# Krishnawati Devi & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 1 ILRA 247
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-01-22
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 14626 of 2019
- **Bench:** Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/krishnawati-devi-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-52974
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - Domestic Violence -
Quashing
of
Complaint
-
Domestic
Relationship
-
Shared
Household
-
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 - Section 2(q), 2(f),
2(s), 3 & 12 - Relatives of the husband
who do not reside in a shared household
with the complainant do not fall within
the definition of "respondents" under
Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act
- Respondent will be a person who is or
has been in a domestic relationship with
an aggrieved person - Lower courts must
scrutinize
complaints
before
issuing
notices to non-resident family members to
prevent misuse of legal provisions. (Para -
12,13,14)

Applicant no. 7 (husband) and opposite party
no. 2 (wife) were in a matrimonial dispute - wife
filed a case under Section 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act, implicating the husband, his
mother (applicant no. 1), and other relatives
(applicants no. 2 to 6) - relatives (applicants no.
2 to 6) claimed they lived separately and were
falsely implicated. (Para - 2 to 4)

HELD:- Court found that applicants no. 2 to 6
were not in a shared household and thus did not
qualify as "respondents" under Section 2(q). No
specific
allegations
against
them
in
the
complaint. Proceedings against applicants 2
to 6 were deemed malicious, hence quashed.
Mother-in-law (Applicant No. 1) resided in the
shared household and was accused of harassing
the complainant for dowry. Therefore, the
proceedings against her cannot be quashed.
Trial court was directed to proceed against
applicant nos. 1 and 7 within 60 days. (Para -16
to 20)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. partly allowed.
(E-7)

List of Cases cited:

Hiral P. Harsora & ors. Vs Kusum Narottamdas
Harsora & ors., (2016) 10 scc 165

## Text

1 All. Krishnawati Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
247
the present applicant, who is accused in the
impugned proceeding is a history sheeter
having 32 cases against him and no reason
was assigned in the application filed by the
public prosecutor under Section 321
Cr.P.C. for withdrawing the prosecution
against the applicant. If the prosecution is
permitted to withdraw case against such
type of person on the basis of unreasoned
application then it would definitely be
against the public interest as well as against
the guidelines laid down by the Apex
Court.

14. Therefore, this Court does not find
any illegality in the impugned order.
Accordingly, the present application is
dismissed.
---------
(2025) 1 ILRA 247
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.01.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH
DESHWAL, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 14626 of 2019

Krishnawati Devi & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Om Prakash Shukla

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

(A) Criminal Law - Domestic Violence -
Quashing
of
Complaint
-
Domestic
Relationship
-
Shared
Household
-
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 - Section 2(q), 2(f),
2(s), 3 & 12 - Relatives of the husband
who do not reside in a shared household
with the complainant do not fall within
the definition of "respondents" under
Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act
- Respondent will be a person who is or
has been in a domestic relationship with
an aggrieved person - Lower courts must
scrutinize
complaints
before
issuing
notices to non-resident family members to
prevent misuse of legal provisions. (Para -
12,13,14)

Applicant no. 7 (husband) and opposite party
no. 2 (wife) were in a matrimonial dispute - wife
filed a case under Section 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act, implicating the husband, his
mother (applicant no. 1), and other relatives
(applicants no. 2 to 6) - relatives (applicants no.
2 to 6) claimed they lived separately and were
falsely implicated. (Para - 2 to 4)

HELD:- Court found that applicants no. 2 to 6
were not in a shared household and thus did not
qualify as "respondents" under Section 2(q). No
specific
allegations
against
them
in
the
complaint. Proceedings against applicants 2
to 6 were deemed malicious, hence quashed.
Mother-in-law (Applicant No. 1) resided in the
shared household and was accused of harassing
the complainant for dowry. Therefore, the
proceedings against her cannot be quashed.
Trial court was directed to proceed against
applicant nos. 1 and 7 within 60 days. (Para -16
to 20)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. partly allowed.
(E-7)

List of Cases cited:

Hiral P. Harsora & ors. Vs Kusum Narottamdas
Harsora & ors., (2016) 10 scc 165
(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh
Deshwal, J.)

1. Heard Sri Om Prakash Shukla,
learned counsel for the applicants and Sri
Pankaj Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the
State, but no one appeared on behalf of the
opposite party no. 2 despite service of
notice.
248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. The present 482 Cr.P.C. application
has been filed to quash the entire
proceeding/complaint in Case No. 59 of
2016 (Smrita Srivastava Vs. Rajiv Kumar
Srivastava and others) under Section 12 of
the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Domestic Violence Act'), pending in
the court of Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sonbhadra.

