# Kamlesh Shukla & Ors v. Smt. Annapurna Devi & Anr

- **Citation:** (2022) 5 ILRA 1447
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-02-17
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 940 of 1997
- **Bench:** Subhash Chandra Sharma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kamlesh-shukla-ors-v-smt-annapurna-devi-anr-48428
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law - Hindu Succession Act, 1956 -
Section 14 -Deceased had two wives-deceased
wife was entitled for residence and maintenance
from her husband-family settlement-several
properties devised in her favour and also to her
step son-to avoid future dispute-house in
dispute-right to transfer with consent of step
son-possession handed to her-she died in 1977Hindu Succession Act came into force in 1956she was occupying the property on that timethrough family settlement-her pre-existing right
of maintenance and residence was recognizedshe became full owner of the property in
question by virtue of section 14(1) and section
14 (2) cannot be applied. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Kamlesh Shukla & Ors. Vs. Smt. Annapurna Devi & Anr.
1447
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs-respondents
before this Court and not disputed by
learned
counsel
for
the
defendantspetitioners, the date 8.2.2018 is fixed before
the court below for arguments. Therefore, I
find it appropriate to request the court
below to decide the aforesaid SCC Suit
No.05 of 2016 (Ram Niwas Verma and
others Vs. State Bank of India and another)
in accordance with law, expeditiously,
preferably within eight weeks from the date
of presentation of a certified copy of this
order, without granting any unnecessary
adjournment to either of the parties."

11. From perusal of Order XV Rule 5
of C.P.C., it is apparently clear that any
deposit made prior to first appearance in
SCC suit may be adjusted for arrears of
rent due upon filing an application, but
after institution of suit, it is mandatory
requirement to deposit rent before the
Court, where the suit is instituted. Once it
is not disputed that rent has not been
deposited before the Court concerned,
where the suit is instituted, there is no
option before the Court to struck off the
defence as provided under the provisions of
Order XV Rule 5 of C.P.C.

12. So far as present case is
concerned, there is admission on the part of
revisionist no.2 that she has paid rent from
time to time and she is tenant. She also
admitted that she has never paid rent before
the Court concerned after first hearing of
the suit as required under Order 5 Rule 15
of C.P.C.

13. Therefore, in light of facts of the
case as well as law laid down by this Court
from time to time, there is no illegality or
irregularity and Court has rightly struck off
the defence of revisionists. Revision lacks
merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No
order as to costs.
----------
(2022)05ILR A1447
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.02.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH CHANDRA
SHARMA, J.

Second Appeal No. 940 of 1997

Kamlesh Shukla & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Smt. Annapurna Devi & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri S.D. Kautilya, Sri Dinesh Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri R.P. Shastri, Sri H.P. Mishra, Sri
Raghvendra P. Shastri, Sri Vivek Saran

Civil Law - Hindu Succession Act, 1956 -
Section 14 -Deceased had two wives-deceased
wife was entitled for residence and maintenance
from her husband-family settlement-several
properties devised in her favour and also to her
step son-to avoid future dispute-house in
dispute-right to transfer with consent of step
son-possession handed to her-she died in 1977Hindu Succession Act came into force in 1956she was occupying the property on that timethrough family settlement-her pre-existing right
of maintenance and residence was recognizedshe became full owner of the property in
question by virtue of section 14(1) and section
14 (2) cannot be applied. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. V. Tulasamma & ors. Vs V. Shehsa Reddy, AIR
1977 SC 1944

2. Badri Parasad Vs Smt. Kanso Devi AIR 1970
SC 1963
1448 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3. Rangaswami Naicker Vs Chinnammal, AIR
1964 Mad 387

4. Gullapalli Krishna Das Vs Vishnumolakala
Venkaiah & ors., AIR 1978 SC 361
(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Chandra
Sharma, .J.)

1. Heard Sri S.D. Kautilya, learned
counsel for the appellants and Sri H.P.
Mishra,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents.

