# Katwaru v. Addl. Commissioner Administration & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 3 ILRA 1209
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-08-21
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 9013 of 2003
- **Bench:** Yashwant Varma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/katwaru-v-addl-commissioner-administration-ors-44646
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 117, 122-B
(4-F) - land of Gaon Sabha - possession
of agricultural labourer of SC or ST class
since 30.06.1985 i.e. before the cut-off
date
u/s
122B(4F)
-
Rights
are
bhumidhari with non-transferable rights
- No need to get declaration from the
competent
authority
-
private
respondents do not claim benefit of sub
Section (4F).

Held: - Viewed in light of the above, it is
manifest that the Additional Commissioner has
clearly erred in holding that the petitioners
were liable to obtain a declaration from a
competent court in respect of their status or
their eligibility to the benefits introduced by
sub-section (4F). The findings as returned by
the Additional Commissioner on this aspect
clearly
run
contrary
to
the
principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Manorey.
(Para 13)

Writ Petition allowed (E-9)
List of cases cited : -

## Text

3 All. Katwaru Vs. Addl. Commissioner Administration & Ors.
1209
avail remedy in common law by filing a
suit with appropriate relief.

33. In view of above, we are clearly
of the view that it is not a fit case where
this Court must exercise its public law
remedy
available
under
Constitution
which is extraordinary, discriminatory
remedy and instead petitioner must be
relegated to avail its alternative remedy
by invoking arbitration clause in the
agreement or avail common law remedy
in Civil Court.

34. Writ petition is, accordingly,
dismissed.
----------

(2019)11ILR A1209

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.08.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE YASHWANT VARMA, J.

Writ C No. 9013 of 2003

Katwaru ...Petitioner
Versus
Addl. Commissioner Administration &
Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Shashi Prakash Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anuj Kumar, Sri D.D. Chauhan,
Sri M.S. Haq, Sri Pradeep Narain Pandey,
Sri Ramanand Pandey

A. U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 117, 122-B
(4-F) - land of Gaon Sabha - possession
of agricultural labourer of SC or ST class
since 30.06.1985 i.e. before the cut-off
date
u/s
122B(4F)
-
Rights
are
bhumidhari with non-transferable rights
- No need to get declaration from the
competent
authority
-
private
respondents do not claim benefit of sub
Section (4F).

Held: - Viewed in light of the above, it is
manifest that the Additional Commissioner has
clearly erred in holding that the petitioners
were liable to obtain a declaration from a
competent court in respect of their status or
their eligibility to the benefits introduced by
sub-section (4F). The findings as returned by
the Additional Commissioner on this aspect
clearly
run
contrary
to
the
principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Manorey.
(Para 13)

Writ Petition allowed (E-9)
List of cases cited : -
1. Barendra & anr. Vs St. Of U.P. & 3 ors. -
W.P. No.-29430/2018 (distinguished)
2. Manorey@ Manohar Vs Board of Revenue
(U.P.) & ors., (2003) 5 SCC 521

(Delivered by Hon'ble Yashwant Varma, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel
for the State respondents as well as Sri
Ramanand Pandey, who has appeared for
the respondents 2 to 5. Although the
Gram Panchayat is represented, none has
appeared on its behalf even in the revised
call.

2. This petition impugns the orders
dated 7 April 1999 and 23 December
2002. In terms of the order of 7 April
1999, the Additional Commissioner has
set aside the orders dated 4 December
1992 and 22 December 1995 in terms of
which the petitioner was extended the
benefits comprised in Section 122-B(4-F)
of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 [hereinafter to
be referred as "the Act"]. The petitioner
1210 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
asserting that the aforesaid order was ex
parte, filed an application for recall. That
recall application came to be dismissed on
23 December 2002 with the Additional
Commissioner holding that he had no
jurisdiction to recall a final order passed.
He further observed that since the
petitioners had failed to participate in the
original proceedings as a consequence of
which they were taken ex parte it would
be open to them to establish their rights
before a competent authority.

3. During the pendency of the
present petition, the original petitioner
died. His heirs were substituted in the writ
petition on 25 September 2013. The
essential facts which would be relevant
for the purposes of disposal of the writ
petition are noted hereunder.

