# Laxman Prasad alias Nand Lal v. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Lko & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1405
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-10-28
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53361 of 2014
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J. Pradeep Kumar Singh Bhaghel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/laxman-prasad-alias-nand-lal-v-uttar-pradesh-power-corporation-lko-ors-43141
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Police Liability Insurance Act, 1991-Section
6(2), 3 (c)-compensation-death caused due
to electrician deceased 24 years young boysnapped of high tension electric cableclaimed 5 lac compensation along with
12% interest-District Magistrate under no
fault liability awarded 1 lac after adjusting
amount already paid-held-as per Section
2(e) of Environment (Protection) Act 1896electricity would fall within expression
'hazardous substance'-nature of accidentundisputed-District Magistrate to pass fresh
order within period of 3 month-petition
disposed of.
Held: Para-10
The provisions of Section 7(1) of the Act
empower the Collector to determine the
amount of relief which appears to him to
be just. Under sub-section (4) of Section 7
of the Act the Collector is empowered to
follow such summary procedure as he
thinks fit, subject to any rule made in that
behalf. Under sub-section (5) the Collector
has been vested with the powers of a Civil
Court for certain specific purposes. The
award of compensation under Section 6 is
not in the nature of an ex gratia. The Act
recognises a statutory entitlement and
imposes
a
corresponding
statutory
obligation. An Undertaking, which engages
itself in the supply and distribution of
electricity, cannot be unmindful of the
serious hazard to life and property that
may result as a consequence of its
activities. The award of compensation
under the Act has, therefore, to be
construed to be in recognition of the right
to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Collector ought to have furnished a
reasoned justification in quantifying the
award of compensation following the well
settled principles in that regard.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 2010 Allahabad 117; AIR 1998 Allahabad
1: 1998 All LJ 1.

## Text

3 All].
Laxman Prasad alias Nand Lal Vs. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation, Lko & Ors.
1405
in Uma Devi's case and the decision of the
District Judge dated 9.9.2014 also does not
do so, but, in view of the apparent factual and
legal position and the discussion made
hereinabove, as, the only possible conclusion
is that the regularization of the services of the
petitioners was not permissible and it was in
violation of the dictum of the Supreme Court
in Uma Devi's case, I do not find any valid
ground for interfering with the impugned
orders. Reference may be made in this regard
to the dictum of the Supreme Court : M.C.
Mehta Versus Union of India (1999) 6 SCC
237, wherein their Lordships have observed
as under:
" .......If the High Court had quashed
the said order, it would have restored an
illegal order - it would have given the
Health Centre to a village contrary to the
valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat
Samithi..........................................
The above case is a clear authority
for the proposition that it is not always
necessary for the Court to strike down an
order merely because the order has been
passed against the petitioner in breach of
natural justice. The Court can under
Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to
exercise its discretion of striking down the
order if such striking down will result in
restoration of another order passed earlier
in favour of the petitioner and against the
opposite party, in violation of the
principles
of
natural
justice
or
is
otherwise not in accordance with law."
41. In the aforesaid background, the
High Court cannot be faulted for having
issued the letter dated 30.8.2014 to the
District
Judge,
Baghpat
for
taking
remedial measures in conformity with the
dictum of the Supreme Court. The District
Judge can also not be faulted for having
acted in conformity thereof nor for
cancelling orders of regularization after
issuing show-cause-notice to them.
42.
Having said so, I am also of the
view that the High Court does not appear to
have considered the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Lal's Case
(supra), specially Paragraph 207.9 thereof,
whereby direct recruit ad hoc judges of Fast
Track Courts were ordered to be considered
for
regular
appointment/regularisation
subject to the terms and conditions
mentioned therein. As both judges and
employees of Fast Track Courts were part of
the same Scheme, in my view, there is no
reason as to why they should be treated
differently, therefore, I am of the view that
the respondents may consider the case of the
petitioners for grant of such benefits as has
been extended by the Supreme Court in Brij
Mohan Lal's Case (supra) to the Fast Track
Courts' Judges vide paragraph 207.9 thereof,
subject to such variations as may be
necessary, unless there are exceptional and
compelling reasons for not extending such
benefit to them.
43. Subject to the above, the writ
petition is dismissed.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.10.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA YESHWANT
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BHAGHEL, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53361 of 2014
Laxman Prasad alias Nand Lal .Petitioner
Versus
Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Lko &
Ors.