2. This second appeal arises from the
judgment and decree dated 12.09.1997
passed in First Appeal No.12/1993 (Smt.
Annapurna Devi and others vs. Pt. Ram
Shankar Shukla substituted by his legal
heirs) by learned First Additional District
Judge, Pilibhit by which learned court has
allowed the appeal and set aside the
judgment and decree dated 28.11.1981
passed by Civil Judge, Pilibhit in O.S.
No.49/2007 (Ram Shankar Shukla Vs. Smt.
Annapurna Devi and Harish Chandra
Bajpai) holding that Smt. Ramshri Kunwar
(mother of Smt. Annapurna Devi) became
full owner of the property in suit by virtue
of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession
Act and not a licencee.

3. The facts giving rise to the
present appeal are in brief that Pt. Jagan
Mohan Shukla was owner of movable and
immovable property. He had two wives,
one Smt. Ramshri Kunwar and other Smt.
Saraswati Devi. Smt. Annapurna Devi
was daughter of Smt. Ramshri Kunwar
and Pt. Ram Shankar Shukla was son of
Smt. Saraswati Kunwar. Sri Ram Shankar
Shukla was represented by his son
Kamlesh Kumar, daughter Smt. Indra
Prakashini and Smt. Raj Mohini. During
pendency of this appeal, Kamlesh Shukla
also died and represented through his
legal
representatives.
Likewise
respondent Smt. Annapurna Devi died
and
represented
through
her
legal
representatives.

4. Pt. Jagan Mohan Shukla executed a
family settlement deed on 27.05.1940 with
a view to maintain peace and harmony in
the family between Sri Ram Shankar
Shukla and Smt. Ramshri Kunwar his step
mother. He made arrangement of his entire
property and gave life estate to his wife
Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar in two houses as
described in para no.4 A of the plaint and
granted absolute rights of ownership of one
shop as mentioned in para no.4C, half share
in two grooves as mentioned in para no.4B
of the plaint. He reserved for his own use,
the property mentioned in para no.5 for
lifetime
and
after
his
death,
the
plaintiff/Ram Shankar Shukla was to
become its absolute owner. The settlement
deed dated 27.05.1940 was acted upon and
Smt.
Ramshri
Kunwar
was
given
possession accordingly. She sold some of
the property given to her by the deed dated
27.05.1940 and continued to occupy the
houses mentioned in para no.4A of the
plaint till she died on 16.04.1977 and then
property was occupied by her daughter
Smt. Annapurna Devi and her husband.
Since Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar was given
life interest in the property (houses) and
daughter of Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar with
her husband was living in the houses even
after the death of Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar,
therefore, they were asked to vacate the
property but on their failure, this suit was
filed by the plaintiff Ram Shankar Shukla
which was decreed by the learned trial
court holding that since Smt. Ram Shri
Kunwar was given life interest in the
disputed houses by way of gift-cum-willcum family settlement by Pt. Jagan Mohan
Shukla, therefore, the case was covered by
5 All. Kamlesh Shukla & Ors. Vs. Smt. Annapurna Devi & Anr.
1449
sub Section 2 of Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act.

5. Being aggrieved with this judgment
and decree Smt. Annapurna Devi preferred
first appeal before the District Judge which
was heard and decided by learned First
Additional District Judge, Pilibhit on
12.09.1997 by which learned court allowed
the appeal and held that Smt. Ram Shri
Kunwar became the owner of the property
in view of Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act and she was not a licencee.
Being aggrieved with this judgment and
decree this second appeal has been
preferred by legal heirs of Ram Shankar
Shukla against Smt. Annapurna Devi (died
during the pendency of appeal) and her
husband Harish Chandra Bajpai before this
Court.

6. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

7. In this appeal two substantial
questions of law were formulated.

I. Whether the Gift-cum-willcum-family settlement dated 27.5.1940
executed by Pt. Jagan Mohan Shukla is not
covered by the provisions of Section 14(2)
of the Act of 1956.

