# Laxman Singh v. Bhagwati Singh

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 223
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-07-02
- **Case number:** SECOND APPEAL No.2 of 1983
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/laxman-singh-v-bhagwati-singh-44443
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Second Appeal - Section 100 C.P.C. -
Absence of jurisdiction in Civil Court - Bar
imposed by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A & L.R.
Act, 1951 - Decree of declaration of
cancellation of will by both court below -
Status of tenure holders involved - Though
cancellation of will-deed was the main
relief, but real relief was transfer of
property from possession of defendant to
plaintiff - Declaration of tenancy right is real
relief, which can be granted by revenue
court
-
Substantial
question
of
law
answered positively holding Civil suit is not
maintainable - Second Appeal allowed.

B. Second Appeal - Section 331 of
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1951 - Determining
factor to decide the jurisdiction is real
cause of action - It is the pith and
substance, which is to be seen, not the
language used, to oust jurisdiction, is to
be seen - Principle laid down.

C. Second Appeal - Expression 'any relief'
used in s. 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act - is
of wide import. It means not only relief
claimed, but also includes relief arising
out of cause of action, which led Plaintiff
to invoke jurisdiction of a court of law -
Principle laid down.

D. Second Appeal - Determining factor
for a matter to be entertained only by
revenue court - More than one relief
sought, but no such relief can be granted
without declaring tenancy right - relief of
injunction and possession sought. Name
of
plaintiff
not
recorded.
Without
declaration of tenancy right no further
relief can be granted - Suit is cognizable
by Revenue court - Principle laid down.
 (E-1)

## Text

1 All. Laxman Singh Vs. Bhagwati Singh
223
The judgment and decree of the appellate
court, dated 12.02.1999, passed by IV
Additional District Judge, Jhansi in Civil
Appeal no. 179 of 1994 (Ramji Das
Agarwal Vs Ramesh Chandra Sharma) is
set aside. The judgment and decree dated
22.11.1994 rendered by the learned IIIrd
Additional Munsif, Jhansi in Original Suit
No. 260 of 1989 (Ramesh Chandra
Sharma Vs Ramji Agarwal alias Ramji
Das Agarwal) is affirmed.

28. The second appeal is allowed.
--------
APPELLATEJURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.07.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

SECOND APPEAL No.2 of 1983

Laxman Singh ...Appellant
Versus
Bhagwati Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Ramesh Singh,Sri Kunal Ravi Singh, Sri
R.S. Maurya, Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary.

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri G.M. Tripathi, Sri C.M. Shukla, Sri
Indra Raj Singh, Sri Prabhakar Dubey

A. Second Appeal - Section 100 C.P.C. -
Absence of jurisdiction in Civil Court - Bar
imposed by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A & L.R.
Act, 1951 - Decree of declaration of
cancellation of will by both court below -
Status of tenure holders involved - Though
cancellation of will-deed was the main
relief, but real relief was transfer of
property from possession of defendant to
plaintiff - Declaration of tenancy right is real
relief, which can be granted by revenue
court
-
Substantial
question
of
law
answered positively holding Civil suit is not
maintainable - Second Appeal allowed.

B. Second Appeal - Section 331 of
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1951 - Determining
factor to decide the jurisdiction is real
cause of action - It is the pith and
substance, which is to be seen, not the
language used, to oust jurisdiction, is to
be seen - Principle laid down.

C. Second Appeal - Expression 'any relief'
used in s. 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act - is
of wide import. It means not only relief
claimed, but also includes relief arising
out of cause of action, which led Plaintiff
to invoke jurisdiction of a court of law -
Principle laid down.

D. Second Appeal - Determining factor
for a matter to be entertained only by
revenue court - More than one relief
sought, but no such relief can be granted
without declaring tenancy right - relief of
injunction and possession sought. Name
of
plaintiff
not
recorded.
Without
declaration of tenancy right no further
relief can be granted - Suit is cognizable
by Revenue court - Principle laid down.
 (E-1)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. Heard Sri Kunal Ravi Singh,
Advocate, for appellant. None appeared
on behalf of respondents despite the case
having been called in revise. Hence, I
proceed to hear and decide this case
finally after hearing learned counsel for
appellant.

