# Krishna Nand Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 753
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-01-22
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 18087 of 2021
- **Bench:** Prakash Padia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/krishna-nand-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47609
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Appointment on the post of
Assistant Teacher - Complaint claiming the
appointment as illegal appointment was
made
-
Maintainability
-
Preliminary
objection to the locus of complainant raised
- Word 'Aggrieved person' defined - Held,
the expression 'Aggrieved person' denotes
an elastic and to extent, an elusive concept.
It cannot be confined with the bounds of a
rigid exact and comprehensive definition -
No legal rights of the petitioner have been
denied or deprived. He has not sustained
any injury to any legal protected interest by
payment
of
salary
in
favour
of
the
respondent no. 6. Therefore he is not a
'person aggrieved' and he has no locus
standi to challenge the payment of salary.
(Para 14 and 15)
B. Service Law - Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 - District Magistrate issued
direction to the educational authorities -
Power of District Magistrate challenged -
Principle of no interference by the foreign
authority laid down - Held, the District
Magistrate is a foreign authority under the
Scheme of the Act - District Magistrate has
no authority under the Act, 1921 or Act No.
24 of 1971 to take a decision in respect of
appointment or salary of teaching or nonteaching staff - If a statute impose a duty
on an authority he must exercise that power
independently and personally without any
supervisory control of some other authority.
Even a superior authority cannot interfere in
his decision which he has to take personally.
(Para 24, 26 and 33)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-

## Text

4 All. Krishna Nand Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
753
the
impugned
charge-sheet
dated
22.01.2022 passed by respondent no.4 so as
to warrant any interference by this Court in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

28. The present writ petition being
devoid of merits and is accordingly
dismissed.

29. However, it is provided that the
departmental inquiry be initiated against
the petitioners and brought to its logical
end, strictly in accordance with law,
keeping in view that the recommendation
of Lokayukta is only to the extent of
punishment to the petitioner as per law, at
the earliest possible preferably within a
period of three months from the date of
production of a certified copy of this order
before the disciplinary authority.
----------
(2022)04ILR A753
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.12.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

Writ-A No. 18087 of 2021

Krishna Nand Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sandeep Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anand Kumar Pandey

A. Service Law - Appointment on the post of
Assistant Teacher - Complaint claiming the
appointment as illegal appointment was
made
-
Maintainability
-
Preliminary
objection to the locus of complainant raised
- Word 'Aggrieved person' defined - Held,
the expression 'Aggrieved person' denotes
an elastic and to extent, an elusive concept.
It cannot be confined with the bounds of a
rigid exact and comprehensive definition -
No legal rights of the petitioner have been
denied or deprived. He has not sustained
any injury to any legal protected interest by
payment
of
salary
in
favour
of
the
respondent no. 6. Therefore he is not a
'person aggrieved' and he has no locus
standi to challenge the payment of salary.
(Para 14 and 15)
B. Service Law - Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 - District Magistrate issued
direction to the educational authorities -
Power of District Magistrate challenged -
Principle of no interference by the foreign
authority laid down - Held, the District
Magistrate is a foreign authority under the
Scheme of the Act - District Magistrate has
no authority under the Act, 1921 or Act No.
24 of 1971 to take a decision in respect of
appointment or salary of teaching or nonteaching staff - If a statute impose a duty
on an authority he must exercise that power
independently and personally without any
supervisory control of some other authority.
Even a superior authority cannot interfere in
his decision which he has to take personally.
(Para 24, 26 and 33)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-
1. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs Rashan Kumar
reported in 1976 (1) SCC 671
2. Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja Vs St. of
Guj., (1995) 5 SCC 302.
3. Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs St. of Pun.; (2001)
6 SCC 260
4. Purtabpore Co. Ltd. Vs Cane Commissioner of
Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 308
5. Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots'
Association of India (A.L.P.A.I.) & ors. Vs.
Director General of Civil Aviation & ors., (2011)
5 SCC 43

(Delivered by Hon'ble Prakash Padia, J.)
754 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. Heard counsel for the parties.

2. The petitioner has preferred the
present
petition
inter-alia
with
the
following prayer:-

"i) Issue a writ or direction or pass an
order in the nature of MANDAMUS
commanding the respondent no. 2 and 3 to
pass
an
appropriate
order
on
the
complaint/representation dated 07.09.2021
submitted by the petitioner and take
appropriate action against the guilty and
take other measures as per the law, as
early as possible and within such time
frame, which this Hon'ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the circumstances of the
case;"

3. Facts in brief as contained in the
present writ petition are that institution in
question namely Jangli Baba Intermediate
College Gadwar District Ballia is a
recognized Intermediate College, the same
is on the grant in aid list by the State
Government and all the teachers and
employees are getting their salary from the
State Exchequer as per the provisions of the
U.P. High Schools And Intermediate
Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers
and Other Employees) Act, 1971.

