# Krishna Chandra & Ors v. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 7 ILRA 146
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-07-23
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 7 of 2008
- **Bench:** Virendra Kumar-Ii
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/krishna-chandra-ors-v-smt-sarju-dei-died-ors-45857
- **Pages:** 68

## Headnote

Law
-
Adverse
Possession
-
Possession of defendants on disputed
portion 227-A and 227-C is "permissive
possession"
based
on
"implied
permission/license" given by plaintiff.
Hence defendants have not perfected their
title on the basis of alleged adverse
possession. (Para 141(ix))

D.W. 3 has also accepted that plaintiff, Durga
Prasad, is receiving rent from tenants of
aforesaid house. He never received rent from
tenants of aforesaid house. It is pertinent to
mention here that the entry/access of plaintiffs
in
disputed
house
was
never
restricted/prohibited in disputed house was
never
restricted/prohibited
from
common
portions of disputed house. Defendants are
unable to prove and plead specifically that when
and at which time possession of defendants of
disputed portions of house became adverse to
title of plaintiffs. (Para 141 (x))

(a) Substantial question of law cannot be
formulated only to appreciate and analyze
a
piece
of
evidence/documentary
evidence. (Para 140)

(b) Period of Limitation - Limitation Act,
1908: Articles 104, 136 137, 138, 140,
141, 142, 144 and 47 - Limitation Act,
1963: Articles 64, 65 - Provisions of
Article 142 and 144 of Old Act and Article
65 of New Act. Article 142 and 144 of Old
Act and Article 65 of New Act prescribe
period of limitation 12 years from the
period/ the date of the dispossession or
discontinuance and when the possession
of the defendant becomes adverse to the
plaintiff. (Para 127)

Since
the
respondents/plaintiffs
were
not
dispossess
by
the
appellants,
and
the
defendants/appellants
are
only
claiming
themselves as co-sharers of the disputed house,
7 All. Krishna Chandra & Ors. Vs. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
147
Article 142 of the Old Act would not apply to the
facts and circumstances of the present case.
(Para 128)

Provisions of Article 144 of the Old Act and
provisions of Article 65 of the New Act would
apply to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. Both the provisions provide period
of 12 years for perfecting the title on the basis
of adverse possession/ Therefore, materially
and substantially both these provisions are pari
materia. (Para 129)

Possession over potion of disputed house was
permissible possession/ license, Dargahi and his
family entered in the disputed house on the
basis of implied permission/license. Therefore,
the defendants/appellants could not in any way
perfected their title regarding disputed property.
The plaintiffs are the exclusive owner of the
disputed house and the defendants are not the
co-sharers. The defendants are compelled to
enter in shoes of their ancestors Bhagwan Das.
(Para 133)

Second Appeal rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,960 of 228,384. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39960 for what follows._

146 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
personal data of selected persons reflects
colorable exercise of powers by the
Executive.

24. In entirety, we are having no
doubt that the action of the State which is
subject matter of this public interest
litigation is nothing but an unwarranted
interference in privacy of people. The same
hence, is in violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.

25.

Accordingly,
the
District
Magistrate,
Lucknow
and
the
Commissioner
of
Police,
Lucknow
Commissionerate, Lucknow are directed to
remove the banners from the road side
forthwith. The State of Uttar Pradesh is
directed not to place such banners on road
side containing personal data of individuals
without having authority of law.

26.

A
report
of
satisfactory
compliance is required to be submitted by
the District Magistrate, Lucknow to the
Registrar General of this Court on or before
16th March, 2020. On receiving such
compliance report, the proceedings of this
petition shall stand closed.
----------
(2020)07ILR A146
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.07.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIRENDRA KUMAR-II, J.

Second Appeal No. 7 of 2008

Krishna Chandra & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
D.C. Mukerjee, Mohammad Aslam Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.K. Mehrotra, Anurag Srivastava, I.D.
Shukla, Ishwar Dutt Shukla, Santosh Kumar
Mehrotra

Civil
Law
-
Adverse
Possession
-
Possession of defendants on disputed
portion 227-A and 227-C is "permissive
possession"
based
on
"implied
permission/license" given by plaintiff.
Hence defendants have not perfected their
title on the basis of alleged adverse
possession. (Para 141(ix))

D.W. 3 has also accepted that plaintiff, Durga
Prasad, is receiving rent from tenants of
aforesaid house. He never received rent from
tenants of aforesaid house. It is pertinent to
mention here that the entry/access of plaintiffs
in
disputed
house
was
never
restricted/prohibited in disputed house was
never
restricted/prohibited
from
common
portions of disputed house. Defendants are
unable to prove and plead specifically that when
and at which time possession of defendants of
disputed portions of house became adverse to
title of plaintiffs. (Para 141 (x))

(a) Substantial question of law cannot be
formulated only to appreciate and analyze
a
piece
of
evidence/documentary
evidence. (Para 140)

