# Lalloo Singh v. State of U.P. and another

- **Citation:** (2007) 3 ILRA 1052
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2007-11-02
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 28429 of 2006
- **Bench:** Shishir Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/lalloo-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-another-40999
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

(Punishment & Appeal) Rules 1991-Rule8-Dismissal from service without enquiry
without-recording
any
reason
for
satisfaction-why enquiry not possiblemerely
this
fact-the
misconduct
if
incourased in discipline in force-heldcontrary to requirement of Rules 8
(2)(b)-disciplinary
authority
not
expected to dispense with enquiry lightly
or arbitrarily.

Held: Para 12,13 & 15

After
noticing
this
fact,
the
Superintendent of Police held that he is
satisfied that it is not possible to hold an
enquiry against the petitioner. It was
also observed in the order that in case
petitioner remain in post, it will give a
bad lesson to others.

No reason in the order has been
recorded as why it is not reasonably
practicable to hold disciplinary enquiry
against the petitioner as observed in
Tulsi Ram Patel's case that disciplinary
authority is not expected to dispense
with a disciplinary enquiry lightly or
arbitrarily.

In view of the aforesaid fact, it is clear
that the power which has been exercised
by the Superintendent of Police under
Rule 8(2)(b) contrary to the requirement
as laid down in Rule 8(2)(b).
Case law discussed:
2005 (2) ESC Alld-1229
1985 (2) SLR-576
1991 (1) SCC-362

## Text

1052 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
proposing
to
take
against
these
institutions. All these institutions are
receiving
grant-in-aid
from
the
Government and are duty bound to follow
the orders of the Government. It is within
the jurisdiction of the State Government
to take necessary action against these
institutions. The State Government must
also state on the affidavit as to what
action will be taken against these
institutions if the directions given by the
U.P.
Secondary
Education
Service
Selection Board are not honoured by these
institutions. They will see to it that the
petitioner is absorbed. It is for this
purpose that the matter will be listed
before the learned Single Judge. The
matter will be listed on 17th December,
2007. By that date these affidavits must
be filed.

23. The appeal is allowed in
aforesaid terms. There will be no order as
to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.11.2007

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SHISHIR KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 28429 of 2006

Lalloo Singh

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and another ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri G.K. Singh
Sri V.K. Singh
Sri Ram Sajiwan

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.
Sri C.B. Yadav

U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks
(Punishment & Appeal) Rules 1991-Rule8-Dismissal from service without enquiry
without-recording
any
reason
for
satisfaction-why enquiry not possiblemerely
this
fact-the
misconduct
if
incourased in discipline in force-heldcontrary to requirement of Rules 8
(2)(b)-disciplinary
authority
not
expected to dispense with enquiry lightly
or arbitrarily.

Held: Para 12,13 & 15

After
noticing
this
fact,
the
Superintendent of Police held that he is
satisfied that it is not possible to hold an
enquiry against the petitioner. It was
also observed in the order that in case
petitioner remain in post, it will give a
bad lesson to others.

No reason in the order has been
recorded as why it is not reasonably
practicable to hold disciplinary enquiry
against the petitioner as observed in
Tulsi Ram Patel's case that disciplinary
authority is not expected to dispense
with a disciplinary enquiry lightly or
arbitrarily.

In view of the aforesaid fact, it is clear
that the power which has been exercised
by the Superintendent of Police under
Rule 8(2)(b) contrary to the requirement
as laid down in Rule 8(2)(b).
Case law discussed:
2005 (2) ESC Alld-1229
1985 (2) SLR-576
1991 (1) SCC-362

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shishir Kumar, J.)

1. By means of the present writ
petition the petitioner has approached this
court for a writ of certiorari quashing the
order dated 8.5.2006 (Annexure 1 to the
writ petition) passed by respondent No.2.
Further a writ in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondents from
3 All] Lalloo Singh V. State of U.P. and another
1053
interfering with the peaceful functioning
of the petitioner as Constable.

