# Kanhaiya Bux Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 3 ILRA 740
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-02-22
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 45 of 2022
- **Bench:** Rajesh Bindal, C.J. Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kanhaiya-bux-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48234
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 14, 226 - - Appellant
moved belated claim - for arrears of
salary - for a particular period of time
after retirement of 6 years - rejected
being not entitled - writ petition -
dismissed on the ground of delay &
laches - Special Appeal - keeping in
view of the authoritative enunciation of
law & a disputed question of fact
cannot be gone into writ jurisdiction -
appeal accordingly, dismissed.(Para - 4,
20, 21)

Special Appeal dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

740 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of question booklet inasmuch as, they were
issued
set
'B'
of
question
booklet.
Reiterating the contention raised before the
learned Single Judge, learned counsel
submitted that in case of mentioning of
wrong roll number, the mistake is permitted
to be rectified by deducting 5 marks, there
was no reason not to permit the appellants
to rectify the mistake of non indication of
the set of question booklet opted.

5. Indisputably, before attempting
the question paper, the candidates were
expected to read the instructions carefully.
Unless question booklet 'A' or 'B' opted by
the appellants is reflected in the OMR
sheets, the answers given could not have
been
evaluated
by
OMR
software
application. The appellants, who were
negligent in not reading the instructions
properly and not filling the column meant
for corresponding question booklet set,
could not have been granted indulgence to
fill up the column in the OMR sheets
subsequently. If the OMR sheets are
permitted to be opened and corrected in this
manner, it may result in making fairness
and transparency in the examination
process questionable. For the parity of
reasons, the OMR sheet cannot be
permitted to be evaluated physically either.

6.
For
the
aforementioned
reasons, we are in agreement with the view
taken by the learned Single Judge."

32. In view of the discussion, the fact
remains that once the instructions were
clear and were to apply universally to all
candidates, if the error as per the
instructions is fatal, a hands-off approach
by the Writ Court is justified, hence we
find no good reason to interfere in the
matter.
Consequently,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
----------
(2022)03ILR A740
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.02.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Special Appeal No. 45 of 2022
arising out of Writ -A No. 377 of 2022

Kanhaiya Bux Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Suresh Sharma

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri H.P. Srivastava, A.C.G.C., Sri Rahul
Shukla

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 14, 226 - - Appellant
moved belated claim - for arrears of
salary - for a particular period of time
after retirement of 6 years - rejected
being not entitled - writ petition -
dismissed on the ground of delay &
laches - Special Appeal - keeping in
view of the authoritative enunciation of
law & a disputed question of fact
cannot be gone into writ jurisdiction -
appeal accordingly, dismissed.(Para - 4,
20, 21)

Special Appeal dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:-

1. St. of Uttaranchal & anr.Vs Sri Shiv Charan
Singh Bhandari & ors. (2013 (6) SLR 629),

2. U.O.I. & ors. Vs M. K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC
59

3. St. of Orissa Vs Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3
SCC 579
3 All. Kanhaiya Bux Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
741
4. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs Ghanshyam
Dass & ors., (2011) 4 SCC 374

5. St. of T. N. Vs Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC
137

6. Ghulam Rasool Lone VsSt. of J&K & anr.,
(2009) 15 SCC 321

7. New Delhi Municipal Council Vs Pan Singh &
ors., (2007) 9 SCC 278

8. P. S. Sadasivasway Vs St. of T.N., (1975) 1
SCC 152

9. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board & ors. Vs T. T. Murali Babu,
2014 (4) SCC 108

10. Bal Krishan Vs St. of Punjab & ors. 2013(2)
RSJ 18, (P&H)

11. U.O.I. & ors. Vs M K Sarkar (2010 Vol. 2 SCC
59),

12. Vijay Kumar Kaul & ors. Vs U.O.I. & ors.,
2012 (7) SCC 610

13. Prabhakar Vs Joint Director Sericulture
Department & anr., (2015) 15 SCC 1

14. St. of Jammu & Kashmir Vs R. K. Zalpuri &
ors., 2015 (15) SCC 602

15. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Chaman Rana, 2018 (5)
SCC 798

