# Karunesh Tripathi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 11 ILRA 1027
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-10-08
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 8780 of 2021
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/karunesh-tripathi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46452
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Suspension - Indian Penal
Code -1860 - Sections 409, 420 & 468.

1) Issue of delay in submitting the charge
sheet - Ordinarily, when there is an accusation
of defalcation of the monies, the delinquent
employees have to be kept away from the
establishment till the charges are finally
disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless,
malicious or vindictive and are framed only to keep
the individual concerned out of the employment is a
different matter. But even in such a case, no
conclusion can be arrived at without examining the
entire record in question and hence it is always
advisable to allow disciplinary proceedings to continue
unhindered. (Para 19, 21)

Where such a huge amount of money has been
defalcated by several officers in collusion with
Directors/Managers
and
Principals
of
several
institutions; naturally, the investigation would take
time to ascertain the link of the flow of money into
hands of several persons, who colluded with each
other to misappropriate such a huge amount. (Para
24)

In the case in hand, only seven months have elapsed,
and considering the gravity of the charge, this Court
finds that the principles elucidated by the Apex Court
in the cases of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Parishad (infra) and Allahabad Bank & anr. (infra) are
applicable, and delay in submitting the charge sheet
cannot be ground to interfere in the suspension
order. (Para 25)

2)
This
Court
expressed
its
reservation
regarding practice of keeping an employee
under suspension for an indeterminate period -
Suspension
order should
not
be
for
an
indeterminate
period
as
it
amounts
to
harassment of an employee and employee has
to endure the scorn of the society and would
injure his reputation in the society and his
family. Court observed that considering the nature of
charge in the instant case, one and half year would
be sufficient time within which the respondents
should issue charge sheet. If for any reason, the
respondents are not able to comply with that, it is
1028 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
open to the petitioner to submit a representation
before the competent authority requesting for
revocation of the suspension order. And if at that
time, the competent authority thinks that the
petitioner should continue under suspension, he shall
pass
reasoned
and
speaking
order
on
the
representation specifying the reasons for continuance
of suspension. (Para 28)

B. Though petitioner contends that no other
person except him has been suspended but
there is no pleading in the writ petition
stating the name of persons who are also
charged with the same allegation as that of
the petitioner but have not been suspended.
(Para 26)

C. The mere grant of interim order in favour of
some of the I.T.I. institutions does not
establish that charge against the petitioner is
incorrect or false. (Para 27)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

11 All. Karunesh Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1027
type speed, it is not open for the petitioner to turn
around and seek a fresh appointment on a lower
post. The claim for compassionate appointment on
having being exhausted on appointment cannot be
re-agitated on termination or for that matter on
acquiring a higher qualification. The contention of
the petitioner if accepted would be violative of
Article 14/16 of the Constitution of India. Such an
appointment at this stage, in the given facts, would
tantamount to backdoor appointment bypassing the
recruitment rules.

21. Petitioner cannot claim reversion or fresh
appointment on a post which he had not held at the
time of appointment under Rules, 1974. Petitioner
having not fulfilled the specific condition of
appointment, this Court had declined to interfere
with the impugned order terminating the services
of the petitioner as no illegality or infirmity could
be pointed out. Petitioner cannot seek appointment
on mercy and/or sympathy. Such an appointment
was rightly not granted by the State-respondents.

22. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed
to
point
out
any
illegality,
infirmity
or
jurisdictional error.

23. The petition being devoid of merit is,
accordingly, dismissed.
----------

(2021)12ILR A1027
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.10.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ-A No. 8780 of 2021

Karunesh Tripathi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sujeet Kumar, Ms. Chhaya Gupta, Sri Ashok Khare

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Suspension - Indian Penal
Code -1860 - Sections 409, 420 & 468.

1) Issue of delay in submitting the charge
sheet - Ordinarily, when there is an accusation
of defalcation of the monies, the delinquent
employees have to be kept away from the
establishment till the charges are finally
disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless,
malicious or vindictive and are framed only to keep
the individual concerned out of the employment is a
different matter. But even in such a case, no
conclusion can be arrived at without examining the
entire record in question and hence it is always
advisable to allow disciplinary proceedings to continue
unhindered. (Para 19, 21)

Where such a huge amount of money has been
defalcated by several officers in collusion with
Directors/Managers
and
Principals
of
several
institutions; naturally, the investigation would take
time to ascertain the link of the flow of money into
hands of several persons, who colluded with each
other to misappropriate such a huge amount. (Para
24)