2. The petitioner was selected in the
year 1998 on the post of Constable. After
completion of training he was posted at
different places. When the petitioner was
posted at Kotwali, Farrukhabad, an
incident took place on 30.4.1996 in which
cross F.I.R.'s were lodged by the
Superintendent of Police and Inspector
Kotwali. It was stated in the F.I.R. that an
incident has taken place on 2nd May,
2006, when the Superintendent of Police
was sitting in his office and one Sri Nar
Singh Pal Singh, Inspector, Kotwali along
with Anand Kumar Singh and Rajesh
Singh,
Sub-Inspector
Kotwali,
Farrukhabad along with two constables,
entered into the office and attacked the
Superintendent of Police. It was also
stated in the F.I.R. lodged by the
Superintendent of Police that he was
threatened by the police officials. Another
F.I.R. was also lodged by Nar Singh Pal
Singh, Inspector Kotwali which states that
no such incident has taken place. On the
basis of the aforesaid F.I.R. it appears that
the Superintendent of Police had passed
an order dispensing the services of the
petitioner by invoking Rule 8(2)(b) of the
U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks
(Punishment and Appeal) Rule, 1991
(here-in-after referred to as the Rules of
1991). Rule 8 is being reproduced below:-

"8. Dismissal and removal- (1) No
police officer shall be dismissed or
removed from service by an authority
subordinate to the appointing authority.

(2) No Police Officer shall be
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank
except
after
proper
inquiry
and
disciplinary proceedings as contemplated
by these Rules:

Provided that this rule shall not
apply-

(a) Where a person is dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank on the
ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge: or
(b) Where the authority empowered
to dismiss or remove a person or to
reduce him in rank is satisfied that for
some reason to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not reasonably
practicable to hold such enquiry : or
(c)
Where
the
Government
is
satisfied that in the interest of the security
of the State it is not expedient to hold such
enquiry."

3. Petitioner aggrieved by the
aforesaid
order
of
dismissal
has
approached this Court. It has been
submitted by the learned counsel for the
petitioner that Rule 8(2) (b) clearly
indicates that no police officer shall be
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank
except
after
proper
enquiry
and
disciplinary proceedings, as contemplated
by the Rules, provided that this rule will
not apply where an order of dismissal or
removal was passed on the ground of
conduct, which has led to conviction on a
criminal charge or where the authority
empowered to pass an order is satisfied
that for some reasons, to be recorded in
writing, it is not reasonably practicable to
hold such enquiry or where the State
Government is satisfied that in the interest
of security of the State, it is not expedient
to hold such an enquiry. The bare perusal
of the order dated 8.5.2006 would clearly
indicate that the conditions mentioned in
the aforesaid rule has not at all been
1054 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
complied with. The impugned order
further indicate that some preliminary
enquiry
was
conducted
by
the
Superintendent of Police, Kannauj and on
the basis of some information received
from eye witnesses, he has submitted a
report that Superintendent of Police Sri
Rahul Asthana was assaulted by some
police officials.

4.

While
passing
the
order
impugned, the competent authority has
not recorded a finding to this effect that it
is not practicable to hold the regular
enquiry. The condition precedent of Rule
8(2)(b) is over stayed rule can be invoked
only
when
the
authority
who
is
empowered to pass the order is satisfied
that holding of enquiry is not practicable.
Once a finding has been recorded in the
impugned order that there was some eye
witness
and
on
the
basis
of
the
information received, it was found that
the
Superintendent
of
Police
was
assaulted, then there is no justification for
not
conducting
the
enquiry
while
dispensing with the services of the
petitioner. The rule clearly indicates that
no police officer should be dismissed or
removed from service by an authority
except
after
proper
enquiry
and
disciplinary proceedings, as contemplated
under the Rule. The only exception in
Rule 8(2)(b) provides that while passing
the impugned order a satisfaction to that
effect has to be recorded. As the
disciplinary authority has not recorded
satisfaction in respect of employment and
the practicability of holding an enquiry, as
such, the order is liable to be quashed.
The respondents have erred in dismissing
the services of the petitioner without
holding
any
enquiry
and
without
affording him an opportunity of hearing.
But the preliminary enquiry alleged to
have been done was behind the back of
the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid
fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that order is liable to be quashed.

5. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon a
judgement reported in 2005(2) ESC,
Allahabad, 1229 Ravindra Raghav Vs.
State of U.P. and others and reliance has
been placed upon paras 8 and 9 of the said
judgement. The same are being quoted
below:-

"8. In the present case, the order of
Superintendent of Police, dismissing the
petitioner from service, after invoking the
powers under Rule 8(2) (b) of the Rules,
has been given any reason as to why it is
not reasonably practicable to hold an
enquiry. The order notes the incident,
dated 19th October, 2000, in which
allegation against the petitioner was
made that he along with other Constables
had realised Rs.50/- each from drivers of
Combine Machines and when Incharge
Kotwali reached on the spot, then he
misbehaved with Incharge in presence of
public. Observation has been made in
paragraph 3 of the order that by the
misconduct of the petitioner, the faith of
public is losing in police and by the above
act
of
petitioner,
there
is
strong
possibility
of
encouragement
of
indiscipline in the force. After noticing the
above facts, the Superintendent of Police
held that he is satisfied that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold enquiry
against the petitioner. It was further
observed that in case petitioner remain in
the force, he may repeat the incident in
future, and taking advantage of he being
in police, he may make efforts to save
himself from his deeds and in-continuing
the petitioner in Department, there will be
3 All] Lalloo Singh V. State of U.P. and another
1055
possibility of increase of indiscipline in
the employees. No reason in the order has
been recorded as to why it is not
reasonably
practicable
to
hold
disciplinary
enquiry
against
the
petitioner. It has been observed by the
Apex Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram
Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 that disciplinary
authority is not expected to dispense with
a
disciplinary
enquiry
lightly,
or
arbitrarily. In the counter affidavit, which
has been filed by the respondents also,
there is no reason given for not holding
disciplinary
enquiry
against
the
petitioner. No facts have been mentioned
in the order, or referred to, on the basis of
which satisfaction has been recorded for
dispensing/holding of disciplinary enquiry
against the petitioner. The observation
that in the event petitioner is allowed to
remain in the Department, there is
possibility of increase of indiscipline in
the Department, cannot be held to be
germane
for
dispensing/holding
of
disciplinary
enquiry.
The
appellate
authority, while dismissing the appeal has
observed that there was possibility of
petitioner threatening the complainant
and witnesses, was an observation, which
does not find place in the order of
Superintendent of Police, who invoked the
power under Rule 8 (2) (b) of the Rules.
Neither any reasons have been recorded
in the order of Superintendent of Police
for dispensing/holding of disciplinary
enquiry, nor other observations made in
the order to the effect that continuance of
the petitioner in the police force, would
have encouraged indiscipline in the
Department were relevant for dispensing
/holding of disciplinary enquiry. The key
words in Rule 8(2) (b) are "not
reasonably
practicable".
The
Rules
contemplate exercise of power under Rule
8(2)
(b)
for
dispensing/holding
of
disciplinary enquiry, when it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such
enquiry. The reasons, thus, which can
satisfy the requirement of Rule 8(2) (b)
has to be referable to "not reasonably
practicable", to hold an enquiry. No
reasons have been given in the order,
which can be said to fulfil the requirement
of not reasonably practicable to hold
enquiry. The statutory requirement of
exercising the power is absent in the
present case. As observed above, no
reasons have also been given in the
counter affidavit, bringing on the record
the reasons on the basis of which such
satisfaction
was
recorded
by
Superintendent of Police, the Court is at
last to find out the basis for invoking the
power under Rule 8(2) (b) of the Rules.

9. In above view of the facts, it is
clear that power has been exercised by
Superintendent of Police, under Rule 8
(2)(b) contrary to the requirement as laid
down in Rule 8(2)(b). The order of
Superintendent of Police, cannot be
sustained. The appellate order, which
confirms the said order, also cannot
survive,
and
both
the
orders
are
consequently quashed. It is, however,
open
to
the
respondents
to
hold
disciplinary
enquiry
against
the
petitioner, in accordance with law."

6. As the counter and rejoinder
affidavits have already been exchanged,
therefore, with the consent of the parties
the present writ petition is being disposed
of finally.