16. Senior Divisional Manager, L.I.C. Vs Shree
Lal Meena (2019) 4 SCC 479

17. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & ors. Vs Shyam
Kishore Singh (Civil Appeal No.1009 of 2020)
Dated 5.2.2020

18. St. of J&K & ors. Vs S. Bhupinder Singh,
(LPASW No.192 of 2017) Dated 30.12.2017

19. Farooq Ahmad Vs St. of J&K & ors., (LPA
No.210 of 2019) Dated 21.8.2019

20. St. of Mah. Vs Digambar, (1995 4 SCC
683)

21. St. of M. P. & ors. etc. etc. Vs Nandlal
Jaiswal & ors. etc.(AIR 1987 SC 251)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Bindal, C.J.
&
Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

1. The order dated January 28,
2022 passed by learned Single Judge has
been impugned by filing present intraCourt appeal.

2. The claim made before the
learned Single Judge was that the appellant
has not been paid salary for the period from
July 1, 2015 to September 25, 2015. He
retired from service on attaining the age of
superannuation on March 31, 2016. The
writ petition was dismissed on account of
delay and laches and also noticing the fact
that for the period from July 1, 2015 to
September 25, 2015, petitioner, in fact, had
not worked, hence was not entitled to any
payment of salary.

3. Learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that there was no delay
in filing the writ petition as the appellant
had been pursuing his remedy before the
department and further that he handed over
the matter to Mr. Sunil Kumar Bajpai,
Advocate, but he did not file the writ
petition.

4. After hearing the learned
counsel for the appellant, we do not find
that any case is made out for interference in
the present appeal. Law on the principles of
delay and laches is well settled. It is a case
in which salary for the period from July 1,
2015 to September 25, 2015 has been
sought by filing a petition in the year 2022,
i.e., more than six years thereafter. The
appellant
had
attained
the
age
of
superannuation
on
March
31,
2016.
742 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Thereafter relationship of master and
servant ceased and no issue with regard to
any service dispute could have been raised
more than six years after the retirement.
Even repeated representations filed by an
employee will not take care of the period of
limitation or the principle of delay and
laches on which the writ petition filed in
this Court has to be examined.

5. Different facets of issue
regarding delay and laches in filing the
petition had been subject matter of
consideration before Hon'ble the Supreme
Court on number of occasions, wherein it
has been consistently opined that the party
can be denied relief if he sleeps over the
matter.

6. In State of Uttaranchal and
another v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari and others 2013 (6) SLR 629,
Hon'ble
the
Supreme
Court,
while
considering the issue regarding delay and
laches and referring to earlier judgments on
the
issue,
opined
that
repeated
representations made will not keep the
issues alive. A stale or a dead issue/dispute
cannot be got revived even if such a
representation has either been decided by
the authority or got decided by getting a
direction from the court as the issue
regarding delay and laches is to be decided
with reference to original cause of action
and not with reference to any such order
passed. Delay and laches on the part of a
government servant may even deprive him
of the benefit which had been given to
others. Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, in a situation of that nature, will not
be attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert and
vigilant. Even equality has to be claimed at
the right juncture and not on expiry of
reasonable time. Even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet
it should be filed within a reasonable time.
Such an order promoting a junior should
normally be challenged within a period of
six months or at the most in a year of such
promotion. Though it is not a strict rule, the
courts can always interfere even subsequent
thereto, but relief to a person, who allows
things to happen and then approach the
court and puts forward a stale claim and try
to unsettle settled matters, can certainly be
refused relief on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights
is bound to suffer. An employee who sleeps
like Rip Van Winkle and got up from
slumber at his own leisure, deserves to be
denied the relief on account of delay and
laches. Relevant paragraphs from the
aforesaid judgment are extracted below:-

 "13. We have no trace of doubt
that the respondents could have challenged
the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They
chose not to do so for six years and the
junior employee held the promotional post
for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned
counsel for the respondents is that they had
given representations at the relevant time
but the same fell in deaf ears. It is
interesting to note that when the regular
selection took place, they accepted the
position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at
the doors of the tribunal only in 2003. It is
clear as noon day that the cause of action
had arisen for assailing the order when the
junior employee was promoted on ad hoc
basis on 15.11.1983. In C. Jacob v.
Director of Geology and Mining and
another, (2008) 10 SCC 115, a two-Judge
Bench was dealing with the concept of
representations and the directions issued by
3 All. Kanhaiya Bux Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
743
the court or tribunal to consider the
representations and the challenge to the
said rejection thereafter. In that context, the
court has expressed thus:-

 "Every
representation
to
the
Government for relief, may not be replied
on merits.

