# Km. Supriya Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. and others - **Citation:** (2004) 2 ILRA 427 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2002-03-19 - **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 607 of 2004 - **Bench:** M. Katju, R.S. Tripathi - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/km-supriya-chaturvedi-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-40391 - **Pages:** 4 ## Headnote Constitution of India, Article 226Practice and Procedure-Maxium-'Dura Lex Sed Lex'- Explained-law and equity- Equity to supplement laws not the law to supplant it the equity-In case of conflict between law and equity- law will prevail. http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004 428 The Latin maxim "Dura Lex Sed Lex" means "The law is hard, but it is the law." Hence it must be obeyed. Once we start departing from law on equitable considerations then the rule of law gets under-mind and jeopardized. Equity can only supplement the law but cannot supplant it vide 2004 A.L.J.993Chhetrapal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others. If there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law which has to prevail, even if it causes hardship to some persons. No doubt if there is some ambiguity in a rule equitable considerations may apply, but in the present case the provision of clause 3.4 is very clear. Para 12 Case law discussed: AIR 2001 SC 1980 AIR 2001 SC 1121 (1979) 1 SCC 168 2003 (2) UPLBEC 1216 JT 1994 (1) SC 94 (1998) 9 SCC 395 1998 suppl.(1) SCC 714 2004 ALJ 993 ## Text http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in 2 All] Km. Supriya Chaturvedi V. State of U.P. and others 427 does not affirmatively considers or recognizes about the work and conduct and only raises a doubt cannot be relied upon to retire a person in public interest. The object of the compulsory retirement is chop off dead wood and to give honorable farewell to the employee before his retirement without causing stigma upon him. Such a farewell cannot be given on only raising a doubt on his ability to work. 27. A consideration of entries given to the petitioner shows that the officer recording the entries was not satisfied with the petitioner's work. That by itself is not a ground to hold that the petitioner had become a dead wood, and had lost his utility to the department. The failure to initiate required number of prosecution, directive and for timely production of diary before senior officer could not be a ground to retire him in public interest. 28. For the aforesaid reasons, I find that the petitioner's representations against adverse entries were not decided in accordance with law. The competent authority did not applied his mind and that the manner and method in which the representations were decided was arbitrary and unfair. The Screening Committee did not consider the previous and subsequent entries in the annual confidential roll of the officer and only raised a question on the assessment of his work and utility to the department. It did not positively report about his utility after assessing his entire work and conduct and thus the opinion of the appointing authority to retire him inn public interest was not justified and is vitiated. I further find that Sri Ram Singh was prejudiced against petitioner and allegations of malafides are proved against him. 29. Both the writ petitions are consequently allowed. The adverse entries to the petitioner for the years 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99 and the order dated 19.3.2002 as well as communication of the order dated 6.4.2002 rejecting petitioner's representations against adverse entries and the order dated 24.4.2002 passed by the Labour Commissioner, U.P. compulsorily retiring petitioner in public interest and the consequential letter dated 27.4.2002 are set aside. The petitioner shall be given continuity of service and with all consequential benefits. The petitioner is also held entitled to Rs.5,000/- as costs of these two writ petitions. --------- APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.5.2004 BEFORE THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J. THE HON'BLE R.S. TRIPATHI, J. Special Appeal No. 607 of 2004 Km. Supriya Chaturvedi ...Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and others ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri R.N. Singh Sri G.K. Singh Sri V.K. Singh Counsel for the Respondents: Sri B.N. Singh C.S.C. Constitution of India, Article 226Practice and Procedure-Maxium-'Dura Lex Sed Lex'- Explained-law and equity- Equity to supplement laws not the law to supplant it the equity-In case of conflict between law and equity- law will prevail. http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004 428 The Latin maxim "Dura Lex Sed Lex" means "The law is hard, but it is the law." Hence it must be obeyed. Once we start departing from law on equitable considerations then the rule of law gets under-mind and jeopardized. Equity can only supplement the law but cannot supplant it vide 2004 A.L.J.993Chhetrapal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others. If there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law which has to prevail, even if it causes hardship to some persons. No doubt if there is some ambiguity in a rule equitable considerations may apply, but in the present case the provision of clause 3.4 is very clear. Para 12 Case law discussed: AIR 2001 SC 1980 AIR 2001 SC 1121 (1979) 1 SCC 168 2003 (2) UPLBEC 1216 JT 1994 (1) SC 94 (1998) 9 SCC 395 1998 suppl.(1) SCC 714 2004 ALJ 993 (Delivered by Hon'ble M. Katju, J.) 1. This Special Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment dated 17.5.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge. 2. Heard Shri R.N. Singh and G.K. Singh learned counsel for the appellant, Shri B.N. Singh learned counsel for respondents no. 2 and 3 and learned Standing Counsel for respondents no. 1 and 4. 3. The petitioner had been granted a fellowship for completing Ph.D. under the Faculty Improvement Programme. By the order dated 7.4.2004 passed by the University Grant Commission, the Fellowship awarded to the appellant for completing Ph.D. under the Faculty Improvement Programme Scheme under the 10th plan has been cancelled on the ground that on the date of submission of her application, the appellant did not possess three years' teaching experience. The learned Single Judge upheld that order, and hence this appeal. 