# Kesar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 1027
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-01
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 456 of 2025
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Praveen Kumar Giri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kesar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53698
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

against an order passed by the learned Single
Judge that merely directs certain officers to
submit a report with regard to the Public
Interest Litigation that has been filed and
directed the appellant herein to file a counter
affidavit?

Headnotes
A. Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952:
Chapter VIII Rule 5 - If an order of the
Court is in the nature of a final order, it
could be appealable and not otherwise.
When an order is passed by the Court
affects valuable rights which amounts to
pre- hearing of the judgment, it could be
appealable. (Para 14)

Unless an order has the trappings of a final
order and/ or affects the valuable rights of a
party causing serious injustice to a party, no
appeal would lie before the Division Bench from
the order passed by a Single Judge of this
Court. (Para 16)

It is patently clear that an interlocutory order to
be appealable under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the
Rules must adversely affect the valuable right of
a party or decide an important aspect. In order
to constitute 'appealable order', the adverse
effect on a party must be direct and immediate
and not indirect or remote. Furthermore, routine
orders passed by Single Judge of seeking
reports
and/or
directing
affidavits
to
be
exchanged that would facilitate the progress of
a case even though may cause some element of
inconvenience or prejudice to a party would not
constitute a judgment as the same does not
finally determine the rights and obligations of
the parties. (Para 17)

In the present case, the order passed is neither
an interim nor a final order affecting the interest
of any party. The learned single judge has
simpliciter sought for reports to determine the
truthfulness of the allegations made in the PIL.
Under no circumstances, such directions can be
termed as judgment and/or an interim order
that decides the vital and valuable rights of any
of the parties. (Para 18)

The issue of maintainability of the writ petition
was never raised by the appellant herein before
the learned Single Judge. The only ground
raised was that the petitioner in the said petition
wanted to withdraw the said petition (PIL)
which was rejected by the Hon'ble Judge. Such
a rejection order does not in any manner impact
any valuable rights of the appellant herein. The
appellant shall be at liberty to raise the point of
maintainability as a preliminary issue before the
Hon'ble Single Judge. (Para 19)

In the impugned order, no decision has been
taken by the learned Single Judge with regard
to the maintainability of the PIL not does it in
any manner negatively impact the valuable
rights of any party including the appellant at this
stage. (Para 23)

B. The present appeal has not been filed
by the petitioner who had wished to
withdraw the petition, but has been
filed by the respondent no. 5 in the writ
petition
against
whom
several
allegations have been made by the writ
petitioner. This itself raises questions
on the maintainability of the special
appeal.
1028 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The appellant here emphasizes the point that
the Court must encourage only genuine and
bonafide PIL and effectively discourage the PIL
filed for extraneous consideration. It is held that
the question whether the Public Interest
Litigation is a bonafide exercise or not is to be
decided by the Hon'ble Single Judge as and
when the issue is raised before him. (Para 21,
22)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited

## Text

8 All. Kesar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1027
(2025) 8 ILRA 1027
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE PRAVEEN KUMAR GIRI, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 456 of 2025

Kesar Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Ajay Mishra, Sri Krishna Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Bhagwan Das,
C.S.C., Mohammad Zunaid Khan, Ranjana

Issue for consideration
 Whether the Special Appeal is maintainable
against an order passed by the learned Single
Judge that merely directs certain officers to
submit a report with regard to the Public
Interest Litigation that has been filed and
directed the appellant herein to file a counter
affidavit?