 Representations
relating
to
matters which have become stale or barred
by limitation, can be rejected on that
ground alone, without examining the merits
of the claim. In regard to representations
unrelated to the Department, the reply may
be only to inform that the matter did not
concern the Department or to inform the
appropriate Department. Representations
with incomplete particulars may be replied
by seeking relevant particulars. The replies
to such representations, cannot furnish a
fresh cause of action or revive a stale or
dead claim."

 14. In Union of India and others
v. M. K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, this
Court, after referring to C. Jacob (supra)
has ruled that when a belated representation
in
regard
to
a
"stale"
or
"dead"
issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
compliance with a direction by the
court/tribunal to do so, the date of such
decision cannot be considered as furnishing
a fresh cause of action for reviving the
"dead" issue or time- barred dispute. The
issue of limitation or delay and laches
should be considered with reference to the
original cause of action and not with
reference to the date on which an order is
passed in compliance with a Court's
direction. Neither a court's direction to
consider a representation issued without
examining the merits, nor a decision given
in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, or erase the delay and
laches.

 15.

From
the
aforesaid
authorities it is clear as crystal that even if
the
court
or
tribunal
directs
for
consideration of representations relating to
a stale claim or dead grievance it does not
give rise to a fresh cause of action. The
dead cause of action cannot rise like a
phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of
representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time. In Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman &
Managing Director v. K. Thangappan and
another, (2006) 4 SCC 322, the Court took
note of the factual position and laid down
that when nearly for two decades the
respondent-workmen therein had remained
silent mere making of representations could
not justify a belated approach.

 16. In State of Orissa v.
Pyarimohan Samantaray, (1977) 3 SCC
396, it has been opined that making of
repeated
representations
is
not
a
satisfactory explanation of delay. The said
principle was reiterated in State of Orissa v.
Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579.

 17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited v. Ghanshyam Dass (2) and others,
(2011) 4 SCC 374, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court reiterated the principle stated
in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1977) 6
SCC 538 and proceeded to observe that as
the respondents therein preferred to sleep
over their rights and approached the
tribunal in 1997, they would not get the
benefit of the order dated 7.7.1992.

 18. In State of T. N. v.
Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137, this
Court, testing the equality clause on the
744 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to
grant of service benefit, has ruled thus:-

 "... filing of representations alone
would not save the period of limitation.
Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a
court of law to determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an applicant
deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches
on the part of a government servant may
deprive him of the benefit which had been
given
to
others. Article
14 of
the
Constitution of India would not, in a
situation of that nature, be attracted as it is
well known that law leans in favour of
those who are alert and vigilant."

 19. There can be no cavil over
the fact that the claim of promotion is
based on the concept of equality and
equitability, but the said relief has to be
claimed within a reasonable time. The said
principle has been stated in Ghulam Rasool
Lone v.State of Jammu and Kashmir and
another, (2009) 15 SCC 321.

 20. In New Delhi Municipal
Council v. Pan Singh and others, (2007) 9
SCC 278, the Court has opined that though
there is no period of limitation provided for
filing a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a
writ petition should be filed within a
reasonable time. In the said case the
respondents had filed the writ petition after
seventeen years and the court, as stated
earlier, took note of the delay and laches as
relevant factors and set aside the order
passed by the High Court which had
exercised the discretionary jurisdiction.

 21. Presently, sitting in a time
machine, we may refer to a two Judge
Bench decision in P. S. Sadasivasway v.
State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152,
wherein it has been laid down that a person
aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior
over his head should approach the court at
least within six months or at the most a
year of such promotion. It is not that there
is any period of limitation for the Courts to
exercise their powers under Article 226 nor
is it that there can never be a case where
the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after
the passage of a certain length of time, but
it would be a sound and wise exercise of
discretion for the Courts to refuse to
exercise
their
extraordinary
powers
under Article 226 in the case of persons
who do not approach it expeditiously for
the relief and who stand by and allow
things to happen and then approach the
court to put forward stale claims and try to
unsettle settled matters.