In the case in hand, only seven months have elapsed,
and considering the gravity of the charge, this Court
finds that the principles elucidated by the Apex Court
in the cases of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Parishad (infra) and Allahabad Bank & anr. (infra) are
applicable, and delay in submitting the charge sheet
cannot be ground to interfere in the suspension
order. (Para 25)

2)
This
Court
expressed
its
reservation
regarding practice of keeping an employee
under suspension for an indeterminate period -
Suspension
order should
not
be
for
an
indeterminate
period
as
it
amounts
to
harassment of an employee and employee has
to endure the scorn of the society and would
injure his reputation in the society and his
family. Court observed that considering the nature of
charge in the instant case, one and half year would
be sufficient time within which the respondents
should issue charge sheet. If for any reason, the
respondents are not able to comply with that, it is
1028 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
open to the petitioner to submit a representation
before the competent authority requesting for
revocation of the suspension order. And if at that
time, the competent authority thinks that the
petitioner should continue under suspension, he shall
pass
reasoned
and
speaking
order
on
the
representation specifying the reasons for continuance
of suspension. (Para 28)

B. Though petitioner contends that no other
person except him has been suspended but
there is no pleading in the writ petition
stating the name of persons who are also
charged with the same allegation as that of
the petitioner but have not been suspended.
(Para 26)

C. The mere grant of interim order in favour of
some of the I.T.I. institutions does not
establish that charge against the petitioner is
incorrect or false. (Para 27)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & ors. Vs
Sanjiv Rajan, 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 483 (Para 19)

2. Allahabad Bank & anr. Vs Deepak Kumar Bhola,
(1997) 4 SCC 1 (Para 20)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Ajay Kumar Chaudhary Vs U.O.I. through its
Secretary, (2015) 7 SCC 291 (Para 6, 22)

Precedent referred:

1. Ajay Kumar Chaudhary Vs U.O.I. through its
Secretary, (2015) 7 SCC 291 (Para 28)
Present petition assails suspension order dated
24.12.2020, passed by Principal Secretary,
Social Welfare, UP at Lucknow.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Ms. Chhaya Gupta, learned
counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing
Counsel for respondent nos.1 & 2.

2. The petitioner by means of the present
writ petition has assailed the suspension order
dated 24.12.2020 passed by respondent no.1.

3. The petitioner was appointed as District
Social Welfare Officer. He was promoted to the
post of Additional District Development Officer
on 07.01.2010. Thereafter, the petitioner was
transferred to District Mathura on the post of
District
Social
Welfare
Officer/Additional
District Development Officer on 27.06.2017.

4. It appears that a report was published in
the newspaper Times of India, Lucknow on
11.08.2018 regarding defalcation of funds
allocated for students fee reimbursement as well
as scholarship by the Directors/Managers and
principals of I.T.I. institutions in Mathura.
Acting on the said report, the state government
constituted a committee to enquire into the
allegations of misappropriation of fund of fee
reimbursement and scholarship of the students.

5. The committee enquired into the matter
and submitted the report on 27.11.2020. The
committee
found
that
the
allegation
of
misappropriation of fund prima facie is correct.
Based on the aforesaid report, an F.I.R. was also
lodged against the erring officers including
petitioner under Sections 409, 420 & 468 of
I.P.C. Thereafter, petitioner was suspended by
order dated 24.12.2020 on the ground that in the
inquiry conducted by three members committee
in respect of allegations of misappropriation of
fund of fee reimbursement and scholarship, it
was prima facie found that the petitioner was
involved
in
collusion
with
private
ITI
institutions in misappropriation of about 23
crores of public money allotted for scholarship
and reimbursement of the fee to students.

6. Challenging the suspension order,
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has
urged that more than seven months have passed
from the date of the suspension order, neither
11 All. Karunesh Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1029
charge sheet has been issued nor the inquiry has
commenced, therefore, the petitioner cannot
remain in suspension for an indefinite period,
hence, the suspension order deserves to be
quashed. In support of his contention, he has
placed reliance upon the judgment of Apex
Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs.
Union of India through its Secretary 2015 7
SCC 291.

