# Karamavir & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 1098
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-13
- **Case number:** Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 39561 of 2025
- **Bench:** Avnish Saxena
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/karamavir-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-52623
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for
summoning the Internal Committee report at
the stage of considering discharge under
Section 227 Cr.P.C.
Whether the departmental inquiry findings,
which partly negated the allegation of rape,
should have been considered before framing
charges.
Whether the rejection of the application causes
prejudice to the applicant's rights and career.

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Section - 91, 227, - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Section - 354D, 376, 420,
506,
-
Information
Technology
(Amendment) Act, 2008 - Sections 67, 67A
:- Application u/s 528 BNSS - filed to challenge
the trial court's order rejecting Section 91
Cr.P.C. application - Opposite party no. 2, a lady
constable
in
consensual
relationship
with
applicant who is also a constable, lodged FIR -
alleging rape, cheating, intimidation, stalking
under IPC and obscene messages and videos
under IT Act - investigation - parallel a
departmental inquiry also conducted by an
internal departmental committee - charge sheet
- Discharge Application - Application under
section 91 of the Cr.P.C. - rejected by trial court
- Applicant's plea - relied on departmental
Internal Committee report, which did not
substantiate rape allegation, and sought its
summoning under Section 91 Cr.P.C. during
discharge proceedings - Court's finds that,
applicant himself admitted some allegations and
apologized in inquiry - hence, trial court rightly
rejected the Section 91 application - held report
not legally required at discharge stage and
found no abuse of process or travesty of justice
in the impugned order - accordingly, Application
is dismissed.
(Para - 7, 8, 9, 12)
Application Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Om Prakash Sharma v. CBI, (2000) 5 SCC 679 -
Neelesh Jain v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Crl LJ
2151 - Nitya Dharmananda alias K. Lenin v.
Gopal Sheelum Reddy, (2018) 2 SCC 93

LIST OF ACTS
10 All. Karamavir & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1099
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC) - Information Technology
(Amendment) Act, 2008.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Discharge Application - Section 91 Cr.P.C. -
Departmental
Inquiry
Report
-
Internal
Committee Findings - Consensual Relationship -
Workplace Harassment - Charge Sheet -
Cognizance - Abuse of Process.

CASE ARISING FROM
Sessions Trial No. 85 of 2025 (State v.
Karamveer
Singh)
-
Impugned
Order:
27.08.2025, Additional Sessions Judge, Court
No.1, Jalaun at Orai - Application Challenged:
Rejection of Section 91 Cr.P.C. application
during pendency of discharge plea.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Shri : Sri Ajay Sengar,
Counsel for Respondent(s): GA., AGA.

## Text

1098 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
instituting a civil suit and it is pending,
there can be no doubt with respect to the
fact that the attempt on the part of the
respondent
is
to
use
the
criminal
proceedings as weapon of harassment
against the appellant."

12.In view of aforesaid facts and
circumstances, the orders dated 08.05.2015
as well as non-bailable warrant dated
14.05.2024, 22.05.2024 and 24.06.2024
passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Court No. 6, Meerut in
Complaint Case No. 3833 of 2014
(Dharmpal vs. Chander) under Sections
323, 504, 506, 427 IPC, Police Station
Sadar Bazar, District Meerut are hereby
quashed and the matter is remitted back to
the Court concerned to pass a fresh order in
light of the observations made by Hon'ble
Apex
Court
expeditiously,
preferably
within a period of six weeks, from the date
of production of a certified copy of this
order.

13.With the aforesaid direction, the
application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 1098
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AVNISH SAXENA, J.

Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 39561 of 2025

Karamavir & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
S Sengar
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the trial court was justified in rejecting
the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for
summoning the Internal Committee report at
the stage of considering discharge under
Section 227 Cr.P.C.
Whether the departmental inquiry findings,
which partly negated the allegation of rape,
should have been considered before framing
charges.
Whether the rejection of the application causes
prejudice to the applicant's rights and career.