3. Facts giving rise to the present
controversy is that applicant no. 7 is the
husband of opposite party no. 2 and
matrimonial discord between them has
culminated into this proceeding as well as
other proceeding between them.

4. Learned counsel for the applicants
has submitted that applicant no. 1 is the
mother-in-law of opposite party no. 2 while
applicant nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 are married
sisters of applicant no. 7 while applicant
no. 6 is the husband of applicant no. 3.
Applicant nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have been
residing separately with their family at
different places which is clear from their
addresses. Therefore, they are not in a
domestic relationship with opposite party
no. 2. Therefore, applicant nos. 2 to 6 will
not
come
within
the
definition
of
respondents as per Section 2(q) of the
Domestic Violence Act and they have been
falsely
implicated
in
the
impugned
proceeding.
Therefore,
the
impugned
proceeding is nothing but an abuse of the
process of the Court. It is further submitted
that this Court has rejected the present
application at the instance of applicant no.
7 vide order dated 16.04.2019 but the
proceeding against applicant no. 1, motherin-law of the opposite party no. 2, is also
erroneous. It is lastly submitted that the
impugned
proceeding
is
absolutely
malicious and liable to be quashed.

5. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has
submitted that applicant no. 1, mother-inlaw of opposite party no. 2 has been in a
domestic relationship with opposite party
no. 2 at the relevant time. Therefore,
applicant no. 1 would come within the
definition of the respondent as per Section
2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act.

6. After hearing the submissions of
parties and on perusal of record, it appears
that the marriage of the applicant no. 7 and
opposite party no. 2 has been solemnized in
the year 02.06.2011. Subsequently, on the
rising of matrimonial discord between
them, they have filed cases against each
other, including the impugned proceeding.

7. From the perusal of the record, it
appears that the applicant nos. 2 to 6 are
relatives of applicant no. 7 and they have
been residing separately. Therefore, as per
Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act,
they cannot be termed as respondents as
they have not been residing in a shared
household with the opposite party no. 2.

8. Section 2(q) of Domestic Violence
Act is being quoted as under:-

(q) "respondent" means any
adult male person who is, or has been, in
a
domestic
relationship
with
the
aggrieved person and against whom the
aggrieved person has sought any relief
under this Act;

9. The proceeding under Domestic
Violence Act can be initiated when the
domestic violence as mentioned in Section
3 of Domestic Violence Act is committed
by the respondent who is living in domestic
relationship with the aggrieved person. The
word "domestic relationship" has been
defined in Section 2(f) of Domestic
1 All. Krishnawati Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
249
Violence Act which is being reproduced as
follows :

(f)
"domestic
relationship"
means a relationship between two persons
who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shared household, when they
are related by consanguinity, marriage, or
through a relationship in the nature of
marriage, adoption or are family members
living together as a joint family;

10. The above definition of domestic
relationship shows that it will be presumed
when two persons are related to each other
by consanguinity, marriage, or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption, or are family members of a joint
family
living
together
in
a
shared
household.
The
definition
of
shared
household is being provided u/s 2(s) of
Domestic Violence Act which is being
reproduced as follows :

(s) "shared household" means a
household where the person aggrieved lives
or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the
respondent and includes such a household
whether owned or tenanted either jointly by
the aggrieved person and the respondent,
or owned or tenanted by either of them in
respect of which either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or
singly have any right, title, interest or
equity and includes such a household
which may belong to the joint family of
which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or
the aggrieved person has any right, title or
interest in the shared household;

11. From the above definition of
shared household, it is clear that this is a
household where aggrieved person lives or
at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship with the respondent.

12. From the definition of respondent
given in Section 2(q) of the Domestic
Violence Act, it is also clear that the
respondent will be a person who is or has
been in a domestic relationship with an
aggrieved person.

13. From the above analysis, it is
clear for holding a person liable u/s 3 of
Domestic Violence Act, the following
condition must be satisfied :

"The
respondent
must
be
related to the aggrieved person in the
manner as mentioned in Section 2(f) and
he lived or has been living together with
aggrieved person in a shared household
and then commits domestic violence in
the manner mentioned in Section 3 of
Domestic Violence Act."

