# Laxman Prasad Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2022) 6 ILRA 1092
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-05-17
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision Defective No. 273 of 2016
- **Bench:** Shamim Ahmed
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/laxman-prasad-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-48631
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Limitation Act - Section 5-Revision filed
after delay of 756 days -no sufficient causecomplete
careless
and
reckless-virtually
unexplained-Application
and
revision
dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1092 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. The office is directed to transmit
back the lower court record, if any, with a
copy of the judgment and order of this
Court before the court below for its
compliance.
----------
(2022)06ILR A1092
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Criminal Revision Defective No. 273 of 2016

Laxman Prasad ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Anurag Pathak, Sti Rajesh Kumar
Pandey

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Govt. Advocate, Sri Shri Prakash Dwivedi

Limitation Act - Section 5-Revision filed
after delay of 756 days -no sufficient causecomplete
careless
and
reckless-virtually
unexplained-Application
and
revision
dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Katiji, 1987(2)
SCC 107

2. P.K. Ramachandran Vs St. of Kerala, AIR 1998
SC 2276

3. Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs Kuntal Kumari, AIR
1969 SC 575

4. Brij Indar Singh Vs Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45
Cal 94

5. St. of Nagaland Vs Lipok AO & ors., AIR 2005
SC 2191

6. Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs
Shantaram Baburao Patil & ors., JT 2001(5) SC
608

7. Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project &
anr. (2008) 17 SCC 448

8.
Maniben
Devraj
Shah
Vs
Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC
157
(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

(Criminal Misc. Delay Condonation
Application No. 135146 of 2016)

1. This revision has been filed
challenging the judgment and order dated
21.10.2015 passed by Principal Judge,
Family Court, Mirzapur in Misc. Case No.
39 of 2014, by which application of
revisionist filed under Section 126(2)
Cr.P.C. was rejected, which was preferred
by the revisionist against the judgment and
order dated 01.01.2014 passed by Principal
Judge, Family Court, Mirzapur in Misc.
Case No. 102 of 2013, Smt. Meera Devi
Vs. Laxman Prasad, whereby the court
below has allowed the application undr
Section 125 Cr.P.C. moved on behalf of
wife (opposite party No. 2 herein) and
directed the revisionist to pay maintenance
allowance to his wife at the rate of Rs.
5,000/- per month from the date of
application and remaining balance amount
be paid in four equal installments in every
three months within a period of one year.

2. Heard learned counsel for the
revisionist and learned counsel for the
opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for
the State.

3. This revision is barred by limitation
and has been filed with a delay of 756 days.
6 All. Laxman Prasad Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1093

4. Learned counsel for the revisionist
submits that the revisionist is husband and
his wife-opposite party no.2 filed an
application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.,
which was allowed by the Principal Judge,
Family Court, Mirzapur vide its order dated
01.01.2014 and awarded maintenance at the
rate of Rs. 5000/- per month from the date
of application i.e. 28.07.2006. Against the
said
order
the
revisionist
filed
an
application under Section 126(2) Cr.P.C.
which was rejected by the learned Principal
Judge,
Family
Court,
Mirzapur
on
21.10.2015. He further submits that the
revisionist
reached
Allahabad
on
24.03.2016 and thereafter, again went back
to Mirzapur for taking some relevant
papers and finally came to Allahabad on
11.04.2016
and
after
preparing
this
revision, filed the same along with
application
under
Section
5
of
the
Limitation Act.

5. The explanation given in affidavit
accompanying
delay
condonation
application filed under Section 5 of
Limitation Act, 1963 is neither acceptable
nor trustworthy.

6. The expression "sufficient cause"
in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to
receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally a
delay
in
preferring
appeal
may
be
condoned in interest of justice where no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fide is imputable to parties,
seeking condonation of delay. In Collector,
Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2)
SCC 107, the Court said, that, when
substantial
justice
and
technical
considerations are taken against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred, for, the other side cannot claim
to have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non deliberate delay. The
Court
further
said
that
judiciary
is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.

7. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State
of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court
said:

"Law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribe and the Courts have no power
to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."