 22. We are absolutely conscious
that in the case at hand the seniority has not
been disturbed in the promotional cadre and
no promotions may be unsettled. There may
not be unsettlement of the settled position but,
a pregnant one, the respondents chose to sleep
like Rip Van Winkle and got up from their
slumber at their own leisure, for some reason
which is fathomable to them only. But such
fathoming of reasons by oneself is not
countenanced in law. Anyone who sleeps over
his right is bound to suffer. As we perceive
neither the tribunal nor the High Court has
appreciated these aspects in proper perspective
and proceeded on the base that a junior was
promoted and, therefore, the seniors cannot be
denied the promotion. Remaining oblivious to
the factum of delay and laches and granting
relief is contrary to all settled principles and
even would not remotely attract the concept of
discretion. We may hasten to add that the
same
may
not
be
applicable
in
all
circumstances where certain categories of
fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale
claim
of
getting
promotional
benefits
3 All. Kanhaiya Bux Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
745
definitely should not have been entertained by
the tribunal and accepted by the High Court.
True it is, notional promotional benefits have
been granted but the same is likely to affect the
State exchequer regard being had to the
fixation of pay and the pension. These aspects
have not been taken into consideration. What
is urged before us by the learned counsel for
the respondents is that they should have been
equally treated with Madhav Singh Tadagi.
But equality has to be claimed at the right
juncture and not after expiry of two decades.
Not for nothing, it has been said that
everything may stop but not the time, for all
are in a way slaves of time. There may not be
any provision providing for limitation but a
grievance relating to promotion cannot be
given a new lease of life at any point of time."

7. The aforesaid view was followed
by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of
India and others vs Chaman Rana 2018(5)
SCC 798 and Union of India and others vs.
C. Girija and others 2019 (3) SCALE 527.

8. In Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board and others v.
T. T. Murali Babu 2014 (4) SCC 108,
Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined as under:-

 "13. First, we shall deal with the
facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, Amravati and others, AIR
1969 SC 329, the Court referred to the
principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall,
and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221, which is
as follows:-

 "Now the doctrine of laches in
Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct, done
that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps
not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay
of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might
affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy."

 14. In State of Mahrashtra v.
Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683, while
dealing with exercise of power of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
the Court observed that power of the High
Court to be exercised under Article 226 of
the Constitution, if is discretionary, its
exercise must be judicious and reasonable,
admits of no controversy. It is for that
reason, a person's entitlement for relief
from a High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution, be it against the State or
anybody else, even if is founded on the
allegation of infringement of his legal right,
has
to
necessarily
depend
upon
unblameworthy conduct of the person
seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant
the discretionary relief to such person in
exercise
of
such
power,
when
he
approaches it with unclean hands or
blameworthy conduct.
746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

 15. In State of M. P. and others
etc. etc. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc.
etc., AIR 1987 SC 251, the Court observed
that it is well settled that power of the High
Court
to
issue
an
appropriate
writ
underArticle 226 of the Constitution is
discretionary and the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been
further stated therein that if there is
inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner in filing a petition and such delay
is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay
and laches stating that resort to the
extraordinary remedy under the writ
jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience
and bring in injustice.

 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay
and laches should not be lightly brushed
aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of
the same. The court should bear in mind
that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of
the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep
itself alive to the primary principle that
when
an
aggrieved
person,
without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his
own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinize whether
the lis at a belated stage should be
entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes
in
the
way
of
equity.
In
certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
delay would only invite disaster for the
litigant who knocks at the doors of the
court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction
on the part of a litigant "a litigant who has
forgotten
the
basic
norms,
namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of
time" and second, law does not permit one
to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does
bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
In the case at hand, though there has been
four years' delay in approaching the court,
yet the writ court chose not to address the
same. It is the duty of the court to
scrutinize whether such enormous delay is
to be ignored without any justification.
That apart, in the present case, such belated
approach gains more significance as the
respondent employee being absolutely
careless to his duty and nurturing a
lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility
had remained unauthorisedly absent on the
pretext of some kind of ill health. We
repeat at the cost of repetition that
remaining innocuously oblivious to such
delay does not foster the cause of justice.
On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it
is likely to affect others. Such delay may
have impact on others' ripened rights and
may
unnecessarily
drag
others
into
litigation which in acceptable realm of
probability, may have been treated to have
attained finality. A court is not expected to
give indulgence to such indolent persons-
who compete with `Kumbhakarna' or for
that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our
considered opinion, such delay does not
deserve any indulgence and on the said
ground alone the writ court should have
thrown the petition overboard at the very
threshold."