4. The petitioners claim to be
members of the Scheduled Castes and
landless agriculturists in possession of the
land in dispute since 1975. According to
the case set up in the writ petition, the
father of the respondents 2 to 5 instituted
proceedings before the Sub Divisional
Officer for recordal of his name over the
land in dispute claiming rights thereon by
virtue of possession. That case was
contested by the original petitioner before
the Sub Divisional Officer who ultimately
by his order of 4 December 1992 held that
the petitioner fulfilled the conditions as
placed by Section 122-B(4-F) and the
land in dispute consequently was liable to
be settled in his favour. The Sub
Divisional Officer proceeded to frame
directions for recordal of his name over
the land in dispute. The father of the
respondents 2 to 5 is stated to have filed
an application for recall and restoration.
That application came to be dismissed by
the Sub Divisional Officer on 22
December 1995. Aggrieved by that order,
the father of the respondents preferred a
revision which ultimately came to be
allowed on 7 April 1999, the order
impugned in the instant writ petition.

5. As is evident from the facts as
recorded by the Sub Divisional Officer
both the petitioner as well as the
respondents asserted rights over the land
in dispute by virtue of possession. It
appears that initially the land had come to
be recorded in the name of the father of
the respondents 4 to 5. There were thus
competing claims in respect of the land in
question with both sides asserting rights
thereon by virtue of possession. The Sub
Divisional Officer in the order dated 22
December 1995 has noted that on due
scrutiny of the revenue record it was
evident that the land in question was the
property of the Gaon Sabha. He further
noted the assertion of the petitioner that
he had been in possession of the land
from prior to 30 June 1985. It was also
noted that the petitioner belonged to the
Scheduled Castes and was in possession
of the land prior to the cut off date
prescribed in Section 122 B(4F) of the
Act. It was also noted that the father of
the respondents could claim no rights
over the land since it belonged to the
Gaon Sabha. He further noted in this
order that even if it were assumed that the
petitioner came to possess the land after
30 June 1985, he was evidently in
possession of the same from prior to 3
June 1995 [the amended cut off date
prescribed in Section 122 B (4F)] and
consequently there was no justification to
recall the order dated 4 December 1992.

6. The Additional Commissioner,
the first respondent herein, while allowing
the revision preferred by the father of the
3 All. Katwaru Vs. Addl. Commissioner Administration & Ors.
1211
respondents has held that that the original
order of 4 December 1992 had come to be
passed without the Gaon Sabha having
been put to notice or made a party.
According to the first respondent, the
Gaon Sabha was a necessary party and
since the proceedings culminating in the
order of 4 December 1992 was ex parte
the Gaon Sabha it was liable to be set
aside. The first respondent then referring
to certain decisions rendered by this Court
proceeded to hold that in case the
petitioner were claiming benefits of the
provisions made in Section 122-B (4-F),
it was incumbent upon them to establish
their rights before a competent court and
obtain a requisite declaration in that
respect. According to the said respondent,
in the absence of any such declaration
existing, the petitioners could not have
been extended the benefits of the
provision
aforementioned.
He
consequently, proceeded to allow the
revision preferred by the respondents and
further directed the revenue records to be
corrected in order to reflect the position
as it existed prior to 4 December 1992.
He further left it open to the parties to
establish their rights before a court of
competent jurisdiction.

7. Assailing the order counsel for
the petitioner has submitted that the
benefit of Section 122-B (4-F) was liable
to be extended to the petitioners who
were landless agriculturist and belonged
to the Scheduled Castes. According to the
learned counsel, the benefits flowing from
sub-section (4-F) were not dependent
upon a declaration in that respect being
obtained from a competent court. Learned
counsel submitted that the language of
sub-section (4-F) itself obviates the
necessity of an eligible person instituting
a suit for declaration of his rights.

8. Refuting those submissions,
learned
counsel
for
the
private
respondents contended that the provisions
of
sub-section
(4-F)
can
have
no
application where competing claims on
the basis of possession are raised.
According to the learned counsel, the
benefits of that provision cannot have
automatic application in a case where two
parties assert possessory rights over the
land in dispute. Learned counsel would
submit that the order dated 4 December
1992 had come to be passed without the
concerned Gaon Sabha having been
provided an opportunity to place its side
and version and therefore the Additional
Commissioner has correctly set aside the
orders made in favour of the petitioners.
Learned counsel in support of his
submissions
has
additionally
placed
reliance upon a decision rendered by a
learned Judge of the Court in Barendra
And Another Vs. State of U.P. And 3
Others1 and particularly to the following
observations as made therein:

"Having
heard
the
learned
counsel for the petitioners, learned
Standing Counsel, Sri Rajesh Kumar and
the learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha, I
am of the considered view that when two
tenure holders claim that they were in
possession illegally over certain plots of
land which belonged to the Gaon Sabha
then Administrative Authorities had no
power to adjudicate upon the matter.
When a person claims to be in possession
from before a certain cut off date which
had been provided by the provisions of
Section 122-B (4F) of the U.P.Z.A. &
L.R. Act then it is to be deemed that he is
a Bhumidhar with non-transferable rights
as per the provisions of the Section 122B(4F) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The
Supreme Court in Manorey @ Manohar
1212 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vs. Board of Revenue (U.P.) and others
(JT 2003(3) SC 538) has stated that no
formal declaration is required when the
benefit of Section 122-B (4F) of the
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act is to be extended to a
person who had been in possession from
before a cut off date which is provided
under Section 122-B(4F) of the U.P.Z.A.
& L.R. Act. That villager becomes a
Bhumidhar with non-transferable rights
automatically.
However,
when
two
residents of the same village begin to
claim ownership over the land then under
Section 122-B(4F) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R.
Act, no machinery has been provided for
an adjudication as to who exactly was in
possession over the property in question.
In 2011 (2) ADJ 878 (Ram Das and
Others vs. Munna Lal and Others) when
accrual of rights under the Indian Forest
Act, 1914, of various settlers/occupiers of
forest land was being considered, this
Hon'ble Court observed that if a right of
certain occupier vis-a-vis the forest
authority was concerned then the forest
authorities could have looked into the
matter but if two individuals claimed right
over some forest land then they had to
approach the proper court, either under
the general law or under the relevant land
law.

The relevant paragraph of the
judgement and order dated 28.01.2011 is
being reproduced here as under:-

"I am of the considered opinion
that since there is an inter se dispute of
title between two private persons over a
plot of land, qua which an order under
Section 11(2)(i) (2) has been passed by
the Forest Settlement Officer, there can be
no adjudication of title dispute on an
appeal under Section 17 of the Act, 1927.

The parties have to be relegated
to the remedy available under the
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act or under the
common civil law. The Act, 1927 cannot
be extended to include within its ambit
title dispute over the property which are
excluded from the Act only because at a
particular point of time a notification
under Section 4 was issued qua the plots.

It may be clarified that inter se
dispute of title claimed in respect of land
which continues to be covered under
notification under Section 4 can always
be adjudicated by the Settlement Officer
Consolidation and thereafter in appeal
under Section 17. The judgment in the
case of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Mahendra Lal Jaini (supra) is
applicable in such cases only.

In view of the aforesaid, this
Court finds that it is not necessary to enter
into the issues, as to whether a review
application was maintainable or not or as
to whether the first order of the Appellate
Authority declaring one of the parties as
Bhumidhar was legally justified or not,
inasmuch as Bhumidhari rights in respect
of a plot of land, which is excluded from
the notification under Section 4 of the
Act, 1927 vide an order under Section
11(2)(i), can only be agitated and
examined by the competent revenue court
under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act or by the
competent civil court, as the case may be.

Accordingly, this Court feels
that setting aside of the order passed on
review application, under challenge in the
present writ petition, would have the
effect of restoring another illegal order of
the Appellate Authority declaring the
petitioner as the Bhumidhar. Therefore, in
the larger interest of justice it is provided
as follows:

The petitioner and respondents
are at liberty to get their rights declared
over the plots by approaching the revenue
court under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act or
the competent civil court, as they may be
3 All. Katwaru Vs. Addl. Commissioner Administration & Ors.
1213
advised. Order passed under the Act by
the Appellate Authority or for that
purpose by the Forest Settlement Officer,
insofar as it pertains to the inter se dispute
of Bhumidhari rights over the plot in
question, shall not be binding upon any of
the parties.

Writ petition is disposed of
subject to the observation made above."

In the instant case also when
two villagers were claiming possession
over
Gaon
Sabha
land
then
the
Administrative Authorities could not have
adjudicated as to who was in possession
and, therefore, the proper course open for
the petitioners was to approach the Civil
Court or the relevant Court under the
Land Laws for getting their rights
adjudicated. Thus, the petitioners cannot
be given any relief by this Court and
therefore the instant writ petition, so far
as it concerns petitioner, is being
dismissed.