...Respondents
1406
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Deepali Srivastava, Sri Amit Kumar Sinha
Counsel for the Respondents
C.S.C., Sri Mahboob Ahmad
Police Liability Insurance Act, 1991-Section
6(2), 3 (c)-compensation-death caused due
to electrician deceased 24 years young boysnapped of high tension electric cableclaimed 5 lac compensation along with
12% interest-District Magistrate under no
fault liability awarded 1 lac after adjusting
amount already paid-held-as per Section
2(e) of Environment (Protection) Act 1896electricity would fall within expression
'hazardous substance'-nature of accidentundisputed-District Magistrate to pass fresh
order within period of 3 month-petition
disposed of.
Held: Para-10
The provisions of Section 7(1) of the Act
empower the Collector to determine the
amount of relief which appears to him to
be just. Under sub-section (4) of Section 7
of the Act the Collector is empowered to
follow such summary procedure as he
thinks fit, subject to any rule made in that
behalf. Under sub-section (5) the Collector
has been vested with the powers of a Civil
Court for certain specific purposes. The
award of compensation under Section 6 is
not in the nature of an ex gratia. The Act
recognises a statutory entitlement and
imposes
a
corresponding
statutory
obligation. An Undertaking, which engages
itself in the supply and distribution of
electricity, cannot be unmindful of the
serious hazard to life and property that
may result as a consequence of its
activities. The award of compensation
under the Act has, therefore, to be
construed to be in recognition of the right
to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Collector ought to have furnished a
reasoned justification in quantifying the
award of compensation following the well
settled principles in that regard.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 2010 Allahabad 117; AIR 1998 Allahabad
1: 1998 All LJ 1.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya
Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J.)
1. In these proceedings the petitioner
has called into question the legality of an
order dated 2 January 2014 passed by the
Collector
and
District
Magistrate,
Allahabad on an application which was
moved under Section 6 of the Public
Liability Insurance Act, 19911. The
Collector has, taking due note of the fact
that an amount of Rs. 20,000/- was paid
over to the petitioner on account of an
accidental death of his son caused due to
electrocution, directed the payment of a
further sum of Rs.80,000/-. The petitioner
seeks to challenge the order and claims an
enhancement of the compensation to an
amount of Rs. 5 lacs, on which interest
has been claimed at the rate of 12% per
annum.
2. The residential house of the
petitioner
is
situated
in
Mohalla
Ramkiyan
Gandhi
Nagar,
Nagar
Panchayat Sirsa, Allahabad. A high
tension electric overhead cable passes in
close proximity. On 8 August 2004, the
high tension electric cable snapped, as a
result of which the petitioner's son Raj
Kumar, who was about 24 years of age,
came into contact with the wire and
sustained grievous injury. The petitioner's
son succumbed to the injuries. A report of
the incident was lodged by the petitioner
at Police Station Meja, District Allahabad
on 9 August 2004. The police prepared an
inquest report and sent the dead body for
post-mortem. The cause of the death was
ascertained in the post-mortem report to
be due to shock as a result of passage of
electricity in the body. The petitioner's
3 All].
Laxman Prasad alias Nand Lal Vs. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation, Lko & Ors.
1407
son was, at the material time, a student of
IInd year of the B.A. Degree course. The
petitioner
moved
the
U.P.
Power
Corporation
for
the
grant
of
compensation. A detailed enquiry was
conducted by the Joint Director. Since no
further steps were taken for the disbursal
of the compensation, the petitioner moved
proceedings2 before this Court. In the
said proceedings, an order was passed on
29 October 2010 by a Division Bench of
this Court by which a direction was issued
to the effect that if the petitioner furnished
all the relevant documentary material to
the Executive Engineer, his claim for the
grant of compensation shall be decided in
accordance with law. In compliance with
the order, the petitioner submitted a copy
of the first information report, postmortem report and succession certificate
to
the
Executive
Engineer
in
the
Electricity Distribution Division of the
first respondent. Since no action was
initiated,
the
petitioner
filed
an
application before the District Magistrate,
Allahabad under Section 6 of the Act. At
that stage, on 11 September 2013, the first
respondent
awarded
an
amount
of
Rs.20,000/- to the petitioner by way of
compensation. The District Magistrate by
an order dated 2 January 2014 partly
allowed the claim and directed the
payment of compensation quantified as
Rs.1 lac after giving due credit for the
amount of Rs.20,000/-, which has already
been paid. The petitioner is aggrieved by
the quantum of compensation that has
been awarded.