Headnotes
A. Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952:
Chapter VIII Rule 5 - If an order of the
Court is in the nature of a final order, it
could be appealable and not otherwise.
When an order is passed by the Court
affects valuable rights which amounts to
pre- hearing of the judgment, it could be
appealable. (Para 14)

Unless an order has the trappings of a final
order and/ or affects the valuable rights of a
party causing serious injustice to a party, no
appeal would lie before the Division Bench from
the order passed by a Single Judge of this
Court. (Para 16)

It is patently clear that an interlocutory order to
be appealable under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the
Rules must adversely affect the valuable right of
a party or decide an important aspect. In order
to constitute 'appealable order', the adverse
effect on a party must be direct and immediate
and not indirect or remote. Furthermore, routine
orders passed by Single Judge of seeking
reports
and/or
directing
affidavits
to
be
exchanged that would facilitate the progress of
a case even though may cause some element of
inconvenience or prejudice to a party would not
constitute a judgment as the same does not
finally determine the rights and obligations of
the parties. (Para 17)

In the present case, the order passed is neither
an interim nor a final order affecting the interest
of any party. The learned single judge has
simpliciter sought for reports to determine the
truthfulness of the allegations made in the PIL.
Under no circumstances, such directions can be
termed as judgment and/or an interim order
that decides the vital and valuable rights of any
of the parties. (Para 18)

The issue of maintainability of the writ petition
was never raised by the appellant herein before
the learned Single Judge. The only ground
raised was that the petitioner in the said petition
wanted to withdraw the said petition (PIL)
which was rejected by the Hon'ble Judge. Such
a rejection order does not in any manner impact
any valuable rights of the appellant herein. The
appellant shall be at liberty to raise the point of
maintainability as a preliminary issue before the
Hon'ble Single Judge. (Para 19)

In the impugned order, no decision has been
taken by the learned Single Judge with regard
to the maintainability of the PIL not does it in
any manner negatively impact the valuable
rights of any party including the appellant at this
stage. (Para 23)

B. The present appeal has not been filed
by the petitioner who had wished to
withdraw the petition, but has been
filed by the respondent no. 5 in the writ
petition
against
whom
several
allegations have been made by the writ
petitioner. This itself raises questions
on the maintainability of the special
appeal.
1028 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The appellant here emphasizes the point that
the Court must encourage only genuine and
bonafide PIL and effectively discourage the PIL
filed for extraneous consideration. It is held that
the question whether the Public Interest
Litigation is a bonafide exercise or not is to be
decided by the Hon'ble Single Judge as and
when the issue is raised before him. (Para 21,
22)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania,
(1981) 4 SCC 8 (Para 13)
2. Sandeep Agarwal and others Vs. Adarsh
Chaddha and others, 2002 (4) AWC 3083 (Para
14)
3. Society Madarasa Mazahir Uloom Mubarak
Shah, Saharanpur Vs. Muzaffar Hussain, (1994)
1 AWC 55 (Para 14)
4. Ashutosh Shrotiya and Others Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Dr B R Ambedkar University &
Others, (2015) 6 All LJ 383 (Para 15)
5. State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh
Chaufal and Others, (2010) 3 SCC 402 (Para
21)

List of Acts/Statutes
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.

List of Keywords
maintainable, special appeal.

Appearances for Parties
For Appellant: Ajay Mishra, Shri Krishna
Mishra

For Respondent: Abhishek Kumar Pandey,
Bhagwan Das, C.S.C., Mohammad Zunaid Khan,
Ranjana

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

Order
on
Delay
Condonation
Application

1. Heard Mr. Shri Krishna Mishra,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of
appellant and learned standing counsel
appearing on behalf of State.
2. This special appeal is reported to
be beyond time by 10 days.

3. We have perused the delay
condonation application and the affidavit
filed in support thereof. Cause shown is
sufficient. Delay in filing the special appeal
is condoned. Application stands allowed.

Order on Special Appeal

4. This special appeal has been
filed against the order dated May 26, 2025
passed by learned Single Judge in Public
Interest Litigation (P.I.L.) No. 1375 of
2025.

5. The impugned order is a brief
order and we are accordingly reproducing
the same hereinbelow:

 "When this matter has come up
for
admission,
Mr.
V.C.
Srivastava,
Advocate says that the petitioner may be
permitted to withdraw this petition with
liberty to file a fresh petition. Mr. Irfan Ali,
Advocate holding brief of Mr. Abhishek
Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the
petitioner, who have filed this petition
along with Mr. Alok Singh and Mr. Mohd.
Zunaid Khan, Advocates, submits that this
prayer for withdrawal is a result of
pressure brought upon the petitioner by
respondent no. 5, Kesar Singh, who is an ill
reputed land Mafia with a criminal history
of 16 cases registered against him in
district Fatehpur, He has invited the
attention of the Court to the criminal
history of respondent no. 5 summarized at
page no. 66 of the paper book. The offences
there are under the Gunda Act, more than
one cases of attempt to murder, mischief,
ublic property and criminal intimidation.
Mr. Irfan Ali submits that it is on account
of the threats extended by respondent no. 5
8 All. Kesar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1029
that
the
petitioner
is
attempting
to
withdraw this petition through Mr. V.C.
Srivastava, Advocate.

Be that as it may, this Public
Interest Litigation and the petitioner does
not
have
an
indefeasible
right
for
withdrawing a PIL. Once a public cause is
brought
to
this
Court's
notice,
the
petitioner if he abandons it, leaves the
Court with the option to direct the
petitioner to be substituted by some other
public spirited person ready and willing to
espouse the cause or the matter may be
converted Suo Motu Into action. Let the
Secretary (Home), Government of U.P.,
Lucknow and the Director General of
Police, Government of U.P., Lucknow be
made parties to this petition during the
course of the day.

What has been brought to the
notice of this Court is that respondent no. 5
has encroached into the land comprising
Gata No. 276, Gata No. 294 and 308
besides Gata Nos. 292, 298 and 299 as also
Gata Nos. 295 and 296, all situate in
Village Rakshapalpur, Pargana Ekhla and
Tehsil Khaga, District Fatehpur. These
plots are all public utility land and
recorded as Khalihan, Manure Pit besides
Banjar which is Goon Sabha land.

Let the Collector, Fatehpur and
the Sub Divisional Officer, Khaga, District
Fatehpur submit a report on or before
29.05.2025, if the plot numbers aforesaid
are indeed Gaon Sabha land or public
utility land encroached by respondent no.
5.

Notice on behalf of respondent
no. 5, who is present in Court, is accepted
by Mr. Sharad Chand Rai, Advocate. He
will file a counter affidavit by the next date
fixed. He will explain his criminal history
also and categorically explain the case that
has been put forward by Mr. Irfan Ali that
the petitioner has been threatened into
withdrawing the PIL.

Lay as fresh on 29.05.2025.

Let this order be communicated
to the Collector, Fatehpur and the Sub
Divisional
Officer,
Khaga,
District
Fatehpur through the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Fatehpur by the Registrar
(Compliance) within 24 hours."

6. Shri Krishna Mishra, Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant herein
(respondent no. 5 in the Public Interest
Litigation) submits that the learned Single
Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by passing
the orders in the the said petition when the
petitioner himself wanted to withdraw the
petition. He further submits that learned
Single Judge has granted certain reliefs to
the petitioner that would have a negative
impact upon his valuable rights.

7. The question that arises before
this Court is primarily whether the Special
Appeal is mainatainable against an order
passed by the learned Single Judge that
merely directs certain officers to submit a
report with regard to the Public Interest
Litigation that has been filed and directed
the appellant herein to file a counter
affidavit.

8. Before delving into the issue, it
is pertinent to look into the provision of
Special Appeal in the Allahabad High
Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to
as the 'Rules').

Chapter VIII Rule 5:

 "5. Special appeal :- An appeal
shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not
being a judgment passed in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a
decree or order made by a Court subject to
1030 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the superintendence of the Court and not
being an order made in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of
its power of superintendence or in the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction [or in the
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by
Article
226
or
Article
227 of
the
Constitution in respect of any judgment,
order or award--(a) of a tribunal, Court
or
statutory
arbitrator
made
or
purported to be made in the exercise or
purported exercise of jurisdiction under
any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any
Central Act, with respect to any of the
matters enumerated in the State List or
the Concurrent List in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of
the Government or any officer or
authority, made or purported to be made
in the exercise or purported exercise of
appellate
or
revisional
jurisdiction
under any such Act of one Judge.]"

9. The present special appeal is
directed against a Public Interest Litigation
which in its essence is a writ petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constituion of
India for the protection of fundamental
rights of the public at large.

10. From the perusal of Chapter
VIII Rule 5 of the Rules a special appeal
shall lie before this Court from the
judgment passed by single Judge of the
Court. However, such special appeal will
not lie in the following circumstances:

 (i) the judgment passed by one
Judge
in
the
exercise
of
appellate
jurisdiction, in respect of a decree or order
made
by
a
Court
subject
to
the
Superintendence of the Court;

(ii) the order made by one Judge
in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction;

(iii) the order made by one Judge
in
the
exercise
of
the
power
of
Superintendence of the High Court;

(iv) the order made by one Judge
in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction;

(v) the order made by one Judge
in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by
Article 226 or Article 227 of the
Constitution of India in respect of any
judgment, order or award by

(a) the tribunal,

(b) Court or

(c) statutory arbitrator made or
purported to be made in the exercise or
purported exercise of jurisdiction under any
Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central
Act, with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in the State List or the
Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution of India;

(vi) the order made by one Judge
in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by
Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of
India in respect of any judgment, order or
award of

(a) the Government or

(b) any officer or

(c) authority,

made or purported to be made in
the exercise or purported exercise of
appellate or revisional jurisdiction under
any such Act, i.e. under any Uttar Pradesh
Act or under any Central Act, with respect
to any of the matters enumerated in the
State List or the Concurrent List in the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of
India."

11. Upon perusal of the order, it is
clear that the learned Single Judge was of
the view that the petitioner has been
intimidated in some manner and was
accordingly seeking to withdraw the writ
petition. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Single
Judge held that there is no indefeasible
8 All. Kesar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1031
right for a petitioner to withdraw a Public
Interest Litigation once the same has been
brought to the knowledge of the Court.

12. In view of the same, the learned
Single Judge has passed certain orders
seeking report from the Collector, Fatehpur
and the Sub Divisional Officer, Khaga,
District Fatehpur with regard to the plot
numbers (that was supposedly encroached)
as to whether certain plot numbers are
Gaon Sabha Land or public utility land.
Direction has also been given to the
respondent no.5 (appellant herein) to
explain his criminal history, by way of
filing a counter affidavit.

13. The Supreme Court in Shah
Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania,
reported in (1981) 4 SCC 8 has laid down
various principles as to when a 'judgment'
would be appealable under letters patent
appeal and also delineated the interlocutory
order which would be appealable. The
relevant paragraphs of the judgment are
quoted hereinelow:

"120. Thus, these are some of the
principles which might guide a Division
Bench in deciding whether an order passed
by the trial Judge amounts to a judgment
within the meaning of the letters patent. We
might, however, at the risk of repetition
give illustrations of interlocutory orders
which may be treated as judgments:
(1) An order granting leave to
amend the plaint by introducing a new
cause of action which completely alters the
nature of the suit and takes away a vested
right of limitation or any other valuable
right accrued to the defendant.
(2) An order rejecting the plaint.
(3) An order refusing leave to
defend the suit in an action under Order
37, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(4) An order rescinding leave of the
trial Judge granted by him under clause 12
of the letters patent.
(5)
An
order
deciding
a
preliminary objection to the maintainability
of the suit on the ground of limitation,
absence of notice under Section 80, bar
against competency of the suit against the
defendant even though the suit is kept alive.
(6)
An
order
rejecting
an
application for a judgment on admission
under Order 12 Rule 6.
(7) An order refusing to add
necessary parties in a suit under Section 92
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(8) An order varying or amending a
decree
.
(9) An order refusing leave to sue in
forma pauperis.
(10) An order granting review.
(11) An order allowing withdrawal
of the suit with liberty to file a fresh one.
(12) An order holding that the
defendants are not agriculturists within the
meaning of the special law.
(13) An order staying or refusing to
stay a suit under Section 10 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
(14) An order granting or refusing
to stay execution of the decree.
(15) An order deciding payment of
court fees against the plaintiff."
***