II.
Whether
the
defendants/opposite parties have any rights
on the property in dispute by virtue of the
settlement dated 27.05.1940.

8. Learned counsel for the appellants
has argued that in the present situation of
the case sub-section (2) of Section 14 of
Hindu Succession Act will apply because
property was not given to Smt. Ram Shri
Kunwar by her husband Pt. Jagan Mohan
Shukla for her maintenance with limited
interest but she was admitted to the
property as licencee. The family settlement
by which property was devised will not
come within the ambit of sub-section (1) of
Section 14 of the Act. Nowhere the word
maintenance gets mention in the deed of
family settlement. In this view, the
judgment and decree passed by learned first
appellate court is to be set aside and appeal
be allowed.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the
respondents urged that the reasoning as
given by the learned counsel for the
appellants does not get support from the
language as used in sub-section (1) & (2) of
Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. It is
against the intention of the legislature. By
passing the act the legislature intended to
confer full rights of ownership in the
property possessed by a female Hindu
either before or after the commencement of
the Act. As per interpretation by Hon'ble
the Supreme Court, if pre-existing right of
a female is recognized in conferring rights
regarding some property then sub-section
(1) of Section 14 will apply. On the
contrary if new right is created only then
sub-section (2) may apply. In the present
case respondent Smt. Annapurna Devi is
daughter of Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar wife of
Jagan Mohan Shukla who was entitled for
her residence and maintenance from her
husband and that right was recognized by
devising the property to her through family
settlement, therefore, sub-section (1) of
Section 14 will apply but not sub-section
(2). The learned first appellate court has
passed the judgment and decree in question
in this appeal after considering all these
facts in the light of law as laid down by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court and as provided
under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act. There is no any illegality or infirmity
in the impugned judgment but this appeal
1450 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
being forceless, is liable to be dismissed
with
cost.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent relied on the cases of V.
Tulasamma & othes Vs. V. Shehsa Reddy,
AIR 1977 SC 1944 and Gullapalli Krishna
Das Vs. Vishnumolakala Venkaiah &
others, AIR 1978 SC 361.

10. To decide the question, as to
whether property in dispute which was
devised by Pt. Jagan Mohan Shukla in
favour of Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar through
family settlement creating life interest in it,
confers full right of ownership on her by
virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of
the Hindu Succession Act or it is covered
with the provisions of sub-section (2) of
Section 14 of the Act, it is necessary to go
through the provisions as contained in
Section 14 of the Act and also the various
judicial pronouncements in this regard.

11. Section 14 of Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 provides that :-

"14(1) Any property possessed by
a female Hindu, whether acquired before
or after the commencement of this Act,
shall be held by her as full owner thereof
and not as a limited owner.

Explanation.---In
this
subsection,
"property"
includes
both
movable
and
immovable
property
acquired by a female Hindu by inheri-
tance or device, or at a partition, or in
lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance, or by gift from any person,
whether a relative or not, before, at or
after her marriage, or by her own skill or
exertion,
or
by
purchase
or
by
prescription, or in any other manner
what- ever, and also any such property
held by her as stridharas immediately
before the commence- ment of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in subsection (1) shah apply to any property
acquired by way of gift or under a will or
any other instrument or under a decree or
order of a civil court or under an award
where the terms of the gift, will or other
instrument or the decree, order or award
prescribe a restricted estate in such
property."

12. Prior to the enactment of Section
14, the Hindu Law restricted the nature of
the interest of Hindu female in property
acquired by her. The legislature by enacting
sub-section (1) of the Section 14 intended
to convert the interest which a Hindu
female has in property, however, restricted
the nature of that interest under the Shastri
Hindu Law, into absolute interest. The
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 had made far
reaching changes in this regard. The Act
confers upon the Hindu female, full rights
of inheritance and sweeps away the
traditional limitations on her powers of
disposition.