2. This is defendant's appeal filed
under Section 100 Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to
as "CPC") arising from judgment and
decree dated 12.05.1978 passed by Sri
S.C. Bose, Munsif, Basti in Original
Suit No. 213 of 1972 decreeing the suit
which has been confirmed by judgment
224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and decree dated 19.10.1982 passed by
Sri H.C. Lal, 1st Additional District
Judge, Basti in Civil Appeal No. 177 of
1978 by dismissing the same.

3. Initially, this appeal was admitted
on following four substantial questions of
law:

(a) Whether Civil Court had
jurisdiction to try the suit?

(b)
Whether
suit
was
maintainable in the absence of State of
U.P. and Gaon Sabha as defendants?

(c) Whether in view of the
allegation in the plaint that 'Will' was
void, suit was cognizable by Revenue
Court alone?

(d) Whether Smt. Dhrupraji
became absolute owner of bhumidhari
rights under Section 14 of Hindu
Succession Act?
 (emphasis added)

4. Subsequently, vide order dated
22.05.2018 one more substantial question
of law was formulated as under:

(e) Whether in view of the fact
that Dhrupraji inherited property from
Matwar
Singh
in
1945,
prior
to
enforcement of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the
claim on the basis of succession can be
entertained in view of the Section 174 of
U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act?

5. Facts in brief giving rise to this
appeal
are
that
Bhagwati
(now
deceased and substituted by legal
heirs) instituted Original Suit No. 213
of 1972 in the Court of Munsif, Basti
against
sole
defendant-appellant
Lakshman
(now
deceased
and
substituted by legal heirs), son of
Shohrat
Singh,
praying
for
cancellation of 'Will' dated 20.06.1948
and delivery of possession of disputed
property to plaintiff.

6. Plaint Case set up vide plaint
dated 19.07.1972 is that Bhagwati is
real
brother
of
Matwar
Singh
(deceased) and both are sons of Bal
Karan. Bal Karan had other sons also
namely
Tahsildar,
Shohrat
and
Vikrmaditya
alias
Uma
Shanker.
Dhrupraji is wife of Matwar Singh and
one Hanuman is son of Tahsildar.
Defendant
Lakshman
was
son
of
Shohrat
and
Indira
is
wife
of
Vikrmaditya. That is how defendant
Lakshman became real nephew of
plaintiff
Bhagwati.
For
better
understanding I may provide family
tree as under:

Bal Karan
________________I_________________
I

I

I

I

I
Bhagwati

Matwar

Tahsildar

Shohrat
Vikrmaditya
(Plaintiff) Singh I I alias
(Dhrupraji-wife)Hanuman Lakshman Uma
(Defendant) Shankar
(Indira-wife)

7. Matwar Singh was Sirdar and
Khudkasht holder of property stated in ListA at the bottom of plaint and tenant in the
plots stated in List-B, and, in possession
thereof. He died issueless in 1945 AD.
Consequently, Dhrupraji, wife of Matwar
Singh, entered into possession of aforesaid
property.
After
enforcement
of
U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter
referred to as "Act, 1951"), on the date of
vesting,
i.e.,
01.07.1952
she
became
Bhumidhar of plots mentioned in List-A and
Sirdar of plots mentioned in List-B.
Dhrupraji died in 1970 AD. Other sons of
Bal Karan, having predeceased Matwar
1 All. Laxman Singh Vs. Bhagwati Singh
225
Singh, on the death of Dhrupraji, plaintiff
became sole heir of entire property and
applied for mutation in respect of plots of
Lists-A
and
B.
Defendant
contested
Mutation application on the basis of a 'Will'
alleging that Matwar Singh executed the
same. Revenue Court while deciding
mutation application, relied on 'Will', and
though ordered for mutation of plaintiff's
name over plots mentioned in List-B as
Sirdar, but rejected his claim with respect to
Bhumidhar of plots mentioned in List-A. In
the circumstances, plaintiff challenged 'Will'
dated 20.06.1948 on the ground that it is
forged and fictitious and liable to be
cancelled and possession over the plots in
dispute be handed over to him.