151.
An
order
which
is
appealable under the Code or under any
other statute becomes appealable as the
statute confers a right on the litigant to
prefer an appeal against such an order.
Such an order may or may not be
appealable as "judgment" under clause 15
of the letters patent. An order which may be
appealable under clause 15 of the letters
patent
as
a
"judgment"
becomes
appealable as letters patent confers on the
litigant a right of appeal against such an
1032 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order as "judgment". An order appealable
under the letters patent may or may not be
appealable under the Code. A right of
appeal is a creature of statute. A litigant
does not have an inherent right to prefer an
appeal against an order unless such a right
is conferred on the litigant by law. Certain
orders become appealable under the Code,
as the Code makes such orders appealable.
Other statutes may confer a right of appeal
in respect of any order under the statute.
The letters patent by clause 15 also confers
a right to prefer an appeal against a
"judgment". An order which satisfies the
requirements of 'judgment' within the
meaning of clause 15 becomes appealable
under the letters patent. What kind of an
order will constitute a judgment within the
meaning of clause 15 of the letters patent
and will become appealable as such must
necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and on the
nature and character of the order passed.
The question whether a particular order
constitutes a judgment within the meaning
of clause 15 of the letters patent to be
appealable under the provisions thereof
has come up for consideration before the
various courts in a number of decisions.
Very many decisions have been cited in the
present case and they have been considered
by my learned brother, Fazal Ali, J. in his
judgment. The question indeed, is not free
from difficulties and divergent views have
been expressed by different courts and by
various learned judges. This Court had
also the occasion to consider as to what
may constitute a judgment within the
meaning of clause 15 of the letters patent in
certain cases. In the case of Shanti Kumar
R. Canji v.The Home Insurance Co. of New
York [(1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC
1719 : (1975) 1 SCR 550] this Court
referring to the earlier decision of this
Court in the case of Asrumati Devi v.
Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot [(1953) 1
SCC 333 : AIR 1953 SC 198 : 1953 SCR
1159] observed at p. 550:"

14. The Division Bench of this
Court in Sandeep Agarwal and others v.
Adarsh Chaddha and others reported in
2002 (4) AWC 3083 has categorically held
that if an order of the Court is in the nature
of a final order, it could be appealable and
not otherwise. The Division Bench of this
Court has also held in Society Madarasa
Mazahir
Uloom
Mubarak
Shah,
Saharanpur
v.
Muzaffar
Hussain
reported in (1994) 1 AWC 55 that when an
order is passed by the Court affects
valuable rights which amounts to prehearing of the judgment, it could be
appealable.

15. The Full Bench judgment of
this Court penned by the then Chief Justice
Hon'ble D.Y. Chandrachud in Ashutosh
Shrotiya and Others v. Vice-Chancellor,
Dr B R Ambedkar University & Others
reported in (2015) 6 All LJ 383 after
considering the judgment of Supreme Court
in
Shah
Babulal
Khimji
(supra)
specifically
dealt
with
the
issue
of
maintainability of a Special Appeal and
culled out principles as to what constitute
'judgments'. The relevant paragraphs of the
judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

 "30. We now formulate the
governing principles:

(i) The expression 'judgment' was
advisedly not defined in the Letters Patents
of various High Courts which conferred a
right of appeal against a judgment of a
Single Judge to a Division Bench of that
Court;

(ii) The expression 'judgment' is
not to be construed in the narrower sense
in which the expression 'judgment', 'decree'
8 All. Kesar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1033
or 'order' is defined in the CPC, but must
receive a broad and liberal construction;