13. Section 14 (1) is wide in its scope and
ambit. It provides that any property possessed
by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or
after the commencement of this Act shall be
held by her as full owner thereof and not as a
limited owner. The words 'any property' are
large enough to cover any and every kind of
property but in order to make it comprehensive,
there is an explanation. Now, whatever be the
kind of property movable or immovable and
whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would
be covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14, the
object of legislature being to wipe out the
disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered
in regard to ownership of property under the old
law.

14. The provision under sub-section
(2) of Section 14 is more in the nature of a
proviso or exception to sub-section (1). It
5 All. Kamlesh Shukla & Ors. Vs. Smt. Annapurna Devi & Anr.
1451
cannot be interpreted in a manner to
deprive a Hindu female of the protection
sought to be given to her by sub-section
(1). Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read
in the context of sub-section (1) so as to
leave as large a scope for operation as
possible to sub-section (1). It must be
confined to cases where property is
acquired by a female Hindu for the first
time as a grant without any pre-existing
right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree,
order or award, the terms of which
prescribe a restricted estate in the property.

15. This line of approach in the
construction of sub-section (2) of section
14 is amply borne out by the trend of
judicial decisions of Hon'ble the Apex
Court. In this connection reference be made
to the decision in the case of Badri
Parasad vs. Smt. Kanso Devi AIR 1970 SC
1963. The facts in that case were that one
Gajju Mal owning self- acquired properties
died in 1947 leaving five sons and a
widow. On August 5, 1950, one Tulsi Ram
Seth was appointed by the parties as an
arbitrator for resolving certain dif- ferences
which had arisen relating to partition of the
properties left by Gujju Mal. The arbitrator
made his award on December 31, 1950 and
under clause 6 of the award, the 'widow
was awarded certain properties and it was
expressly stated in the award that she
would have a widow's estate in the
properties awarded to her. While the widow
was in possession of the properties, the Act
came into force and the question arose
whether on the coming into force of the
Act, she became full owner of the
properties under sub- section (1) or her
estate in the properties
remained a
restricted one under sub-section (2) of
section 14. It was held that although the
award gave a restricted estate to the widow
in the properties allotted to her, it was sub-
section (1) which applied and not subsection (2), because inter alia the properties
given to her under the award were on the
basis of a pre-existing right which she had
as an heir of her husband under the Hindu
Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and
not as a new grant made for the first time.
Sub-section (2) can come into operation
only if acquisition in any of the methods
enacted therein is made for the first time
without there being any pre-existing right
in the female Hindu who is in possession of
the property. It was further held that the
mere fact that the partition was by means of
an award would not bring the matter within
Section 14(2) of the Act, because the
interest given to the widow was on the
basis of pre-existing right and not a new
grant for the first time. So also in Nirmal
Chand v. Vidya Wanti (dead) by her legal
representatives, C.A. No.609 of 1965, D/-
21-1 1969 (SC) there was a regular
partition deed made on December 3, 1945
between Amin Chand, a coparcener and
Subhrai Bai, the widow of a deceased
coparcener, under which a certain property
was allotted to Subhrai Bai and it was
specifically provided in the partition deed
that Subhrai Bai would be entitled only to
the user of the property and she would have
no right to alienate it in any manner but
would only have a life interest. Subhrai Bai
died in 1957 subsequent to the coming into
force of the Act after making a will
bequeathing the property in favour of her
daughter Vidyawati. The right of Subhrai
Bai to bequeath the property by will was
challenged on the ground that she had only
a limited interest in the property and her
case was covered by sub-section (2) and
not sub-section (1). This contention was
negatived and it was held that though it was
true that the instrument of partition
prescribed only a limited interest for
Subhrai Bai in the property, that was in
1452 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recognition of the legal position which then
prevailed and hence it did not bring her
case within the exception contained in subsection (2) of section 14. It was observed:

"If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a
share in her husband's properties then the
suit proper- ties must be held to have been
allotted to her in accordance with law. As
the law then stood she had only a life
interest in the properties taken by her.
Therefore the recital in the deed in question
that she would have only a life interest in
the properties allotted to her share is
merely recording the true legal position.
Hence it is' not possible to con- clude that
the properties in question were given to her
subject to the condition of her enjoying it
for her life time. Therefore the trial court
as well as the first Appellate Court were
right in holding that the facts of the case do
not fall within S. 14 (2) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956."

