# Lal Bahadur Maurya & Anr v. State of U.P. & Anr. Oposite Parties

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 470
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-11
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 23886 of 2019
- **Bench:** Karuna Nand Bajpayee
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/lal-bahadur-maurya-anr-v-state-of-u-p-anr-oposite-parties-45083
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Procedure Code, 1973, Section 156 (3) -
the powers of a Judicial Magistrate under
Section
156(3)
of
Cr.P.C.
and
the
Administrative powers to maintain law
and order in order to ensure appropriate
administrative action against the wrong
doers are two qualitatively different
spheres of operation.

Even otherwise if the local police which is a law and
order implementing limb of local administration,
does not act properly with efficient alacrity and if
somebody feels aggrieved by such lackadaisical
attitude, it is frequently seen that a protest or a
complaint in that regard is made before the District
Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police. It is also
frequently seen that on such application, District
Magistrate directs the concerned local officials who
may be of police or may be of police or may be
officials of other department, that they should "do
the needful" or "take necessary actions in
accordance with law". Being in charge of the
administration, the District magistrate has to pass
orders almost on regular basis on a large scale every
day which relate to multiple departments of all kinds
including police. (Para 6)

B. Inherent Jurisdiction - Section 482 -
Cr.P.C. - Scope - the Trial Court and not
the High Court is expected to analytically
analyze the facts and factual matrix of
case.
Application u/s 482 rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

470 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2020)1ILR 470

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE KARUNA NAND BAJPAYEE, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 23886 of 2019

Lal Bahadur Maurya & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Oposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Rajesh Kumar Shukla, Sri P.N. Ojha

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sunil Kumar Patel

A. First Information Report - Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, Section 156 (3) -
the powers of a Judicial Magistrate under
Section
156(3)
of
Cr.P.C.
and
the
Administrative powers to maintain law
and order in order to ensure appropriate
administrative action against the wrong
doers are two qualitatively different
spheres of operation.

Even otherwise if the local police which is a law and
order implementing limb of local administration,
does not act properly with efficient alacrity and if
somebody feels aggrieved by such lackadaisical
attitude, it is frequently seen that a protest or a
complaint in that regard is made before the District
Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police. It is also
frequently seen that on such application, District
Magistrate directs the concerned local officials who
may be of police or may be of police or may be
officials of other department, that they should "do
the needful" or "take necessary actions in
accordance with law". Being in charge of the
administration, the District magistrate has to pass
orders almost on regular basis on a large scale every
day which relate to multiple departments of all kinds
including police. (Para 6)

B. Inherent Jurisdiction - Section 482 -
Cr.P.C. - Scope - the Trial Court and not
the High Court is expected to analytically
analyze the facts and factual matrix of
case.
Application u/s 482 rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited: -

1. State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan lal 1992 SCC
(Cr.) 426

(Delivered by Hon'ble Karuna Nand
Bajpayee, J.)

1. Supplementary affidavit has been
filed by the counsel for applicants, which
is taken on record.

2. This application u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
has been moved on behalf of applicants
seeking the quashing of Charge Sheet
dated 25.09.2018 and cognizanc order
dated 11.02.2019 as well as the entire
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 433 of
2019 (State Vs. Lal Bahadur), arising out
of Case Crime No. 60 of 2018, under
Section 457 I.P.C., Police Station Pawara,
District Jaunpur, pending in the court of
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate 3rd
Jaunpur.

3. Heard Shri N.P. Ojha holding brief
of Shri Rajesh Kumar Shukla counsel for
the applicants, counsel for opposite party
No.2 and learned A.G.A. and also perused
the record.

4. Submission of learned counsel for
the applicants is that the F.I.R. of the case
could have been directed only by a
Judicial Magistrate while in the present
case the same has been registered on the
orders of S.D.M. or District Magistrate.
Therefore, according to the counsel, the
registration of F.I.R. will be an illegal act
and the consequent investigation and
submission of charge sheet will also
1 All. Lal Bahadur Maurya & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
471
become illegal and it deserves to be
quashed for that reason. It has been
submitted that if the police did not register
the F.I.R. then the only course open for the
complainant was to have moved an
application under Section 156(3) of
Cr.P.C. and it was none of his business to
have made any protest regarding that on
the administrative side. This is the only
submission that has been pressed by the
counsel before the Court in order to seek
quashing of charge sheet that has been
submitted by the police after registering
the case under Section 457 of I.P.C.
against the accused-applicants. Counsel
for the applicants has not sought to point
out any other irregularity, illegality or
impropriety much less than any abuse of
court's process in the impugned order or
proceedings which in the estimate of the
counsel could persuade this Court to
interfere in the same.

5. This Court has cogitated upon the
submissions raised by the counsel and has
considered them in the light of the facts of
this case and the record.

6. With regard to the submission
made by the counsel that only a Judicial
Magistrate could have directed the police
to register the F.I.R. under Section 156(3)
of Cr.P.C. and therefore, the present F.I.R.
and the subsequent investigation and the
charge sheet deserves to be quashed for
the reason of having been lodged at the
instance of the District Magistrate or the
Sub Divisional Magistrate, the same does
not appear to be a sound argument in the
peculiar facts of the case. It goes without
saying that so far as the implied power to
direct registration of F.I.R. and direct the
investigation into the case under Section
156 (3) of Cr.P.C. is concerned, the
Judicial Magistrate no doubt possess such
power. But the contents of the present
F.I.R. show that it was never lodged on the
basis of any application under Section
156(3) of Cr.P.C. at all. In fact, the
contents of the application on the basis of
which F.I.R. has been lodged show that the
same had been addressed to the S.H.O. of
Police Station Pawara, District- Jaunpur
and not to any Magistrate whether Judicial
or Executive. It is not at all a case in which
it may be said that some application in the
form of 156(3) Cr.P.C. was moved before
the court of Executive Magistrate on
which the Magistrate might have passed
the order directing the police to register
the F.I.R. and initiate investigation into the
case. To the contrary it appears to be the
case where some application has been
addressed to S.O. of Police Station Pawara
on the basis of which the F.I.R. has been
registered. In fact, the perusal of the record
shows that probably initially the police
was reluctant to lodge the F.I.R. and in
that regard protests were made by some
local political leaders and the matter came
to the notice of the District Magistrate who
then set up an enquiry in this regard. The
perusal of annexure no. 2 shows that this
inquiry was conducted by the Circle
Officer of the police and the Sub
Divisional Magistrate of Machhalishahar,
Jaunpur jointly and it was found by them
that the opposite party no. 2 Rajendra
Prasad Maurya had purchased the land in
question which was duly mutated in his
favour. After ascertaining so many other
facts it was found prima facie in the
enquiry that the house in question was
constructed by the first informant Rajendra
Prasad Maurya regarding which the
accused persons had committed criminal
trespass and unlawful possession of the
same was taken by the accused by
breaking into the house. The inquiry report
also indicated that the accused persons had
472 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
committed cognizable offence and the
balance of equity and justice was clearly
therefore in favour of the first informant
who was wronged by the accused and the
locks of his house were forcibly broken
and the unlawful possession of the
property in question was illegally taken by
the accused persons. It was also indicated
in the preliminary inquiry report that the
political protest was justified and the
police ought to have registered the F.I.R.
for committing cognizable offences. It
appears that in all probability it was in the
wake of this background that the officials
of local police station having found that
the higher police officer i.e. Circle Officer
of Machhalishahr himself has submitted
such kind of report to the District
Magistrate which also contained the
signature of the Sub Divisional Magistrate,
endorsing the same view, that they (the
local police) decided to register the F.I.R.
into the case on the basis of application
that was moved and addressed to S.H.O.
The perusal of the the check report does
not show any such direction that may be
said to have been issued either by the
District Magistrate or the Sub Divisional
Magistrate to register the case. The
registration of F.I.R. therefore cannot at all
be said to have been by any such order
passed by the Executive Magistrate which
may be equated to an order which is
normally passed on an application moved
under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. by the
Judicial Magistrate. Even otherwise if the
local police which is a law and order
implementing limb of local administration,
does not act properly with efficient alacrity
and if somebody feels aggrieved by such
lackadaisical attitude, it is frequently seen
that a protest or a complaint in that regard
is made before the District Magistrate or
the Superintendent of Police. It is also
frequently seen that on such application
being
moved
before
the
District
Magistrate, he directs the concerned local
officials who may be of police or may be
officials of other department, that they
should "do the needful" or "take necessary
action in accordance with law." Being
incharge of the District Administration, the
District Magistrate has to pass such orders
almost on a regular basis on a large scale
every day which relate to multiple
departments of all kinds including police.
Even though in the present case we do not
have any material before us to indicate that
any such formal specific direction to lodge
F.I.R. was issued to the local police on the
basis of which the present F.I.R. in
question might be said to have been
registered. But even if we presume it to be
so such kind of general orders to "take
appropriate action in accordance with law"
or "do the needful in accordance with law"
or to "do the needful and maintain law and
order" cannot be equated and will not be
tantamount to a direction issued under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The powers vested
in the Judicial Magistrate to pass an order
under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. is a
statutory power and it is within the rights
of every aggrieved individual to invoke
such power if he is so advised. It can also
be said with equal force that the powers of
a Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3)
of Cr.P.C. and the Administrative Powers
to maintain law and order in order to
ensure appropriate administrative action
against wrong doers are two qualitatively
different spheres of operation. Sometimes
it may appear in the ultimate analysis that
the relief which an aggrieved person may
get by approaching the District Magistrate
was such which in part might also have
been achieved by approaching a Court of
Law
but
such
kind
of
ostensible
overlapping would not mean that the
aggrieved person had no right to make a
1 All. Lal Bahadur Maurya & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
473
complaint on the higher administrative
side or to raise a protest on the higher
executive side against the dereliction of
duty committed by some subordinate
administrative
officials.
If
the
local
incharge of police station refuses to
register the F.I.R. and shoes away the
complainant or misbehaves with him, it is
very much natural and permissible both
that the aggrieved complainant may go to
the Superintendent of Police and may even
go the District Magistrate, who is the
overall head of the District Administration,
in
order
to
express
his
grievance.
Approaching the Superintendent of Police
in such a situation has even got a statutory
recognition in the Code of Criminal
Procedure
itself.
If
the
aggrieved
complainant
approaches
the
District
Magistrate, narrates his grievances and
makes a complaint about the dereliction of
duty in which the local police official
indulged or as to how the local police
appeared to have colluded with the other
side and has not properly behaved in the
matter, what else is expected from a
District Magistrate in such a situation than
to either call for an explanation or to
initiate a departmental inquiry or to entrust
somebody to find facts or to call up the
erring police officer to explain his conduct
or to reprimand him to watch the step,
behave properly, do the right thing, and act
in accordance with law and perform his
duty. It cannot be said with any
reasonableness
that
the
aggrieved
complainant in such situation was wrong
to
have
approached
either
the
Superintendent of Police or the District
Magistrate
or
any
other
Executive
Magistrate of higher rank whom the
complainant found to be within his reach
or accessibility nor can it be contended
with any amount of reasonableness that if
any higher Executive Officer or the
Superintendent
of
Police
in
such
circumstances tried to ameliorate the
grievance of the complaint and endeavored
to mend the ways of such erring police
officer, he did or would do anything
wrong. In fact, if the higher administrative
officers in such a situation would just
shrug their shoulders and tamely plead to
be helpless and simply remained content
with giving a pontificating advice to the
complainant to engage a counsel, approach
the Court of Law and move an application
under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., they
themselves might be held guilty for
dereliction of their own duty. What has
happened in the present matter is an event
which by its recurring frequency has
become banal and we often come across
such matters where instead of performing
their duty, the police officers refuse to
register the F.I.R. just to keep the crime
graph low in their police station and the
aggrieved persons are shown the doors in a
most insensitive manner. As it appears in
the present matter also that despite the
crime committed against the complainant
their grievance remained unregistered and
unaddressed. The initial report was clearly
not registered in the manner as it ought to
have been and attempts were made to
dilute the offences and keep them on low
key. As the complainant was conscious of
his rights he did not give up and staged a
"Dharna" which impelled the District
Magistrate to set up a higher level inquiry
which was conducted by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police and the Sub
Divisional Magistrate together and who
gave a detailed fact finding report
affirming the highhandedness and wrongs
committed against the complainant. It
appears that when the matter got exposed
and the reality got unearthed the local
police thought it prudent to mend its way
and do what they ought to have done much
474 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
earlier in accordance with law. For all these
reasons as discussed above, this Court does
not find any substance in the contention
raised by the applicant's counsel that the
only way permissible to get the F.I.R.
registered, was to move an application under
Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and the matter
should not have been brought to the notice
of the higher Administrative Authorities of
the District. Nor this Court finds any
substance in the contention raised by the
applicant's counsel that the initiative taken
on the administrative side by the District
Magistrate where by it set up a fact-finding
inquiry, he did anything wrong. In the
considered opinion of this Court, what the
District Magistrate did was not only right but
it was his duty to do what he did. Any coldshouldering
on
his
part
in
such
circumstances could have been termed as
nothing but a meek refusal on his part to
look into what was rotting under his nose
and what was growing wild right under his
foot.

7. No other submission worth
consideration has been raised by the
counsel. All other contentions that have
been raised relate to pure questions of fact
which can be adjudicated upon only during
the course of trial and related to
appreciation of evidence. In exercise of
inherent jurisdiction, this Court does not
propose to have a pre-trial of accused
before the actual trial may began. The
perusal of the F.I.R. and the other material
collected
during
the
course
of
investigation
clearly
disclose
the
commission of cognizable offnece and the
matter certainly does not fall in any of the
categories recognized by the Apex Court
in its decision given in the case of State of
Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC(Cr.)
426 on the basis of which the impugned
proceedings could have been quashed.
This Court also does not see any illegality
much less than any abuse of court's
process having been committed by the
court below and in the wake of the
allegations made in the F.I.R. and the
material that has been collected during the
course of investigation in the case there is
no good reason to scuttle the impugned
criminal proceedings at its threshold.

8. The application lacks merit and
stands dismissed.
----------
(2020)1ILR474

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE KARUNA NAND BAJPAYEE, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 35253 of 2019

Ram Avtar Gupta ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Kuldeep Kumar

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Abetment of Suicide - Section 306 of
Indian
Penal
Code
-
somebody's
misbehavior also may abet a person to
commit suicide.

There may be cases where the nature of illtreatment meted out to a person, the
constancy of humiliation to which the other
person has been subjected to, and the
continuation of ill-treatment towards that
person may be so extreme that even a normal
self-respecting person having normal levels of
sensitivity may be driven to commit suicide.
The act of abatement may be direct and it can
also be indirect in a particular case. (Para 10)