7. In paragraph 4 of the counter
affidavit, it has been submitted by the
learned Chief Standing Counsel that
petitioner in the year 2002, was punished
for seven days, in the year 2003, for 14
1056 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
days again in the year 2005 for seven
days.
On
2.5.2006,
when
the
Superintendent of Police Farrukhabad was
holding a meeting in his camp office, one
Station House Officer Police station
Kotwali along with three others entered in
the office, abused by filthy languages and
started beating to the Superintendent of
Police, who sustained serious injuries on
his stomach, chest, ears and eyes. This
incident occurred on account of collusion
with four police officers against the
Superintendent of Police in order to create
terror in Police Department. An F.I.R.
was lodged and the case was registered as
Case Crime No.611/2006 under Sections
147, 148, 149, 452, 307, 323, 504 and 506
I.P.C. read with Section 7 of the Criminal
Act. The Station House Officer Kotwali
has also lodged F.I.R. only to safe his skin
and only by way of peshbandi and for the
purposes of create a defence. The
Superintendent of Police, Kannauj was
requested to hold an enquiry of the
incident which took place in the office of
the
Superintendent
of
Police,
Farrukhabad. The enquiry officer after
affording full and ample opportunity of
hearing to all concerned who were
involved in the incident holding full
fledged enquiry as required under the
provisions of U.P. Police Officers of
Subordinate
Ranks
(Punishment
and
Appeal) Rules, 1991 and after that the
authority concerned has exercised the
powers conferred under Rule 8(2)(b) of
the Rules. The said action has been taken
only for the purposes of maintaining the
balance in the administration. It was
necessary in the interest of administration,
discipline in police force and also to
maintain balance in administration, the
power has rightly been exercised by the
concerned authority. The rule clearly
provides that if the authority concerned is
satisfied that for some reason to be
recorded by that authority in writing, it is
not reasonably practicable to hold such
enquiry in that contingency the order of
dismissal may be passed, even without
holding enquiry as required under the
Rules.

8. The learned Chief Standing
Counsel has submitted that this proviso
has been dealt with by the Apex Court in
a case of Union of India and another
Vs. Tulsi Ram Patel reported in A.I.R.
1985 (2) S.L.R, 576. Reliance has been
placed upon paras 61, 62, and 64 of the
said judgement. The same are being
reproduced below:-

"61. The language of the second
proviso is plain and unambiguous. The
keywords in the second proviso are, "this
clause shall not apply". By "this clause" is
meant clasue (2). As clause (2) requires
an
inquiry to be held against a
government servant, the only meaning
attributable to these words is that this
inquiry shall not be held. There is no
scope for any ambiguity in these words
and there is no reason to give them any
meaning different from the plain and
ordinary meaning which they bear. The
resultant effect of these words is that
when a situation envisaged in any of the
three clauses of the proviso arises and
that clause becomes applicable, the
safeguard provided to a government
servant by clause by clause (2) is taken
away. As pointed out earlier, this
provision is as much in public interest
and for public good and a matter of
public policy as the pleasure doctrine and
the safeguards with respect to security of
tenure contained in clauses (1) and (2) of
Article 311.
3 All] Lalloo Singh V. State of U.P. and another
1057
62. Before, however, any clause of
the second proviso can come into play the
condition laid down in it must be satisfied.
The condition for the application of each
of these clauses is different. In the case of
clause (a) a government servant must be
guilty of conduct deserving the penalty of
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank
which conduct has led to him being
convicted on a criminal charge. In the
case of clause (b) the disciplinary
authority must be satisfied that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry.
In the case of the clause (c) the President
or the Governor of State, as the case may
be, must be satisfied that in the interest of
the security of the State, it is not expedient
to hold an inquiry. When these conditions
can be said to be fulfilled will be
discussed later while dealing separately
with each of the three clauses. The
paramount thing, however, to bear in
mind is that the second proviso will apply
only where the conduct of a government
servant
such
as
he
deserves
the
punishment of dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank. If the conduct is such
as to deserve a punishment different from
those mentioned above, the second
proviso cannot come into play at all,
because Article 311(2) is itself confined
only to these three penalties. Therefore,
before denying government servant his
constitutional right to inquiry, the first
consideration would be whether the
conduct of the concerned government
servant is such as justifies the penalty of
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.
Once that conclusion is reached an the
condition specified in the relevant clause
of the second proviso is satisfied, that
proviso becomes applicable and the
government servant is not entitled to an
inquiry. The extent to which a government
servant can be denied his right to an
inquiry formed the subject matter of
considerable debate at the Bar and we,
therefore, now turn to the question
whether under the second proviso to
Article 311(2) even though the inquiry is
dispensed with, some opportunity at least
should not be afforded to the government
servant so that he is not left wholly
without protection. As most of the
arguments on his part of the case were
common to al the three clauses of the
second proviso, it will be convenient at
this stage to deal at one place with all the
arguments on this part of the case,
leaving aside to be separately dealt with
the other arguments pertaining only to a
particular clause of the second proviso.

64. So far as Article 311 (2) was
concerned, it was said that the language
of the second proviso did not negative
every single opportunity which could be
afforded to a government servant under
different situations though the nature of
such
opportunity
may
be
different
depending upon the circumstances of the
case. It was further submitted that the
object of Article 311(2) was that no
government servant should be condemned
unheard and dismissed or removed or
reduced in rank without affording him at
least some chance of either showing his
innocence or convincing the disciplinary
authority that the proposed penalty was
too drastic and was uncalled for in his
case and a lesser penalty should,
therefore, be imposed upon him. These
arguments, though attractive at the first
blush, do not bear scrutiny."

9. In view of the aforesaid fact, the
learned counsel for the respondents
submits that the writ petition is liable to
be dismissed.
1058 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
10. After hearing counsel for the
parties and after perusal of the record,
Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules provides that
where the authority empowered to dismiss
or remove a person, is satisfied that for
some reason to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not a reasonably
practicable to hold such enquiry, the
police officer shall be dismissed or
removed, without proper enquiry as
contemplated in Sub Rule (2) of Rule 8 of
the Rules. For invoking the aforesaid rule,
the authority empowered to dismiss has to
be satisfied for reasons to be recorded in
writing
that
it
is
not
reasonably
practicable to hold such enquiry. Thus,
the requirement are two fold. Firstly,
recording of reason and secondly, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry. It is well settled in law that when
power under Rule 8(2)(b) is invoked
judicial review is permissible where
subjective satisfaction of the authority
that it was not reasonably practicable to
hold an enquiry not based on objective
facts as laid down by the Apex Court in
case of Jaswant Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and others reported in 1991 (1)
SCC 362. In that case, the Apex Court has
considered the provisions of Article
311(2)
second
proviso
(b)
of
the
Constitution of India. Rule 8(2)(b) of the
Rules is of parimateria with the second
proviso (b) of Article 311, sub clause (2).
The Apex Court has laid down two
conditions for involving the power under
Clause (b) of Rule 8(2) of the Rules.
Following was laid down in para 4 of the
said judgement:-

"4. ...........In so far as clause (b) is
concerned this Court pointed out that two
conditions must be satisfied to sustain any
action taken thereunder. These are (i)
there must exist a situation which renders
holding of any inquiry "not reasonably
practicable"; and (ii) the disciplinary
authority must record in writing its
reasons in support of its satisfaction. Of
course the question of practicability
would depend on the existing fact
situation
and
other
surrounding
circumstances, that is to say, that the
question of reasonable practicability must
be judged in the light of the circumstances
prevailing at the date of the passing of the
order. Although clause (3) of that article
makes the decision of the disciplinary
authority in this behalf final such finality
can certainly be tested in a Court of law
and interfered with if the action is found
to be arbitrary of malafide or motivated
by extraneous considerations or merely a
ruse to dispense with the inquiry. Also
see: Satyavir Singh v. Union of India;
Shivaji Atmaji Sawani v. State of
Maharashtra and Ikrammuddin Ahmed
Borah
v.
Superintendent
of
Police,
Darrang."

11. The Apex Court has also held
that Clause (b) of Second Proviso to
Article 311(2) can be invoked only when
the authority is satisfied from the material
placed before him that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold enquiry.
Further satisfaction has to be based on
certain objective facts and not the out
come of whim, or caprice of concerned
officer. In Tulsiram Patel's case (supra) it
has been observed that "A disciplinary
authority is not expected to dispense with
a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily
or out of ulterior motives or merely to
avoid the holding of an inquiry or because
the department's case against government
servant is week and must fail. The
decision
to
dispense
with
the
departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be
rested solely on the ipse dixit of the
3 All] Lalloo Singh V. State of U.P. and another
1059
concerned
authority.
When
the
satisfaction of the concerned authority is
questioned in a Court of law, it is
incumbent on those who support the order
to show that the satisfaction is based on
certain objective facts and is not the
outcome of the whim or caprice of the
concerned officer........."

12. In the present case, the order
passed
by
the
competent
authority
dismissing the petitioner from service,
after invoking the powers under Rule
8(2)(b) of the Rules, has not recorded any
reason as to why it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an enquiry. The order
mentioned the date 2.5.2006 in which the
allegation has been made against the
petitioner that about 10.00 in the night
when Superintendent of Police was
working in his camp office the petitioner
with other police officials have quarreled
and abused the Superintendent of Police
and beaten him. An observation has been
made in the order that by this misconduct
of the petitioner, the discipline in the
department is going down and there is
strong possibility of encouragement of
indiscipline in the force. After noticing
this fact, the Superintendent of Police
held that he is satisfied that it is not
possible to hold an enquiry against the
petitioner. It was also observed in the
order that in case petitioner remain in
post, it will give a bad lesson to others.

13. No reason in the order has been
recorded as why it is not reasonably
practicable to hold disciplinary enquiry
against the petitioner as observed in Tulsi
Ram
Patel's
case
that
disciplinary
authority is not expected to dispense with
a
disciplinary
enquiry
lightly
or
arbitrarily.

14. In the counter affidavit filed on
behalf of the respondents no reasons have
been
given
that
what
were
the
circumstances against the petitioner for
not holding the disciplinary enquiry. The
observations that in the event the
petitioner is allowed to remain in service,
there
is
possibility
of
increase
of
indiscipline in the department cannot be
held to be germane for dispensing
/holding of disciplinary enquiry. As
observed above, no reasons have been
recorded and in the counter affidavit it has
also not been mentioned any reason that
what was the reason for dispensing of the
enquiry. In my opinion the Superintendent
of Police has not exercised his powers
according to Rules as in the order there is
no compliance of Rule 8(2)(b), therefore,
in my opinion the order impugned cannot
be sustained.

15. In view of the aforesaid fact, it is
clear that the power which has been
exercised by the Superintendent of Police
under Rule 8(2)(b) contrary to the
requirement as laid down in Rule 8(2)(b).

16. The writ petition is allowed. The
order dated 8.5.2006 (Annexure 1 to the
writ petition) passed by the respondent
no.2 is hereby quashed. It is, however,
open
to
the
respondents
to
hold
disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner
in accordance with law.

No order as to costs. Petition
Allowed.
---------
1060 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED; ALLAHABAD 14.11.2007

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34830 of 2003
And
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 39268-04

Dhani Saran Khare

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P., and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Brajesh Singh
Sri R.B. Singhal

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

U.P. Minor Irrigation Department Boring
Technicians Service Rules 1993-Rule-8Qualification-Direct recruitment on the
Post of Assistant Boring Techniciancertificate
in
Diploma
by
I.T.I.-tool
maker-Diploma stopped in 1968-diploma
in tool Die maker started in 1976rejection of candidature after written
test of petitioner-on pretext absence of
tool maker certificate-held-not propertrade of Tool Maker and tool die maker is
same-out of 401 only 387 filled upconsequential direction issued.

Held: Para 6

Thus controversy involved is squarely
covered by the aforesaid decisions and
therefore I am of the opinion that the
petitioners
can
not
be
denied
consideration for appointment on the
post of Assistant Boring Technician in
the Minor Irrigation Department after
having qualified the written test and
having appeared in the interview on the
ground that they do not posses the
diploma in the trade "Tool Maker"
ignoring the diploma in "Tool and Die
maker".
The
respondents
are
also
estopped under law from ignoring their
candidature at such a belated stage after
they have accepted the applications of
the petitioners to take the written
examination followed by interview.
Case law discussed:
(Undated judgement)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)

1. The only prayer made in this writ
petition is to direct the respondents to
consider the candidature of the petitioners
for
the
post
of
Assistant
Boring
Technician in the Irrigation department
and not to ignore their candidature for the
said post on the ground that they do not
possess the Diploma in the trade of "Tool
Maker" though they are holding two years
diploma in " Tool and Die maker"
awarded by the National Council for
Vocational Training and State Council for
Vocational
Training
from
Adarsh
Training Institute (ATI) Kanpur.

2. The Chief Engineer, Minor
Irrigation Department, respondent No. 3
issued
an
advertisement
inviting
applications to fill up 401 posts of
Assistant Boring Technicians. The said
advertisement was published in the
newspaper 'Amar Ujala' dated 8.6.2003.
Advertisement
provided
that
the
candidates must have passed High School
of the Board of High School and
Intermediate examination U.P., or an
examination recognized by the State
government as equivalent thereto and at
the same time must possess a certificate
of Tube-well mechanic course awarded
by the Government Technical Centre,
Gorakhpur
or
certificate
equivalent
thereto
recognized
by
the
State
government or a diploma of two years
course
awarded
by
Directorate
of
Employment and Training U.P., or