(iii) Every order passed by a trial
Judge on the Original side of a High Court
exercising original jurisdiction or, for that
matter,
by
a
learned
Single
Judge
exercising the writ jurisdiction, would not
amount to a judgment. If every order were
construed to be a judgment, that would
result in opening a flood of appeals and
there would be no end to the number of
orders which could be appealable under
the Letters Patent;

(iv) Any interlocutory order to
constitute a judgment, must possess the
characteristic of finality in the sense that it
must adversely affect a valuable right of a
party or decide an important aspect of the
trial in an ancillary proceeding. In order to
constitute a 'judgment', the adverse effect
on a party must be direct and immediate
and not indirect or remote;

(v) In order to constitute a
judgment, an interlocutory order must: (a)
decide a matter of moment; or (b) affect
vital and valuable rights of the parties and
must also work serious injustice to the
party concerned:

(vi) On the other hand, orders
passed in the course of the proceedings of a
routine nature, would not constitute a
judgment even if they result in some
element of inconvenience or hardship to
one party or the other. Routine orders
which are passed by a Single Judge to
facilitate the progress of a case may cause
some element of inconvenience or prejudice
to a party but do not constitute a 'judgment'
because they do not finally determine the
rights or obligations of the parties.
Procedural orders in aid of the progression
of a case or to facilitate a decision are not
judgments.
***

44. In view of the aforesaid
discussions, we answer the question of law
referred to the Full Bench by holding that,
an order of a learned Single Judge upon a
petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the
Constitution only calling for counter and
rejoinder affidavits is merely a procedural
order in aid of the progression of the case.
An order of this nature which is purely of a
procedural nature in aid of the progression
of the case and to enable the Court to form
a considered view after a counter affidavit
and a rejoinder are filed would not be
amenable to a special appeal under
Chapter VIII Rule 5. Such an order does
not decide anything nor does it have the
trappings of finality. If a party to the
proceedings seeks to press an application
for ad interim relief of a protective nature
even before a counter affidavit is filed, on
the ground that a situation of irretrievable
injustice may result or that its substantive
rights would be adversely affected in the
meantime, such an argument must be
addressed before the Single Judge. If such
an argument is urged, it should be dealt
with however briefly, consistent with the
stage of the case, by the Single Judge. It is
for the Division Bench hearing the special
appeal to consider whether the order
decides mattes of moment or is of such a
nature that would affect the vital and
valuable rights of the parties and causes
serious injustice to the concerned party."
(Emphasis added)

16. From the perusal of the above
judgments, the ratio is crystal clear that
unless an order has the trappings of a final
order and/ or affects the valuable rights of a
party causing serious injustice to a party,
no appeal would lie before the Division
Bench from the order passed by a Single
Judge of this Court. The Full Bench in
1034 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ashutosh
Shrotiya
(supra)
has
categorically concuded as follows:

 "31. Now, it is in the background
of these principles that we need to deal
with the issue as to whether an order of a
Single Judge, in the exercise of writ
jurisdiction, calling for the filing of a
counter affidavit and a rejoinder, must in
all circumstances without exception be
treated as orders merely facilitating the
progress of the case and not constituting a
judgment. Where a judge requires the filing
of a counter affidavit by the respondent and
a rejoinder by the petitioner in response,
this is in the nature of a procedural
direction to enable the Court to have a full
disclosure of the underlying facts and
issues so as to facilitate a decision. The
object of such a direction is to enable the
Single Judge to be apprised of facts
relevant and material to arriving at a
considered view. Such a direction is in aid
of the progression of the case. It does not
decide the matter or issue in controversy.
The lis continues to remain pending before
the Single Judge. The Court would apply its
mind to the merits of the controversy, for
the purpose of deciding an application for
interim relief and eventually for the final
disposal of the writ proceedings after
affidavits are filed. This is a procedural
order and not a judgment."
(Emphasis added)

17. Applying the ratio of the above
discussed judgments, it is patently clear
that an interlocutory order to be appealable
under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules
must adversely affect the valuable right of a
party or decide an important aspect. In
order to constitute 'appealable order', the
adverse effect on a party must be direct and
immediate and not indirect or remote.
Furthermore, routine orders passed by
Single Judge of seeking reports and/or
directing affidavits to be exchanged that
would facilitate the progress of a case even
though may cause some element of
inconvenience or prejudice to a party
would not constitute a judgment as the
same does not finally determine the rights
and obligations of the parties.