8. Defendant contested the suit
stating that 'Will' was actually executed in
his favour. He further pleaded that
Matwar Singh had 1/5 share in the
property of Bal Karan. He had separated
from other brothers during his lifetime.
He was in possession of disputed property
during lifetime and executed 'Will' dated
20.06.1948 in favour of defendant in lieu
of services rendered by defendant to
Matwar Singh. 'Will' was executed by
Matwar
Singh
and
contained
his
signature. It was kept in the custody of
Smt. Dhrupraji. Subsequently, 'Will' was
handed over by Smt. Dhrupraji to
defendant's wife. Plaintiff has no right to
get the 'Will' cancelled and suit was
barred by Section 331 of Act, 1951.

9. An additional written statement
was also filed claiming that Smt.
Dhruprati had only a Life Estate in the
property as stated in the 'Will'.

10. Trial Court formulated following
four issues:

(1) Whether the will deed Dated
20-6-48 is liable to be cancelled as
alleged, if so, its effect?

(2) To what relief, if any, is the
plaintiff is entitled?

(3) Whether the defence is
barred by Section 49 CH Act?

(4) Whether the Court has no
jurisdiction to try the suit?

11. Trial Court held that suit is not barred
by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred
to as "Act, 1953") and, therefore, issue-3
was answered in favour of plaintiff.
Thereafter, issue-1 was considered and it
held that 'Will' is dated 20.06.1948 while
Matwar Singh died on 20.10.1945 hence
claim of defendant that 'Will' was
executed on 20.06.1948 is not correct and
it is forged and fictitious. Consequently it
answered Issue-1 in favour of plaintiff. It
answered Issue-4 also in favour of
plaintiff and consequently suit was
decreed by issuing a declaration of
cancellation of 'Will' dated 20.06.1948
and defendant was directed to hand over
possession
of
disputed
property
mentioned in List-A to plaintiff.

12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid
judgment
and
decree,
defendant
Lakshman preferred Civil Appeal No. 177
of
1978.
Lower
Appellate
Court
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
"LAC")
formulated three points for determination,
as under:

(1) Whether the will in dispute
is genuine and really executed by
Matwar Singh? This point includes the
consideration of the fact whether the will
has been executed on 20.6.48 or 20.6.42?

(2) Whether the suit is not
cognizable by Civil Court?
226 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(3) Whether the plaintiff has
right of suit? (emphasis added)

13. Concurring with the findings of
Trial Court, LAC answered issue-1 in
favour of plaintiff and against defendantappellant holding that 'Will' was not
genuine. It also held that suit is not barred
and
consequently
Issue-2
was
also
answered in favour of plaintiff holding
that Civil Court had competence to
entertain the suit and decide the same.
Thereafter it answered Issue-3 again in
favour of plaintiff-respondent and against
defendant-appellant. As a result thereof,
appeal was dismissed vide judgment and
decree dated 19.10.1982.

14. Sri Kunal Ravi Singh, learned
counsel for appellant, commencing his
argument stated that Village in question,
i.e.,
Village
Vangarh
undergone
consolidation operations on 16.02.1991.
Thereupon defendant-appellant filed an
application under Section 5(2) of Act,
1953
on
16.02.1994
stating
that
proceedings of Suit have abated. The said
application was registered as Application
No. 719 of 1994 but dismissed vide order
dated 16.11.1994.

15. The first aspect which has to be
examined in this appeal is "whether
plaintiff's suit in question was barred by
Section 331 of Act, 1951." This will cover
the substantial questions of law-(a) and
(c) both.

16. The contention of learned
counsel for appellant is that 'Will' was
relied and accepted by Revenue Court in
mutation
proceedings
and
pursuant
thereto application was partly allowed and
mutation was made. The suit in question
basically challenges Revenue entry which
is in respect to possession of the property
for which mutation was allowed and,
therefore, it is barred by Section 331 of
Act, 1951.

17. From the facts discussed above,
it is evident that property in dispute i.e.
List-A, was in possession of defendant
throughout since plaintiff sought relief of
directing
defendant
to
hand
over
possession of property mentioned in the
Plaint to plaintiff. It is not the case of
plaintiff that after death of Dhrupraji in
1970, plaintiff got possession over entire
property including that mentioned in
Plaint or that even at the time of death
Dhrupraji was in possession of the said
property. The issue, therefore, who was in
cultivatory possession on the date of
vesting and what status stood conferred
upon such person vis-a-vis Dhrupraji was
an issue which could have been decided
by Revenue Court.