9. Learned Standing Counsel has
supported
the
impugned
order
by
submitting that the benefits of sub-section
(4-F) could not have been extended to the
petitioners without notice to the Gaon
Sabha. It is these rival submissions which
fall for determination. Before proceeding
further it may only be noted that although
this petition has been pending on the
board of this Court since 2003 and the
concerned Gaon Sabha duly put to notice,
counter affidavits have been filed only by
the private respondents and no Affidavit
has been filed by the Gaon Sabha in these
proceedings.

10. Since the submissions addressed
before this Court would have to be tested
in the backdrop of the special provisions
made in Section 122B (4F) of the Act, it
would be apposite to extract it hereunder:

"Section
122B
(4F):-
Notwithstanding
anything
in
the
foregoing
sub-section,
where
any
agricultural labourer belonging to a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is in
occupation of any land vested in a Gaon
Sabha under section 117 (not being land
mentioned
in
section
132)
having
occupied it from before [May 1, 2002],
and the land so occupied together with
land, if any, held by him from before the
said date as bhumidhar, sirdar or asami,
does not exceed 1.26 hectares (3.125
acres), then no action under this section
shall be taken by the Land Management
Committee or the Collector against such
labourer, and [he shall be admitted as
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights of
that land under section 195 and it shall
not be necessary for him to institute a suit
for declaration of his rights as bhumidhar
with non-transferable rights in that land."

11. Sub-section (4F) firstly protects
the possessory rights of an agricultural
labourer belonging to the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes who may be
in occupation of any land vested in the
Gaon Sabha under Sections 117 of the
Act. The cut off date as prescribed in subsection (4-F) has been amended from time
to time. Insofar as the present proceedings
are concerned indubitably the relevant
date for the purposes of considering the
eligibility of an agricultural labourer was
30
June
1985.
Consequently,
an
agricultural labourer belonging to the
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in
occupation of any land vested in the Gaon
Sabha from a date prior to 30 June 1985
is
protected
from
the
perils
of
dispossession. The provision however
does not rest here. It proceeds further to
confer on such an agricultural labourer
bhumidhari rights albeit on a non-
1214 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
transferable basis. The provision, in
essence fulfils the twin objectives of
firstly protecting the possession of an
eligible agricultural labourer and further
confers on him the status of a bhumidhar
with
non-transferable
rights.
The
legislative ethos underlying that provision
was eloquently explained by the Supreme
Court in Manorey @ Manohar Vs.
Board of Revenue (U.P.) And Others2
in the following terms:

"8. First, the endeavour should
be to analyze and identify the nature of
the right or protection conferred by subsection (4-F) of Section 122-B. Subsections (1) to (3) and the ancillary
provisions upto sub-section (4-E) deal,
inter alia, with the procedure for eviction
of unauthorized occupants of land vested
in Gaon Sabha. Sub-section (4-F) carves
out an exception in favour of an
agricultural labourer belonging to a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
having land below the ceiling of 3.125
acres. Irrespective of the circumstances in
which such eligible person occupied the
land vested in the Gaon Sabha (other than
the land mentioned in Section 132), no
action to evict him shall be taken and
moreover, he shall be deemed to have
been admitted as a bhumidhar with nontransferable rights over the land, provided
he satisfies the conditions specified in the
sub-section. According to the findings of
the Sub-Divisional Officer as well as the
Appellate Authority, the appellant does
satisfy the conditions. If so, two legal
consequences follow. Such occupant of
the land shall not be evicted by taking
recourse to sub-sections (1) to (3) of
Section 122-B. It means that the occupant
of the land who satisfies the conditions
under sub-section (4-F) is entitled to
safeguard his possession as against the
Gaon Sabha. The second and more
important right which sub-section (4-F)
confers on him is that he is endowed with
the rights of a bhumidhar with nontransferable
rights.
The
deeming
provision has been specifically enacted as
a measure of agrarian reform, with a
thrust on socio-economic justice. The
statutorily conferred right of bhumidhar
with non-transferable rights finds its echo
in clause (b) of Section 131. Any person
who acquires the rights of bhumidhar
under
or
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of the Act, is recognized under
Section 131 as falling within the class of
bhumidhar. The right acquired or accrued
under sub-section (4-F) is one such right
that falls within the purview of Section
131(b).