18. From a perusal of the order
passed, it appears that it is neither an
interim nor a final order affecting the
interest of any party. The learned single
judge has simpliciter sought for reports to
determine the truthfulness of the allegations
made in the Public Interest Litigation.
Under no circumstances, such directions
can be termed as judgment and/or an
interim order that decides the vital and
valuable rights of any of the parties.

19. It is to be noted that the issue of
maintainability of the writ petition was
never raised by the appellant herein before
the learned Single Judge. The only ground
raised was that the petitioner in the said
petition wanted to withdraw the said
petition (Public Interest Litigation) which
was rejected by the Hon'ble Judge. Such a
rejection order does not in any manner
impact any valuable rights of the appellant
herein. The appellant shall be at liberty to
raise the point of maintainability as a
preliminary issue before the Hon'ble Single
Judge.

20. It is to be further noted that the
present appeal has not been filed by the
petitioner who had wished to withdraw the
petition, but has been filed by the
respondent no. 5 in the writ petition against
whom several allegations have been made
by the writ petitioner. This itself raises
questions on the maintainability of the
special appeal.
8 All. Committee of Management & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1035
21. Learned
Counsel
for
the
appellant has referred to the judgment of
Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal v.
Balwant Singh Chaufal and Others
reported in (2010) 3 SCC 402 emphasizing
the point that the Court must encourage
only genuine and bonafide Public Interest
Litigation and effectively discourage the
Public
Interest
Litigation
filed
for
extraneous consideration. He relies upon
paragraph 181 of the said judgment to
buttress the argument that the Public
Interest Litigation which has been sought to
be withdrawn by the petitioner itself is an
abuse of the process of Court.

22. We once again emphasise that
the question whether the Public Interest
Litigation is a bonafide exercise or not is to
be decided by the Hon'ble Single Judge as
and when the issue is raised before him.
Ergo, the judgment in Balwant Singh
Chaufal (supra) is not relevant to decide
the issue herein.

23. It is also to be noted that in the
impugned order which is under challenge
before us, no decision has been taken by
the learned Single Judge with regard to the
maintainability of the Public Interest
Litigation not does it in any manner
negatively impact the valuable rights of
any party including the appellant at this
stage.
24. Accordingly, the present special
appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.

25. As the counter affidavit has not
been filed by the appellant in the Public
Interest Litigation, the time to file counter
affidavit therein is extended by three
weeks.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 1035
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Special Appeal No. 652 of 2025

Committee of Management & Anr
 ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Ved Byas Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.,
Ankit
Gaur
(S.C.),
Prabhakar
Awasthi

Issue for consideration
Whether
the
present
special
appeal
is
maintainable under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952?

Headnotes
A.
Societies
Registration
Act,
1860:
Section
25(1);
Allahabad
High
Court
Rules, 1952: Chapter VIII Rule 5 - Special
appeal is not maintainable against the
order passed by the writ court in a
challenge laid to the order passed u/s
25(1) of the Act passed by the Prescribed
Authority, (Para 15)

A perusal of the said Rule (Rule 5 of Rules,
1952) reveals that restriction on maintainability
of special appeal inter alia has been provided
with regard to the order passed 'in the exercise
of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or
Article 227 of the Constitution' in respect of any
judgment, order or award of a tribunal, Court or
statutory arbitrator made or purported to be
made in the exercise or purported exercise of
jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or
under any Central Act, with respect to any of
the matters enumerated in the State List or the
Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. (Para 17)