4. Certain post of Assistant Teachers
fell vacant in the Institution in the year
1998. An application was submitted by the
Committee of Management before the
District Inspector of Schools seeking prior
permission to fill up the vacant post.

5. Vide order dated 04.02.1998, the
Joint Director of Education declined to give
permission to fill up the post to the
Committee of Management. Aggrieved
against the aforesaid order passed by the
Joint Director of Education, the Committee
of Management filed a Writ Petition
No.23443 of 1998 (C/M Jangali Baba
Intermediate College Vs. State of U.P. and
others) before this Court. The aforesaid
writ petition was finally disposed of with a
direction to the Director of Education, U.P.
Lucknow to look into the matter and pass
appropriate
orders
after
taking
into
consideration
the
grievances
of
the
petitioner and after providing opportunity
of hearing within a period of one month.
Pursuant to the aforesaid order, a decision
has been taken by the Director of Education
on 23.07.1998. By the aforesaid order, the
Director of Education (Secondary) U.P.
Lucknow rejected the claim set up by the
Management.
Thereafter
another
writ
petition was filed by the respondent no.6
namely Ram Ji Singh before this Court in
the year 1999 in which directions were
given by this Court on 22.02.1999 by
which District Inspector of Schools was
directed to decide the matter in accordance
with law. Pursuant to the order passed by
this Court dated 22.2.1999, an order was
passed by the District Inspector of Schools
Ballia on 27.5.2003 by which financial
approval was granted by him in respect of
the payment of salary to the respondent
no.6. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the
respondent no.6 was paid his salary for the
month of May, 2003 to August, 2003.
Thereafter another order was passed by him
on 25.6.2005 by which petitioner started
getting his salary regularly.

6. It is argued that against the
aforesaid
illegal
payment,
certain
complaints were made before the Director
of Education (Secondary) by one Rajesh
Kumar Singh on 12.04.2007 but till date no
decision has been taken on the same. After
expiry of more than 14 years, a fresh
complaint has been made by the present
petitioner before the Director of Education
4 All. Krishna Nand Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
755
(Secondary) U.P. Lucknow 07.09.2021. In
the aforesaid complaint, it is stated that the
respondent no.6 is getting his salary
without any legal basis. In this view of the
matter, it is argued that mandamus be
issued directing the educational authorities
to
pass
appropriate
orders
on
the
complaint/representation of the petitioner
dated 07.09.2021. It is further argued that
another representation was submitted by
the petitioner on the same date before the
District Magistrate, Ballia. On the said
representation, directions were issued by
the District Magistrate, Ballia to the
District Inspector of Schools, Ballia to
inquire the matter and do the needful.

7. A preliminary objection has been
raised by Shri Anand Kumar Pandey,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent no.6 that present petition is not
at all maintainable in view of the fact that
petitioner does not fall within the definition
of person aggrieved. It is further argued
that the respondent No.6 is getting his
salary regularly since May, 2003 pursuant
to the order passed by the District Inspector
of Schools, Ballia and he is going to retire
very soon. It is further argued that the order
passed by the District Inspector of Schools,
Ballia was never challenged by any person
till date.

8. In response to the same it is argued
by the counsel for the petitioner that
present petition is fully maintainable under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India due
to the fact that:-

1. petitioner is a Citizen of India

2. Petitioner is a social worker and

3. Petitioner is tax payer.

9. When query was made by the
Court that enquiring about the nature of
social work which is undertaken by the
petitioner,
no
suitable
reply
was
provided. Apart from the same nothing
has been stated in the writ petition that
regarding the nature and extent of social
work undertaken by the petitioner.

10. From perusal of the record, it is
clear that financial approval was granted by
the District Inspector of Schools, Ballia in
favour of the respondent no. 6 initially on
27.05.2003 and thereafter on 25.06.2005
and since then the respondent No.6 is
getting his salary from the State Exchequer.

11. It is further argued by the counsel
for the respondent no. 6 that the age of
respondent no.6 is about 62 years and he is
going to be superannuated from school. It
is further argued that no illegality or
irregularity
what
so
ever
has
been
committed by the appointing authorities in
respect of appointment of the respondent
no.6. It is further argued that District
Magistrate has absolutely no role what so
ever to make any kind of inquiry in respect
of appointment of teachers and employees
in the educational institutions.

12. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

13. Insofar as the preliminary
objection raised by the counsel for the
respondent no.1 is concerned, the law has
already been laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Jasbhai
Motibhai Desai Vs. Rashan Kumar
reported in 1976 (1) SCC 671. Insofar as
the present petitioner is concerned, he is
only a complainant and the complaint was
first time filed by him in the year 2021
regarding payment of salary in favour of
respondent No.6 since 2003. Nothing has
been stated in the writ petition or the entire
representation regarding delay in filing the
756 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
complaint
by
the
petitioner
against
respondent No.6.

14. In paragraph 13 of the aforesaid
judgement, the word "Aggrieved person"
has been dealt with. It is stated that the
expression "Aggrieved person" denotes an
elastic and to extent, an elusive concept. It
cannot be confined with the bounds of a
rigid exact and comprehensive definition.
Paragraph Nos.13 and 48 of the Jasbhai
Motibhai Desai (supra) are reproduced
below:-

"13. This takes us to the further
question: Who is an "aggrieved person"
and what are the qualifications requisite
for
such
a
status?
The
expression
"aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and,
to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot
be confined within the bounds of a rigid,
exact and comprehensive definition. At
best, its feature can be described a broad
tentative manner. Its scope and meaning
depends on diverse, variable factors such
as the content and intent of the statute of
which contravention is alleged, the specific
circumstances of the case, the nature and
extent of the petitioner's interest and the
nature and extent of the prejudice or injury
suffered by him. English Courts have
sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a
wide
construction
on
the
expression
"aggrieved
person".
However,
some
general
tests
have
been devised
to
ascertain whether an applicant is eligible
for this category so as to have the
necessary locus standi or 'standing' to
invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

48. In the light of the above
discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the
appellant has not been denied or deprived
of a legal right. He has not sustained injury
to any legally protected interest. In fact, the
impugned order does not operate as a
decision against him, much less does it
wrongfully affect his title to something. He
has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He
has suffered no legal grievance. He has no
legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on.
Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved'
and has no locus standi to challenge the
grant of the No Objection Certificate."

15. It reveals from perusal of the
record that no legal rights of the petitioner
have been denied or deprived. He has not
sustained any injury to any legal protected
interest by payment of salary in favour of
the respondent no.6. Therefore he is not a
"person aggrieved" and he has no locus
standi to challenge the payment of salary.

16. Apart from the same, it is clear
from the record that no action has been
taken by the petitioner from the year 2003
till 2021. When the respondent No.6 is
going to retire after about 18 years, a
compliant
has
been
made
and
no
explanation was given either in the writ
petition or in the representation regarding
delay in filing the complaint by the
petitioner against respondent No.6.

17. Insofar as the complaint made by
the petitioner before the District Magistrate
is concerned, the instructions issued on the
same day by him, i.e., on 07.09.2021.

18. The question, that calls for
determination is as to whether the District
Magistrate
has
any
power
to
issue
directions to Educational Authorities under
Statutes, which are self-contained Act.

19. The issue in question has
enormous
practical
implication.
The
institution is govern by the provisions of
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921
(hereinafter referred to as the Act), the
4 All. Krishna Nand Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
757
regulations framed thereunder and the U.P.
High Schools and Intermediate Colleges
(Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other
Employees) Act, 1971.

20. I find it helpful to have a bird eye
view of both the Acts to find out the true
intention of the Legislature.

21.

In
the
U.P.
Intermediate
Education
Act,1921,
various
sections
defines the authorities under the Act. Under
section 2 (aaa) "Director" means the
Director of Education, Uttar Pradesh and it
includes
an
Additional
Director
of
Education; 2 (dd) defines "Regional Deputy
Director of Education" means the Deputy
Director of Education in charge of a region
and includes an officer authorized by the
State Government to perform all or any of
the duties of a Regional Deputy Director.
The Superintendent and Invigilator are
defined under section 2. Section 3 of the
Act deals with the constitution of the
Board. The Board comprises several
officers such as Director , State Council of
Educational Research and Training , Uttar
Pradesh, Lucknow, Additional Director of
Education,
the
Director,
Bureau
of
Psychology, Allahabad one Professor of a
Degree College, one Professor of a
Engineering College, one Professor of
Agricultural University,one Professor of
Medical College (all nominated by the
State Government), Head of Institution,
Teachers, Principal etc. It is aforesaid
persons who constitute the Board, the
District Magistrate is not even an ex officio
member.