18. Revenue Authorities on the
mutation application, though apparently it
is said that relied on 'Will' dated
20.06.1948 in non suiting the plaintiff for
mutation of his name in respect to
properties mentioned in List-A, but the
facts as pleaded including that plaintiff
had sought a relief of handing over
possession to plaintiff by defendant, show
that at no point of time plaintiff was in
possession of property in dispute. The
status of Dhrupraji on the date of vesting
vis-a-vis defendant, therefore, was the
basic issue since only thereafter plaintiff
could have claimed any right after death
of Dhrupraji on the ground that there is no
other legal heir to succeed property of
Dhrupraji.

19. In the present case, cancellation
of 'Will' though appears apparently the
1 All. Laxman Singh Vs. Bhagwati Singh
227
main relief, but real relief is, possession
of disputed property to be transferred
from defendant to plaintiff.

20. Construing Section 331 of Act,
1951, a Full Bench of this Court in Ram
Padarath and others Vs. Second Additional
District Judge and others 1989 AWC 290
(All) observed that it is the real 'cause of
action' which determines jurisdiction of Court
to entertain particular action notwithstanding
the language used in plaint or relief claimed.
The strength on which Plaintiff comes to
Court does not depend upon the defence or
relief claimed which could determine the
Forum for the entertainment of claim and
grant of relief. It is the pith and substance
which is to be seen and not the language used
which may have been so used to oust
jurisdiction of a particular Court.

21. Expression 'any relief' used in
Section 331 of Act, 1951 is of too wide
import. It not only means the relief
claimed but would also include any relief
arising out of the cause of action which
led the Plaintiff to invoke jurisdiction of a
Court of law. The word 'relief' is not part
of cause of action nor the same is related
to the defence set up in the case. The
relief is a remedy which a Court grants
from the facts asserted and proved in an
action. The 'relief' in other words means
'remedy' which a Court of justice may
afford in regard to such actual or
apprehended wrong or injury. Such
remedy being large or small, as the case
may be, but it is not synonymous with
'cause of action'.

22. Full Bench further observed that
Section 331 of Act, 1951 has enlarged
scope in regard to jurisdiction of Revenue
Court. The provision is not confined to
specified reliefs claimed which are
mentioned in Schedule-II to Act, 1951,
but Explanation to it has enlarged its
scope further by using the word 'any
relief'. It is the cause of action alone
which determines the Forum and keeps
the jurisdiction of Revenue Court intact in
matters referred to in respect of suit,
application or proceeding mentioned in
Schedule-II to Act, 1951 to the exclusion
of Civil Court. The jurisdiction of Civil
Court is not concurrent with that of
Revenue Court by means of such suit,
application or proceeding. The reliefs of
the nature mentioned in Schedule-II can
be obtained from Revenue Court which
will take cognizance of such suit,
application or proceeding notwithstanding
the fact that relief provided in a different
language can also be granted by the Civil
Court.

23. A Revenue Court may grant a
relief in present, but so far as relief for
future is concerned Revenue Court may
not be in a position to grant such a-relief
as the same may travel beyond the relief
which could be granted by it mentioned in
Schedule-II to Act, 1951.

24. It is the alleged injury or
apprehended injury or cloud on the right and
title of a person by some action on the part of
any other person, or interference or attempt to
interfere or encroach upon the right and title of
a person over a particular property by any
positive or negative act or declaration etc.,
which give a Suitor, cause of action, to
approach a Court of law for relief or reliefs
against the same. The dispute as to jurisdiction
arises when more than one reliefs are claimed
in an action on the same cause of action one of
which can be granted by a Civil Court. If the
principal or real relief can be granted by
Revenue Court, then ancillary relief or the
relief which flows out from principal relief
228 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
can also be granted by Revenue Court
notwithstanding the fact that all the reliefs can
be granted by Civil Court. If things are in
reverse direction, then all the reliefs can be
granted by Civil Court, but if so-called main
relief is redundant or mere surplusage then it
is the real relief involved in the matter which
may or may not have been claimed as
ancillary relief will determine the jurisdiction
of Court which is to entertain a particular
action. Even if a plaint or application is
couched in such a language so as to oust
jurisdiction of a particular Court, then it is the
cause of action and relief flowing out of such
cause of action which would determine the
Forum for entertaining the said action and not
the so-called relief claimed.