7. He further contends that the inquiry
report reveals that it does not indict the
petitioner, therefore, the suspension order has
been
passed
mechanically
and
without
application of mind. He submits that petitioner
has issued recovery orders for recovery of the
embezzled amount, therefore, the charge against
the petitioner of defalcation of huge public
money in the suspension order on the face of the
record is incorrect. He further submits that the
affiliation of private ITI institutions was
canceled which has been stayed by this Court in
several writ petitions and order of one of such
petitions passed in Writ-C No.928 of 2021 is
Annexure 7 to the writ petition. He also
contends that several officers have been named
in the inquiry report, but only the petitioner has
been suspended, therefore, the action of the
respondent is arbitrary and discriminatory. Thus,
he contends that the suspension order is not
sustainable in law.

8. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel
would contend that the charge against the
petitioner is serious inasmuch as the petitioner is
said to be involved in embezzlement of Rs. 23
crores which is huge public money allotted for fee
reimbursement and scholarship to students, and
therefore, considering the nature of the charge
leveled against the petitioner, the petitioner has
rightly
been
suspended.
He
submits
that
considering the gravity of the charge, the petitioner
must be kept out of duty so that he may not
manipulate or tamper with the evidence. He further
submits that to substantiate the charge against the
petitioner that he is involved in the defalcation of
Rs. 23 crores of public money; link of the trail of
money to various accounts have to be traced out by
the authority and investigating agencies which
obviously would take time, therefore, considering
the nature of the charge, the delay in submitting
the charge sheet cannot be ground in the instant
case to interfere with the order of suspension.

9. He further submits that the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner
has not been indicted in the inquiry is incorrect. He
contends that the issuance of the recovery order by
the petitioner does not imply that he is not
involved in the defalcation of public money.

10. Learned Standing Counsel further
contends that so far as the contention of counsel
for the petitioner that no other officer except the
petitioner has been suspended, the said contention
is not borne out from the record since there is no
pleading to this effect in the writ petition. He
submits that the petitioner cannot take shelter of
the interim order passed by this Court in Writ-C
No.928 of 2021 filed by the private ITI institutions
as stay order in the said writ petitions does not
mean that the court has given the clean chit to the
institutions.

11. I have considered the rival submissions
of the parties and perused the record.

12. Three members committee was
constituted pursuant to a report published in the
daily newspaper in Times of India, Lucknow on
11.08.2018 unearthing a big scam where 2700
private I.T.I. institutions have been found
involved in the misuse of affiliation to these
I.T.I. Institutions, and misappropriation of funds
allocated for fee reimbursement and scholarship
to the students.

13. On the basis of the said report, F.I.R.
has been registered against the erring officers
including the petitioner under Sections 409, 420,
1030 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and 468 of IPC. Based on the said inquiry report,
the petitioner is charged with involvement in
misappropriation of Rs. 23 crores of public
money allotted for reimbursement of fees and
scholarship to the marginal section of the
students. The charge on the face of it is very
serious, and if found proved, would entail major
punishment.

14. Now coming to the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner
has issued recovery certificate against the
institutions and as per the inquiry report he is not
indicted.

15. The inquiry report, page 48 of the
paper book, only suggest that District Social
Welfare Officer, Mathura on 01.09.2020 issued
notices to several I.T.I. institutions for returning
excessive fund which has been wrongly paid to
them towards fee reimbursement and scholarship
to the students.

16. So far as the submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner that inquiry report does
not indict the petitioner, it is worth mentioning that
report is bulky and runs into several pages. At this
stage, it would be apt to refer to paragraph 11 of
the conclusion of the inquiry report which shows
that the petitioner is also indicted. Paragraph 11 of
the conclusion of the inquiry report is being
reproduced herein below:-

"11. धनयमावली के धनयम-12 (vii) के अन्तगमत दिमोिर
छात्रवृधि एवां िुल्क प्रधतपूधतम की स्वीकृधत हेतु गठीत जनपदीय
छात्रवृधि स्वीकृधत सधमधत व वषम 2015-16 से 2019-20 तक
जनपद मथुरा मे तैनात रहे धजला समाज कल्याण अधिकारी, धजला
धवद्यालय धनरीक्षक, सांयुि धनदेिक प्रधिक्षण, आगरा मिल
आधद एवां दिमोिर छात्रवृधि का कायम देख रहे सम्बक्तन्धत पटल
सहायक अधनयधमतता के धलए उिरदायी हैं। उि वषों मे कायमरत
रहे धजला समाज कल्याण अधिकाररयोां व कममचाररयोां का धववरण
सांलग्न हैं। "

17. Thus, the submission of counsel for the
petitioner that the inquiry report does not indict
the petitioner is not sustainable.