22. Section 7 of the Act enumerates
various powers of the Board. Section 9 (4)
of
the
Act
enjoins
that
the
State
Government shall have power to issue
directions in case where in its opinion
immediate action is required. Section 16- D
envisages that the Director has the
authority to make inspection of any
recognised institution and if he finds
certain
defects
mentioned
under
the
section, he may point out the same to the
committee of management to remove such
defects, failing which a penal action of
appointment of a authorised controller can
be taken by the State Government, (ii) of
subsection 3 of 16-D provides that if a nonteaching staff is appointed in contravention
of the provisions of this Act or the
regulations it may be one of the ground for
appointment of the Authorized Controller.

23. From the detail procedure
provided under 16 -D of the Act it emerges
that the Director can only send report to the
State Government, whereupon the State
Government after affording opportunity to
the concerned institution passes the order
of appointment of the authorised controller
or if it is satisfied that the cause shown by
the institution is sufficient it may drop the
proceedings.

24. A close look at the gamut of the
Scheme of the Act instantly brings out that
the District Magistrate is a foreign
authority under the Scheme. There is no
reference of the District Magistrate in the
entire Scheme of the Act.

25. In case the institution receives aid
out of the State Fund the provisions of the
U.P. High Schools and Intermediate
Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers
and
other
Employees)
Act
1971
(hereinafter referred to Act No. 24 of
1971), a close look at the Scheme of the
said Act No. 24 of 1971 also establishes
that like U.P. Intermediate Education Act,
1921 under this Act also the District
Magistrate has not been assigned any role.
758 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The Regional Deputy Director of Education
and the District Inspector of Schools are
authorities to pass orders/directions against
the erring managements. The order passed
by those authorities are appealable; under
section 7 and under section 8 revision lies
to the State Government. Again in this Act
also there is no reference of the District
Magistrate under any provisions of the Act.

26. Keeping the above Statutory
provisions in the mind I am driven to the
conclusion that the District Magistrate has
no authority under the Act,1921 or Act
No.24 of 1971 to take a decision in respect
of appointment or salary of teaching or
non-teaching staff.

27. Professor De Smith, in his
Principles
of
Judicial
Review
1999
Edition, page 240 has aptly said :-

"an
authority
entrusted
with
a
discretion must not, in the purported
exercise of its discretion, act under the
dictation of another body or person. In at
least two Commonwealth cases, licensing
bodies were found to have taken decision
on the instructions of the heads of
government
who
were
prompted
by
extraneous motives. But, as less colourful
cases illustrate, it is enough to show that a
decision which ought to have been based
on the exercise of independent judgment
was dictated by those not entrusted with the
power to decide, although it remains a
question of fact whether the repository of
discretion abdicated it in the face of
external pressure."

28.

Professor
Wade
in
his
Administrative Law, 7th Edition has dealt
with "Surrender, Abdication, Dictation"
and "Power in the wrong hands" in the
following words :-

"Closely akin to delegation, and
scarcely distinguishable from it in some
cases, is any arrangement by which a
power conferred upon one authority is in
substance exercised by another. The proper
authority may share its power with
someone else, or may allow someone else
to dictate to it by declining to act without
their consent or by submitting to their
wishes or instructions. The effect then is
that the discretion conferred by Parliament
is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong
authority, and the resulting decision is
ultra vires and void. So strict are the courts
in applying this principle that they
condemn
some
administrative
arrangements which must seem quite
natural and proper to those who make
them....

Ministers and their departments have
several times fallen foul of the same rule,
no doubt equally to their surprise...."

29. This paragraph of Professor Wade
has been applied by the Supreme Court in
the case of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji
Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC
302.

30. The said judgment has been
followed by the Supreme Court in the case
of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of
Punjab, (2001) 6 SCC 260 in following
terms:-

"16.............No
government
servant
shall in the performance of his official
duties, or in the exercise of power
conferred on him, act otherwise than in his
best judgment except when he is acting
under the direction of his official superior.
In Anirudhsinhji Jadeja this Court has held
that a statutory authority vested with
jurisdiction must exercise it according to
its own discretion; discretion exercised
4 All. Krishna Nand Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
759
under the direction or instruction of some
higher authority is failure to exercise
discretion altogether. Observations of this
Court in Purtabpore Co. Ltd are instructive
and apposite. Executive Officers may in
exercise of their statutory discretion take
into account considerations of public policy
and in some context, policy of a Minister or
the Government as a whole when it is a
relevant factor in weighing the policy but
they are not absolved from their duty to
exercise
their
personal
judgment
in
individual cases unless explicit statutory
provision has been made for instructions by
a superior to bind them. As already stated,
we are not recording, for want of adequate
material, any positive finding that the
impugned order was passed at the behest of
or dictated by someone else than its author.
Yet we have no hesitation in holding that
the impugned order betrays utter nonapplication of mind to the facts of the case
and the relevant law. The manner in which
the power under Section 22 has been
exercised by the competent authority is
suggestive of betrayal of the confidence
which the State Government reposed in the
Principal Secretary in conferring upon him
the exercise of drastic power like removal
of President of a Municipality under
Section 22 of the Act. To say the least, what
has been done is not what is expected to be
done by a senior official like the Principal
Secretary
of
a
wing
of
the
State
Government. We leave it at that and say no
more on this issue."