9. Thus, sub-section (4-F) of
Section 122-B not merely provides a
shield to protect the possession as opined
by the High Court, but it also confers a
positive right of bhumidhar on the
occupant of the land satisfying the criteria
laid
down
in
that
sub-section.
Notwithstanding the clear language in
which the deeming provision is couched
and the ameliorative purpose of the
legislation, the learned Single Judge of
the High Court had taken the view in
Ramdin V. Board of Revenue (followed by
the same learned Judge in the instant
case) that the bhumidhari rights of the
occupant contemplated by sub-section (4F) can only blossom out when there is a
specific allotment order by the Land
Management Committee under Section
198. According to the High Court, the
deeming provision contained in subsection (4-F) cannot be overstretched to
supersede the other provisions in the Act
dealing specifically with the creation of
the right of bhumidhar. In other words,
the view of the High Court was that a
3 All. Katwaru Vs. Addl. Commissioner Administration & Ors.
1215
person
covered
by
the
beneficial
provision contained in sub-section (4-F)
will have to still go through the process of
allotment under Section 198 even though
he is not liable for eviction. As a corollary
to this view, it was held that the occupant
was not entitled to seek correction of
revenue records, even if his case falls
under sub-section (4-F) of Section 122-B.
We hold that the view of the High Court
is clearly unsustainable. It amounts to
ignoring the effect of a deeming provision
enacted with a definite social purpose.
When
once
the
deeming
provision
unequivocally provides for the admission
of the person satisfying the requisite
criteria laid down in the provision as
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights
under Section 195, full effect must be
given to it. Section 195 lays down that the
Land Management Committee, with the
previous
approval
of
the Assistant
Collector in-charge of the sub-division,
shall have the right to admit any person as
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights to
any vacant land (other than the land
falling under Section 132) vested in the
Gaon Sabha. Section 198 prescribes "the
order of preference in admitting persons
to land under Sections 195 and 197". The
last part of sub-section (4-F) of Section
122-B confers by a statutory fiction the
status of bhumidhar with non-transferable
rights on the eligible occupant of the land
as if he has been admitted as such under
Section 195. In substance and in effect,
the deeming provision declares that the
statutorily recognized bhumidhar should
be as good as a person admitted to
bhumidhari rights under Section 195 read
with other provisions. In a way, subsection (4-F) supplements Section 195 by
specifically granting the same benefit to a
person coming within the protective
umbrella of that sub-section. The need to
approach the Gaon Sabha under Section
195 read with Section 198 is obviated by
the deeming provision contained in subsection (4-F). We find no warrant to
constrict the scope of the deeming
provision.

10.
That
being
the
legal
position, there is no bar against an
application being made by the eligible
person coming within the four corners of
sub-section (4-F) to effect necessary
changes in the revenue record. When once
the claim of the applicant is accepted, it is
the bounden duty of the concerned
Revenue Authorities to make necessary
entries in revenue records to give effect to
the statutory mandate. The obligation to
do so arises by necessary implication by
reason of the statutory right vested in the
person coming within the ambit of subsection (4-F). The lack of specific
provision for making an application under
the Act is no ground to dismiss the
application as not maintainable. The
revenue records should naturally fall in
line with the rights statutorily recognized.
The Sub-Divisional Officer was therefore
within his rights to allow the application
and direct the correction of the records.
The Board of Revenue and the High
Court should not have set aside that order.
The fact that the Land Management
Committee of Gaon Sabha had created
lease hold rights in favour of the
respondents herein is of no consequence.
Such lease, in the face of the statutory
right of the appellant, is non est in the eye
of law and is liable to be ignored."

12. In Manorey the Supreme Court
explained the provisions made in subsection (4-F) by stating that its provisions
not only entitled such an agricultural
labourer to safeguard his possession as
against the Gaon Sabha but also conferred
1216 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the more important right of being
recognised as a bhumidhar with nontransferable rights of that land. It further
held that the conferment of status of
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights
on an eligible occupant extends by way of
a statutory fiction. It was held that once
the eligible occupant was found to satisfy
the preconditions enumerated for the
applicability of sub-section (4-F), there
would be no further obligation upon him
to seek a declaration from any competent
Court. In Manorey, the Supreme Court
further held that sub-section (4-F) entitled
the eligible occupant to consequently
apply by way of an application to the
competent authority for extension of
benefits
under
that
provision.
Significantly the Supreme Court in
Manorey also specifically overruled the
view taken by this Court that an
agricultural labourer was liable to obtain a
declaration with respect to the extension
of benefits conferred by Section 122B
(4F).