18. So far as the argument of counsel for
the petitioner that more than seven months have
elapsed and no charge sheet has yet been issued
against the petitioner and he cannot remain in
suspension for an indefinite period; in the
opinion of the Court, the said submission of the
counsel for the petitioner is misconceived in the
fact of the present case since considering the
gravity of the charge against the petitioner, and
the fact that amount of Rs. 23 crores have been
defalcated by the petitioner and other persons in
connivance with private I.T.I. institutions, it is
obvious that the investigation will take time as
the investigating agency is to find out the trail of
money into various hands to establish the
charge. Hence, there would naturally be delay in
issuing charge sheet due to the tedious process
of finding out the trail of money into various
hands.

19. In this respect, it would be apt to refer
to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad
and Others Vs. Sanjiv Rajan 1993 Supp. (3)
SCC 483 where on the issue of delay in
submitting the charge sheet, Apex Court held as
under in paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment:-

"5. The ground given by the High Court to
stay the operation of the suspension order, is
patently wrong. There is no restriction on the
authority to pass a suspension order second
time. The first order might be withdrawn by the
authority on the ground that at that stage, the
evidence appearing against the delinquent
employee is not sufficient or for some reason,
which is not connected with the merits of the
case. As happened in the present case, the
earlier order of suspension dated March 22,
1991 was quashed by the High Court on the
ground that some other suspended officer had
been allowed to join duties. That order had
nothing to do with the merits of the case.
Ordinarily, when there is an accusation of
defalcation of the monies, the delinquent
11 All. Karunesh Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1031
employees have to be kept away from the
establishment till the charges are finally
disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless,
malicious or vindictive and are framed only to
keep the individual concerned out of the
employment is a different matter. But even in
such a case, no conclusion can be arrived at
without examining the entire record in question
and hence it is always advisable to allow
disciplinary
proceedings
to
continue
unhindered. It is possible that in some cases, the
authorities do not proceed with the matter as
expeditiously as they ought to, which results in
prolongation of the sufferings of the delinquent
employee. But the remedy in such cases is either
to call for an explanation from the authorities in
the matter, and if it is found unsatisfactory, to
direct them to complete the inquiry within a
stipulated period and to increase the suspension
allowance adequately. It is true that in the
present case, the charge-sheet was filed after
almost a year of the order of suspension.
However, the facts pleaded by the appellants
show that the defalcations were over a long
period from 1986 to 1991 and they involved
some lakhs of rupees. It also appears that the
authorities have approached the police and in
the
police
investigation,
the
amount
of
defalcation is found to be still more. Since the
matter is of taking accounts which are spread
over from 1986 to 1991 and of correlating the
entries with the relevant documents, and several
individuals are involved, the framing of charges
was bound to take some time. The Court has to
examine each case on its own facts and decide
whether the delay in serving the charge-sheet
and completing the inquiry is justified or not.
However, in the present case, the High Court
has not quashed the order of suspension on the
ground of delay in framing the charges. As
stated earlier, it has set aside the order or
suspension on the ground that the authority had
no power to pass the second order of suspension
in the same case. We are afraid that the High
Court has misconstrued the nature and purpose
of the power of suspension vested in the
management. It is not disputed that at present
all officers concerned are served with the
charge-sheets and have been suspended. There
is no discrimination between the officers on that
account. The charges are also grave and the
authorities have come to the conclusion that
during the disciplinary proceedings, the officers
should not continue in employment to enable
them to conduct the proceedings unhindered.
Hence, we are satisfied that the order in appeal
was not justified."

20. In another case of Allahabad Bank
and Another Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola (1997)
4 SCC 1 the Apex Court allowed the appeal of
the bank against the order of the High Court
setting aside the suspension order of the
respondent who was charged with the offence of
criminal misconduct and cheating by adopting
corrupt and illegal means or otherwise abusing
his position to obtain undue pecuniary gain for
himself which amounted to an offence involving
moral turpitude.