4. Clause 3.4 of the said Scheme, copy of which is annexure 3 to the affidavit filed in support of stay application before us states:- "3.4 The teacher should have at least 3 years of teaching experience on the date of submitting the application for award of teacher fellowship." 5. The language of Clause 3.4 is very clear. It is a settled principle of interpretation that when the language of a provision is plain and clear then the plain and literal meaning should be given to it, and the Court should not stretch or distort that meaning. 6. In Gurudevdatta Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 S.C. 1980 the Supreme Court observed: "It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in 2 All] Km. Supriya Chaturvedi V. State of U.P. and others 429 themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver." 7. Similarly, in Pattangrao Kadam Vs. Prithviraj AIR 2001 S.C. 1121 the Supreme Court observed that where the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous the same has to be given effect. It is not open to the court to first create an ambiguity and then look for some principle of interpretation. 8. Clause 3.4 uses the word "at least three years of teaching experience on the date of submitting the application". The words "at least 3 years" are sign out. The language used here is categorical. 9. Thus on the date when the appellant filed her application she should have at least 3 years teaching experience. As her teaching experience was three months short of three years hence she was not eligible as per clause '3.4'. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Vs. State of U.P. (1979) 1 SCC 168. That decision pertains to an employee confirmed in Govt. service as a Statistical Officer. In that case the Supreme Court has held that the appointment of the appellant as Labourcum-Conciliation Officer though he did not possess the necessary five years experience is regular and not void. 10. In our opinion this decision is wholly distinguishable. It pertains to a different class of person and has nothing to do with the Fellowship under the Scheme. Moreover, Ram Sarup's case (supra) has been distinguished by a Division Bench of our Court in Sushil Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Basic Shiksha Adhikari, 2003 (2) U.P.L.B.E.C. 1216 (vide para 15). It was observed therein that in Ram Sarup's case (supra) it has been specifically noted in para 2 of the judgment that there was specific power in the Govt. to relax the requirement of qualification. 11. There are a large number of decisions of the Supreme court in which it was held that if a teacher does not possess the necessary qualifications on the relevant date then his appointment cannot be held to be valid merely because subsequently he acquired such qualifications, e.g. U.P. Public Service Commission Vs. Alpana -J.T. 1994(1) S.C. 94, Kishori Lal Charmakar Vs. District Education Officer, 1998 (9) S.C.C. 395, etc. In Dr. Prit Singh Vs. S.K. Mangal, 1993 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 714 the Supreme Court observed: "If he was not eligible for appointment in terms of the prescribed qualifications on the date he was appointed by the Managing Committee subject to the approval of the Vice Chancellor, then later he cannot become eligible after the qualifications for the post were amended. As such we are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court, that on the date of appointment the appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications and as such his appointment had to be quashed." 12. The Latin maxim "Dura Lex Sed Lex" means "The law is hard, but it is the law." Hence it must be obeyed. Once we start departing from law on equitable considerations then the rule of law gets under-mind and jeopardized. Equity can only supplement the law but cannot supplant it vide 2004 A.L.J.993Chhetrapal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004 430 others. If there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law which has to prevail, even if it causes hardship to some persons. No doubt if there is some ambiguity in a rule equitable considerations may apply, but in the present case the provision of clause 3.4 is very clear. 13. For the reasons given above, this appeal is dismissed. --------- APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.05.2004 BEFORE THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J. THE HON'BLE R.S. TRIPATHI, J. Special Appeal No. 625 of 2004 Sri Vinod Kumar ...Petitioner Versus D.N. Agarwal, HJS Registrar (Listing) High Court, Allahabad and another ...Respondents Counsel for the Appellants: Sri K.R. Sirohi Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Satya Narain Mishra S.C. Principle of Natural Justice-Imposition of exemplary costs by Single Judge upon Registrar (Listing)-Special Appeal- No opportunity of hearing given before imposition of costs-Court should give opportunity before making adverse remarks-order set aside- In our opinion directing the Registrar (Listing) of this Court to pay exemplary cost of Rs.500/- was, with great respect to the learned Single Judge, unwarranted and uncalled for, particularly when these adverse remarks was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing. The rules of natural justice require that before adverse remarks made the Court should give opportunity of hearing to the person, but no such opportunity appears to have been given to the Registrar (Listing) before passing the impugned order dated 18.5.2004. Para 6 The Registrar General is therefore directed to prepare a scheme so that in future all documents filed in the Registry are placed as soon as possible thereafter on the record so that the functioning of the Court may not suffer. Para 7 (Delivered by Hon'ble M. Katju, J.) 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This special appeal has been filed against the impugned interim order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.5.2004 by which the Registrar (Listing) of this Court has been directed to pay exemplary cost of Rs. 500/- because some affidavit was not available on the record. 3. Since the facts are not in dispute it is not necessary to call for a counter affidavit. 4. A perusal of the impugned order dated 18.5.2004 shows that the learned Single Judge was unhappy because the affidavit dated 5.4.2004 filed by the petitioner in the Registry was not available on the record. While we fully share the concern of the learned Single Judge that the documents filed in this Court should as soon as possible be placed on the record, we cannot approve of the order directing imposition of exemplary cost on the Registrar (Listing) as well as the other personnel of the Registry.