31. In the case of Purtabpore Co. Ltd.
v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar, (1969) 1
SCC 308 the matter was in respect of
exercise
of
power
by
the
Cane
Commissioner under the provisions of
Sugar Cane (Control) Order,1966. Clause 6
of
the
order
enjoins
the
Cane
Commissioner to reserve the area in favour
of the sugar mill subject to fulfillment of
the certain conditions made under the
statutory provisions. The Chief Minister of
the State issued direction to the Cane
Commissioner to divide the reserved area
into two portions and allot one portion to
the Sugar Mill/respondent no.5 therein. The
Cane Commissioner in compliance of the
direction of the Chief Minister divided the
reserved area into two portion. The order of
the Cane Commissioner was challenged on
the ground that the Cane Commissioner
without application of mind had carried out
the directions of the Chief Minister, thus he
had abdicated his authority under the Act.
The Supreme Court set aside the order of
the Cane Commissioner on the ground that
Clause 6 (1) is a statutory power and the
said Clause empowers the Commissioner
alone to take the decision in the light of the
Scheme of the Statutory provisions. The
Supreme Court held that Clause 6 (1) is a
Statutory power and he alone could have
exercised that power. The Supreme Court
further observed while exercising that
power the Commissioner cannot abdicate
his responsibility in favour of the State
Government or the Chief Minister. The
Court
expressed
its
displeasure
and
observed that it was not proper for the
Chief Minister to have interfere with the
functions of the Cane Commissioner.

32. The Hon'ble Apex Court in re:
Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots'
Association of India (A.L.P.A.I.) and
others v. Director General of Civil
Aviation and others, (2011) 5 SCC 435
vide paras 26 and 27 has considered the
controversy relating to competence of
passing any order and held that only the
competent authority can pass such orders.

8. The paras 26
and
27 are
reproduced herein under:
760 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"26. The contention was raised before
the High Court that the Circular dated
29.5.2008 has been issued by the authority
having no competence, thus cannot be
enforced. It is a settled legal proposition
that the authority which has been conferred
with the competence under the statute
alone can pass the order. No other person,
even a superior authority, can interfere,
with the functioning of the Statutory
Authority. In a democratic set up like ours,
persons occupying key positions are not
supposed to mortgage their discretion,
volition and decision making authority and
be prepared to give way to carry out
commands having no sanctity in law. Thus,
if any decision is taken by a statutory
authority at the behest or on suggestion of
a person who has no statutory role to play,
the same would be patently illegal. (Vide:
Purtabpur Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner
of Bihar, Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar,
Tarlochan Dev. Sharma v. State of Punjab
and Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen).

27. Similar view has been reiterated
by this Court in Commissioner of Police,
Bombay
v.
Gordhandas
Bhanji,
Bahadursinh
Lakhubhai
Gohil
v.
Jagdishbhai M. Pradesh Kamalia and
Pancham Chand and others v. State of
Himachal observing. that an authority
vested with the power to act under the
statute alone should exercise its discretion
following the procedure prescribed therein
and interference on the part of any
authority upon whom the statute does not
confer
any
jurisdiction,
is
wholly
unwarranted in law. It violates the
constitutional scheme."
 (Emphasis supplied)

33. The principle which can be
discerned from the above mentioned
judgments of the Supreme Court is that if a
statute impose a duty on an authority he
must exercise that power independently and
personally without any supervisory control
of some other authority. Even a superior
authority cannot interfere in his decision
which he has to take personally. And he
should not be guided by any other
person/authority.

34.

In
the
above
facts
and
circumstances, the District Magistrate has
no absolutely power to interfere in the
matter in any way and he is restrained to do
anything further in the matter.

35. In view of the above discussion,
this Court is of the opinion that the present
petition lacks merits and same is liable to
be dismissed with costs.

36. Accordingly, the present writ
petition is dismissed with costs.
----------
(2022)04ILR A760
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.
THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Writ-A No. 21121 of 2020

Murad Ahsan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shireesh Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - UP Public Service
(Tribunal) Act, 1976 - Section 4 - UP
Government
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 14 -Reference
petition against award of punishment of