21. One of the arguments raised by the
learned counsel for the respondent, as noted by
the Apex Court in paragraph 4 of the judgment,
is that since 10 years had elapsed from the date
order of suspension was set aside, therefore, the
Court should not interfere. The said argument
was repelled by the Apex Court and it has noted
in paragraph 11 of the judgment that merely
because 10 years have elapsed since the charge
sheet had been filed cannot be a ground to the
respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive
post of the bank till he is exonerated of the
charges. Paragraph 11 of the aforesaid judgment
is being extracted herein below:-

"11. We are unable to agree with the
contention of learned counsel for the respondent
that there has been no application of mind or the
objective consideration of the facts by the
appellant before it passed the orders of
1032 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
suspension. As already observed, the very fact
that the investigation was conducted by the C.B.I
which resulted in the filing of a charge-sheet,
alleging various offences having been committed
by the respondent, was sufficient for the
appellant to conclude that pending prosecution
the respondent should be suspended. It would be
indeed inconceivable that a bank should allow
an employee to continue to remain on duty when
he is facing serious charges of corruption and
mis-appropriation of money. Allowing such an
employee to remain in the seat would result in
giving him further opportunity to indulge in the
acts for which he was being prosecuted. Under
the circumstances, it was the bounden duty of
the appellant to have taken recourse to the
provisions of clause 19.3 of the First Bipartite
Settlement, 1966. The mere fact that nearly 10
years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was
filed, can also be no ground for allowing the
respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive
post in the Bank, unless he is exonerated of the
charge."

22. Now coming to the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra) relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioner; the said judgment has
been rendered in different factual circumstances
wherein an officer was suspended for the charge
that he had granted NOC to certain land treating
the same to be private land though, in fact, the
land was owned by Union of India and held by
Director General of Defence Estates. In the said
case, the charged officer was suspended on
30.09.2011 and no charge sheet was issued till
21.06.2013 and thereafter, the suspension order
was extended from time to time, and when it
was extended four times for 90 days w.e.f.
22.03.2013, the appellant challenged the same
before the Central Administrative Tribunal who
disposed of the Original Application directing
that if no charge memo was issued to the
appellant before the expiry of 21.06.2013, the
appellant would be reinstated in service. The
said order came to be challenged by the
respondent in the writ petition before the Delhi
High Court who allowed the writ petition with
certain directions. Against the order of Delhi
High Court, the appellant preferred S.L.P. and
Apex Court held that currency of a suspension
order should not extend beyond three months if,
within this period, the charge sheet is not served
on the delinquent employee. Paragraph 21 of the
said judgment is being reproduced herein
below:-

"21. We, therefore, direct that the currency
of a suspension order should not extend beyond
three
months
if
within
this
period
the
memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not
served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the
memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served
a reasoned order must be passed for the
extension of the suspension. As in the case in
hand, the Government is free to transfer the
concerned person to any department in any of its
offices within or outside the State so as to sever
any local or personal contact that he may have
and which he may misuse for obstructing the
investigation against him. The Government may
also prohibit him from contacting any person, or
handling records and documents till the stage of
his having to prepare his defence. We think this
will adequately safeguard the universally
recognised principle of human dignity and the
right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve
the
interest
of
the
Government
in
the
prosecution.
We
recognise
that
previous
Constitution Benches have been reluctant to
quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and
to set time limits to their duration. However, the
imposition of a limit on the period of suspension
has not been discussed in prior case law, and
would not be contrary to the interests of justice.
Furthermore, the direction of the Central
Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal
investigation departmental proceedings are to
be held in abeyance stands superseded in view
of the stand adopted by us."
11 All. Karunesh Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1033

23. The judgment of Apex Court in the
case of Ajay Kumar Chaudhary (supra) has not
noticed the judgments of Apex Court in the
cases of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Parishad (supra) and Allahabad Bank and
Another (supra). Further, the judgment of Apex
Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Chaudhary
(supra) was rendered in a factual situation where
charge leveled against the appellant was that he
has wrongly granted N.O.C. to the land owned
by the Union of India which was held by the
Director-General of Defence Estates treating it
to be private land and there was no charge of
defalcation of huge amount of money traveling
into the hands of several persons as in the
present case.

24. It is worth noticing that where such a
huge amount of money has been defalcated by
several
officers
in
collusion
with
Directors/Managers and Principals of several
institutions; naturally, the investigation would
take time to ascertain the link of the flow of
money into hands of several persons, who
colluded with each other to misappropriate such
a huge amount.

25. In the case in hand, only seven months
have elapsed, and considering the gravity of the
charge, this Court finds that the judgment of
Ajay Kumar Chaudhary (supra) does not come
in aid to the petitioner rather, the principles
elucidated by the Apex Court in the cases of
U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad
(supra) and Allahabad Bank and Another
(supra) are applicable, and delay in submitting
the charge sheet cannot be ground to interfere in
the suspension order.

