# Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1786
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-20
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 4116 of 2019
- **Bench:** Anish Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kunwar-pal-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54423
- **Pages:** 15

## Text

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1786 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
unsustainable. The Division Bench of this Court in Anita Rani (supra) has held that long continuance in
service, coupled with the absence of fraud or deceit, operates as a significant equitable consideration against
annulment of appointment.

47. This Court finds that long standing appointment should not be disturbed in absence of any fraud.
The aforesaid has been held by Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC
4, wherein the caste certificate of the petitioner was questioned, however, on the aforesaid principle, the
appointment of the petitioner was not disturbed as the certificate of the petitioner therein was accepted with
open eyes by the respondents.

48. Equally significant is the procedural infirmity vitiating the impugned order. It is evident that no
regular departmental inquiry, as mandated under the U.P. Basic Education (Staff) Service Rules, 1973 read
with the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, has been conducted. The
termination has been effected merely on the basis of notices, without formulation of charges, without
adducing evidence, and without affording the petitioner a meaningful and effective opportunity of hearing.
Such a course of action is in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, as expounded by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772.

49. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner's educational credentials, namely, the High School
Certificate (1991), Certificate of Physical Education (1993-94), and Intermediate Certificate (1995), continue
to hold the field, having never been annulled or invalidated by any competent authority. In such
circumstances, the substratum of the impugned action is rendered wholly untenable.

50. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court is constrained to hold that the impugned order
dated 11.12.2025 is vitiated by arbitrariness, non-application of mind, procedural impropriety, and violation
of settled principles of law. The same, therefore, cannot be sustained.

51. The impugned order dated 11.12.2025 passed by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, District- Gautam
Budhh Nagar, is hereby quashed.

52. The writ petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1786
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Writ A No. 4116 of 2019

Kunwar Pal Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
4 All. Kunwar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1787
Issue(s) for consideration
(a) Whether recommendation of punishment by the Inquiry Officer in the inquiry report itself, vitiates the
inquiry proceedings and the inquiry report?
(b) Whether the departmental proceedings as well as the criminal trial can proceed simultaneously?
(c) Whether a subsequent criminal acquittal based on the "benefit of doubt" automatically invalidates a prior
termination order passed in a regular departmental inquiry involving identical facts?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - UP Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules
1991: Rule 14(1) - The petitioner was a Constable in the U.P. Police Department. On 14.12.2011, while
assigned to present an accused person at the Sadar Lockup in District Firozabad, the petitioner allegedly
consumed alcohol. Due to his severe intoxication, his service rifle accidentally discharged. The gunshot injured
two private citizens, Buddhpal and Chunnilal. Following the incident, a criminal case was registered against
the petitioner (Case Crime No. 318 of 2011). Concurrently, a preliminary inquiry was conducted, leading to
the initiation of formal departmental disciplinary proceedings u/Rule 14(1) of the Rules, 1991.
A charge sheet was issued and served upon the petitioner via his daughter on 17.09.2012. Despite multiple
notices detailing the time and place of the inquiry hearings, the petitioner entirely boycotted the proceedings.
The Inquiry Officer subsequently conducted the inquiry ex-parte. In his report dated 29.06.2013, the Inquiry
Officer found the petitioner guilty and explicitly recommended his removal from service. A show-cause notice
along with the inquiry report was served on the petitioner on 10.07.2013. He failed to file an explanation
within the stipulated 15 days. On 19.08.2013, the Disciplinary Authority ordered his removal from service. His
statutory appeal was dismissed on 21.12.2013, and his revision petition was later dismissed as time-barred.
The petitioner subsequently approached the High Court. (Para 12)
B. Provisions of Rule 14(1) along with Appendix 1 of 1991 Rules - The proviso to the Appendix
specifically empowers the Disciplinary Authority to make the recommendation w.r.t. the
punishment after conclusion of the guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer. However, it is expected
that such recommendation ought to have been made separately. The purpose being that the
aforesaid recommendations are in between the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority and the same
ought not to have been communicated to the delinquent officer before any punishment order is passed. Thus,
the aforesaid requirement is just a requirement of convenience and caution, however, the same
would not vitiate the inquiry report itself, which has been otherwise based upon the cogent evidence
recorded by the Inquiry Officer, during the inquiry proceedings. (Para 13)

C. The criminal trial as well as the disciplinary proceedings for identical allegations are two
different things and operate in different spheres. The purpose of a criminal trial is to punish the
offender for the offense committed by him and for such purpose, the allegations are required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. So far as the disciplinary proceedings are concerned, the purpose thereof is to
ascertain the misconduct, indiscipline committed by the delinquent officer while on service and with regard to
the finding of guilt for misconduct, negligence, etc. by one's service, the degree of proof is
preponderance of probabilities and not the strict proof as in the criminal trial. (Para 14)

The departmental proceedings as well as the criminal trial can proceed simultaneously as there
is no bar to their being conducted simultaneously. However, it provides that where the charges in the
departmental proceedings as well as criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the
charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature, which involves complicated
questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the
criminal case. However, due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings
cannot be unduly delayed and wherever the disposal of criminal case is delayed, the disciplinary
proceedings cannot be delayed. (Para 16)
1788 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
D. The criminal trial and the disciplinary proceedings for the identical allegations operate in
different spheres and both are not dependent on each other. Merely because an employee is
acquitted in a criminal trial, he cannot be ipso facto reinstated in service due to such acquittal in
criminal trial. Wherever charges and allegations were identical and the criminal court has acquitted then it is
the duty of the Court to examine whether it was an honorable acquittal or benefit of doubt has been
given to such employee. Even if there is an honorable acquittal the Court is required to examine whether
the witnesses produced before the Disciplinary Authority and the criminal trial were the same. The dismissal
stands if inquiry witnesses supported the charges but did not support (turned hostile) the criminal trial, or if
the inquiry proved additional facts not covered in the trial. (Para 27)

In present case, most of the witnesses who were injured were turned hostile and did not support the
prosecution case and the petitioner has been acquitted on the basis of his own statement, which is similar to
the explanation allegedly submitted by him to the show-cause notice before the Disciplinary Authority, where
he has also not been cross-examined by the prosecution. (Para 28)

The petitioner was found to be guilty of misconduct. It was not a clean acquittal. Writ petition dismissed.
(Para 29, 30)

Case Law Cited:
1. Constable No.118 Awadhes Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others, Judgment and order dated
26.09.2024, passed by the Division Bench of this Court, Special Appeal No. 601 of 2024 (Para 8)
2. State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Phool Singh, Civil Appeal No. 5930 of 2022 (Para 11)
3. Maharana Pratap Singh Vs. State of Bihar and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 890 (Para 11)
4. Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 679 (Para 15)
5. Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited Vs. C. Nagaraju, 2019 10 SCC 367 (Para 17)
6. Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra, (2019) 20 SCC 588 (Para 18)
7. Ajit Kumar Negi Vs. General Manager Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2005) 7 SCC 764 (Para 19)
8. State of Rajasthan Vs. Heem Singh, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 886 (Para 20)
9. Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal no. 7935 of 2023, dated 04.12.2023 (Para 22)
10. Maharana Pratap Singh Vs. State of Bihar and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 890 (Para 23)
11. Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another Vs. Mehar Singh, 2013 (7) SCC 685 (Para 24)
12. Anand Kumar Vs. Union of India and Another, 2025 0 AHC 188636; 2025 0 Supreme (All) 3430 (Para 26)

List of Acts
UP Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991.

List of Keywords
domestic inquiry, criminal, acquittal, punishment, service, department, termination, benefit of doubt,
honourable.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner(s): Pawan Kumar Tripathi, Vijay Gautam, Vijay Gautam (Senior Adv.), Vinod Kumar Mishra
For Respondent(s): C.S.C.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anish Kumar Gupta, J.)

1. Heard Sri Pawan Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel assisted by Sri Deepanshu Sharma,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Gaurav Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the State
respondents.
4 All. Kunwar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1789
2. The briefly stated facts of the case are that the petitioner was posted as Constable on
15.05.1982 in the U.P. Police Department. At the relevant time in the year 2011, the petitioner was
posted as Constable at Police Line, District- Firozabad. On 14.12.2011, the petitioner was assigned
duty to present an accused at Sadar Lockup. While on such duty, allegedly the petitioner got
intoxicated and due to such intoxication consumed by the petitioner, a gunshot fire from his service
rifle took place, due to which private persons got injured. With regard to the aforesaid incident, an
F.I.R. was lodged against the petitioner being Case Crime No. 318 of 2011 at Police Station-
Mathsena, District- Firozabad. Thereafter, a preliminary inquiry was conducted with regard to the
misconduct of the petitioner herein by an Inquiry Officer appointed by the Department, who held
the petitioner herein guilty of the misconduct. Thereafter, on the basis of the report of the
preliminary inquiry, the departmental disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner
under Rule 14 (1) of the UP Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal)
Rules 1991 (hereinafter referred to as '1991 Rules').

3. In the disciplinary proceedings, the Inquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry
against the petitioner with regard to the aforesaid misconduct, due to which bullet was fired from
his service rifle causing injury to private persons during intoxication while on duty. Initially, the
disciplinary inquiry was handed over to Shri Asharam Yadav, the then Circle Officer. On
30.07.2012, the charge-sheet was issued by him with the approval of the Disciplinary Authority to
the petitioner, which was served through the daughter of the petitioner as the petitioner was not
found at his given address on 17.09.2012.

4. Thereafter, the inquiry was handed over to Shishpal Singh, Circle Officer, Firozabad,
who noted that the charge-sheet had been duly served, acknowledgement of the daughter of the
petitioner is available on record. Thereafter, he proceeded with the inquiry and called for the
witnesses and intimation with regard to the date, time, and place of the disciplinary proceedings to
be conducted was sent to the petitioner calling upon the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses,
if he so desires but petitioner did not appear before the Inquiry Officer in the entire inquiry
proceedings. Thus, the Inquiry Officer had no other option but to proceed with recording the
statements of witnesses in accordance with rules ex-parte. The witnesses have categorically stated
that after the incident medical examination of the petitioner was conducted, wherein it was proved
that the petitioner had consumed alcohol. Thus, from the evidence available on record, the Inquiry
Officer concluded that the petitioner herein was guilty of intoxication while on duty and due to his
negligence a bullet was fired from his service rifle, due to which two public persons namely,
Buddhpal and Chunnilal had sustained injuries and for the aforesaid incident, an F.I.R. was lodged
by one Rajkumar, being Case Crime No. 318 of 2011 under section 307 I.P.C.

5. In the medical examination of the petitioner, intoxication was found, therefore, the
Inquiry Officer held him guilty of the aforesaid charges and also recommended the punishment of
removal from services in his inquiry report dated 29.06.2013. Therefore, on 03.07.2013, a showcause notice was issued by Superintendent of Police, Firozabad to the petitioner herein along with
the copy of the inquiry report. The petitioner had submitted his explanation to the aforesaid showcause notice, stating therein that while performing his duties to escort the accused in the Court of
ACJM-II, Firozabad and looking at sensitivity and crowed he kept the loaded rifle with him to
ensure that the accused cannot escape or assaulted by the opposite parties. The opposite parties to
1790 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the accused had crowded him in the verandah of the ACJM-II Court and had tried to snatch the rifle
from him. Thereafter, the petitioner consciously kept the point of rifle towards the roof, however,
due to the crowd, someone had pressed the trigger, thus the fire was caused, the bullet first touched
to the roof and thereafter came back on the floor and due to some stones from the floor hit the
injured persons. Thus, he submitted that he has not committed any misconduct deliberately and he
has not been negligent in his duties. Had he been negligent then there would have been some
mishappening. The petitioner was immediately arrested and was sent to jail without giving any
opportunity to explain his conduct. The matter was investigated by the Investigation Officer and in
the said offense, only offense under Sections 286 and 338 I.P.C. was found to have been committed
and thereafter the petitioner was released on bail and the trial is pending. However, with regard to
the aforesaid reply/explanation submitted by the petitioner, neither the date has been given on
which date the said explanation/reply was submitted by petitioner nor there is any acknowledgment
that the said reply/explanation was actually submitted by him.