16. It will be seen from these
observations that even though the property
was acquired by Subhrai Bai under the
instrument of partition, which gave only a
limited interest to her in the property, the
Court held. that the case fell within sub-
section (1) and not sub-section (2). The
reason obviously was that the property was
'given to Subhrai Bai in virtue of a preexisting right inhering in her and when the
instrument of partition provided that she
would only have a limited interest in the
property, it merely provided for something
which even otherwise would have been the
legal position under the law as it then
stood. It is only when property is acquired
by a Hindu female as a new grant for the
first time and the instrument, decree; order
or award giving the property prescribes the
terms on which it is to be held by the Hindu
female, namely, as a restricted owner, that
sub- section (2) comes into play and
excludes the applicability of sub-section
(1).

17. The object of sub-section (2), as
pointed out by Hon'ble the Apex Court in
Badri Prasad's case (supra) while quoting
with approval the observations made by the
Madras
High
Court
in
Rangaswami
Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad
387, is "only to remove the disability of
women imposed by law and not to interfere
with contracts, grants or decree etc. by
virtue of which a woman's right was
restricted" and, there- fore, where property
is acquired by a Hindu female under the
instrument in virtue of a pre-existing right,
such as a right to obtain property on
partition or a right to maintenance and
under the law as it stood prior to the
enactment of the Act, she would have no
more than limit- ed interest in the property,
a provision in the instrument giving her
limited interest in the property would be
merely by way of record or recognition of
the true legal position and the restriction on
her interest being a "disability imposed by
law" would be wiped out and her limited
interest would be enlarged under subsection (1). But where property is acquired
by a Hindu female under an instrument for
the first time without any pre-existing right
solely by virtue of the instrument, she must
hold it on the terms on which it is given to
her and if what is given to her is a restricted
estate, it would not be enlarged by reason
of sub-section (2).

18. In the light of the above decisions
of the Hon'ble Apex Court the following
principles appear to be clear:

(1) that the provisions of Section
14, of the 1956 Act must be liberally
construed in order to advance the object of
5 All. Kamlesh Shukla & Ors. Vs. Smt. Annapurna Devi & Anr.
1453
the Act which is to enlarge the limited
interest possessed by a Hindu widow which
was in consonance with the changing
temper of the times;

(2) it is manifestly clear that subs. (2) of Section 14 does not refer to any
transfer which merely recognises a preexisting right without creating or conferring
a new title on the widow. This was clearly
held by this Court in Badri Parshad's case
(supra).

(3) that the Act of 1956 has made
revolutionary and far-reaching changes in
the Hindu society and every attempt should
be made to carry out the. spirit of the Act
which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt
need and tried to do away with the
invidious distinction between a Hindu male
and
female
in
matters
of
intestate
succession;

(4) that sub-s. (2) of Section 14 is
merely a proviso to. subs. (1) of Section 14
and has to be interpreted as a proviso and
not-in a manner so' as to destroy the effect
of the main provision.

19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of V. Tulasamma & othes Vs. V.
Shehsa Reddy, AIR 1977 SC 1944 has
considered
the
aforesaid
cases
and
discussed the legal position elaborately
relating to sub-section (2) of Section 14 and
held in Para No.40 as under :-