3. The Public Liability Insurance
Act, 1991 was enacted by Parliament to
provide for public liability insurance for
the purpose of providing immediate relief
to persons affected by accidents occurring
while handling any hazardous substance.
Section 2(a) of the Act defines the
expression 'accident', as follows:
"(a) "accident" means an accident
involving a fortuitous or sudden or
unintended occurrence while handling any
hazardous
substance
resulting
in
continuous or intermittent or repeated
exposure to death of, or injury to, any
person or damage to any property but
does not include an accident by reason
only of war or radio-activity;"
4. The expression 'handling' is
defined in Section 2(c), thus:
"(c) "handling", in relation to any
hazardous
substance,
means
the
manufacture,
processing,
treatment,
package,
storage,
transportation
by
vehicle,
use,
collection,
destruction,
conversion, offering for sale, transfer or
the like of such hazardous substance;"
5. Section 3 of the Act provides for
the payment of no fault compensation in
the following terms:
"3. Liability to give relief in certain
cases on principle of no fault
(1) Where death or injury to any
person (other than a workman) or damage
to any property has resulted from an
accident, the owner shall be liable to give
such relief as is specified in the Schedule
for such death, injury or damage.
(2) In any claim for relief under subsection (1) (hereinafter referred to in this
Act as claim for relief), the claimant shall
not be required to plead and establish that
the death, injury or damage in respect of
which the claim has been made was due
to any wrongful act, neglect or default of
any person.
1408
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Explanation: For the purpose of this
section--
(i) "workman" has the meaning
assigned
to
it
in
the
Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923);
(ii) "injury" includes permanent total
or permanent partial disability or sickness
resulting out of an accident."
6. Section 6 of the Act provides for
the making of an application for a claim
for relief. Section 6 is in the following
terms:
"6. Application for claim for relief
(1) An application for claim for relief
may for made--
(a) by the person who has sustained
the injury;
(b) by the owner of the property to
which the damage has been caused;
(c) where death has resulted from the
accident, by all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by
such person or owner of such property or
all or any of the legal representatives of
the deceased, as the case may be:
PROVIDED that where all the legal
representatives of the deceased have not
joined in any such application for relief,
the application shall be made on behalf of
or for the benefit of all the legal
representatives of the deceased and the
legal representatives who have not so
joined shall be impleaded as respondents
to the application.
(2) Every application under subsection (1) shall be made to the Collector
and shall be in such form, contain such
particulars and shall be accompanied by
such documents as may be prescribed.
(3) No application for relief shall be
entertained unless it is made within five
years of the occurrence of the accident."
7. Under Section 7(1) of the Act, on
the receipt of an application under Section
6(1), the Collector is empowered to hold
an enquiry consistent with the principles
of natural justice, into the claim and to
make an award determining the amount of
relief which appears to him to be just and
specifying the person or persons to whom
such amount of relief shall be paid. Under
sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act,
the Collector is empowered to follow such
summary procedure as he thinks fit for
holding the enquiry. Under sub-section
(5) of Section 7, the Collector has all the
powers of a Civil Court inter alia for
taking the evidence on oath and for
enforcing the attendance of witnesses and
for
compelling
the
discovery
and
production of documents and material
objects as well as for such other purposes,
as may be prescribed. Section 8(1) of the
Act makes it clear that the right to claim
relief under sub-section (1) of Section 3 in
respect of death or injury to any person or
damage to any property shall be in
addition to any other right to claim
compensation in respect thereof under any
other law for the time being in force.
8. Under Section 3(1) of the Act the
compensation is based on the no fault
liability principle where death or injury
has been caused to any person, other than
a workman, or damage to any property
has resulted from an accident. The
expression 'accident' is defined to mean
an accident involving a fortuitous or
sudden or unintended occurrence while
handling
any
hazardous
substance
resulting in continuous or intermittent or
repeated exposure to death, among other
3 All].
Laxman Prasad alias Nand Lal Vs. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation, Lko & Ors.
1409
things. The expression 'handling' in
Section 2(c) of the Act in relation to a
hazardous substance includes use, transfer
or the like of such hazardous substance.
'Hazardous substance' is defined under
Section 2(d) of the Act to have the same
meaning as under the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1896. Section 2(e) of the
Environment
(Protection)
Act,
1986
defines
the
expression
'hazardous
substance' as follows:
"(e) "hazardous substance" means
any substance or preparation which, by
reason of its chemical or physicochemical properties or handling is liable
to cause harm to human beings, other
living creatures, plants, micro-organism,
property or the environment;"
9. Electricity is clearly a hazardous
substance covered by the definition
contained
in
Section
2(e)
of
the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. A
learned Single Judge of this Court in Uttar
Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. and anr.
v. Kaleemullah and ors.3, following an
earlier decision in U.P. Electricity Board
and
another
v.
District
Magistrate,
Dehradun and others4, held that the
electricity
would
fall
within
the
expression 'hazardous substance'.
10. In the present case, an
application was moved by the petitioner
to the Collector and District Magistrate
under the provisions of Section 6 of the
Act. The facts, which have been pleaded
by the petitioner, are not in dispute. There
is no challenge on the part of the first
respondent to the legality of the order
passed
by
the
Collector
awarding
compensation under the Act and, as we
have noted, the challenge of the petitioner
is to the quantum of compensation. In this
regard, the order which has been passed
by the Collector is completely bereft of
any reason or justification for the award
of compensation in the amount which the
Collector found to be just and proper. The
provisions of Section 7(1) of the Act
empower the Collector to determine the
amount of relief which appears to him to
be just. Under sub-section (4) of Section 7
of the Act the Collector is empowered to
follow such summary procedure as he
thinks fit, subject to any rule made in that
behalf.
Under
sub-section
(5)
the
Collector has been vested with the powers
of a Civil Court for certain specific
purposes. The award of compensation
under Section 6 is not in the nature of an
ex gratia. The Act recognises a statutory
entitlement and imposes a corresponding
statutory obligation. An Undertaking,
which engages itself in the supply and
distribution of electricity, cannot be
unmindful of the serious hazard to life
and property that may result as a
consequence of its activities. The award
of compensation under the Act has,
therefore, to be construed to be in
recognition of the right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution. The
Collector ought to have furnished a
reasoned justification in quantifying the
award of compensation following the well
settled principles in that regard.
11. In this view of the matter, we are
inclined to allow the petition and to remit
the proceedings back to the Collector for
a fresh assessment of the quantum of
compensation
payable
under
the
provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act. We
clarify that we have not set aside the
findings of fact which are contained in the
order of the Collector in regard to the
nature of the incident and in regard to the
liability to pay the compensation since
1410
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
there is no challenge before the Court to
be considered at the behest of the first
respondent. On remand, the Collector
shall duly hear both the petitioner and the
first respondent and pass an appropriate
order in accordance with law quantifying
the
amount
of
compensation.
This
exercise shall be completed within a
period of three months of the receipt of a
certified copy of this order. In the
meantime, we direct that any payment
which has been made in compliance with
the impugned order of the Collector, shall
necessarily abide by the final result of the
proceedings.
12. The petition is, accordingly,
disposed of. There shall be no order as to
costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.10.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53815 of 2014
Smt. Sudha & Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/D.J. Etah
& Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Upendra Upadhyay
Counsel for the Respondents
C.S.C.
Constitution of India, Art.-226-Release
claimed amount-deposited by Insurance
company
towards
accident
compensation-claimant
being
poor
illiterate widow of deceased-application
to release Rs. 2 lacs for repairing of
dilapidated house-rejection by Tribunalmisinterpreting the guidelines of Apex
Court-held-not proper-quashed-direction
for immediate release with interest
given.
Held: Para-8
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners
submits that in the instant case, in view of
the above, this Court finds that the
Tribunal has taken a very rigid stand and
had mechanically passed the order without
understanding and without appreciating
the distinction drawn by the Supreme
Court. The guidelines, which have now
been incorporated in the Rules was only to
safeguard the interest of the claimants
particularly the minors and the illiterates.
In the instant case the Court finds that the
application was meant for the release of
the money so that the petitioner's can get
her house repair by making boundary wall
and plaster, but the Tribunal has failed to
understand the need and urgency in the
matter and has mechanically passed the
order while rejecting the application.
Case Law discussed:
2014 (1) T.A.C. 630 (All.).
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J.)
1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioners and learned Standing Counsel
for the respondents.
2. By means of present writ petition,
the
petitioners
has
challenged
the
impugned order dated 24.03.2014 passed
by the the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal / District Judge, Etah.in Misc.
Case No. 18 of 2014 in M.A.C.P. No. 14
of 2012 (Smt. Sudha and another Vs.
Kamrujjama and others).
3.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners submits that petitioners has
filed the Motor Accident Claims Petition
No. 14 of 2012 (Smt. Sudha and another's
Vs.
Kamrujjama
and
others)
for