6. The Superintendent of Police being the Disciplinary Authority has categorically noted
that initial show-cause notice was sent to petitioner on 03.07.2013 calling upon him to submit his
explanation. Thereafter, it was submitted by the Police Line- Hathras that the petitioner is absent
from his duties from 28.06.2013. Thereafter, a copy of show-cause notice was sent through Special
Messenger to his permanent address at Village- Khoobkhabar, P.S.- Lodha, District- Aligarh,
wherein it was informed by various persons, resident of the said village, that he is not residing in
the village and has sold his house and land and shifted to Aligarh. Thereafter, again, the Special
Messenger was sent to his address at Aligarh, wherein the notice was duly served on the petitioner
on 30.07.2013. He was expected to submit his reply/explanation within 15 days. Since, the
petitioner has failed to submit any explanation or reply to the show-cause notice, thereafter, the
Disciplinary Authority has proceeded ex-parte and has passed the punishment order of removal
from service on 19.08.2013. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner herein has filed a statutory
appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Agra Zone, Agra, which was dismissed by
the Appellate Authority on 21.12.2013. Thereafter, the petitioner has submitted a revision petition
on 21.05.2015, though the copy of the order of the Appellate Authority was duly served to the
petitioner on 17.01.2014. Thereafter, the Revisional Authority having found that the revision is
time-barred, the same was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid three orders passed by the
Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority, as well as the Revisional Authority, the instant
petition has been filed by the petitioner herein.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner herein has already
been acquitted in the criminal case, lodged for the identical allegations against the petitioner herein.
Initially, the Case Crime No. 318 of 2011 was registered under Section 307 I.P.C, however, the
charge-sheet was filed under Sections 286 and 338 I.P.C., for which the petitioner was tried and
after trial, giving benefit of doubt to the petitioner he was acquitted.

8. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
judgment and order dated 26.09.2024 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal
No. 601 of 2024 (Constable No.118 Awadhes Kumar Pandey vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others).
4 All. Kunwar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1791
 "37. We have also carefully perused the judgment of trial court, which is on record, and
it can be safely said that the petitioner-appellant was honorably acquitted. We find that the
disciplinary proceeding and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges
were not just the same but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the
same. Merely on the basis of two days absence, that so due to ailment, no such major penalty can
be inflicted. Accordingly, question no.2 is answered. "

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the petitioner has been acquitted
for the identical charges in a judicial trial, therefore, the punishment order on the basis of the
identical charges cannot be sustained in law. Thus, the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement with
all consequential benefits. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
Inquiry Officer has recommended the punishment in the inquiry report itself, which is
impermissible for the Inquiry Officer. Though, the Appendix 1 of 1991 Rules permits the Inquiry
Officer to make the recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police
officer, however, such recommendations ought to have been made separately, but not in the inquiry
report and the Disciplinary Authority, without application of his mind, has simply agreed with the
recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer and has passed the punishment order. The appeal
filed by the petitioner against the order of removal from service was rejected and the revision has
been dismissed as time-barred. Thus, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the
Inquiry Officer has made the recommendations in inquiry report itself, then the entire inquiry
proceedings gets vitiated. Thus, he seeks quashing of the inquiry proceedings as well as the
termination order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and consequently the orders passed by the
Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority. 10. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the
State submits that on perusal of the inquiry, it is apparent that sufficient opportunity to defend
himself was granted by the Inquiry Officer to the petitioner. The charge-sheet was duly served.
Date, time, and place for examination of witnesses was duly intimated to the petitioner time and
again, and despite that, the petitioner has failed to cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings.
Thus, the Inquiry Officer had no other option but to proceed ex-parte against the petitioner, and has
after examination of witnesses in accordance with law, has found petitioner guilty of the charges
leveled against the petitioner. As per Appendix 1 attached to 1991 Rules, read with Rule 14 (1)
empowers the Inquiry Officer, after conclusion of inquiry proceedings, to make the
recommendation with regard to punishment. Thus, the aforesaid recommendation made by the
Inquiry Officer were well within its powers. It is further submitted by learned Standing Counsel for
the State that merely because the petitioner has been acquitted in a criminal trial, it would not
amount to reversal of the findings of misconduct which were arrived in a fairly concluded
disciplinary proceeding.

11. In support of the submission, learned Standing Counsel for the State has relied upon the
judgment and order dated 02.09.2022 passed by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 5930 of 2022,
State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs. Phool Singh, and also in Maharana Pratap Singh vs. State of
Bihar and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 890. Thus, Standing Counsel for the State seeks dismissal
of the instant case.

12. Having heard the rival submissions so made by learned counsel for the parties, this
Court has carefully gone through the records of the Case. The facts of the case have already been
1792 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
noted herein above. From the perusal of the inquiry report, it is apparent that the charge-sheet was
served to the petitioner through her daughter and despite service of the charge-sheet the petitioner
has failed to file any response to the said charge-sheet. Thereafter, under intimation to the petitioner
and by calling upon him to join the inquiry proceedings and cross-examine the witnesses on the
given date, time and place, since the petitioner failed to cooperate in the inquiry proceedings, the
Inquiry Officer having no other option, had proceeded ex-parte against the petitioner in accordance
with the law and he had examined the witnesses and thereupon has concluded the inquiry against
the petitioner and found him guilty of the alleged charges against the petitioner. Thus, in the
considered opinion of this Court, there is no illegality so far as the inquiry proceedings are
concerned and the petitioner was found guilty by the Inquiry Officer.

13. So far as the argument raised by counsel for the petitioner that the Inquiry Officer had
recommended the punishment in the inquiry report itself, which vitiates the inquiry proceedings
and the inquiry report, this Court has gone through the provisions of Rule 14(1) along with
Appendix 1 of 1991 Rules. The proviso to the Appendix specifically empowers the Disciplinary
Authority to make the recommendation with regard to the punishment after conclusion of the guilt
recorded by the Inquiry Officer. However, it is expected that such recommendation ought to have
been made separately. The purpose of such recommendation being made separately appears to be
that the aforesaid recommendations are in between the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary
Authority and the same ought not to have been communicated to the delinquent officer that is why
it is expected that such recommendations ought to have been made separately by the inquiry officer
before any punishment order is passed. Thus, the aforesaid requirement is just a requirement of
convenience and caution, however, the same would not vitiate the inquiry report itself, which has
been otherwise based upon the cogent evidence recorded by the Inquiry Officer, during the inquiry
proceedings. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid argument advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioner is not sustainable in law.

14. So far as the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the
petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal trial for the identical allegation against the petitioner,
thus, the petitioner is automatically entitled for reinstatement. In this regard, it is a settled position
of law that the criminal trial as well as the disciplinary proceedings for identical allegations are two
different things and operate in different spheres. The purpose of a criminal trial is to punish the
offender for the offense committed by him and for such purpose, the allegations are required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. So far as the disciplinary proceedings are concerned, the purpose
thereof is to ascertain the misconduct, indiscipline committed by the delinquent officer while on
service and with regard to the finding of guilt for misconduct, negligence, etc. by one's service, the
degree of proof is preponderance of probabilities and not the strict proof as in the criminal trial.

15. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to take note of some of the judgments
of the Apex Court, which throw light on the aforesaid issue. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat
Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr : (1999) 3 SCC 679, the Apex Court has drawn the following conclusion:-

 "22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred
to above are:
4 All. Kunwar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1793
 (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed
simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

 (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and
similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a
grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the
departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

 (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated
questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the
nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected
against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

 (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay
the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental
proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

 (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the
departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal
case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the
employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the
administration may get rid of him at the earliest."

16. According to the aforesaid judgment, the departmental proceedings as well as the
criminal trial can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar to their being conducted
simultaneously. However, it provides that where the charges in the departmental proceedings as
well as criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal
case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature, which involves complicated questions of
law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the
criminal case. Whether the criminal case involves the grave charges or whether it involves the
complicated questions of fact and law, will depend upon the nature of the offense, nature of the
case lodged against the employee on the basis of the evidence and material collected during
investigation. However, it has further been provided in the said judgment that the Stay of
departmental proceedings cannot operate in isolation on the aforesaid principles but due regard has
to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed and wherever
the disposal of criminal case is delayed, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be delayed.

17. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited vs. C. Nagaraju : 2019 10
SCC 367, the Apex Court has held as under:

 "10. As the High Court set aside the order of dismissal on the basis of the judgments of
this Court in M. Paul Anthony [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 810] and G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 1121] , it is necessary to examine whether the said judgments are applicable to the
facts of this case. Simultaneous continuance of departmental proceedings and proceedings in a
1794 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
criminal case on the same set of facts was the point considered by this Court in M. Paul Anthony
case [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] .
This Court was of the opinion that departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case
can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar. However, it is desirable to stay departmental
inquiry till conclusion of the criminal case if the departmental proceedings and criminal case are
based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the
delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact. On
the facts of the said case, it was found that the criminal case and the departmental proceedings
were based on identical set of facts and the evidence before the criminal court and the
departmental inquiry was the same. Further, in the said case the departmental inquiry was
conducted ex parte. In such circumstances, this Court held that the ex parte departmental
proceedings cannot be permitted to stand in view of the acquittal of the delinquent by the criminal
court on the same set of facts and evidence. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this
case. In the present case, the prosecution witnesses turned hostile in the criminal trial against
Respondent 1. He was acquitted by the criminal court on the ground that the prosecution could
not produce any credible evidence to prove the charge. On the other hand, the complainant and
the other witnesses appeared before the inquiry officer and deposed against Respondent 1. The
evidence available in the departmental inquiry is completely different from that led by the
prosecution in criminal trial.