14. This Court came across number
of cases where just to harass the family
of husband or the person in domestic
relationship, aggrieved party used to
implicate the relatives of other side who
are not even living or lived with the
aggrieved person in shared household
and they have been residing at separate
places. Therefore, courts below while
issuing notice u/s 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act must look into this fact
from the perusal of the application filed
u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act along
with other available record including the
report of the Protection Officer, if
available on record. It is further
observed that the concerned courts
before issuing notices to the persons
impleaded
as
respondents
in
the
application under Domestic Violence Act
should satisfy about the fulfilment of the
250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
conditions mentioned in paragraph no.
13 of this judgment.

15. This issue also came into light
before the Apex Court in the case of Hiral
P. Harsora and Others Vs. Kusum
Narottamdas
Harsora
and
Others,
(2016) 10 SCC 165 wherein the Apex
Court
considered
the
definition
of
respondent mentioned in Section 2(q) of
Domestic Violence Act and declared that
word "adult male" mentioned in Section
2(q) of Domestic Violence Act as well as
the proviso to Section 2(q) will stand
deleted and observed that respondent for
the purpose of domestic violence could be
any person who is in domestic relationship
with the aggrieved person. Paragraph nos.
20, 21 and 50 of Hiral P. Harsora (supra)
are being quoted as under :

20. It will be noticed that the
definition
of
"domestic
relationship"
contained in Section 2(f) is a very wide one.
It is a relationship between persons who
live or have lived together in a shared
household and are related in any one of the
four
ways-blood,
marriage
or
a
relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption, or family members of a joint
family. A reading of these definitions makes
it clear that domestic relationships involve
persons belonging to both sexes and
includes persons related by blood or
marriage. This necessarily brings within
such domestic relationships male as well as
female in-laws, quite apart from male and
female members of a family related by
blood.
Equally,
a
shared
household
includes a household which belongs to a
joint family of which the respondent is a
member. As has been rightly pointed out by
Ms Arora, even before the 2005 Act was
brought into force on 26-10-2006, the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was amended,
by which Section 6 was amended, with
effect from 9-9-2005, to make females
coparceners of a joint Hindu family and so
have a right by birth in the property of such
joint family. This being the case, when a
member of a joint Hindu family will now
include a female coparcener as well, the
restricted definition contained in Section
2(q) has necessarily to be given a relook,
given that the definition of "shared
household" in Section 2(5) of the Act would
include a household which may belong to a
joint family of which the respondent is a
member.
The
aggrieved
person
can
therefore make, after 2006, her sister, for
example, a respondent, if the Hindu
Succession Act g amendment is to be
looked at. But such is not the case under
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, as the main
part of Section 2(q) continues to read
"adult male person", while Section 2(s)
would include such female coparcener as a
respondent, being a member of a joint
family. This is one glaring anomaly which
we have to address in the course of our
judgment.

21. When Section 3 of the Act
defines "domestic violence", it is clear that
such violence is gender neutral. It is also
clear that physical abuse, verbal abuse,
emotional abuse and economic abuse can
all be by women against other women.
Even sexual abuse may, in a given fact
circumstance, he by one woman on
another. Section 3, therefore, in tune with
the general object of the Act, seeks to
outlaw domestic violence of any kind
against a woman, and is gender neutral.
When one goes to the remedies that the Act
provides, things become even clearer.
Section 17(2) makes it clear that the
aggrieved person cannot be evicted bor
excluded from a shared household or any
part of it by the "respondent" save in
accordance with the procedure established
1 All. Krishnawati Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
251
by law. If "respondent" is to be read as
only an adult male person, it is clear that
women who evict or exclude the aggrieved
person are not within its coverage, and if
that is so, the object of the Act can very
easily be defeated by an adult male person
not standing in the forefront, but putting
forward female persons who can therefore
evict or exclude the aggrieved person from
the shared household. This again is an
important indicator that the object of the
Act will not be subserved by reading "adult
male person" as "respondent".

50. We, therefore, set aside the
impugned judgment of the Bombay High
Court and declare that the words "adult
male" in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will
stand deleted since these words do not
square with Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. Consequently, the proviso to
Section 2(4), being rendered d otiose, also
stands deleted. We may only add that the
impugned judgment has ultimately held, in
para 27. that the two complaints of 2010. in
which the three female respondents were
discharged finally, were purported to be
revived, despite there being no prayer in
Writ Petition No. 300 of 2013 for the same.
When this was pointed out, Ms Meenakshi
Arora very fairly stated that she would not
be pursuing those complaints, and would
be content to have a declaration from this
Court as to the constitutional validity of
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act. We, therefore,
record the statement of the learned counsel,
in which case it becomes clear that nothing
survives in the aforesaid complaints of
October
2010.
With
this
additional
observation, this appeal stands disposed of.