(b) Period of Limitation - Limitation Act,
1908: Articles 104, 136 137, 138, 140,
141, 142, 144 and 47 - Limitation Act,
1963: Articles 64, 65 - Provisions of
Article 142 and 144 of Old Act and Article
65 of New Act. Article 142 and 144 of Old
Act and Article 65 of New Act prescribe
period of limitation 12 years from the
period/ the date of the dispossession or
discontinuance and when the possession
of the defendant becomes adverse to the
plaintiff. (Para 127)

Since
the
respondents/plaintiffs
were
not
dispossess
by
the
appellants,
and
the
defendants/appellants
are
only
claiming
themselves as co-sharers of the disputed house,
7 All. Krishna Chandra & Ors. Vs. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
147
Article 142 of the Old Act would not apply to the
facts and circumstances of the present case.
(Para 128)

Provisions of Article 144 of the Old Act and
provisions of Article 65 of the New Act would
apply to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. Both the provisions provide period
of 12 years for perfecting the title on the basis
of adverse possession/ Therefore, materially
and substantially both these provisions are pari
materia. (Para 129)

Possession over potion of disputed house was
permissible possession/ license, Dargahi and his
family entered in the disputed house on the
basis of implied permission/license. Therefore,
the defendants/appellants could not in any way
perfected their title regarding disputed property.
The plaintiffs are the exclusive owner of the
disputed house and the defendants are not the
co-sharers. The defendants are compelled to
enter in shoes of their ancestors Bhagwan Das.
(Para 133)

Second Appeal rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited: -

1. Santosh Hazari Vs Purushottam Tiwari (2001)
3 SCC 179

2. Madhukar Vs Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756

3. Jagdish Singh Vs Madhuri Devi (2008) 10 SCC
497

4. Munshi Manzoor Ali Khan Vs Sukhbasi Lal AIR
1974 SC 706, 1969 (2) UJ 343 SC

5. Nathulal Vs Ambaram 1981 SCC OnLine MP
76, 1982 MP LJ 59, AIR 1982 MP 114

6. Uma Shankar . & ors. Vs Dy. Director of
Consolidation (1979) SCC OnLine All 1161, 1979
RD 305

7. Shashidhar Vs Ashwini Uma Mathad (2015)
11 SCC 269, (2015) SCC OnLine SC 26

8. Vinod Kimar Vs Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC
(Civ) 521, (2014) SCC OnLine SC 826

9. Laliteshwar Prasad Singh Vs S.P. Srivastava
(2017) 2 SCC 415, (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 680, 2016
SCC OnLine SC 1476

10. G. Amalorpavam Vs R.C. Diocese of Madurai
(2006) 3 SCC 224

11. Arumgham Vs Sundarambal (1999) 4 SCC
350

12. Radha Raman Samanta Vs Bank of India
(2004) 1 SCC 605, (2004) SCC (L&S) 248

13. SBI Vs S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92, (2008)
2 SCC (L&S) 678

14. Gurunam Singh Vs Lehna Singh (2019) 7
SCC 641, (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 709, 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 374

15. Naresh and ors. Vs Hemant & ors. 2019 CC
OnLine SC 1490

16. Damodar Lal Vs Sohan Devi (2016) 3 SCC
78, (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 36, 2016 SCC OnLine SC
5

17. Uttam Chand (D) through Lrs. Vs Nathu
Ram (D) through Lrs. & ors. 2020 SCC OnLine
SC 37

18. Dalla Vs Nanhu (2018) SCC OnLine All 5845

19. Smt. Mamju Lata Agarwal Vs St. of U.P. &
ors. (2008) 1 UPLBEC 211

20. Dagadabai Vs Abbas (2017) 13 SCC 705,
(2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 718, 2017 SCC OnLine SC
431, 2017 (35) LCD 1112

21. Girish Chandra Singh Vs Sheo Nath 2013
SCC OnLine All 14241, (2013) 120 RD 337, 2013
(31) LCD 1193

22. Rama Kant Vs Borad of Revenue 2005 SCC
OnLine All 49, (2005) 1 AWC 929, (2005) 98 RD
389, 2005 (26) LCD 1057

23. Thulasidhara Vs Narayanappa (2019) 6 SCC
409

24. State of M.P. Vs Dungaji (2019) 7 SCC 465
148 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
25. Narayana Gramani Vs Mariammal (2018) 18
SCC 645

26. Arulmighu Nellukadai Mariamman Tirukkoil
Vs Tamiarasi (2019) 6 SCC 686

27. Chand Kaur Vs Mehar Kaur (2019) 12 SCC
202, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 426

28. State of Rajasthan Vs Shiv Dayal (2019) 8
SCC 637, (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 203, 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 1034

29. Saroop Singh Vs Banto (2005) 8 SCC 330

30. Des Raj Vs Bhagat Ram (2007) 9 SCC 641

31. Arundhati Mishra (Smt) Vs Sri Ram Charitra
Pandey (1994) 2 SCC 29 (followed)

32. State of Kerala Vs Mohd. Kunshi (2005) 10
SCC 139

(Delivered by Hon'ble Virendra Kumar -II, J.)

1. Heard Shri Mohammad Arif Khan,
learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri
Mohammad
Aslam
Khan
and
Shri
Mohiuddin Khan, learned counsel for the
appellants and Sri I.D.Shukla, learned
counsel for the respondents.