13. Viewed in light of the above, it
is
manifest
that
the
Additional
Commissioner
has
clearly
erred
in
holding that the petitioners were liable to
obtain a declaration from a competent
court in respect of their status or their
eligibility to the benefits introduced by
sub-section
(4-F).
The
findings
as
returned by the Additional Commissioner
on this aspect clearly run contrary to the
principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Manorey. While it may be true
that the Gaon Sabha was not made a party
to the proceedings which culminated in
the passing of the order of 4 December
1992, it is evident that the respondents do
not hold that the petitioners were
otherwise ineligible to be extended the
benefits of sub-section (4-F). It is not
their case that the petitioners were not
eligible occupants on the relevant date.
Neither
the
fact
of
the
petitioner
belonging to the Scheduled Caste being in
occupation of the land in question from
prior to the cut off date nor of the land
belonging to the Gaon Sabha is disputed
by the respondents before this Court. In
view thereof, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the mere absence
of
the
Gaon
Sabha
would
not
fundamentally detract from the right of
the petitioners to be accorded the benefits
of sub-section (4-F).

14. That only leaves the Court to
consider the contention of a competing
claim of the private respondents on the
basis of possession. It is pertinent to note
that the private respondents do not claim
the benefit of sub-section (4-F). They do
not assert their rights on the strength of
being agricultural labourers belonging to
the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled
Tribes. It is in that backdrop that the
objection as taken by them to the
conferment of benefits of sub section (4F)
must necessarily be tested. It must at the
outset be noted that the Additional
Commissioner himself has recorded that
the land in dispute was the property of the
Gaon Sabha. The private respondents
have not demonstrated or established
before this Court their right or status to
lawfully occupy the land in dispute. The
do not claim to have been admitted upon
the land in dispute by virtue of a lawful
settlement made in their favour under the
relevant provisions of the Act. It becomes
pertinent to note that the provisions of the
Act lay down a detailed machinery for
settlement of land vesting in the Gaon
Sabha. The respondents have woefully
failed to establish their possessory right
either on the strength of a lawful
3 All. C/M Pt. Janardan Mani Sri Krishnadeo Mani Sri Durga Maa Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 1217
settlement or on any other basis. The land
of the Gaon Sabha cannot be occupied
otherwise than in accordance with a
procedure established by law. In absence
of any evidence being placed or relied
upon in this respect, the Court cannot
possibly recognise the existence of a legal
right inhering in the respondents to
occupy the land.

15. The reliance placed by learned
counsel
on
Barendra
is
also
misconceived since the observations as
entered there would only have application
where competing claims under subsection
(4F)
are
placed
for
the
consideration of the State respondents. In
the absence of one of the claimants being
entitled to the benefits of sub-section (4F) and having failed to establish a lawful
right to possess the land belonging to the
Gaon Sabha, the principles as enunciated
in Barendra would have no application.
In fact and as is evident from the
observations made by the learned Judge
in Barendra, the necessity to obtain a
formal declaration would arise only when
competing sides claim to be in possession
from before the cut off date prescribed in
sub-section
(4-F).
The
decision
in
Barendra must therefore necessarily be
understood in that context.

16. In any case, this Court finds itself
unable to extend the principles propounded
therein to the facts of the present case where
the private respondents neither claim the
benefits of sub-section (4F) nor have they
established any lawful or legal right to be in
occupation of land belonging to the Gaon
Sabha.

17. Accordingly and for the reasons
aforenoted, this writ petition is allowed.
The impugned orders dated 7 April 1999
and 23 December 2002, are hereby
quashed and aside.
----------

(2019)11ILR A1217

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.09.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.

Writ C No.- 13179 of 2016

C/M Pt. Janardan Mani Sri Krishnadeo
Mani Sri Durga Maa ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Kushmondeya Shahi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., S.C.

A. Committee of Management- Petitioner
institution
recognized
-approved
by
respective universities - rejection of
grant in aid - for clerical defects - badinformation to remove defects - received
by Petitioner college after cut-off dateimpugned order quashed.

Writ Petition allowed (E-9)

List of cases cited : -

1.Committee of Management, Shri Dravi Nath
Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya & anr. Vs St. of
U.P. & Ors., (2019) (1) ADJ 513
2.St. of U.P. & ors. Vs Pawan Kumar Divedi &
anr., (2014) (9) SCC 692
3.Paripurna Nand Tripathi & ors. Vs St. of U.P.
& ors., (2015) (3) ADJ 567 (DB)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.)