"Finally, we cannot overlook the
scope and extent of a proviso. There can be
no doubt that sub-s. (2) of Section 14 is.
clearly a proviso to Section 14 (1) and this
has been so held by this Court in Badri
Prasad's case (supra). It is well settled that
a provision in the nature of a proviso
merely carves out an exception to the main
provision and cannot be interpreted in a
manner so as to. destroy the effect of the
main provision or to render the same
nugatory. If we accept the argument of the
respondent that sub-s. (2 ) to Section 14
would include even a property which has
been acquired by a Hindu female at a
partition or in lieu of maintenance then a
substantial part of the Explanation would
be completely set at naught which could
never be the intention of the proviso Thus
we are clearly of the opinion that sub-s. (2)
of of the proviso should be interpreted in
such a way so as not to substantially erode
Section 14 (1) or the Explanation thereto.
In the present case we feel that the proviso
has carved out completely a separate. field
and before it can apply three conditions
must exist:

(i) that the property must have
been acquired by way of gift, will, instrument,
decree, order of the Court or by an award;

(ii) that any of these documents
executed in favour of a Hindu female must
prescribe a restricted estate in such property;
and

(iii) that the instrument must create
or confer a new right, title or interest on the
Hindu female and not merely recognise or
give effect to a pre-existing right which the
female Hindu already possessed."

20. In the case of Gullapalli Krishna
Das Vs. Vishnumolakala Venkaiah &
others, AIR 1978 SC 361, the Hon'be Apex
Court has again affirmed the law as laid
down by it in the case of V. Tulasamma Vs.
V. Shehsa Reddy (supra).

21. In the instant case Pt. Jagmohan
Shukla had two wives and Smt. Ram Shri
Kunwar was one of them who had a
1454 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
daughter namely Smt. Annapurna Devi.
Ram Shankar Shukla was from the other
wife. Being wife, Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar
was entitled for residence and maintenance
from her husband Pt. Jagan Mohan Shukla.
Through
family
settlement
several
properties were devised in favour of her
and her step son Ram Shankar Shukla by
Pt. Jagan Mohan Shukla to avoid future
disputes. She was also conferred right of
full ownership in respect of other properties
but the houses in dispute except the right to
transfer with the consent of Ram Shankar
Shukla. Possession was also handed over to
her. In the year 1956, the Hindu Succession
Act came into force with Section 14
conferring the rights of full ownership on
Hindu women. At that time, she was
occupying the property. She died on
16.04.1977. It is crystal clear that through
family settlement the pre-existing right of
residence & maintenance of Smt. Ram Shri
Kunwar was recognized. No any new right
was conferred on her. So she became full
owner of the property in question by virtue
of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the
Hindu Succession Act and sub-section (2)
of Section 14 of the Act, cannot be applied.

22.

Consequently
the
defendant/respondent
Smt.
Annapurna
Devi, daughter of Smt. Ram Shri Kunwar,
who became the full owner of the property
in question, is also entitled to inherit the
property.

23. This Court is of the considered
opinion that there appears no illegality or
impropriety in the judgment and decree
dated 12.09.1997 passed by learned First
Additional District Judge, Pilibhit by which
learned court had allowed the appeal and
set aside the judgment and decree dated
28.11.1981 passed by Civil Judge, Pilibhit
in O.S. No.49/2007.

24. Accordingly, this second appeal
lacks merit and is, hereby, dismissed and
the judgment and decree passed by first
appellate court is confirmed.

25. No order as to costs.
----------

(2022)05ILR A1454
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.

Second Appeal No. 957 of 2017

Gokul Pandey & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Gram Pradhan & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Sheo Shankar Tripathi, Sri Adya Prasad
Tewari

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Girish Vishwakarma, Sri Tariq Maqbool
Khan, Sri P.K. Giri (Addl. C.S.C.)

Civil Law - Specific Relief Act,1963 -
Section 34 - Declaratory Suit against
defendants/respondent-for declaring them as
legal heir of deceased-and for declaring
Markandey Pandey as dead-not heard and
seen for last ten years-Appellate Court
recorded-though suit u/s 34 maintainable-
no notice u/s 80 (2) CPC given to defendants
being
St.
-appeal
rejected-error
in
dismissing.

Second Appeal allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. LIC of India Vs Anuradha, 2004 (10) SCC 131

2. Sanju Devi & ors. Vs St. & ors. 2014 SCC
Online Delhi 65