2. The present Second Appeal No. 7
of 2008: Krishna Chandra and others Vs.
Smt. Sarju Devi (since dead) and others,
has been preferred assailing impugned
judgment and decree dated 26.09.2007
delivered by the Court of Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Court No. 15, Sultanpur
in Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1970.

3. The first appellate court has set
aside
judgment
and
decree
dated
28.02.1970 delivered by the Court of
Munsif (South), Sultanpur in Regular Suit
No. 209 of 1963, by which suit of
respondents/
plaintiffs
was
dismissed.
During pendency of original suit before the
trial court defendant No.1-Dargahi had
expired and his legal representatives were
substituted. The present matter was decided
by learned trial Court Munsif South
Sultanpur vide judgment dated 28.02.1970.
The appellants assailed impugned judgment
dated 28.02.1970 in Civil Appeal No. 45 of
1970.

4. Learned District Judge, Sultanpur
dismissed aforesaid Appeal No. 45 of 1970
vide impugned judgment dated 10.11.1970.
The plaintiffs/respondents preferred Second
Appeal No. 2585 of 1970: Durga Prasad
and another Vs. Dargahi and others, before
this
Court,
which
was
decided
on
01.08.1980 by coordinate Bench and matter
was remanded to the first appellant court.

Therefore, Civil Appeal No. 45 of
1970 was again decided by first appellate
court
of
Additional
Civil
Judge-II,
Sultanpur vide impugned judgment dated
09.09.1986. The first appellate court again
dismissed the suit of plaintiffs/respondents.
Hence, Durga Prasad (since dead) through
his legal representatives Sarju Devi and
Bhaiya Ram preferred Second Appeal No.
677 of 1986 : Durga Prasad and another Vs.
Smt. Chameli Devi and others. This court
decided Second Appeal No. 677 of 1986 on
16.12.2004 and again remanded the matter
to the first appellate court.

5. The appellants of present second
appeal preferred Special Appeal to
Leave (Civil) assailing judgment dated
16.12.2004 passed by this court in
Second Appeal No. 677 of 1986. Hon'ble
Apex
Court
had
dismissed
it
on
26.04.2005.

6. The first appellate court of Civil
Judge (Senior Judge), Court No. 15,
Sultanpur again decided Civil Appeal No.
7 All. Krishna Chandra & Ors. Vs. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
149
45 of 1970 and delivered impugned
judgment and order dated 26.09.2007.
Learned first appellate court has set aside
impugned
judgment
dated
28.02.1970
delivered by the trial court of Munsif
South, Sultanpur and decreed the suit of
plaintiffs. Learned first appellate court has
directed to the appellants/defendants to
vacate the disputed house within one month
from the date of judgment.

7. The appellants/defendants have
preferred present second appeal assailing
impugned judgment and order dated
26.09.2007 delivered by first appellate
court.

8. It is pertinent to mention here that
during proceedings of Second Appeal No.
2585 of 1970 and Second Appeal No. 677
of 1986 and proceedings of Appeal No. 45
of 1970, original plaintiffs and defendants
have expired and their legal representatives
have been substituted.

9. In Second Appeal No. 7 of 2008,
originally Durga Prasad and Bhaiya Ram
were the plaintiffs and Dargahi, Phool
Chand, and Prem Chand, Deep Chand were
defendants, out of them Durga Prasad and
Bhaiya Ram-plaintiffs and Dargahi, Phool
Chand and Prem Chand defendants have
expired.

10. The present appeal was admitted
on 25.05.2009 and coordinate Bench has
passed
order
dated
25.05.2009
and
formulated substantial question of law after
hearing learned counsel for the appellants.
The order dated 25.05.2009 is reproduced
hereunder:

"Heard Sri D.C. Mukherjee,
learned counsel for the appellants and Sri
S.K. Mehrotra, Advocate who has put in
appearance on behalf of the caveatorrespondents.

Learned
counsel
for
the
appellants argued that by order dated
16.12.2004, passed in Second Appeal No.
677 of 1984, the another Bench of this
Court remanded the First Appeal to the
Court of District Judge, Sultanpur to
decide the appeal afresh; that despite the
directions of this Court that the appeal be
decided by the District Judge, the appeal
was decided by the Civil Judge, Senior
Division. Relying upon a decision reported
in 2005 (98) RD 389, Rama Kant Vs. Board
of Revenue, U.P. At Allahabad as well as
another decision reported in AIR 1923
Madras 351, Uthjuman smmal and another
Vs. Naina Mahomed Rowther the learned
counsel for the appellants argued that,
thus, the First Appeal was decided against
the directions given by this Court.

The order dated 16.12.2004,
passed by the another bench of this Court
reveals that the Second Appeal No. 677 of
1984 was against the appellate judgment
passed by 2nd Addl. Civil Judge. The
valuation of this suit and appeal was only
Rs. 4000/-. No reason is stated in the order
dated 16.12.2004 as to why the appeal be
not decided by the appellate court, having
jurisdiction and why it should be heard and
disposed of by the District Judge or Addl.
District Judge.

It appears that since majority of
the judgments assailed in Second Appeal
are the judgments given by the District
Judge or Addl. District Judge, hence, under
that impression, it was inadvertently
dictated that the appeal be decided afresh
by the District Judge.

The impugned judgment was
given by the Court having appellate
jurisdiction over the mater. The Bench by
which the order dated 16.12.2004 was
passed, did not intend that the appeal be
150 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
not disposed of by the Court having
jurisdiction over the First Appeal. The
point
regarding
jurisdiction
has,
therefore, no force. The appeal cannot be
admitted on this point.

The another point raised by the
learned counsel for the appellants is that a
Death Certificate of Harishchandra having
signatures and seal of the Issuing Authority
was lost or misplaced in the Court, hence,
it was re-constructed. That the First
Appellate Court by the impugned judgment
declined to rely upon such re-constructed
Death Certificate giving reasons that the
death certificate has no signature or seal of
the Issuing Authority. He argued that the
Death Certificate has the crucial impact
upon the judgment of the court below.

Learned counsel for the caveatorrespondents, on the other hand, argued that
death of Sri Harishchandra has no crucial
impact upon the judgment of the court
below. On being asked, the learned counsel
for the caveator-respondents refused to
admit
that
the
death
certificate
of
Harishchandra contains true and correct
information.

The appeal is admitted.

The substantial question of law
involved in this appeal is, (i) "Whether
rejection of the re-constructed Death
Certificate of Harishchandra on the
ground that it has no signature or seal of
the Issuing Authority, is legally correct
and sustainable."

Since
Sri
S.K.
Mehrotra
represents all the respondents, there is no
need of issuing notices to them.

The Original Suit was filed in the
year 1963 and it was decided in the year
1971. The matter came repeatedly to this
Court while it was pending in First
Appellate Court. Therefore, there is great
need that this Second Appeal be decided on
top priority.

Summon the lower court record
within two weeks through courier or in any
other efficient manner.

List in 2nd week of July, 2009
peremptorily for final hearing.

The
operation
and
implementation of the impugned judgment
and decree dated 26.09.2007, passed by
Civil Judge (S.D.), Sultanpur shall remain
stayed till next date of listing."

11. It is pertinent to mention here that
this Court remanded the matter twice to the
first appellate court. For the first time vide
order dated 01.08.1980 passed in Second
Appeal No. 2585 of 1970: Durga Prasad
and another Vs. Dargahi and others. The
order dated 01.08.1980 is reproduced
hereunder:

"The present second appeal has
been filed by the plaintiffs. Admitted fact of
the case are that the house was purchased
by a sale-deed dated 12.9.1919 by two
brothers Bhagwan Das and Sita Ram.
These brothers were separate and not
members of joint family at that time. On
19.2.1920 Bhagwan Das executed a sale
deed in favour of Sita Ram in respect of
half
share
in
the
disputed
house.
Subsequently he expired in 1926. The
defendants in the instant case are the sons
and grandsons of Bhagwandas. According
to the plff, he had granted a licence to the
defendants as they were the brothers son
and they were in occupation of a portion of
the house as licensees of the plaintiffs.

According to the plaint the
licence was granted in the year, 1955. The
licence
having
been
revoked,
the
defendants were liable to be ejected.

The defence was that the saledeed executed by Bhagwandas was a
fictitious
document
and
not
a
real
document.
It
was
claimed
that
the
7 All. Krishna Chandra & Ors. Vs. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
151
defendants were in possession of the
property in their own right or in the
alternative in adverse possession.

The trial court found that the
defendants were residing in the house from
before 1955 and had matured title by
adverse possession. The lower appellate
court, however, found that the principal
defendant Dargahi was brought up by Sita
Ram and his wife, alter death of Bhagwan
Das. However, the Court below held that
the question of a adverse possession was
not Rightly decided by the Munsif. He also
held that the findings of the trial court that
the licence was not proved and, therefore,
the defendants were in adverse possession
was also erroneous. However, without
going into the question of the fictitious
nature of the deed of the year, 1920, it held
just in one line that the deed of 1920
executed by Bhagwandas in favour of
Sitaram was fictitious.

After hearing the learned counsel
for the parties, I find that the case has not
at all been dealt within a correct manner
by the court below. I have seen the saledeed of the year, 1920, paper no.l1
executed by Bhagwan Das in favour of
Sitaram in presence of the Sub-Registrar.
The court below has also found that
Dargahi was brought up by Sita Ram
himself. The title of Sitaram was never
before denied by the defendants. Thus title
of Sitaram remained untarnished. Under
the circumstances articles 65 of the
Limitation Act could be applicable and not
article 64. The suit was based on title and
under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the
adverse possession can mature from the
date when the title of the defendant
becomes adverse to the plaintiff. I find that
stair case, open space and other things
shown in the map, which is a part of the
plaint and a part of the decree are
common. The plaintiff has not been
excluded from those common portion by the
defendant. For possession being adverse it
was essential that the plff. Should have
been denied access to the property. Further
the finding that the defendant was residing
with Sitaram and was brought up by him
and his wife would certainly go to prove a
case of implied licence. The lower
appellate court has also held that there was
no licence. However, I find that the matter,
in view of Article 64 and 65 of the
Limitation Act has to be decided in view of
the evidence on record.

I, however, find that the plff -
pleaded that the license was granted to
Dargahi in the year, 1955. The court below
has rejected the plft's case on the ground
that this Dargahi was proved to have been
residing in the Mohalla or in the house
from before do not go to prove the adverse
nature of the defendant. The possession
could be adverse only from the date when it
was not claimed by the defendant and not
from any imaginary point of time. The sale
deed of 1920 is binding on Dargahi and his
heirs. It is not disputed that Bhagwandas
had executed the sale - deed.

Under the circumstances the
judgment and decree passed by the lower
appellate court, dismissing the suit of the
plff. is set aside and the case is sent down
to it for deciding it afresh in accordance
with law and observations made above. As
the case is being remanded to the lower
appellate court and the judgment and
decree under appeal has been set aside, the
appellant will be entitled to a refund of the
court fee paid on the names of the appeal
under section 13 of the court fees Act."

12. This court in Second Appeal No.
677 of 1986: Durga Prasad (deceased) and
another Vs. Smt. Chamela Devi and others,
passed the order dated 16.12.2004, which is
as follows:
152 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"1. This is second appeal under
Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure
against the judgment and decree dated
9.9.86 in Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1970
passed by IInd Addl. Civil Judge, Sultanpur
dismissing the appeal against the judgment
and decree dated 28.2.1970 in Regular suit
No. 209 of 1963 passed by Munsif South
Sultanpur dismissing the suit.

2. I have heard Shri S. K.
Mehrotra for the plaintiffs - appellants and
Shri PN. Mathur for the defendants -
respondents.

Plaintiffs' case

3. The plaintiffs - appellants filed
a suit for possession against Dargahi
predecessor of the respondents and his
sons alleging therein that Ramanand
original owner of the house in dispute
executed a sale deed dated 12. 9. 1919
selling the above house for Rs. 2,000 / - to
Sitaram predecessor of the plaintiff and
Bhagwan
Das
Predecessor
of
the
defendants who were real brother. The sale
deed was registered on 18.10.1919 and
possession of the house was delivered after
sale. Bhagwan Das and Sitaram had half
share each in the house. Bhagwan Das sold
his half share in the house to Sitaram for
Rs. 1, 000 / by registered sale deed dated
19.2.1920 and delivered the possession of
his share to Sitaram and since then Sitaram
has been the owner of the entire house. It is
alleged that in 1926, Sitaram reconstructed
the house. The defendant no. 1 Dargahi
(deceased) came to occupy the portion of
the disputed house as a licensee of the
plaintiffs in 1955. Plaintiffs revoked the
above license the above license vide notice
dated 24.4.1963 but the defendant did not
vacate it.

Defendants' case

4. The case of the defendants is
that they are the co-sharers of the house
and the sale deed executed by Bhagwan
Das dated 19.12.1920 was a sham
document which was executed only with the
object of saving the share of Bhagwan Das
from passing to his third wife on the death
of Bhagwan Das. The case of the licence
was denied and plea of adverse possession
was taken.

Finding of the trial court

5. The trial court rejected the
plaintiffs' case of grant of licence and
defendants' case of adverse possession. But
the plea of co-ownership taken by the
defendants was accepted and the suit was
dismissed.

6. Plaintiffs filed the first appeal
which was dismissed. The plaintiffs -
appellants filed second appeal no. 2585 of
1970 and the judgment and decree of the
first appellate court dated 1.8.1980 was set
aside and the matter was remanded. It is
after the remand that the judgment dated
9.9.1986 has been passed Civil Appeal No.
45 of 1970; Durga Prasad and others Vs.
Chameli and others which has been
impugned in this second appeal.

Substantial question of law

7.
The
following
substantial
question of law were formulated on
19.2.1987:

"Whether the learned court
below has given contrary findings on
certain
points
which
were
already
concluded by the order of the High Court
through which the case was remanded."

8. After hearing the learned
counsel for the parties and the perusal of
the judgment of this court in earlier second
appeal no. 2585 of 1970, I find that there is
a concluded finding of the court that the
sale deed dated 19.2.1920 is binding on
Dargahi and his heirs and it is not disputed
that Bhagwan Das had executed a sale
deed. Just contrary to this finding, the first
appellate court has given the finding that
sale deed is a Sham transaction. The High
7 All. Krishna Chandra & Ors. Vs. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
153
Court has held that title of Sitaram was
never denied by the defendants and thus
title of Sitaram remains untarnished. Under
the circumstances, Article 65 of the
Limitation Act could be applicable and not
Article 64 of the Limitation Act. It was also
held that from the position of the passage
etc. it is established that plaintiffs were
never excluded from the common portion
by the defendants. For possession being
adverse, it was essential that the plaintiffs
should have been denied access to the
property. It was also held that the
defendants were residing with Sitaram and
were brought up by him and it certainly
goes to prove the case of implied licence.

9. It was also held that the
rejection of the plaintiffs' plea of licence on
the ground that Dargahi was proved to be
residing in Mohalla or in house from
before, dies does not prove adverse nature
of possession and possession could be
adverse from the date when it is so claimed
by the defendants and not from any
imaginary point.

10. Learned counsel for the
defendants- respondents Shri P.N. Mathur
has also conceded that it appears that the
first appellate court has not looked into the
judgment of this Court dated 1.8.1980 in
Second appeal no. 2585 of 1970.

Finding on substantial question

11. I am of the view that the first
appellate court cannot go beyond the
findings recorded by this court in second
appeal at the time of remand of the matter.
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court
being contrary to the finding concluded by
this court in the earlier judgment dated
1.8.1980 in the second appeal arising out
of the same suit is to be set aside.

12. In view of the above the
appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment
and decree dated 9.9.1986 passed in civil
appeal no. 45 of 1970: Durga Prasad and
others Vs. Chameli and others is hereby set
aside. Appeal is remanded to the District
Judge Sultanpur to decide it afresh after
hearing both the parties and after keeping
in view the judgment of this court dated
1.8.1980 given in second appeal no. 2585
of 1970: Durga Prasad and other Vs.
Dargahi and others. Costs easy."

13. Earlier the appellants of present
appeal preferred the aforesaid Special
Leave to Appeal (Civil) before the Hon'ble
Apex Court. Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed
Special
Appeal
vide
order
dated
26.04.2005, which is as follows:

"Permission
to
file
Special
Leave Petition is granted.

We are not inclined to interfere
with the impugned order of the High
Court. However, in view of the delay
which has already taken place, it is
directed that the first appellate court shall
hear and decide the appeal expeditiously
by giving an out of turn date of hearing in
the matter.

The special leave petition is
dismissed."

14. On 17.02.2020 the following
additional substantial question of law has
been framed:

"(ii) Whether in any view of the
matter the impugned judgment and decree
passed by learned lower appellate court is
illegal, perverse and against the evidence
brought on record arises as additional
substantial question of law."

15. Learned Senior Counsel has
argued on the basis of grounds of present
second appeal that the present second
appeal has been preferred by the appellants
assailing
impugned
judgment
dated
154 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
26.09.2007 on the grounds that first
appellate court acted illegally and with
material irregularity in reversing the
judgment delivered by the learned trial
Court.
The
learned
trial
court
has
disbelieved
evidence
of
plaintiffs'
witnesses. Learned first appellate court has
not assigned any reason for taking different
view. The present original suit was filed on
22.08.1963, therefore, provisions of Article
142 and 144 of old Limitation Act, prior to
its amendment of 1963 were applicable,
which were materially and substantially
different than those of Article 65 of new
Act.
Learned
first
appellate
court
committed manifest error in misinterpreting
the provisions of Article 144 of old Act in
the light of new Article 65 of Amendment
Act, which was not applicable to the facts
narrated in the plaint.

16. It is also pleaded in grounds of
appeal that first appellate court committed
manifest error of law in rejecting the Death
Certificate of Harishchandra son of original
defendant no.1 on the ground that said
certificate did not bear seal and signature of
any authority and is only signed by the
original defendant losing sight of the fact
that the original certificate which was filed
was sealed and signed by the authority,
which were lost by the court officials and
its copy was reconstructed and kept on
record under the orders of the court.
Therefore, first appellate Court has drawn
wrong conclusion.

17. It is also mentioned in grounds of
appeal that first appellate court illegally
and with material irregularity in completely
ignoring and not considering another
material documents brought on record by
the plaintiffs (Ex 25) a copy of written
statement filed in S.C.C. Suit No. 20 of
1953 and its degree (Ex 26). These
documents were considered and relied upon
by the learned trial Court for holding that
the defendant No. 1 had been residing in
the house in dispute from much before the
alleged license was created falsifying the
case of the plaintiffs.

18. Learned counsel for appellants
further argued that the first appellate court
has
not
considered
that
rights
of
appellants/defendants
matured
and
perfected by their adverse possession on
the disputed house. The first appellate court
has not considered this fact that ancestor of
appellants Sri Bhagwan Das on the date of
execution of sale deed dated 19.02.1920
had not delivered the possession to Sita
Ram-ancestor
of
the
plaintiffs.
Sri
Bhagwan Das continued to occupying the
disputed house during his life time and
thereafter the defendant Dargahi (since
dead) continued his possession till his death
and thereafter appellants are continuing in
possession.

19. It is further argued and pleaded by
appellants that learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division) Sultanpur had no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the civil appeal contrary to
the specific direction given by this Court
for deciding the appeal after remand by the
District Judge himself.

20. On the basis of aforesaid grounds
the
impugned
judgment
and
decree
delivered by learned first appellate court
been termed by the appellants as illegal,
perverse and against the material available
on record.