8. The Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties. They
virtually take away the remedy. They are
meant with the objective that parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over
their rights. They must seek remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The statute relating
to limitation determines a life span for such
legal remedy for redress of the legal injury,
one has suffered. Time is precious and the
wasted time would never revisit. During
efflux of time, newer causes would come
up, necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So
a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential
anarchy.
The
statute
providing limitation is founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). It is for this reason that when an
action becomes barred by time, the Court
should be slow to ignore delay for the
1094 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reason that once limitation expires, other
party matures his rights on the subject with
attainment of finality. Though it cannot be
doubted that refusal to condone delay
would result in foreclosing the suiter from
putting forth his cause but simultaneously
the party on the other hand is also entitled
to sit and feel carefree after a particular
length of time, getting relieved from
persistent and continued litigation.

9. There is no presumption that delay
in approaching the court is always
deliberate. No person gains from deliberate
delaying a matter by not resorting to take
appropriate legal remedy within time but
then the words "sufficient cause" show that
delay, if any, occurred, should not be
deliberate, negligent and due to casual
approach of concerned litigant, but, it
should be bona fide, and, for the reasons
beyond his control, and, in any case should
not lack bona fide. If the explanation does
not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court
should show due consideration to the suiter,
but, when there is apparent casual approach
on the part of suiter, the approach of Court
is also bound to change. Lapse on the part
of litigant in approaching Court within time
is understandable but a total inaction for
long
period
of
delay
without
any
explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt on
the part of suiter, would add to his
negligence, and would be relevant factor
going against him.

10. I need not to burden this judgment
with a catena of decisions explaining and
laying down as to what should be the
approach of Court on construing "sufficient
cause" under Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it
would be suffice to refer a very few of
them besides those already referred.

11. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs.
Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three
Judges Bench of the Court said, that, unless
want of bona fide of such inaction or
negligence as would deprive a party of the
protection of Section 5 is proved, the
application must not be thrown out or any
delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

12. The Privy Council in Brij Indar
Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45
Cal 94 observed that true guide for a court
to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is
whether the appellant acted with reasonable
diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This
principle still holds good inasmuch as the
aforesaid decision of Privy Council as
repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in
State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and
others, AIR 2005 SC 2191.

13. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai
Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil
and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court
said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it
should adopt a pragmatic approach. A
distinction must be made between a case
where the delay is inordinate and a case
where the delay is of a few days. In the
former case consideration of prejudice to
the other side will be a relevant factor so
the case calls for a more cautious
approach but in the latter case no such
consideration may arise and such a case
deserves a liberal approach. No hard and
fast rule can be laid down in this regard
and
the
basic
guiding
factor
is
advancement of substantial justice.

14. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by
LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court
said :
6 All. Shane Abbas Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1095

"...The
evidence
on
record
suggests neglect of its own right for long
time in preferring appeals. The court cannot
enquire into belated and state claims on the
ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The
court helps those who are vigilant and "do
not

15. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal
Corporation
of
Brihan
Mumbai, 2012

"What needs to be emphasised is
that even though a liberal and justice
oriented approach is required to be adopted
in the exercise of power under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act and other similar statutes,
the Courts can neither become oblivious of
the fact that the successful litigant has
acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time
is consumed at various stages of litigation
apart from the cost. What colour the
expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would largely
depend on bona fide nature of the
explanation. If the Court finds that there has
been no negligence on the part of the
applicant and the cause shown for the delay
does not lack bona fides, then it may
condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the
explanation given by the applicant is found
to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it
would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
not to condone the delay. In cases involving
the State and its agencies/instrumentalities,
the Court can take note of the fact that
sufficient time is taken in the decision
making process but no premium can be
given for total lethargy or utter negligence
on the part of the officers of the State and /
or its agencies/instrumentalities and the
applications filed by them for condonation
of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of
course by accepting the plea that dismissal
of the matter on the ground of bar of
limitation will cause injury to the public
interest."

16. In my view, the kind of
explanation rendered herein does not satisfy
the observations of Apex Court that if delay
has occurred for reasons which does not
smack of mala fide, the Court should be
reluctant to refuse condonation. On the
contrary, I find that here is a case which
shows a complete careless and reckless long
delay on the part of revisionist which has
remain
virtually
unexplained
at
all.
Therefore, I do not find any reason to
exercise my judicial discretion exercising
judiciously so as to justify condonation of
delay in the present case.

17. In the result, the application
deserves to be dismissed.

18. Accordingly, the application for
condonation application is hereby rejected.

Since delay condonation application
No. 135146 of 2016 has been rejected by
this Court vide order of date, therefore, the
present revision is also dismissed as barred
by limitation.
----------
(2022)06ILR A1095
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Criminal Revision No. 944 of 2017

Shane Abbas ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties