# Lal Singh & Ors v. Competent Authority Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, Aligarh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 2 ILRA 613
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-01-23
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 69115 of 2009
- **Bench:** Suneet Kumar, Rajendra Kumar-Iv
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/lal-singh-ors-v-competent-authority-urban-land-ceiling-regulation-act-1976-49719
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Act, 1976 - Section 10 - Acquisition of
vacant land in excess of ceiling limit -
Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation (Repeal)
Act, 1999 - Constitution of India, Art. 226
- Writ petition - Delay & Laches -
notification u/s 10(1) with regard to the
acquisition of land in excess of ceiling
limit was issued followed by notice u/s
10(5) of the Act, issued on 31.05.1993 &
the possession of the land was taken by
the competent authority not faced with
any objections - writ petition, filed after
lapse of 13 years, with prayer not to
dispossess from the land declared surplus
in proceedings under 1976 Act - Held -
writ petition hit by inordinate unexplained
laches
-
"delay
defects
equity"
-
discretionary relief can be had, provided
one has not by his act or conduct given a
go-by to his rights - Equity favours a
614 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vigilant rather than an indolent litigant
(Para 14, 15)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

2 All. Lal Singh & Ors. Vs. Competent Authority Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976,
 Aligarh & Ors.
613
under Section 47-A cannot regard the
guidelines valuation as the last word on the
subject of market value.

27. From the aforesaid discussions, it
is very much clear that respondents has
flouted the provisions of U.P. Stamp Rules,
1942, which was prevalent at the time of
execution of the sale-deed.

28. On the basis of aforesaid
discussions, this Court is of the opinion that
the respondents have not acted properly
and in accordance with the existing U.P.
Stamp Rules, 1942 and have passed the
impugned orders in arbitrary and illegal
manner, therefore the writ petition is liable
to be allowed.

O R D E R

29. The writ petition is allowed and
the impugned judgement and orders dated
19.06.1996, Annexure No. 4 and the order
dated 11.01.2000 Annexure No. 5 to this
writ petition are hereby quashed.

30. In this case Rs.96,500/- has been
recovered from the petitioners for which
they were not entitled as per this decision.
The petitioners have prayed to return the
said amount alongwith eighteen percent
(18%) annual interest.

31. In the opinion of this Court, the
respondents are liable to refund the
recovered amount of Rs.96,500/- to the
petitioners alongwith the interest arising
therefrom at the rate of six percent per
annum . Therefore, it is also ordered that
the respondents shall pay the above amount
of Rs. 96,500/- to the petitioners alongwith
six percent (6%) simple interest from the
date of realisation till the date of refund of
the said amount to the petitioners, failing
which the petitioners would be entitled to
recover the same from the respondents as
per the Rules.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 613
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

Writ-C No. 69115 of 2009

Lal Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Competent Authority Urban Land (Ceiling
& Regulation) Act, 1976, Aligarh & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri J.K. Shisodhaa, Sri B. Upadhyay, Sri
Rajneesh Pratap Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

U.P. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 - Section 10 - Acquisition of
vacant land in excess of ceiling limit -
Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation (Repeal)
Act, 1999 - Constitution of India, Art. 226
- Writ petition - Delay & Laches -
notification u/s 10(1) with regard to the
acquisition of land in excess of ceiling
limit was issued followed by notice u/s
10(5) of the Act, issued on 31.05.1993 &
the possession of the land was taken by
the competent authority not faced with
any objections - writ petition, filed after
lapse of 13 years, with prayer not to
dispossess from the land declared surplus
in proceedings under 1976 Act - Held -
writ petition hit by inordinate unexplained
laches
-
"delay
defects
equity"
-
discretionary relief can be had, provided
one has not by his act or conduct given a
go-by to his rights - Equity favours a
614 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vigilant rather than an indolent litigant
(Para 14, 15)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of Assam Vs Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma & ors.,
(2015) 5 SCC 321

2. Shiv Ram Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2015
(7) ADJ 630

3. Shivgonda Anna Patil Vs St. of Mah., (1999) 3
SCC 5

4. Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs Shah
Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48

5. Kapilaben Ambalal Patel & ors. Vs St. of Guj.,
2021 (12) SCC 95

(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.
&
Hon'ble Rajendra Kumar-IV, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties.

2. By the instant writ petition,
petitioners and the subsequent purchasers
seek direction to the State-respondent not
to dispossess the petitioners from the land
declared surplus in proceedings under the
U.P. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 (for short 'Act').

3. The land in dispute being Plot No.
397, admeasuring 1.370 hectares, situated
in Asadpur Kayam, Tehsil Koil, Aligarh.
As per the pleadings set up by the
petitioners, the predecessor in interest of
the petitioners, namely, Chunni Lal, filed
statement under Section 6 of the Act.
Under Section 8(4), the order came to be
passed on 18 March 1985, against Chunni
Lal, by the competent authority. No
objections was filed by the land owner. The
final statement, thereafter, was issued under
Section 9 on 4 October 1985. Thereafter,
notification under Section 10(1) with
regard to the acquisition of land in excess
of ceiling limit was issued, followed by
publication of notification under Section
10(3) declaring the land to have vested
absolutely in the State Government free
from all encumbrances. The notification
under Section 10(1) was issued on 27
February 1988, followed by declaration
under Section 10(3) of 20 September 1988.
Thereafter,
pursuant
to
notice
under
Section 10(5) of the Act, issued on 31 May
1993, the possession of the land was taken
by the competent authority not faced with
any objections.

4. The learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that no notice came to
be issued under Section 10(6) for taking
possession forcefully from the petitioners,
further, it is alleged that pursuant to notice
under Section 10(5), the land in excess was
not
surrendered.
It
is
alleged
that
possession of the land was never delivered
by predecessor in interest, i.e., Chunni Lal.

5.

It
appears,
thereafter,
the
petitioners herein, subsequently, sold and
consequently transferred the excess land in
favour of the proposed petitioners who
have sought impleadment.

6. In the counter affidavit filed on
behalf of the respondents, a categorical
stand has been taken that no objection
against the notice under Section 10(5) of
the Act was filed by the land owner,
consequently, there was no occasion for
proceeding under Section 10(6).

7. Further, it is being stated that the
land in question has since been transferred
to Aligarh Development Authority on 24
2 All. Lal Singh & Ors. Vs. Competent Authority Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976,
 Aligarh & Ors.
615
February 2001, and development work over
the said land has been undertaken.

8. On specific query, the learned
counsel for the petitioners has not disclosed
as to when the land after notification under
Section 10(1)/10(3) was transferred by way
of registered sale-deed.

9. We have considered the rival
submissions and perused the material
placed on record.

10. It is not in dispute that the notice
under Section 10(5) was issued on 31 May
1993, which was not objected to by the
land owner, therefore, the occasion of
issuing notice under Section 10(6) to the
land owner did not arise. The petitioners
herein waited for long and for the first time
approached this court in 2006, by filing
writ petition being Writ Petition No. 49369
of 2006, which came to be disposed of by
order dated 7 September 2009, directing the
Collector to decide the representation. It
appears that the representation was not
decided, hence, the present writ petition
came to be filed in 2009.

11. In this backdrop, it is evident that
the petitioners have raised the issue of
possession and notice under Section 10(6)
the Act after a lapse of 13 years and there is
no explanation for the delay.

12. In the case of State of Assam vs.
Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma and others, (2015)
5 SCC 321 (Paras-16, 17 and 19), Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as under:

"16. The issue can be viewed
from another angle also. Assuming that a
person in possession could make a
grievance, no matter without much gain in
the ultimate analysis, the question is
whether such grievance could be made
long after the alleged violation of Section
10(5). If actual physical possession was
taken over from the erstwhile land owner
on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the
present case any grievance based on
Section 10(5) ought to have been made
within
a
reasonable
time
of
such
dispossession. If the owner did not do so,
forcible taking over of possession would
acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time.
In any such situation the owner or the
person in possession must be deemed to
have waived his right under Section 10(5)
of the Act. Any other view would, in our
opinion, give a licence to a litigant to
make a grievance not because he has
suffered any real prejudice that needs to
be redressed but only because the
fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act
tempted him to raise the issue regarding
his dispossession being in violation of the
prescribed procedure.

17. Reliance was placed by the
respondents upon the decision of this
Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That
decision does not, in our view, lend much
assistance to the respondents. We say so,
because this Court was in Hari Ram's
case (supra) considering whether the word
'may' appearing in Section 10(5)gave to
the competent authority the discretion to
issue or not to issue a notice before taking
physical possession of the land in question
under
Section
10(6).
The
question
whether breach of Section 10(5)and
possible
dispossession
without
notice
would vitiate the act of dispossession itself
or render it non est in the eye of law did
not fall for consideration in that case. In
our opinion, what Section 10(5)prescribes
is an ordinary and logical course of action
that ought to be followed before the
authorities
decided
to
use
force
to
dispossess the occupant under Section
616 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's
version regarding dispossession of the
erstwhile owner in December 1991 is
correct, the fact that such dispossession
was without a notice under Section 10(5)
will be of no consequence and would not
vitiate or obliterate the act of taking
possession for the purposes of Section 3 of
the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb
Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any
grievance based on breach of Section 10(5)
at any stage during his lifetime implying
thereby that he had waived his right to do
so.

19. In support of the contention
that the respondents are even today in
actual physical possession of the land in
question reliance is placed upon certain
electricity bills and bills paid for the
telephone connection that stood in the
name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was
contended that said Mr. Sanatan Baishya
was none other than the caretaker of the
property of the respondents. There is,
however, nothing on record to substantiate
that assertion. The telephone bills and
electricity bills also relate to the period
from 2001 onwards only. There is nothing
on record before us nor was anything
placed before the High Court to suggest
that between 7th December, 1991 till the
date the land in question was allotted to
GMDA in December, 2003 the owner or his
legal heirs after his demise had continued
to be in possession. All that we have is rival
claims of the parties based on affidavits in
support thereof. We repeatedly asked
learned counsel for the parties whether
they can, upon remand on the analogy of
the decision in the case of Gyanaba
Dilavarsinh Jadega (supra), adduce any
documentary evidence that would enable
the High Court to record a finding in
regard to actual possession. They were
unable to point out or refer to any such
evidence. That being so the question
whether actual physical possession was
taken over remains a seriously disputed
question of fact which is not amenable to
a satisfactory determination by the High
Court in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution no matter the High Court
may in its discretion in certain situations
upon such determination. Remand to the
High Court to have a finding on the
question of dispossession, therefore, does
not appear to us to be a viable solution."

(Emphasis supplied by us)

13. The aforesaid judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma and others (supra)
has been followed by a coordinate bench of
this Court in the case of Shiv Ram Singh
vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015 (7)
ADJ 630 and the writ petition was
dismissed on the ground of laches,
observing as under:

"We must also advert to another
aspect of the matter particularly having
regard to the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma
(supra). The petitioner moved the first writ
petition in 2002 nearly three years after the
Repeal Act had come into force. After the
earlier writ petition was disposed of by
directing the District Magistrate to pass an
order
on
the
representation
of
the
petitioner, an order was passed by the
District Magistrate on 10 May 2007. The
petitioner thereafter waited for a period of
over two years until the present writ
petition was filed in July 2009. If the
petitioner had been dispossessed of the
land without due notice under Section
10(5), such a grievance could have been
raised at the relevant time. As a matter of
2 All. Lal Singh & Ors. Vs. Competent Authority Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976,
 Aligarh & Ors.
617
fact, it has been the case of the State all
along that a notice under Section 10(5)
was, in fact, issued in the present case
which would be borne out from the original
file which has been produced before the
Court. The issue is whether such a
grievance could be made long after, before
the Court. The petitioner had waited for
nearly three years after the Repeal Act
came into force to file the first writ
petition and thereafter for a period of over
two years after the disposal of the
representation despite the finding of the
District Magistrate that possession was
taken over on 25 June 1993. In our view,
such a belated challenge should not, in
any event, be entertained."

(Emphasis supplied by us)

14. In Shivgonda Anna Patil Vs.
State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5
wherein, the Supreme Court while dealing
with section 10 of the Act held that the writ
petition under Article 226 for reopening the
proceeding
on
the
ground
that
the
competent authority had not taken into
consideration certain fact, filed after ten
years, after the excess land was vested in
the
State
Government
was
rightly
summarily dismissed by the High Court.

15. While deciding the question of
delay and laches in preferring the petition
under Article 226, the Supreme Court in
Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs.
Shah Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48 held
that the equitable doctrine, namely, "delay
defects equity" has its fullest application in
the matter of grant of relief under Article
226 of the Constitution. The discretionary
relief can be had provided one has not by
his act or conduct given a go-by to his
rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than
an indolent litigant and this being the basic
tenet of law.

16. Recently, in Kapilaben Ambalal
Patel and Others Vs. State of Gujarat,
2021 (12) SCC 95, Supreme Court
declined to accept the pleas setup by the
legal heirs/representatives of the original
land holder on the ground of inordinate
delay. The Court noted the submission of
the land owner:

"Feeling
aggrieved,
the
landowners have approached this Court. It
is urged that there is no tittle of evidence to
substantiate the fact asserted by the
respondent State that physical possession
of the land in question has been taken over
on 20-3-1986. It was merely a paperpossession in the form of possession
panchnama. According to the appellants,
de facto possession of the subject land as
on the date of the Repeal Act is crucial and
entails in abatement of all the actions of the
State authorities under the 1976 Act. Mere
issuance of notification under Section 10(3)
of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting
of the land in the State is not enough for the
purposes of the Repeal Act. Reliance has
been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar
Vs. Collector & Competent Authority,
(2012) 4 SCC 718, State of U.P. Vs. Hari
Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280, Gajanan Kamlya
Patil
vs.
Additional
Collector
&
Competent Authority (ULC) (2014) 12
SCC 523 and Mangalsen Vs. State of U.P.
(2014) 15 SCC 332. The consistent view of
this Court is that physical possession must
be taken by the State authorities, failing
which the proceedings shall abate on
account of the Repeal Act. The appellants
have relied on revenue records to show that
the continued possession remained with the
appellants/landowners
even
after
the
possession panchnama was made on 20-31986.
The
revenue
entries
have
presumptive value and the respondent State
had failed to rebut the same."
618 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. In Paragraph 25 of Kapilaben
Ambalal Patel (supra), the Court noted the
delay and declined to interfere with the
order of the High Court. Relevant portion
reads thus:

"Furthermore, in the grounds all
that is asserted is that the High Court erred
in holding that there was delay of 14 years
in filing of writ petition and in not
appreciating that the notice under Section
10(5) of the 1976 Act dated 23-1-1986, was
not served upon Ambalal Parsottambhai
Patel as he had already expired on 31-121985 and notice sent to him was returned
bacy on 2-2-1986 unserved with remark
"said owner has expired". Further, the
legal heirs of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel
ought to have been served with the said
notice.........Be that as it may, we are not
inclined to reverse the conclusion recorded
by the Division Bench of the High court
that the writ petition filed by the appellants
was hopelpessly delayed and suffered from
laches. That is a possible view in the facts
of the present case."

18. For the reasons aforestated and
also in view of the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Bhaskar
Jyoti
Sharma
(supra),
Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra) and a
coordinate bench decision of this Court in
the case of Shiv Ram Singh (supra), we
do not find any merit in the writ petition,
apart from the fact that it is also hit by
inordinate
unexplained
laches.
Consequently,
the
writ
petition
is
dismissed.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 618
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 03.02.2023

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SURESH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 466 of 2001

Abu Talib & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Ajmal Khan

Counsel for the Respondent:
Govt. Advocate, Prem Prakash Singh

Criminal Law- Probation of Offenders Act,
1958- Section 4 - Code of Criminal
Procedure,
1973-Section
357,
Section
360-
The
effect,
relevance
and
applicability of Section 360 Cr.P.C. have
not been considered by the trial court and
appellants
deserve
probation
under
Section 325 IPC - Since the incident
occurred near about 31 years ago and
during intervening period he had not
indulged into any criminal activity nor he
had any criminal background - Section
357 Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to award
compensation to the victim(s) of the
offence in respect of the loss/injury
suffered. The object of the section is to
meet the ends of justice in a better way.
This section was enacted to reassure the
victim that he is not forgotten in the
criminal justice system. The amount of
compensation
to
be
awarded
under
Section 357 Cr.P.C. depends upon the
nature of crime, extent of loss/damage
suffered and the capacity of the accused
to pay, which the Court has to conduct a
summary inquiry-Benefit of Section 4 of
the Probation of First Offender Act, 1958
should be provided to the appellants- Fine
of
Rs.10,000/-each
is
enhanced
to
Rs.30,000/-each, which shall be deposited
before the trial court.

The Probation of Offenders Act confers power
upon the court to release certain offenders on
probation of good conduct, the same Act along
with Section 357 of the CrPc also gives power to
the courts to provide compensation to the victim
and therefore the said provisions have to be