9. In Bal Krishan vs. State of
Punjab and others 2013(2) RSJ 18,
(P&H), wherein the petitioner, after
rendering about 34 years of service, sought
refixation of his pay from the date he
joined service by filing a petition more than
three years after his retirement, the court
3 All. Kanhaiya Bux Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
747
dismissed the writ petition on account of
delay and laches only.

10. The issue regarding decision
of a claim on a direction by the Court on
the representation filed by a writ petitioner
was also considered in Union of India and
others vs. M.K. Sarkar 2010(2) SCC 59,
wherein it was held that the issue of
limitation or delay and laches is to be
considered with reference to original cause
of action and not with reference to an order
passed in compliance to Court's direction.
The
Court's
direction
to
consider
representation or a decision given in
compliance thereof, will not extend the
limitation or erase the delay and laches.

11. In Vijay Kumar Kaul and
others vs. Union of India and others 2012
(7) SCC 610, Hon'ble the Supreme Court
declined relief to the petitioners who were
fence sitters as they had approached the
Court after the issues raised by other
employees were decided. Relief was
declined on account of delay and laches.

12. The issue was further
examined in Prabhakar vs. Joint Director
Sericulture Department and another
(2015) 15 SCC 1. It was a case under the
Industrial Disputes Act. In the aforesaid
case the matter in dispute was regarding
delay in raising the industrial dispute. The
opinion expressed by the Court was that
right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent even if there is no limitation period
prescribed. The litigant was non-suited on
the doctrine of delay and laches as well as
doctrine of acquiescence. Paragraph 38 of
the judgment is extracted below:-

 "38. Likewise, if a party having a
right stands by and sees another acting in a
manner inconsistent with that right and
makes no objection while the act is in
progress he cannot afterwards complain.
This principle is based on the doctrine of
acquiescence implying that in such a case
party who did not make any objection
acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of
the other party and, therefore, has no right
to complain against that alleged wrong."

13. The Halsbury's Laws of
England
explains
delay,
latches
and
acquiescence as under:

 "In determining whether there has
been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:

 (i) acquiescence on the claimant's
part; and

 (ii) any change of position that
has occurred on the defendant's part.

 Acquiescence in this sense does
not mean standing by while the violation of
a right is in progress, but assent after the
violation has been completed and the
claimant has become aware of it. It is
unjust to give the claimant a remedy where,
by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it; or where by his conduct and
neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he
has put the other party in a position in
which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches."

14. In State of Jammu &
Kashmir vs. R. K. Zalpuri and others
2015 (15) SCC 602, Hon'ble the Supreme
Court considered the issue regarding delay
and laches in raising the dispute before the
748 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court. It was opined that the issue sought to
be raised by the petitioners therein was not
required to be addressed on merits on
account of delay and laches. The relevant
paras thereof are extracted below:-

 "27. The grievance agitated by
the respondent did not deserve to be
addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay
and laches had already visited his claim
like the chill of death which does not spare
anyone even the one who fosters the idea
and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep
to avoid death and eventually proclaim
"Deo gratias - thanks to God".

 28. Another aspect needs to be
stated. A writ court while deciding a writ
petition is required to remain alive to the
nature of the claim and the unexplained
delay on the part of the writ petitioner.
Stale claims are not to be adjudicated
unless
non-interference
would
cause
grave injustice. The present case, need
less
to
emphasise,
did
not
justify
adjudication. It deserves to be thrown
overboard at the very threshold, for the
writ petitioner had accepted the order of
dismissal for half a decade and cultivated
the feeling that he could freeze time and
forever remain in the realm of constant
present."