21. In the grounds of appeal, learned
counsel for the appellants have formulated
seven substantial questions of law, whereas
as mentioned above, only two substantial
questions of law were framed by this court
7 All. Krishna Chandra & Ors. Vs. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
155
and admitted present appeal on the
aforesaid two substantial questions of law
only.

22.

This
court
has
discarded
arguments of learned counsel for the
appellants that first appellate court of Civil
Judge (Senior Judge), Court No. 15,
Sultanpur was not competent to decide
present appeal, because this court vide
order dated 16.12.2004 directed to the
District Judge, Sultanpur to decide appeal
No. 45 of 1970: Durga Prasad and others
Vs. Chameli and others himself.

23. This court at the point of time of
admission of present appeal vide order
dated 25.05.2009 has specifically observed
as follows:

"The order dated 16.12.2004,
passed by the another bench of this Court
reveals that the Second Appeal No. 677 of
1984 was against the appellate judgment
passed by 2nd Addl. Civil Judge. The
valuation of this suit and appeal was only
Rs. 4000/-. No reason is stated in the order
dated 16.12.2004 as to why the appeal be
not decided by the appellate court, having
jurisdiction and why it should be heard and
disposed of by the District Judge or Addl.
District Judge.

It appears that since majority of
the judgments assailed in Second Appeal
are the judgments given by the District
Judge or Addl. District Judge, hence, under
that impression, it was inadvertently
dictated that the appeal be decided afresh
by the District Judge.

The impugned judgment was
given by the Court having appellate
jurisdiction over the mater. The Bench by
which the order dated 16.12.2004 was
passed, did not intend that the appeal be
not disposed of by the Court having
jurisdiction over the First Appeal. The
point regarding jurisdiction has, therefore,
no force. The appeal cannot be admitted on
this point."

24. I have heard learned counsel for
the appellants and learned counsel for the
respondents.
They
concluded
their
arguments on 26.02.2020.

25. At the point of time of preparing
judgment it was revealed that Exhibits-4 to
8 and 12 to 26 and the Exhibits-A-2 to A-7
and A-12 have been misplaced or weeded
out by the trial court. It was reported by the
concerned clerk that Natthi-Ga has been
weeded out, therefore, vide order dated
16.03.2020 the District Judge, Sultanpur
was directed to inquire into the matter and
a
report
was
called
for
whether
reconstruction of these aforesaid exhibits
was possible or not. It was also directed to
fix the responsibility of the concerned
employee
regarding
misplacement
of
aforesaid
exhibits.
District
Judge,
Sultanpur, has reported on 09.06.2020 that
the Assistant Record Keeper has weeded
out the Natthi-Ga of Regular Suit No. 209
of 1963 on 09.01.1979. The learned District
Judge has also examined Shri Abdul
Kareem, Advocate, engaged on behalf of
plaintiff and Shri O. P. Lal, Advocate,
engaged on behalf of defendant. Both the
learned counsels have apprised the learned
District Judge that they have no copy of the
aforesaid documents weeded out by the
Assistant Record Keeper. The District
Judge has also reported that Assistant
Record
Keeper,
Shri
Ram
Prakash
Srivastava has expired on 10.11.1990 after
taking V.R.S. on 20.07.1990. His wife is
getting family pension.

In the aforesaid circumstances,
the District Judge has reported that
reconstruction of Exhibits-4 to 8 and 12 to
156 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
26 and the Exhibits-A-2 to A-7 and A-12 is
not possible.

26. Learned counsel for appellants
Shri Mohammad Aslam Khan and the
learned counsel for respondents, Shri I. D.
Shukla, have also stated at the Bar that they
have no copy of the aforesaid exhibits and
the present second appeal may be decided
on the basis of material available on record.

27. I have perused record of Original
Suit No. 209 of 1963: Durga Prasad (since
dead) and others Vs. Dargahi (since dead)
and others and record of First Appeal No.
45 of 1970: Durga Prasad (since dead) and
others Vs. Dargahi (since dead) and others.

28. The original plaintiffs Durga
Prasad and Bhaiya Ram instituted Original
Suit No. 269 of 1963 on 22.08.1963 along
with plaint map, in which portion of
disputed house in possession of defendant
Dargahi, Phool Chand, Prem Chand and
Deep Chand was marked by "red colour".

Factual Matrix:

29. The brief facts contended by the
plaintiffs in their plaint are that House No.
618 (A) Khata No. 620 situated in Mohalla
Parkinsganj city Sultanpur was owned by
one Ram Anand son of Baladin Kalwar,
who sold it to Sita Ram and Bhagwan Das
by means of sale deed dated 12.09.1919 for
consideration of amount of Rs. 2,000/-. At
this point of time Sita Ram and Bhagwan
Das were living separately. Bhagwan Das
and Sita Ram were having equal share in
the house purchased by them.

30. It is further pleaded that Bhagwan
Das sold his half share in the disputed
house to Sita Ram, who is grand father of
plaintiffs by means of registered sale deed
dated 19.02.1920 for consideration of Rs.
1000/- and delivered possession to Sita
Ram. Therefore, Sita Ram became the
owner of entire house. The ancestor (Sita
Ram) of plaintiffs demolished the house
purchased by them and renovated it in the
month of April, 1926 in accordance with a
map
approved
by
Municipal
Board,
Sultanpur.