 11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on a judgment of this Court in G.M. Tank
[G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] whereby the writ
petition filed by Respondent 1 was allowed. In the said case, the delinquent officer was charged for
an offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988. He was
honourably acquitted by the criminal court as the prosecution failed to prove the charge.
Thereafter, a departmental inquiry was conducted and he was dismissed from service. The order
of dismissal was upheld [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC OnLine Guj 487] by the High
Court. In the appeal filed by the delinquent officer, this Court was of the opinion that the
departmental proceedings and criminal case were based on identical and similar set of facts. The
evidence before the criminal court and the departmental proceedings being exactly the same, this
Court held that the acquittal of the employee by a criminal court has to be given due weight by the
disciplinary authority. On the basis that the evidence in both the criminal trial and departmental
inquiry is the same, the order of dismissal of the appellant therein was set aside. As stated earlier,
the facts of this case are entirely different. The acquittal of Respondent 1 was due to nonavailability of any evidence before the criminal court. The order of dismissal was on the basis of a
report of the inquiry officer before whom there was ample evidence against Respondent 1.

 12. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [Krishnakali Tea
Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, (2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067] this
Court was concerned with the validity of the termination of the services of workmen after acquittal
by the criminal court. Dealing with a situation similar to the one in this case, where the acquittal
was due to lack of evidence before the criminal court and sufficient evidence was available
before the Labour Court, this Court was of the opinion that the judgment in M. Paul Anthony
case [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810]
cannot come to the rescue of the workmen.
4 All. Kunwar Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1795
 13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and Respondent
1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was
unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a criminal court does not preclude a
departmental inquiry against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by
the judgment of the criminal court if the evidence that is produced in the departmental inquiry is
different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a departmental inquiry is to
find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose
of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a
departmental inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which
is based on the evidence before the inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is
different from the evidence available to the criminal court, is justified and needed no
interference by the High Court."

18. In Union of India vs. Sitaram Mishra : (2019) 20 SCC 588, the Apex Court has
observed as under:

 "14. The fact that the first respondent was acquitted in the course of the criminal trial
cannot operate ipso facto as a ground for vitiating the finding of misconduct which has been
arrived at during the course of the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, in our view, has
drawn an erroneous inference from the decision of this Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold
Mines Ltd. [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679: 1999 SCC (L&S)
810]. The High Court adverted to the following principle of law laid down in the above judgment:
(SCC p. 687, para 13)

 "13.While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance
of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the
criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is
common without there being a variance."

 15. It is undoubtedly correct that the charge in the criminal trial arose from the death of
a co-employee in the course of the incident resulting from the firing of a bullet which took place
from the weapon which was assigned to the first respondent as a member of the Force. But the
charge of misconduct is on the ground of the negligence of the first respondent in handling his
weapon and his failure to comply with the departmental instructions in regard to the manner in
which the weapon should be handled. Consequently, the acquittal in the criminal case was not a
ground for setting aside the penalty which was imposed in the course of the disciplinary enquiry.
Hence, having regard to the parameters that govern the exercise of judicial review in
disciplinary matters, we are of the view that the judgment [Sitaram Mishra v. Union of India,
2007 SCC OnLine Cal 718 : (2008) 1 Cal LJ 863] of the Division Bench of the High Court is
unsustainable."

19. In Ajit Kumar Negi vs. General Manager Indian Oil Corporation Limited : (2005) 7
SCC 764, the Apex Court has observed as under:
1796 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 "11. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would
not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with Rules and Regulations in
force. The two proceedings criminal and departmental - are entirely different. They operate in
different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict
appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the
delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with service Rules. In a criminal
trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain
officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not
apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is
different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule
relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law,
burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
accused 'beyond reasonable doubt?, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In departmental
enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding
recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'....."

20. In State of Rajasthan vs. Heem Singh : (2020) SCC OnLine SC 886, the Apex Court
has observed as under:

 "39. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the
spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is
permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason.
The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of
the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor
does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary
authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient
conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But
they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard
of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of
preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the
spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy ? deference to the position of the disciplinary
authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and
efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the
jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when
theysuffer from perversity.