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Section - 91, 227, - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Section - 354D, 376, 420,
506,
-
Information
Technology
(Amendment) Act, 2008 - Sections 67, 67A
:- Application u/s 528 BNSS - filed to challenge
the trial court's order rejecting Section 91
Cr.P.C. application - Opposite party no. 2, a lady
constable
in
consensual
relationship
with
applicant who is also a constable, lodged FIR -
alleging rape, cheating, intimidation, stalking
under IPC and obscene messages and videos
under IT Act - investigation - parallel a
departmental inquiry also conducted by an
internal departmental committee - charge sheet
- Discharge Application - Application under
section 91 of the Cr.P.C. - rejected by trial court
- Applicant's plea - relied on departmental
Internal Committee report, which did not
substantiate rape allegation, and sought its
summoning under Section 91 Cr.P.C. during
discharge proceedings - Court's finds that,
applicant himself admitted some allegations and
apologized in inquiry - hence, trial court rightly
rejected the Section 91 application - held report
not legally required at discharge stage and
found no abuse of process or travesty of justice
in the impugned order - accordingly, Application
is dismissed.
(Para - 7, 8, 9, 12)
Application Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Om Prakash Sharma v. CBI, (2000) 5 SCC 679 -
Neelesh Jain v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Crl LJ
2151 - Nitya Dharmananda alias K. Lenin v.
Gopal Sheelum Reddy, (2018) 2 SCC 93

LIST OF ACTS
10 All. Karamavir & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1099
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC) - Information Technology
(Amendment) Act, 2008.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Discharge Application - Section 91 Cr.P.C. -
Departmental
Inquiry
Report
-
Internal
Committee Findings - Consensual Relationship -
Workplace Harassment - Charge Sheet -
Cognizance - Abuse of Process.

CASE ARISING FROM
Sessions Trial No. 85 of 2025 (State v.
Karamveer
Singh)
-
Impugned
Order:
27.08.2025, Additional Sessions Judge, Court
No.1, Jalaun at Orai - Application Challenged:
Rejection of Section 91 Cr.P.C. application
during pendency of discharge plea.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Shri : Sri Ajay Sengar,
Counsel for Respondent(s): GA., AGA.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Avnish Saxena, J.)

1. Sri Ajay Sengar, Advocate holding
the brief appears on behalf of applicant and
submits that the applicant is a Police
Constable. Being aggrieved by the false
and fictitious FIR lodged by opposite party
no.2, who is a lady Constable stationed
with the accused-applicant. It is admitted
that both the applicant and opposite party
no.2 had a consensual relationship since
2023, but due to some dispute between the
two, the opposite party has lodged the FIR
on 15.03.2024 for offence under Section
354D, 376, 420, 506 IPC and Section 67,
67(a)
of
Information
Technology
(Amendment)
Act,
2008.
After
the
investigation the charge sheet is submitted.
The applicant accused has moved an
application for discharge after obtaining
order from this Court in Criminal Misc.
Application No. 1893 of 2025 (Karamveer
Vs. State Uttar Pradesh and another). The
application for discharge is at page no. 92.
Learned counsel for the applicant has
drawn the attention of this Court towards
paragraph 7 of the application, wherein he
has specifically stated that on same pretext
a departmental inquiry has also been
initiated by the Internal Committee wherein
the Committee did not find substance on
the allegation of rape leveled by the
opposite party no.2. The inquiry report is
dated 22nd February, 2024, which is
annexed as Annexure-3 (page 41). It is
further submitted that the charge sheet is
subsequently submitted on 14.04.2024
including offence of rape, on which the
cognizance has been taken. During the
pendency of the discharge application, the
applicant has moved an application under
Section 91 Cr.P.C. (94 B.N.S.S.) for
summoning the inquiry report from the
department concerned. It is by the
impugned order dated 27.08.2025 passed
by the court of Additional Sessions Judge,
Court no.1, Jalaun at Orai passed in S.T.
No. 85 of 2025 ( State Vs. Karamveer
Singh) that the application moved under
Section
91
Cr.P.C.
for
summoning
departmental inquiry report has been
rejected. It is submitted that the learned
trial court has not given any reason for
rejecting the application except that it is a
departmental inquiry report, which is not
required to be considered at this stage of
considering the application for discharge.