16. Coming back to the present case,
from
the
perusal
of
the
impugned
application filed u/s 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act, it is clear that no specific
allegation has been made against applicant
nos. 2 to 6 that they have been residing in a
shared household with the opposite party
no. 2. Therefore, they cannot be said to be
in a domestic relationship with opposite
party no. 2.

17. From the perusal of the statement
of opposite party no.2 recorded u/s 200
Cr.P.C. in Case No. 1594 of 2015 u/s 498A I.P.C. which has been annexed at page
16 of the supplementary affidavit dated
01.11.2022 filed by the applicants, it is
clear that the allegation of domestic
violence was made against applicant nos. 1
and 7 and it was also not mentioned that
applicant nos. 2 to 6 have been residing
with her in a shared household. Therefore,
impugned proceeding against applicant
nos.2 to 6 is malicious, hence deserves to
be quashed.

18. However, considering the fact that
applicant no.1 who is the mother-in-law of
opposite party no. 2 has been residing in
shared household, will fall within the
definition of respondent and there is the
allegation that opposite party no. 2 has
been harassed for demand of dowry and
she was also extended threat to evict her
from the shared household by the
applicant no. 1, therefore, no case for
quashing is made out at the instance of
applicant
no.
1.
As
the
present
application has already been rejected at
the instance of applicant no. 7, therefore,
the present application is also rejected at
the instance of applicant no. 1.

19. In view of the above observation,
the impugned proceeding/complaint in
Case No. 59 of 2016 (Smrita Srivastava Vs.
Rajiv Kumar Srivastava and others) under
Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act,
against applicant nos. 2 to 6 is hereby
quashed.
252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

20. The court below is free to proceed
against applicant nos. 1 and 7 and decide
Case No. 59 of 2016 (Smrita Srivastava Vs.
Rajiv
Kumar
Srivastava
and
others)
expeditiously within a period of 60 days
from the date of receiving the copy of this
order.

21. With the aforesaid direction, the
present application is partly allowed.

22. The Registrar (Compliance) is
directed to send a copy of this order to the
concerned court.
---------
(2025) 1 ILRA 252
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.01.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH
DESHWAL, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 21759 of 2024

Ram Avtar Agarwal ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Rahul Chaudhary

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections 200, 205, 302, 256 & 482
- The Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 - Sections - 228, 279 & 339 -
Negotiable
Instruments
Act,
1881
-
Sections 138 & 139:
- Application -
challenging the entire proceeding pending u/s
138 of Act, 1881- offence of Dishonour of
cheque - father of opposite party no. 2 filed the
complaint against applicant - alleging that to
return the payment of booking amount of a flat
constructed by the applicant's company, a
cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs was issued in favour of
complainant, being a director of company - on
presenting in bank same was returned with
endorsement 'account closed' - trial court
summon the applicant - complainant died during
pendency trial - opposite party no. 2, son of
deceased complainant, moved an application,
for permitting him to continue the proceeding
being legal heir - trial court allowed the
application - same is under challenged in this
application, on the ground that permitting him
to purse the complaint on behalf of complaint,
which is absolutely illegal as the son has no
personal knowledge, so he cannot be allowed to
pursue the impugned proceeding - court find
that, from the conjoint reding of section 256
Cr.P.C. and section 302 Cr.P.C. as well as legal
position discussed, it is clear that the death of
complainant, his legal heir may be permitted to
continue the proceeding u/s 138 of the Act,
1881 personally or through pleader or through
power of attorney holder - held, there is no
requirement of substitution or impleading the
legal heir of the deceased complainant - hence,
it is not necessary for the concerned court to
dismissed the complaint u/s 256 Cr.P.C. - curt
should normally permit the legal heir of the
complainant to pursue the trial - accordingly,
application is rejected - however, directions
issued, to contest the trial and raise all grounds
available with the applicant, before the court
below, where the proceeding is pending since
2018. (Para - 16, 17, 21)

Petition Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. A.C. Narayanan Vs St. of Mah. & anr.- (2014)
11 SCC 790),

2. Shashibala Agrawal Vs St. of U.P. & anr.-
[2024 SCC OnLine All 1216],

3. Kishore Shankar Signapurkar Vs St. of U.P. &
anr.- [2024 SCC OnLine All 5279],

4. Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas Vs St. of Mah.- [966
SCC OnLine SC 253],

5. Jimmy Jahangir Madan Vs Bolly Cariyappa
Hindley (dead) lrs. - [2004 (12) SCC 509],