15. The aforesaid view was
followed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
Union of India and others v. Chaman
Rana 2018 (5) SCC 798.

16. Subsequently, a Constitution
Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
Senior
Divisional
Manager,
Life
Insurance Corporation v. Shree Lal
Meena (2019) 4 SCC 479, considering the
principle of delay and laches, opined as
under:-

 "36. We may also find that the
appellant remained silent for years together
and that this Court, taking a particular view
subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New
India
Assurance
Company
Limited,
(2011)12 SCC 197 would not entitle stale
claims to be raised on this behalf, like that
of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept
over the matter for almost a little over two
years even after the pronouncemtn of the
judgment.

 37. Thus, the endeavour of the
appellant, to approach this Copurt seeking
the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a
misadventure, which is liable to be
rejected, and the appeal is dismissed."

17. Recently, in Bharat Coking
Coal Ltd. And othyers v. Shyam Kishore
Singh (Civil Appeal No.1009 of 2020)
decided on 5.2.2020, the issue regarding
the delay and laches, was considered by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court and a petition
filed belatedly, seeking change in the date
of birth in the service record, was
dismissed.

18. Reference can also be made to
the Division Bench judgments of the
Jammu and Kashmir High Court in State of
J&K and others v. S. Bhupinder Singh
(LPASW No.192 of 2017) decided on
30.12.2017 and in Farooq Ahmad v. State
of J&K and others (LPA No.210 of 2019)
decided on 21.8.2019.

19. Though in the present appeal,
it is sought to be argued that the documents
were handed over to Mr. Sunil Kumar
Bajpai, Advocate, who did not file the writ
petition, however, there is no such pleading
or stand taken by the appellant before any
of the authority or before the learned Single
Judge.
3 All. Secy. Basic Edu. Board, Prayagraj & Ors. Vs. Jubeda Bano
749

20.

Keeping
in
view
the
authoritative enunciation of law, as referred
to above, the present appeal, challenging
the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge dismissing appellant's
writ petition on the ground of delay and
laches, deserves to be dismissed.

21. Besides this, it is a disputed
question of fact as to whether the appellant
had worked for the period for which he is
claiming the salary. The aforesaid factual
aspect cannot be gone into writ jurisdiction.

22. For the reasons mentioned
above, we do not find any reason to
interfere in the present appeal. The appeal
is, accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2022)03ILR A749
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 08.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DEVENDRA KUMAR
UPADHYAYA, J.
THE HON'BLE MOHD. FAIZ ALAM KHAN, J.

Special Appeal No. 69 of 2022

Secy. Basic Edu. Board, Prayagraj & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Jubeda Bano ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
C.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondents:
Piyush Mishra

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950
- Article 226 - UP Basic Education
(Teachers) Service Rules, Rule 14(3) : -
Appointment
-
Assistant
Teacher
Recruitment Examination - Rejection of
Candidature - on the ground that no
candidate should be permitted to rectify
any
mistake
committed
in
On-line
application
form
-
Error
in
online
application form relating to total marks in
high school examination - writ petition -
direction issued to consider the claim of
applicant - Error attributable to absence of
any clear guidelines for indicating marks
in
the
educational
qualification
examination
where
marks-sheets
are
issued indicating therein grades based on
C.G.P.A. system - Petitioner did not put
herself in any advantaged situation -
Order rejecting candidature rightly set
aside - thus appeal liable to be dismissed.
(Para - 21, 28, 29)

Special Appeal dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Richa Tripathi Vs St. of U.P. & ors. (Special
Appeal (D) No. 716/2021, Decided on Dt.
27.10.2021),

2. Jyoti Yadav & anr.Vs St. of U.P. & ors. (Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 322/2021 Decided on Dt.
08.04.2021),

3. Rahul Kumar Vs St. of U.P. & ors., (Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 378/2021 Decided on Dt.
29.06.2021)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Devendra Kumar
Updhyaya, J.
&
Hon'ble Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, J.)

(Order
on
application
for
Condonation of Delay)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
appellant-State authorities and learned
counsel representing the respondent.

2. Having regard to the averments
made in the affidavit filed in support of the
application seeking condonation of delay,