26. The contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner that no other person except
petitioner has been suspended is also not
substantiated from the record since there is no
pleading in the writ petition stating the name of
persons who are also charged with the same
allegation as that of the petitioner have not been
suspended.

27. The submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner that several I.T.I. institutions who
are also charged with defalcation of money have
been granted an interim order by this Court, and
therefore, prima facie, the charge leveled against
the petitioner is not correct is concerned, the said
submission also has no substance inasmuch as
the mere grant of interim order in favour of
some of the I.T.I. institutions does not establish
that charge against the petitioner is incorrect or
false. Therefore, the said contention does not
stand to merit.

28. This Court before concluding, may note
that Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar
Chaudhary (supra) has expressed its reservation
regarding practice of keeping an employee under
suspension for an indeterminate period, therefore,
keeping in view the fact that suspension order
should not be for an indeterminate period as it
amounts to harassment of an employee and
employee has to endure the scorn of the society
and would injure his reputation in the society and
his family, this Court believes that considering the
nature of charge in the instant case, one and half
year would be sufficient time within which the
respondents should issue charge sheet. If for any
reason, the respondents are not able to submit the
charge sheet within the said period, it is open to the
petitioner to submit a representation before the
competent authority requesting for revocation of
the suspension order. In case, petitioner submits
any such representation for revocation of the
suspension order, and if, the competent authority
thinks that the petitioner should continue under
suspension, he shall pass reasoned and speaking
order on the representation of the petitioner
specifying the reasons for continuance of
suspension of the petitioner.

29. Thus, for the reasons given above, the
writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly,
1034 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
dismissed subject to the observations made
above.
----------
(2021)12ILR A1034
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.11.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.

Writ-A No. 20566 of 2019

Raju ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Syed Fahim Ahmed

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashish Mishra, Ms. Pooja Agarwal

A. Service Law - Termination - Uttar Pradesh
State District Court Rules, 2013 - Rules 3(3), 4,
19 & 23(5) - Once the time of probation is
prescribed and employee is allowed to continue
on the said post after completion of maximum
period of probation without an express order of
confirmation, he shall be treated confirm by
implication. (Para 11, 17)

Uttar Pradesh State District Court Rules,
2013: Rules 19(1) and (2) - Period of probation
is two years and as per Rule 19(3) of Rules, 2013, it
can be extended maximum for two years. Therefore,
once petitioner has completed the service of four
years, his probation cannot be extended beyond
that. (Para 11)

Schedule-B of Rule 3(3) and 4 provides that
for promotion on the post of Senior Assistant from
Junior
Assistant,
minimum
five
years
of
substantive and satisfactory service in the said
scale is required. Here, as petitioner is promoted
on the post of Senior Assistant, his service would
be deemed to be substantive and satisfactory and
his probation is to be deemed completed.
Therefore, his service cannot be terminated on
the ground that he was on probation. (Para 11,
20)
B. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice as
well as procedure prescribed in law - No Inquiry
Officer has been appointed except the show-cause
notice, no opportunity of hearing was given to
petitioner before passing order. In the present case,
petitioner was appointed on the post of Junior
Assistant on probation and thereafter he has been
promoted on the post of Senior Assistant and his
service is to be treated confirmed, therefore,
petitioner cannot be terminated from service without
following the procedure prescribed in Rule 23(5) of
Rules, 2013. (Para 21)

Direction for re-instatement. Writ petition
allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. St. of Punj. Vs Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210
(Para 11)

Precedent distinguished:

1. High Court of M.P. Vs Satya Narain Jhavar, (2001)
7 SCC 161 (Para 10)

2. G.S. Ramaswamy Vs Inspector-General of Police,
1966 SC 175 (Para 10)

3. St. of U.P. Vs Akbar Ali Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1842
(Para 10)

4. Shamsher Singh Vs St.of Pun. & anr., (1974) 2 SCC
831 (Para 10)

5. Sukhbans Singh Vs St.of Pun. & ors., AIR 1962 SC
1711 (Para 10)

6. St. of Pun. & ors. Vs Balbir Singh (2004) 11 SCC
743 (Para 10, 18)

7. St. of U.P. Vs Harendra Arora & anr. (2001) 6
SCC392 (Para 10, 19)

8. Om Prakash Mann Vs Director of Education (Basic)
& ors., (2006) 7 SCC 558 (Para 10, 19)

Present petition assails order of termination
dated 14.11.2019, passed by District Judge,
Maharajganj.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Neeraj Tiwari, J.)