Opinions of private, or even
government, hospitals, obtained by the
concerned candidate, cannot constitute a
legitimate basis for referring the case for
re-examination. At the same time, if the
condition is such as require a specialist's
view, and the Medical Board and Review
Medical Board do not include such
specialists, then the Court may be justified
in directing the candidate to be reexamined by a specialist or by a Medical
Board which includes a specialist. In
passing such a direction, the Court may
legitimately place reliance on the opinion
of such a specialist, even if privately
obtained by the candidate. It is reiterated,
however, that, if the Medical Board or the
Review Medical Board consists of doctors
who are sufficiently equipped and qualified
to pronounce on the candidate's condition,
then an outside medical opinion obtained
by the candidate of his own volition, even if
favourable to him and contrary to the
findings of the DME or the RME, would not
justify referring the candidate for a fresh
medical examination.

(vi) The aspect of "curability"
assumes significance in many cases.
Certain medical conditions may be curable.
The Court has to be cautious in dealing
with such cases. If the condition is itself
specified, in the applicable Rules or
Guidelines, as one which, by its very
existence, renders the candidate unfit, the
Court
may
discredit
the
aspect
of
curability. If there is no such stipulation,
11 All. Kamal Kant Dubey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
809
and the condition is curable with treatment,
then, depending on the facts of the case, the
Court may opine that the Review Medical
Board ought to have given the candidate a
chance to have his condition treated and
cured.
That
cannot,
however,
be
undertaken by the Court of its own volition,
as a Court cannot hazard a medical
opinion
regarding
curability,
or
the
advisability of allowing the candidate a
chance to cure the ailment. Such a decision
can be taken only if there is authoritative
medical opinion, from a source to which
the respondents themselves have sought
opinion or referred the candidate, that the
condition is curable with treatment. In such
a case, if there is no binding time frame
within which the Review Medical Board is
to
pronounce
its
decision
on
the
candidate's fitness, the Court may, in a
given case, direct a fresh examination of
the candidate after she, or he, has been
afforded an opportunity to remedy her, or
his, condition. It has to be remembered that
the provision for a Review Medical Board
is not envisaged as a chance for unfit
candidates to make themselves fit, but only
to verify the correctness of the decision of
the initial Medical Board which assessed
the candidate.

(vii) The extent of judicial review
has, at all times, to be restricted to the
medical examination of the candidate
concerned.
The
Court
is
completely
proscribed even from observing, much less
opining, that the medical disability from
which the candidate may be suffering is not
such as would interfere with the discharge,
by her, or him, of her, or his, duties as a
member of the concerned Force. The
suitability of the candidates to function as a
member of the Force, given the medical
condition from which the candidate suffers,
has to be entirely left to the members of the
Force to assess the candidate, as they
alone are aware of the nature of the work
that the candidate, if appointed, would
have to undertake, and the capacity of the
candidates to undertake the said work. In
other words, once the Court finds that the
decision that the candidate concerned
suffers from a particular ailment does not
merit judicial interference, the matter must
rest there. The Court cannot proceed one
step further and examine whether the
ailment is such as would render the
candidate unfit for appointment as a
member
of
the
concerned
Force."
(emphasis supplied)

9. It is clear from a perusal of the
aforesaid decision that the interference by
courts in such matters is generally
unwarranted because the standards of
medical
fitness
for
recruitment
to
disciplined forces are stringent and require
expert assessment. The Courts, not being
medically and technically equipped to
reassess such findings, must defer to the
opinion of the duly constituted medical
boards and intervene only where there is a
clear violation of procedure, established
law, or principles of fair play. The
judgment also highlights that the opinions
obtained by a candidate from a private or a
governmental hospital on their own accord,
cannot serve as valid grounds for seeking
dismissal and/or review of the observations
of the DME and RME.

10. Adverting to the facts of the
present case, the petitioner's candidature
was rejected on medical grounds for being
unfit due to defective vision of 6/9 in both
eyes, which has been concurrently upheld
by both the DME and RME. The eye test
record produced from Charak Palika
Hospital
also
does
not
justify
any
reconsideration. Thus, we find that none of
810 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the conditions laid down in Aman Singh
(supra) for judicial interference stand
satisfied in the present case.

10. As regards judgment in Rupesh
Kumar (supra) is concerned, the same
does not deal with the said issue.

11. Accordingly, no good ground is
made out to interfere in the present
proceedings. Accordingly, the writ petition
is dismissed.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 810
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Writ - A No. 16734 of 2012

Dr. S.K. Pant Professor & Ors....Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Alok Mishra, Ishir Sripat, Rahul Sripat
(Senior Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondent:
Amrendra Pratap Singh, C.S.C., Chandan
Sharma, Manoj Kumar Singh, Radhey
Krishna Pandey, Ram Gopal Tripathi, Ritvik
Upadhyay,
Shailendra,
Shashi
Prakash
Singh, V.K.Singh

Issue for Consideration
Entitlement of employee of an autonomous
institution namely Govind Ballabh Pant Social
Science Institute to get General Provident Fund
at par with Central University Employee.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - General Provident Fund
-
Entitlement
-
Petitioners
were
appointed in an autonomous institution
registered under Societies Registration
Act, 1860 namely, Govind Ballabh Pant
Social Science Institute, Allahabad, which
was, later on, adopted as constituent
institution of University of Allahabad in
the year 2005 - Petitioner's claim for GPF
was rejected by UGC saying that since
Govind
Ballabh
Pant
Social
Science
Institute, Allahabad was an autonomous
body, therefore, despite it is a constituent
institution of Allahabad University, CCS
Rules were not applied to it - Validity
challenged :
Held : Even after the institution become
constituent of Allahabad University, it still
remain autonomous and its finances are taken
care by Central Government independently.
Therefore also, there is no absolute right that
petitioners may be granted benefit of General
Provident
Fund
Scheme.
In
aforesaid
circumstances, since there is no change in
constitution of institution even after it become
constituent of Allahabad University, as such
petitioners claim has no force - There is no
ground to interfere with impugned order. [Paras
12 and 14] (E- 1)

Case Law Cited
University of Delhi v. Shashi Kiran and others,
(2022) 15 SCC 325; Indian Council of Social
Science Research (ICSSR) v. Neetu Gaur and
others, 2025 INSC 374; Priyankar Upadhyaya v.
Union of India and others, 2025:AHC:37820;
Prof. Harish Chandra Chaudhary and others v.
The
Union
of
India
and
others,
2025:AHC:69579-DB; Civil Appeal Nos. 76827684 of 2021, The State of Maharashtra and
another vs. Bhagwan and others decided on
10.01.2022 - referred to.

List of Acts
Societies Registration Act, 1860; University of
Allahabad Act, 2005; CCS Pension Rules.

List of Keywords
Autonomous
institution;
General
Provident
Fund; Central University Employee; Status of
Central University; Benefit of pension.

Case Arising From
Impugned order passed by the University Grant
Commission rejecting claim for grant of General