# Kulwant Singh & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1517
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-03
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 3000033 of 1999
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kulwant-singh-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54675
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

4 All. Kulwant Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1517
15. On its examination, it is found that it is well settled that although the Court has discretion to
condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such discretion must be exercised judiciously and upon
sufficient cause being shown.

In the present case, the delay is inordinate, extending to about five years and the impugned order
does not disclose any cogent or convincing reasons justifying such delay, therefore the exercise of discretion
appears to be arbitrary and unsustainable in law.

16. The submission of the respondents based on Jawahar Lal Tiwari (supra) that a revision can be
entertained even at the instance of an informant cannot be accepted in absolute terms. The revisional power,
though wide, must be exercised in cases involving jurisdictional error, or where public interest is
demonstrably involved.

 In the present case, respondent no. 3 was neither a party to the original proceedings nor has any
direct legal interest been established. Thus, the Revisional Authority failed to examine the maintainability of
the revision at the instance of respondent no. 3, rendering the order legally infirm.

17. Moreover, it is true that ordinarily writ jurisdiction is not exercised against interlocutory or
interim orders, as held in Smt. Leung (supra). However, an exception arises where the order suffers from
jurisdictional error, or there is manifest illegality or abuse of process.

In the present case, entertaining a highly belated revision without proper reasons, and doing so at the
instance of a person lacking locus, constitutes a clear jurisdictional error, warranting interference.

18. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned order dated 05.06.2000 suffers from non-application of mind and the delay has been condoned in a
mechanical manner. Moreover, the issue of locus standi has not been properly considered.

19. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 05.06.2000
passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Faizabad Division, Faizabad is hereby quashed.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 1517
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 03.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 3000033 of 1999

Kulwant Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
1518 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Whether the Petitioners' recorded tenure lands could legally be clubbed with the holdings of opposite party
no.4 under Section 5 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961, despite separate
consolidation proceedings and undisputed entries in revenue records.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226 - U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act,
1961 - Section 5(1), 10(2) - U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules - Rule 8: - Writ
Petition under Article 226 - seeking quashing of orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and order of
Appellate Authority, and exclusion of petitioners' lands from clubbing with opposite party no.4. - Petitioners,
recorded tenure holders - their lands were separately consolidated and wrongly declared surplus by relying
solely on Lekhpal's statement, without cogent evidence - Authorities below found opposite party no. 4 to be
real holder - treating petitioners as name-lenders - Petitioners relied on precedents (Pritam Singh, Som Nath
Khanna, Shishu Pal Singh) to argue that burden lies on State to prove ostensible holding with substantive
evidence - Respondents countered that possession and benefits were enjoyed by opposite party no.4, and
concurrent findings should not be disturbed - Court finds that revenue entries carry presumption of
correctness, State failed to discharge burden, reliance on Lekhpal's report alone is perverse, and Appellate
Authority abdicated jurisdiction by not remanding - Ceiling Act must be strictly construed - findings based on
surmises are unsustainable - Held, impugned orders vitiated and set aside - Writ petition allowed with
directions issued to exclude petitioners' lands from clubbing.
(Para - 22, 23, 24, 25, 26)
WP Allowed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Pritam Singh v. State of U.P. (1998(1) JCLR 329 All)
Som Nath Khanna v. State of U.P. (Writ C No. 3000025 of 2005)
Shishu Pal Singh v. Prescribed Authority (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4283 of 1992)

LIST OF ACTS
Constitution of India - U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961 - U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Rules.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Ceiling Act, Ostensible Holding, Benami, Revenue Record, Lekhpal Report, Burden of Proof, Appellate
Jurisdiction, Consolidation Proceedings, Surplus Land, Certiorari, Mandamus.
CASE ARISING FROM
Appeal No. 335/93-94 and order dated 30.03.1994 of Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), Kheri, declaring 33.913
hectares irrigated land surplus by clubbing petitioners' land with opposite party no.4.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Shri Aftab Ahmad.
Counsel for Respondent(s): Ms. Richa Sharma (for Respondent No.4), Shri Rajeev Srivastava, Additional Chief
Standing Counsel for State

(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

1. Heard Shri Aftab Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioners, Ms. Richa Sharma, learned
counsel for the respondent no.4 and Shri Rajeev Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for the respondents-State.
4 All. Kulwant Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1519
2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuance of a writ
in the nature of Certiorari, quashing order dated 28.12.1998 passed by opposite party no.2 in
Appeal No. 335/93-94 and order dated 21.4.1994 passed by opposite party no.3, as contained in
Annexure nos.1 and 2 respectively to this writ petition, with further prayer to issue a writ in the
nature of Mandamus, commanding upon the opposite party nos.2 and 3 not to club the land of the
petitioners with other tenure holder whereby they may also be directed to exclude the same in
accordance with law.

3. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioners are recorded tenure holders of the land in
question. The petitioner no.1 is the tenure holder of land comprising plots bearing Khata No.164
(Annexure No.3 to the writ petition), the petitioner no.2 is tenure holder of 02 plots (Annexure no.4
to the writ petition), petitioner no.3 is tenure holder of 01 plot (Annexure No.5 to the writ petition),
petitioner no.4 is tenure holder of 06 plots (Annexure no.6 to the writ petition) and petitioner no.5
is tenure holder of 01 plot (Annexure no.7 to the writ petition).

 The opposite party no.4 was issued notice u/s 10(2) U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1961 and subsequently the land of the petitioners was clubbed with him and they
were issued notice under Rule 8 of the Rules. The opposite party no.4 filed his objection dated
25.01.1993 stating that he had no concerned with the petitioners' land and their chaks were created
separately during consolidation proceedings.

 The petitioners also filed their objection before Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), Kheri
stating that they are having cultivatory possession over the lands in their ownership and they have
no other agricultural land in all over State of U.P. It was also stated that their lands are situated in
different villagers and cannot be in any manner treated and clubbed with the land of opposite party
no.4 and their chaks were created in year 1992 during consolidation proceedings.

 The Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), Kheri vide his impugned judgment and order dated
30.03.1994 declared 33.913 hectare irrigated land as surplus of the opposite party no.5 by clubbing
the land of the petitioners although it has been admitted in the impugned judgment and order dated
30.03.1994 that the land is recorded in the name of the petitioners in revenue record.

 Being aggrieved, the petitioners and the opposite party no.4 filed two separate appeals
which have been dismissed by the opposite party no.2 vide judgment and order dated 28.12.198.
However, while dismissing the appeals the opposite party no.2 has himself directed the opposite
party no.3 to verify the revenue record at his level and if the land four plots which are recorded in
Khata No.1615 in Khatauni 1399-1404 Fasli as Navin Parti are found to be Khalihan land of Gaon
Sabha then there is no justification to declare the same as surplus land and the opposite party no.3
may modify his impugned judgment and order dated 30.03.1994 at his level.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the opposite party no.2 while passing the
impugned judgment and order dated 28.12.1998 has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him
and instead of setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 30.03.1994 and remanding
back the matter to the opposite party no.3 to verify the record and then pass a fresh order after
1520 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
giving opportunity of hearing and evidence to the petitioners and had given it in the hand of the
opposite party no.3 to correct his mistake.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the opposite parties had not
disputed that the names of the petitioners are recorded over the lands in question as tenure holders
and hence the bald statement of the Lekhpal that the opposite party no.4 is in possession over the
petitioners land is totally false and misleading.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that in the instant case, the sole
evidence relied upon by the courts below to return the finding that it is opposite party no.4 who was
ostensible owner of the land in question even on and after 24.01.1971 the statement made by
Lekhpal, is false, wrong and misleading.

7. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the
following judgment:

 (i) Pritam Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., reported in 1998(1) JCLR 329(All)

 (ii) Som Nath Khanna and 3 Ors. vs State of UP through Collector Kheri and 2 Ors.
(Writ C No. 3000025 of 2005),

 (iii) Shishu Pal Singh and Ors. vs Prescribed Authority and Ors. (Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 4283 of 1992)

8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the writ petition is
devoid of merit and the impugned orders dated 30.03.1994 and 28.12.1998 do not suffer from any
illegality or error of law and have been passed after due consideration of material on record.

9. Learned counsel for the respondents next submitted that both the Prescribed Authority
and the Appellate Authority have concurrently recorded findings that Sri Sobaran Singh (Opp.
Party No. 4) was the real tenure holder, and the lands recorded in the names of the petitioners were
merely held ostensibly for his benefit.

10. Learned counsel for the respondents next submitted that though the lands were
recorded in the names of the petitioners, in reality possession remained with Sri Sobaran Singh and
benefits of the land were enjoyed by him, and the petitioners were only name-lenders.

11. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the fact that the notices
issued under Section 10(2) were received by Sri Sobaran Singh, sale receipts of agricultural
produce (wheat) in the names of petitioners were in possession of Sri Sobaran Singh and produced
by him, statement/report of the Lekhpal confirming possession of Sri Sobaran Singh over the land.
Therefore, submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that on this basis, the authorities
rightly concluded that the land was held ostensibly in the names of the petitioners.
4 All. Kulwant Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1521
12. Learned counsel for the respondents next submitted that Section 5 of the Ceiling Act
uses the expression land held ostensibly in the name of another person, which is distinct from
benami transaction. Therefore, clubbing under the Ceiling Act does not depend upon proving a
benami transaction as defined under the 1988 Act.

13. Learned counsel for the respondents next submitted that the findings recorded are pure
findings of fact, the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, should not
interfere with concurrent findings unless shown to be perverse or illegal, and no such ground has
been made out by the petitioners.

14. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused
the material on record as well as law-report cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.

15. To resolve the controversy involved in the present writ petition, operative portion of the
judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is extracted here-in-below:

 (i) Pritam Singh (supra):-
 "21. Having given my anxious consideration I am clearly of the opinion that in the
circumstances indicated hereinabove, in the present case, the presumption contemplated under II
Explanation of Section 5 of the Ceiling Act could not be deemed to be available. As a consequence,
in the absence of the presumption the onus to prove that the transfer effected on 11-8-1970 was a
sham transaction or a transfer ostensible in nature where transferor had not divested himself of all
interest and rights in praesentii in the transferred land and had reserved some benefits in future for
himself or other person of his family had to be established by cogent evidence led by the State."

 (ii) Som Nath Khanna (supra):

 "19. It is further submitted that the findings are based on mere assumption, surmises and
conjunctures. It is pointed out that from the perusal of the impugned order it would reveal; that the
sole reason upon which the impugned order is based is that while the notices were issued, the same
could not be served on any of the petitioners rather it was served on the care taker/agent of Ms.
Asha Nanda and all the petitioners were living in Delhi, hence since Ms. Asha Nanda was in
possession of all the land, hence they were clubbed in the hands of Ms. Asha Nanda.

 32. Now relating to the submissions, relating to Writ-C No.3000025 (Ceiling) of 2005 is
concerned, in light of the above noted facts and from the perusal of the impugned order, it would
reveal that both the Prescribed Authority as well as Appellate Authority has proceeded on the
premise that since notice was issued and received by and on behalf of Ms. Asha Nanda, hence it
was found that the land relating to all the original petitioners namely, Som Nath Khanna, Madan
Lal, Ms. Sangita Khanna and Sai Kiran were ostensible owner whereas possession was of Ms.
Asha Nanda, Hence the same was clubbed together. 33. It would be relevant to notice that the
nature of U.P Imposition of Ceiling Act, 1980 is aproprietary legislation by which land beyond the
prescribed limit can be ex-proprieted by the State under the Act of 1960. In the aforesaid
circumstances where the nature of the Act 1960 is such then the same has to be strictly construed.
In case if the land of any record tenure holder is to be taken by the State in exercise of powers
1522 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
under the Act 1960, then it would be State who has to establish that the condition prescribed in the
Act are clearly met, failing which it cannot be assumed that the entries or the facts as appearing on
record are incorrect."

 (iii) Shishu Pal Singh (supra):-

 "3.The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are not included
within the term family defined under Section 3(7) of the Act and in order to include their
holding by placing reliance on Explanation-1 of Section 5 of the Act, heavy onus lies upon the State
to prove that the holding was benami, i.e., ostensibly in the name of any other person, though it is
a land held by him in his own rights. In the case in hand, the respondents have proceeded
otherwise by observing that the petitioners did not produce any evidence to show that the land was
not held by petitioner's father in his own rights and, therefore, the basic approach of the
respondents is clearly erroneous, illegal and contrary to law. He has also placed reliance on a
single judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2315 of 1977Banshi Singhv.District Judge,
Moradabaddecided on 3-1-1979. The learned Standing Counsel opposed the submission and
supported the reasons assigned by the respondents.

 8.From the order of the appellate authority, it appears that he proceeded on the
assumption that once notice under Section 10(2) of the Act has been issued based on the inquiry of
the Lekhpal and Tahasildar etc. alleging that the noticee held certain holding in his own rights
though ostensibly in the name of other, it is the liability of the noticee to prove otherwise. This
approach is absolutely misconceived and contrary to law. Explanation-1 of Section 5 is in the
nature of exception inasmuch normally every tenure holder is entitled to hold a land to the extent
provided in the Act, but in a case where the land actually belongs to one but has been purchased in
the name of some other person, that is a kind of benami transaction, in that case only to prevent
such cases so as not to frustrate the very purpose of the Act, the explanation-1 has provided that
such land shall be included in the holding area of a tenure holder, but to prove the existence of
such fact, the onus lies on the State heavily and not otherwise. Explanation-1 read with Section 5 is
very clear that neither it purports to add nor to limit the normal meaning of the expression
tenure-holder as defined in Section-3, sub-section (17) of the Act and, thus, clearly shows that
the land must be held by the tenure holder in his own rights. In case, the State claims that any land
is held ostensibly by the tenure holder, the onus lies upon the State to establish the same. A
somewhat similar issue came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court
inMohammad Abbasv.State of U.P., 1979 AWC 23 : (1979 All LJ 326). There two major sons
of the tenure holder executed sale deeds on 12-5-1971, 7-9-1971 and 8-3-1972 transferring the
entire land recorded in their names. Thereafter, the tenure holder claimed two additional hectares
of land on the ground that his two major sons did not hold any land on the appointed date, i.e., 8-61973, but the said claim was rejected by the ceiling authorities holding that the transfer of land by
major sons after 24-1-1971 was liable to be ignored as they could not establish that the sale deeds
were executed in good faith and for adequate consideration. Referring to Section 5, sub-section (3)
of the Act, the Court held that the ceiling area to which a tenure holder is entitled is fixed with
reference to the number of members in the tenure-holder's family and land held by other members
of the tenure-holder's family is to be aggregated with the land held by the tenure holder. The word
family as defined in the Act in relation to a tenure holder, means himself or herself and his wife
4 All. Kulwant Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1523
or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or husband) minor sons
and minor daughters (other than married daughters).

 9.It shows that the said definition does not include the major sons of the tenure holder. By
virtue of Section 5(3), if the tenure holder is a male, land recorded in the name of his wife,
provided she is not a judicially separated wife, and minor sons and minor daughters can be
clubbed in determining the ceiling area which the tenure holder is entitled to retain. This shows
that the land held by the major sons is not to be included in the holding of the tenure holder. The
only possibility for including the said land, therefore, would have been if Explanation-1 of Section
5(1) would have been applicable, namely, if the land is ostensibly held by the tenure holder in the
name of any other person, but for the said purpose, heavy burden lies upon the State to prove this
fact. Considering this aspect of the matter with reference to Explanation-1 to Section 5(1) of the
Act, another Division Bench of this Court inBanshi Singh(supra) wherein this Court held as
under:

 "Explanation 1 of Section 5(1) clearly shows that when the State alleges that the land is
ostensibly being held by a tenure-holder in the name of any other person which should be treated
as the land belonging to the tenure-holder then the burden lies upon the State to prove this fact.
Merely because in the notice the State has clubbed the land belonging to others under the pretext
that it is being held ostensibly in the name of sons or any other person, the burden cannot be said
to have been discharged. Once a notice under Section 10(2) is served upon the tenure-holder he
has to show cause and while showing cause if the tenure-holder establishes by prima facie evidence
by filing documents or by giving evidence that the land was being held by other persons in their
own capacity, the burden shifts upon the State to establish the fact that the land is being held by the
tenure-holder ostensibly in the name of others. In order to discharge this burden the State has to
establish by some cogent and satisfactory evidence that the land is being held by the tenure-holder.
Merely because the land has been clubbed in the land of petitioner No. 1 in the notice issued under
Section 10(2) of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act or merely because the Lekhpal
gives a statement that the petitioner is in possession, is not sufficient to discharge that burden and
to establish that the land was ostensibly being held by the tenure-holder in the name of others. In
the present case petitioner No. 1 led evidence by showing that the names of the sons were entered
in revenue records right from 1264-F and after the partition their names were entered separately
on the basis of the partition decree. When the State was alleging that the land was being ostensibly
held by petitioner No. 1, the State had to discharge that burden by giving cogent and satisfactory
evidence. In the present case no such evidence was adduced and the mere statement of the Lekhpal
was not sufficient to rebut the evidence and to hold that the land was being held ostensibly by
petitioner No. 1 in the names of the sons."

16. I have examined the material on record in the light of the judgment relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioners.

17. Upon careful examination of the entire material on record, submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the parties, and the settled legal position, this Court arrives at the conclusion
that it is an admitted position that the lands in question are recorded in the names of the petitioners
as tenure holders in the revenue records. Such entries carry a presumption of correctness under law
1524 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
unless rebutted by cogent, reliable and admissible evidence reference may be made to the case of
Shishupal (supra).

18. Moreover, the case set up by the State authorities for clubbing the land of the
petitioners with that of opposite party no.4 is founded solely on the allegation that the holdings are
ostensible or benami in nature. No documentary evidence, independent witness, or surrounding
circumstances of a definite character have been brought on record to substantiate such allegation.

19. The entire findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate
Authority rests upon the statement/report of the Lekhpal. It is trite law that such a report, in absence
of corroborative evidence, cannot by itself discharge the heavy burden cast upon the State to
establish that a transaction or holding is benami or ostensible.

20. The issue is no longer res integra. In Som Nath Khanna (supra), this Court has
categorically held that findings based merely on assumptions, such as service of notice or alleged
possession of one person, without substantive evidence, are vitiated being based on surmises and
conjectures. It has further been held that the Ceiling Act, being expropriatory in nature, must be
strictly construed and the burden lies heavily upon the State to establish that the statutory
conditions for clubbing are fully satisfied.

21. Similarly, in case of Shishu Pal Singh (supra),it was held that where the State seeks to
invoke Explanation to Section 5(1) of the Act by alleging that land is held ostensibly in the name of
another, the burden squarely lies upon the State to prove such fact by cogent evidence. It has been
further clarified that mere issuance of notice under Section 10(2) or reliance upon the report of
revenue officials like the Lekhpal is not sufficient to discharge such burden.

22. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments applies fully to the present case. Here also, the
authorities have proceeded on an erroneous premise that once an allegation is made in the notice,
the burden shifts upon the petitioners to disprove the same. Such an approach is clearly contrary to
the settled legal position.

 In fact, the petitioners have discharged their initial burden by placing reliance upon
revenue records showing their independent tenure holding and possession. Once such prima facie
evidence was brought on record, the burden shifted upon the State to establish, by cogent and
convincing evidence, that the holdings were in fact benami or ostensible. The State has failed to
discharge this burden.

23. The reliance placed solely upon the statement of the Lekhpal, without any supporting
evidence such as source of consideration, nature of possession, conduct of parties, or any indicia of
benami transaction, renders the findings wholly perverse and legally untenable.

24. This Court also finds that the Appellate Authority has failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in it in accordance with law. Despite noticing discrepancies, it did not set aside the order of
the Prescribed Authority nor remand the matter for fresh adjudication. Instead, it issued directions
4 All. Nishar Ahmad Khan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1525
to the Prescribed Authority to verify and modify its own order, which is an impermissible
course and amounts to abdication of appellate jurisdiction.

25. The findings recorded by the authorities below are thus vitiated on the ground of
absence
of
cogent
evidence,
misapplication
of
burden
of
proof,
reliance
on
inadmissible/insufficient material, and failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law.
Consequently, the impugned orders cannot be said to be legally sustainable and are liable to be set
aside.

26. Considering in totalities of facts and circumstances of the case, this writ petition is
allowed. Order dated 28.12.1998 passed by opposite party no.2 in Appeal No. 335/93-94 and order
dated 21.4.1994 passed by opposite party no.3, as contained in Annexure nos.1 and 2 respectively
to this writ petition are hereby set aside.

27. Accordingly, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed.

28. No order as to costs.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 1525
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 3000096 of 2002

Nishar Ahmad Khan & Ors. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the Prescribed Authority and appellate authority erred in declaring 13.657 acres irrigated land
surplus despite High Court's remand order dated 12.01.1984, oral family settlement claim, and substitution of
heirs.

Whether the impugned orders suffer from violation of natural justice and non-compliance with binding
directions.
HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226, 227 - U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act, 1961 - Section 10(2): - Writ Petition under Article 226 - seeking quashing of order passed by
prescribed authority under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, and order of appellate order -
whereby 13.657 acres irrigated land was declared surplus - petitioners pleaded that the land was ancestral,
subject to oral family settlement, heirs were not duly substituted, and the Prescribed Authority failed to
comply with the High Court's remand order, directing recalculation - respondents contended that proper
notices were issued, heirs substituted, and recalculation done strictly in compliance with law - Court finds that,