2. Learned counsel has challenged
this order stating that the trial court has not
applied its mind and passed an order,
without appreciating the facts of the
peculiar case wherein the charges levelled
by a fellow official has been negated by the
Internal Committee, which is required to be
seen while proceeded with the criminal
prosecution, as the carrier of applicant is at
peril. Learned counsel has relied on
paragraphs 6 and 7 of judgement of the
Supreme Court in Om Prakash Sharma
1100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Delhi
reported in 2000 (5) SCC 679 and
paragraphs 14 to 19 in Single Judge
judgement of Rajasthan High Court in
Neelesh Jain Vs. State of Rajasthan
reported in 2006 Crl. L.J. 2151. The cited
paragraphs are reiterated underneath :-

Om Prakash Sharma (supra) :-

 "6. The powers conferred under
Section 91 are enabling in nature aimed at
arming the court or any officer in charge of
a police station concerned to enforce and
to ensure the production of any document
or other things ?necessary or desirable?
for the purposes of any investigation,
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the
Code, by issuing a summons or a written
order to those in possession of such
material. The language of Section 91
would, no doubt, indicate the width of the
powers to be unlimited but the inbuilt
limitation inherent therein takes its colour
and shape from the stage or point of time of
its exercise, commensurately with the
nature
of
proceedings
as
also
the
compulsions of necessity and desirability,
to fulfil the task or achieve the object. The
question, at the present stage of the
proceedings before the trial court would be
to address itself to find whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding to the next
stage against the accused. If the accused
could produce any reliable material even at
that stage which might totally affect even
the very sustainability of the case, a refusal
to even look into the materials so produced
may result in injustice, apart from averting
an exercise in futility at the expense of
valuable judicial/public time. It is trite law
that the standard of proof normally
adhered to at the final stage is not to be
insisted upon at the stage where the
consideration is to be confined to find out a
prima facie case and decide whether it is
necessary to proceed to the next stage of
framing the charges and making the
accused to stand trial for the same. This
Court has already cautioned against
undertaking a roving inquiry into the pros
and cons of the case by weighing the
evidence or collecting materials, as if
during the course or after trial vide Union
of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [(1979) 3
SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] . Ultimately,
this would always depend upon the facts of
each case and it would be difficult to lay
down a rule of universal application and
for all times. The fact that in one case the
court thought fit to exercise such powers is
no compelling circumstance to do so in all
and every case before it, as a matter of
course and for the mere asking. The court
concerned must be allowed a large latitude
in the matter of exercise of discretion and
unless in a given case the court was found
to have conducted itself in so demonstrably
an unreasonable manner unbecoming of a
judicial authority, the court superior to that
court cannot intervene very lightly or in a
routine fashion to interpose or impose itself
even at that stage. The reason being, at that
stage, the question is one of mere
proprieties involved in the exercise of
judicial discretion by the court and not of
any rights concretised in favour of the
accused.

 7. Therefore, it is to be only seen
as to whether the trial court has judiciously
and judicially exercised its discretion. The
trial court as also the High Court, seem to
have properly applied their minds by going
into the nature of the documents sought to
be summoned, their bearing and relevance
for the nature of consideration to be made
at that stage of the proceedings before the
Special Judge as well as the necessity and
desirability whereof. The consideration so
10 All. Karamavir & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1101
made by the courts below in rejecting the
claim of the appellant, could not be held to
be either condemnable or constitute any
gross or improper failure to exercise their
jurisdiction and consequently, it does not
call for any interference in our hands.
Therefore, the appeal fails and shall stand
dismissed."

Neelesh Jain (Supra):-

 "14. A bare perusal of the Section
reveals firstly, that it is not subjected to
Section 172 and Section 173 of the Code.
Therefore, the prohibitions contained in
Sections 172 and 173 of the Code do not
crib, cabin and confine the powers of the
Court under Section 91 of the Code.
Secondly, a purposive interpretation has to
be given to Section 91. This provision
empowers the Court to summon the
production of documents or things which
the
Court
considers
?necessary
or
desirable for the purposes of any? ? ?
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under
this Code.? It bestows a power on the
Court to direct the production of the
document or thing before the Court. This is
a tool given in the hands of the Court to
discover the truth of the controversy before
it. It, thus, enables the Court to do complete
Justice with the parties before it. It is
precisely to arm the Courts with this
weapon that the said section is not subject
to Section 173 of the Code. In case the
legislature wanted to give the complete
power of withholding information from the
court
to
the
prosecution,
then
the
legislature would have made Section 91
subject to Section 173 of the Code. But,
such is not the case. Therefore, the only
harmonious interpretation of the two
provisions would be that Sub-section (6) of
Section 173 does not curtail the power of
the Court under Section 91 of the Code. In
case the Court is of the opinion that the
prosecution has withheld vital, relevant
and admissible evidence from the court, it
can legitimately use its power under
Section 91 of the Code to discover the truth
and to do complete justice to the accused.
Hence, any information that is relevant for
the just decision of the case, which has
been gathered by the investigating agency,
must be produced before the Court
provided that such revelation would not
jeopardize the public interest. To do
injustice is against public interest. For, the
people loose faith in the judiciary. One
cannot forget the maxim that ?justice
should not only be done, but it must also
appear
to
be
done.?
Thus,
while
entertaining an application under Section
91 of the Code, the Court should first
consider if any of the three criteria
prescribed by Sub-section (6) of Section
173 of the Code is satisfied or not? It
should also see if the police have given any
cogent reasons for withholding the copies
of the statements/documents from the
Court. In case the criteria prescribed by
Section 173(6) is satisfied, the Court should
then consider if the documents or things
are ?necessary or desirable? for the just
decision of the case. In case it is, then the
Court should allow the application under
Section 91 of the Code notwithstanding the
embargo contained in Section 173(6) of the
Code. In case, the Court comes to the
conclusion that the documents or things are
irrelevant for the just decision of the case
or that the application has been moved with
ulterior motive, then it should reject the
application.
Naturally,
the
discretion
vested in the Court must be applied
judiciously, while keeping in mind the
Constitutional mandate, and the purpose of
Section 91 of the Code. The Court is not
expected to reject the application in a
mechanical manner. Since rejection of such
1102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
an application is subject to the scrutiny of
higher Courts, the Trial Court must assign
reasons for rejecting the application under
Section 91 of the Code.

 15. At times, the prosecution has
used the loophole in the law, in the garb of
using the power and Section 173 (6) of the
Code, to withhold those documents, which
weaken their case against the accused.
However, such a free exercise of power is
against the spirit of the Code. Once a
person has been accused of the commission
of an offence, it is for the investigating
agency to discover if in fact the offence has
been committed by the said offender or by
someone else. Like an archeologist, the
investigator must brush layers of evidence
to reach the truth. But in his endeavor to
book the accused, he cannot collect
onesided evidence and present it to the
court. For the investigating agency has to
be impartial in its investigation. Moreover,
the prosecutor cannot convert himself into
a persecutor by submitting one side of the
investigation and by withholding relevant
portion that would favor the accused
person. Neither the investigating agency,
nor the prosecution is supposed to merely
claim,
?Ashwatham
maro,?
without
informing the Court as to who has died, the
Man or the elephant.

 16. In case the prosecution is
permitted to withhold vital evidence from
the court, the unscrupulous prosecution
would be permitted to keep the Court in the
dark. The law does not permit the
prosecution to play fowl with the Court.
Like any party before the Court, the
prosecution, too, must come to the court
with clean hands. If information is withheld
from the Court, then adverse inference
should be drawn against the prosecution.
Such an inference flows legally from
Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

 17. It is no argument to claim that
the accused can ask for the documents
withheld by the prosecution at the time of
entering his defense. The defense has to be
built up from day one of the trial and not
an ad hoc basis. Unless all the evidence
collected
during
the
course
of
the
investigation is given to the accused, he is
prevented from constructing a proper
defense. The right to defend, which flows
from the fundamental right to ?life? and
?personal liberty? enshrined in Art. 21 of
the Constitution of India, is not an
illusionary right, but a substantive one.
One cannot tie the hands of the accused,
deprive him of the necessary evidence to
defend himself and still claim that a fair
trial is being conducted. Moreover, such
piece-meal supply of relevant documents
and evidence needlessly prolongs the trial.
The Courts must endeavor to deliver justice
in the shortest time period Prolonged trial
not only looses its relevance, it also adds to
the burgeoning burden on the judiciary.
Strategies need to be adopted which would
make the Courts efficient and litigant
friendly and which would ensure quick
delivery of justice to the people. Thus, the
documents or evidence, which can be
provided immediately, need not be held
back till the accused enters his defense.

 18. In the case of Navin Ramji
Kamani v. Shri K.C. Shekhran, Dy. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports (1981
RCC 218) this Court held that, ?The power
given under section 91 of the code is a
general and wide power which empower
the court, the production of any document
or any other thing at any stage of any
investigation, inquiry or other proceedings
under the Cr. P.C. It is no doubt true that
10 All. Karamavir & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1103
the legislature has circumscribed this
power to be exercised only where the court
considers that the summoning of such
document or things was necessary or
desirable in its view, then the court could
pass an order both in favor of the accused
as well as the prosecution. It is no doubt
true that such power would not be
exercised where the documents or thing
may not be found relevant or it may be for
the
mere
purpose
or
delaying
the
proceedings or the order is sought with an
oblique motive.? Similar view has also
been expressed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of
Rajasthan (1998-1989 (Supp) Cr. L.R.
(Raj.) 265).

 19. In the instant case the earlier
report lodged by the prosecutrix's father on
13.9.04 can be used by the accused
petitioner to confront the father when he
steps into the witness box. The report
lodged by the prosecutrix at Mahila Thana
would also shed some light on the
controversy
in
issue.
Similarly,
the
documents recovered by the police at the
instance of the accused would be necessary
and desirable for the purpose of the trial.
Hence, the Learned Additional Judge
should have exercised the power under
Section 91 of the Code."

3. The applicant therefore, seeks
interference of this Court to quash the
impugned order and for issuance of
directions for summoning the report of
Internal Committee.

4. Learned AGA submits that the
Investigating Officer has collected ample
material during the investigation for
submission of charge sheet. The inquiry
conducted by the Internal Committee, has
no bearance on the criminal case. Further
submission, that the trial court has rightly
rejected to summon the material invoking
Section 91 Cr.P.C. after giving plausible
reasons for rejecting the same. Further
submissions that the application is devoid
of merit and liable to be dismissed.

5. There is no point in issuance of
noticed to opposite party no.2 as the matter
pertains to invoking of Section 91 Cr.P.C.
by the trial court at the stage of considering
the application of applicant for discharge,
as it will not prejudice the right of opposite
party no.2 to contest the application for
discharge at the trial court.

6. This Court has taken into
consideration the rival submissions made
by the parties and perused the record.
7. It is an admitted fact made by
the learned counsel for the applicant that
there was consensual relations between the
applicant and opposite party no.2, the
contents of the FIR reveals that the
applicant and opposite party no.2, were
together posted at P.S.Nadigaon. Certain
incidents have been mentioned in the FIR,
like, excesses committed by the applicant
on opposite party no.2; sending of nasty
messages on the mobile phone; tried to
commit rape; recorded photo and video etc.
It is on the complaint made by opposite
party no.2 that the departmental inquiry
conducted by the Internal Committee, has
been proceeded with. The report of Internal
Committee dated 22.02.2024 reveals that
the
applicant
has
conceded
certain
allegations levelled by opposite party no.2.
The conclusion of the Internal Committee
is reiterated underneath :-

 "आवेदिक म०क ० सोमवती द्व र दियेगयेदशक यती
प्र थगन पत्र मेंअंदकत तथ्यों/ आरोपों के सम्बन्ि मेंज ाँच के िौर न
आन्तररक कमेटी द्व र अदभदलदखत दकयेगयेदशक यतकत ग, आरोपी
1104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
एवं स्वतंत्र स दक्षयो के अदभकथन अंदकत कर गहन पूछत ंछ की
गयी, दजसमेंआरोपी क ं० 590 कमगवीर दसंह द्व र पहलेतो आरोपों
क खण्डन दकय गय परन्तुगहन पूछत ंछ व आवेदिक द्व र
उपलब्ि कर येगयेस क्ष्यों के उपर न्त अन्ततोगत्व आरोपी क ं०
590 कमगवीर दसंह द्व र कुछ आरोपों को स्वीक र दकय गय तथ
कुछ आरोपों के प्रदतउत्तर मेंमौन रह तथ अपनेद्व र दकयेगयेअपर ि
की गलती म नतेहुयेम०क ० सोमिती सेक्षम य चन की गयी।
आवेदिक म०क o सोमवती द्व र आरक्षी कमगवीर केदवरुद्ध
लग येगयेआरोप गम्भीर प्रकृदत के हैतथ क यगस्थल पर मदहल ओं के
स थ उत्पीडन (रोकथ म दनषेि और दनव रण) अदिदनयम 2013
केअन्तगगत आरोपी आरक्षी कमगवीर केदवरुद्ध अपर ि सृदजत होत
ह।ाै सम्पूणगज ाँच से आरोपी आरक्षी कमगवीर दसंह द्व र
दशक यतकत ग/ पीदडत म०क ० सोमवती को मैसेज भेजकर तथ
वीदडयो/आदडयो कॉल कर म नदसक रुप सेपरेश न करने, थ न
पररसर अन्तगगत ग्र उण्ड एवं होटल ब्लूस्ट र उरई आदि अन्य स्थ नों
पर श रीररक शोषण करनेकी दनयत सेआवेदिक को स्पशगकरने,
ब्लैक मेल कर ज न सेम रनेकी िमकी दियेज नेतथ आवेदिक के
पररजनों को कॉल कर आवेदिक की छदव िूदमल कर न ज ाँच
केमध्य प य गय ह।ाै आरोपी क ं० 590 कमगवीर दसंह क इस
प्रक र क कृत्य आपर दिक एवं पुदलस दवभ ग जैसेअनुश दसत बेल
की छदव िूदमल करनेकी हि तक पहुाँचत हुाँ ह।ाै अतः पीदडत
म०क ० सोनवती के प्र थगन पत्र पर अंदकत तथ्यों के आि र पर
अदभयोग पंजीकरण व पुदलस दवभ ग की छदव िूदमल करने दवषयक
तथ्यों के आि र पर दवभ गीय क यगव ही कर य ज न औदचत्यपूणग
ह।"

8. The trial court while rejecting
the application of applicant has considered
that there is no point in summoning the
departmental inquiry report for considering
the discharge application.

9. It is mentioned in the discharge
application that the Internal Committee did
not find the evidence in respect to rape in
its report. The Internal Committee Report
dated 22.02.2024 is within the knowledge
of the applicant, but the application under
Section 227 Cr.P.C. despite being moved
on 03.07.2025 does not contain the report.
The applicant himself chosen not to annex
the inquiry report along with application
for discharge, cannot invoke Section 91
Cr.P.C.

10. The Supreme Court in the case
of Nitya Dharmananda alias K.Lenin and
another
Vs.
Gopal
Sheelum
Reddy
reported in (2018) 2 SCC 93 in relevant
paragraph 5 has held and reiterate the
settled law that at the stage of framing of
charge, the accused cannot ordinarily
invoke Section 91 Cr.P.C., but the Court
being under obligation to impart justice and
to uphold law, is not debarred from
exercising its power.

11. The judgement of Om Prakash
Sharma (supra) and Neelesh Jain (supra)
did not come to rescue the applicant,
because in Om Prakash's case the Supreme
Court has considered the settled principle
of law that the trial court is empowered to
exercise its power under Section 91
Cr.P.C.; whereas in Neelesh Jain's case the
Investigating Officer has withhold certain
documents which were collected during
investigation but did not form part of
charge sheet and the court find those
documents as important.

12. The trial court while rejecting
the application made specific mention that
the
enquiry
report
of
the
Internal
Committee is not legally required to be
requisitioned. I do not find any abuse of the
process of law or travesty of justice in the
impugned order.

13.
In
view
of
the
above,
application is devoid of merit and liable to
be dismissed.

14. Accordingly, the application is
dismissed.
10 All. Smt. Heerawati & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Anr.
1105
---------
(2025) 10 ILRA 1105
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIKRAM D. CHAUHAN, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 17331 of 2023

Smt. Heerawati & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Ganesh Shankar Srivastava, Vinod Kumar
Maurya

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Deo Prakash Singh, G.A., Krishna Kumar
Shukla

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the summoning order passed by the
Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad
under Sections 504 & 506 IPC was legally
sustainable, given the vague and general
allegations in the complaint.

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Section - 156(3), 200, 202, 482, -
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section - 498A, 323, 406, 503, 504, 506, - Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 - Sections - 3, 4:-
Application u/Section 482 CrPC - for quashing
the summoning order as well as the impugned
criminal proceedings in Complaint Case -
opposite party no. 2 filed an application
u/section 153(3) against applicant and against
four unknown persons - report called form the
police
-

complaint
case
registered
-
complainant alleged after his marriage, his
relations with wife was soured since she had
having love affairs with another person, and her
parents and others abused, assaulted, damaged
property, and threatened his life - statements
under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC - Magistrate
summoned the applicants under Sections 504
and 506 IPC - The applicants argued that the
order was illegal and arbitrary, pointing out that
their daughter had herself lodged an FIR against
the complainant and his family under Sections
498A, 406, 323, 504, 506 IPC and the Dowry
Prohibition Act, with chargesheet filed and
cognizance taken - and contended that the
husband's complaint was a counterblast with no
ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 IPC made
out - Court finds that, the allegations under
Section 504 IPC were vague with no specific
words of insult, and those under Section 506
IPC were general, against six persons without
identifying who issued the threats, and noted
the matrimonial dispute background, concluding
that the complaint appeared retaliatory -
accordingly, the summoning order and entire
proceedings were quashed, and the application
under Section 482 CrPC is allowed.

(Para - 11, 13, 14, 15)

 Application Allowed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335) - Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749.

LIST OF ACTS
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC) - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Summoning order - complaint case - Quashing
of proceedings - Section 482 CrPC - Intentional
insult - Criminal intimidation - Matrimonial
dispute - Dowry demand - Abuse of process -
Vague allegations - Counterblast complaint.

CASE ARISING FROM
Complaint Case No.745 of 2021 (Gyanendra
Sharma vs. Smt. Heerawati & another), Police
Station Colonelganj, District Prayagraj and
Summoning order dated 07.01.2022 by Special
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Shri : Sri Ganesh
Shankar Srivastava,
Counsel for Respondent(s): Shri Deo Prakash
Singh and learned AGA.