# Kuverjeet Singh v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 1 ILRA 142
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-01-18
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 28636 of 2019
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/kuverjeet-singh-v-u-o-i-ors-49597
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Suniti Chauhan, B.K. Shukla, Brijesh Kumar
Shukla,
K.K.
Pandey,
K.K.
Pandey,
Mahendra Kumar Misra

A. Service Law - Railway Protection
Force Rules, 1987 - Rule 219.4 -
Punishment - Second time enquiry was
initiated by superior authority - Validity
challenged - Order was passed beyond
the statutory period of one years -
Permissibility
-
Held,
the
superior
authority cannot hold an inquiry at its
own level but can only look into the
order
passed
by
the
disciplinary
authority - Clause-B of Rule 219.4
cannot be read so exhaustively as to
permit the superior authority to hold a
de novo inquiry totally ignoring the
inquiry already conducted and the order
passed by the disciplinary authority -
Held
further,
both
the
orders
are
passed beyond the period of one year
which cannot be passed as barred by
the first proviso of the said Rule. (Para
9)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

## Text

142 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 142
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Writ A No. 28636 of 2019

Kuverjeet Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Satish
Chaturvedi,
D.N.
Chaturvedi,
Shantanu Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
Suniti Chauhan, B.K. Shukla, Brijesh Kumar
Shukla,
K.K.
Pandey,
K.K.
Pandey,
Mahendra Kumar Misra

A. Service Law - Railway Protection
Force Rules, 1987 - Rule 219.4 -
Punishment - Second time enquiry was
initiated by superior authority - Validity
challenged - Order was passed beyond
the statutory period of one years -
Permissibility
-
Held,
the
superior
authority cannot hold an inquiry at its
own level but can only look into the
order
passed
by
the
disciplinary
authority - Clause-B of Rule 219.4
cannot be read so exhaustively as to
permit the superior authority to hold a
de novo inquiry totally ignoring the
inquiry already conducted and the order
passed by the disciplinary authority -
Held
further,
both
the
orders
are
passed beyond the period of one year
which cannot be passed as barred by
the first proviso of the said Rule. (Para
9)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Mahendra Kumar Misra,
learned counsel for the Union of India.

2. The petitioner has approached this
Court challenging the order/charge sheet
dated 24.09.2019.

3. The facts of the case are that the
petitioner was given a charge sheet on
25.06.2018 and on the basis of the same an
inquiry was conducted and the punishment
order dated 2.8.2018 was passed by the
Senior Commandant, Railway Protection
Special Force, Lucknow. Against the said
order, the petitioner had filed an appeal but
he had withdrawn the same. Despite the
same the superior authority; namely, the
Chief Security Commissioner, Railway
Protection Force, has proceeded to pass the
impugned order dated 24.09.2019. A
perusal of the same shows that the same is
the repetition of the earlier charge sheet
asking the petitioner to submit reply to the
same. The same nowhere states as to
whether by the same, order by the
disciplinary authority is intended to be
confirmed, modified or set aside or the
punishment is to be enhanced, reduced or
in any other manner modified or even
otherwise as to what order is proposed to
be passed. Rule 219.4 of the R.P.F. Rules of
1987, reads as follows:-

"Rule
219.4
Any
authority
superior to the authority making the
original order may, on its own motion, or
otherwise, call for the records of any
inquiry and revise any order made under
these rules and may:-

(a) confirm, modify or set aside
the order; or

(b) confirm, enhance, reduce or
set aside the punishment imposed by the
1 All. Kuverjeet Singh Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
143
order, or impose any punishment where no
punishment has been imposed; or

(c) remit the case to the authority
which made the order or to any other
authority directing such authority to make
such further inquiry as it may consider
proper in the circumstances of the case; or

(d) pass such other orders as it
may deem fit;

Provided that no action under
this sub-rule shall be initiated after the
expiry of one yearfrom the date of the order
aforesaid:

Provided
further
that
no
proceeding
for
revision
shall
be
commenced until after-

(i) the expiry of the period for
making an appeal specified in subsection
(2) of Section9; or

(ii) the disposal of the appeal,
where
any
such
appeal
has
been
preferred:

Provided further that in a case in
which it is proposed to enhance punishment
further, the aggrieved member shall be
given an opportunity to show cause either
orally or in writing as to why his
punishment should not be enhanced."