31. It is also mentioned in grounds of
plaint that Sita Ram died nearly 27 years
back leaving behind his son Bindeshwari,
who was father of the plaintiffs and nearest
heirs of Sita Ram. Bindeshwari expired in
the year 1954 and plaintiffs inherited the
disputed house. Their names were mutated
on
the
entire
house
in
place
of
Bindeshwari. The grand father of plaintiff,
their father paid and now the plaintiffs were
paying House Tax and Water Tax and
carried out whitewashing and repairing in
it.

32. It is further pleaded that disputed
house consists of seven portion of which
disputed portions "A" and "C" of the house
in dispute are shown in sketch map/plaint
map. Five other portions are in possession
of tenants. Names of tenants is mentioned
in para 6 of the plaint. The disputed
accommodation
in
possession
of
defendants/appellants has been numbered
by Municipal Board, Sultanpur as 227A
and 227C.

33. It is further pleaded that disputed
portion of house of plaintiffs was given on
licence in the year 1955 to defendant No. 1
to live in these portions.

34. The plaintiffs were not intending
to keep defendants in the disputed portion
of house as licencee. Therefore, they gave
notice on 24.04.1963, which was served on
defendant No.1 Dargahi (since dead) on
7 All. Krishna Chandra & Ors. Vs. Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
157
25.04.1963. The plaintiffs asked defendants
to vacate within a month, failing which, it
was informed that legal action would be
taken against them. The condition of
license has been mentioned by plaintiffs in
para-7 of the plaint.

35. The defendants instead of
vacating disputed portion they expressed
that they are co-owners of disputed house
along with the plaintiffs and they are not
willing
to
vacate.
Hence,
plaintiffs
instituted the present suit.

36. During pendency of original suit,
the
trial
Court
passed
order
dated
09.08.1967, 16.03.1967 and 17.04.1967, on
the basis of which, under orders passed by
trial court, plaint was amended and on the
basis of market value, valuation of suit for
the purpose of payment of court fees was
mentioned as amount of Rs. 4,000/- and
court fees amounting to Rs. 537.50 was
paid by the plaintiffs.

37. On the basis of above mentioned
grounds plaintiffs sought relief for decree
of possession of the portion in occupation
of the defendants along with cost.

38. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 filed
their written statement, paper No.-30 Ka,
jointly and defendant No. 4 filed written
statement 33Ka through his guardian. In
both the written statement all defendants
made same contentions. In the grounds it
has been mentioned that Bhagwan Das and
Sita Ram had not partitioned the disputed
house in the year (1919) or after it.
Bhagwan Das had not sold his half share in
the disputed house to Sita Ram nor he was
ever ousted from it. The ancestor of the
defendants Bhagwan Das had been living
in the disputed portion of house purchased
by him until his death. Bhagwan Das has
expired. The defendants are in possession
of the disputed accommodation as owners
thereof.

39. It is further pleaded that Bhagwan
Das died in the year 1924, when defendant
No. 1 Dargahi was only 07-08 years old,
hence he was brought up by Sita Ram. Sita
Ram and Bhagwan Das were real brothers
and at the point of time of death of
Bhagwan Das they were members of joint
family. It is also mentioned in written
statement that mother of defendant No. 1
Dargahi expired in the year 1916, when he
was six months old. Smt. Mera wife of Sita
Ram brought him up.

40. It is further pleaded by defendant
that Bhagwan Das solemnized his second
marriage, but his second wife died issueless,
then
Bhagwan
Das
again
solemnized
marriage with Smt. Lakhpati. Bhagwan Das
fell ill and suffered from Tuberculosis. Smt.
Lakhpati
was
young
lady,
therefore,
Bhagwan Das and Sita Ram got executed
sham sale deed dated 19.02.1920 only to save
property of Bhagwan Das from Smt.
Lakhpati. In fact Bhagwan Das had not
intended to sell his share in disputed property
nor delivered possession to Sita Ram. The
sale deed is fictitious and forged one.
Bhagwan Das was younger brother of Sita
Ram and was under his influence. Therefore,
sale deed executed by him does not extend
any benefit to the plaintiffs.

41. The defendants admitted the
contentions of plaint that Sita Ram was
father of Bindeshwari Prasad and plaintiffs
are their descendants. It is further pleaded
that defendant No.1 Dargahi was nephew
of Sita Ram, therefore, he was also his heir.

42. It is pertinent to mention here that
the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 has mentioned
158 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contradictory pleadings in para 4 and para
15 of written statement 30 Ka. In para-4,
defendant-Dargahi
contended
that
he
resided in the disputed house purchased by
his father continuously after purchase and
since death of Sita Ram plaintiffs were in
possession of disputed house. Whereas in
para 15 he has pleaded that defendant
Dargahi resided in the house with plaintiff,
in which, they are residing at present and
they were doing business in this house.

43. The defendants have pleaded
alternatively that they are residing in the
disputed house on the basis of adverse
possession for more than 12 years.