4. The same empowers the superior
authority to pass appropriate orders for
confirming, setting aside the order or
enhancing, reducing or even to impose a
punishment where no punishment is
imposed or to remit the case or pass such
other order as it may deem fit. It further
provides that such an action can be taken
within a period of one year only from the
date of the punishment order.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the said Rule 219.4 does not
empower the superior authority to issue a
charge sheet and thereafter initiate the
inquiry at its own end.

6. Clause-B of Rule 219.4 has to be
read in reference to the power given by
Rule a to c of Rule 219.4, the same can
only be in support of the aforesaid rules
and cannot enhance the power of the
superior authority to the extent that it may
proceed to hold inquiry at its own level
which is not permissible under any canon
of the said rules. He further submits that
since the initial punishment order was
passed on 2.8.2018 and now the proposed
order/charge sheet is passed after expiry of
one year on 24.9.2019 on the same ground,
it is liable to be set aside.

7.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents submits that the order can be
passed under Rule Clause B of the said
rules. He further submits that a show cause
notice was given within a period of one
year and hence the order impugned can be
passed.

8. I find force in the submissions of
learned counsel for the petitioner.

9. The superior authority cannot hold
an inquiry at its own level but can only
look into the order passed by the
disciplinary authority. The Clause-B of
Rule 219.4 cannot be read so exhaustively
as to permit the superior authority to hold a
de novo inquiry totally ignoring the inquiry
already conducted and the order passed by
the disciplinary authority. Even otherwise,
both the orders are passed beyond the
period of one year which cannot be passed
as barred by the first proviso of the said
Rule.

10. Thus, the impugned order dated
24.09.2019, cannot stand and is hereby set
aside.

11. The writ petition is allowed.
144 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 144
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Writ A No. 30915 of 2021

Dr. Surendra Pratap Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Amrendra Nath Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Constitution of India -
Article 14 - Intelligible differentia - Age of
retirement - Discrimination made between
the doctors practicing homeopathy and
doctors practicing allopathy in respect of
their age of retirement - Permissibility -
Held, merely because the doctors are using
different mode of treatment, it would not
qualify as an intelligible differentia - The
classification was held unreasonable and
discriminatory and inconsistent with Article
14 of the Constitution of India. (Para 8)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:

1. North Delhi Municipal Corp. VsDr. Ram
Naresh Sharma & ors.; 2021 SCC Online SC 540
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for
the State.

2. Present writ petition is filed by the
petitioner challenging the order dated
17.12.2021 passed by respondent no.2
Director, Department of Homeopathy, U.P.
8th Floor, Indira Bhawan, Lucknow. By the
said order petitioner is retied w.e.f.
31.12.2021 at the age of 60 years.

3. The facts of the case are that
petitioner is a homeopathic doctor working
with the State Government. By notification
dated 31.05.2017, the age of the medical
officers of the Provincial Medical and
Health Service in the State of U.P. was
enhanced from 60 years to 62 years. The
doctors working under the Provincial
Medical and Health Service are doctors of
Allopathy. The services of doctors of
homeopathy
belong
to
Homeopathic
Medical Service Cadre and the benefit of
the notification dated 31.05.2017 is not
extended to them.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
relies upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court passed in 'North Delhi Municipal
Corporation Vs. Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma
and others' reported in 2021 SCC Online
SC 540. Paragraph-23 and 24 of the said
judgment reads:-

"23. The common contention of
the
appellants
before
us
is
that
classification of AYUSH doctors and
doctors under CHS in different categories
is reasonable and permissible in law. This
however does not appeal to us and we are
inclined to agree with the findings of the
Tribunal and the Delhi High Court that the
classification
is
discriminatory
and
unreasonable since doctors under both
segments are performing the same function
of treating and healing their patients. The
only difference is that AYUSH doctors are
using indigenous systems of medicine like
Ayurveda, Unani, etc. and CHS doctors are
using Allopathy for tending to their