25. In order to determine, therefore, as
to what matter can be entertained only by
Revenue Court, it is said that if more than
one reliefs are claimed by a particular person,
no relief can be granted to that person unless
declaration of his tenancy right is made and
in that situation suit will be cognizable by
Revenue Court as declaration can be granted
by Revenue Court. Similarly if a person
claims relief of injunction and in the
alternative for possession if he is found to be
out of possession and his name is not on the
record then without declaration that in fact he
is the tenant or he is in possession of the
tenancy rights no further relief can be granted
and the suit is cognizable by Revenue Court.
That is what has been held very categorically
by Full Bench in para 18 of judgment in
Ram Padarath and others Vs. Second
Additional District Judge and others
(supra). It is further said that in case, suit is
for injunction and/or possession, if he is out
of possession, then suit will be cognizable by
Revenue Court notwithstanding the fact that
relief for injunction is to be granted by Civil
Court. Full Bench further said:

"The Civil Court would have no
jurisdiction as the case first involved
declaration of right as tenure-holder
which could be granted by the revenue
court only and thereafter relief could
have been granted only if he was held to
be
tenure-holder
by
succession."
(emphasis added)

26. In order to determine the Forum,
when
validity
of
a
document
is
challenged, Court in para-19 said as
under:

"19. The forum for action in
relation to void documents or instruments
regarding agricultural land depends on
the real cause of action with reference to
the
facts
averred.
Void
documents
necessarily do not require cancellation
like voidable documents. A simple suit for
cancellation of a document or instrument if
the same casts cloud on one's right and title
or is likely to cast cloud over it or affects the
same adversely in respect of agricultural
property, that is, 'land' poses no difficulty
provided further it does not necessitate any
declaration as to the claimant's right and
title over the land i.e. tenancy rights under
the existing law. The difficulty arises when
more than one reliefs are involved or
claimed. It may be that one may get effective
relief in presenting without cancellation of
the document, but if a document remains
uncancelled for several years its existence
may give rise to new trouble and litigation.
The decree of a court in which a document is
declared to be void and is avoided is
obviously a decree in personam and the
same undoubtedly binds a party but it will
not be binding to each and every person as
no note of such a decree can be made in the
Sub-Registrar's register as provided in
Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Such a
1 All. Laxman Singh Vs. Bhagwati Singh
229
document may mislead many and may give
rise to various transactions and litigations."

27. Full Bench also held that while
interpreting provisions of Act, 1951, no
help can be taken from the provisions of
Act, 1953 for the reason that jurisdiction
of consolidation authorities or Courts is
wider than that of Civil or Revenue Court
and adjudication by them is final and
cannot be responded by any Civil or
Revenue Court in view of bar for the
same contained in Section 49 of Act, 1953
which even bars the case which should
have been raised before consolidation
authorities, but not raised. In the operative
part of the judgment, Court ultimately laid
down the following law:

"Suit or action for cancellation
of void document will generally lie in the
civil court and a party cannot be deprived
of his right getting (his relief permissible
under law except when a declaration of
right or status of a tenure-holder is
necessarily needed in which event relief
for cancellation will be surplusage and
redundant. A recorded tenure-holder
having prima facie title in his favour can
hardly be directed to approach the
revenue court in respect of seeking relief
for cancellation of a void document which
made him to approach the court of law
and in such case he can also claim
ancillary relief even though the same can
be granted by the revenue court."

28. In the present case status of
Tenure Holder was necessarily involved.
Therefore, in my view, in respect to
property in dispute which admittedly was
in possession of defendant, remedy was
available only in Revenue Court and not
in Civil Court, more so, when plaintiff
himself pleaded that 'Will' is void.
Therefore, I answer substantial questions
of law-(a) and (c) holding that suit was
not maintainable before Civil Court and
therefore both substantial questions of law
are answered in favour of appellant.

29. Now coming to substantial
question of law-(b), counsel for appellant
could not show as to why State of U.P. or
Gaon Sabha was necessary party so as to
render suit, not maintainable. Hence, I
answer substantial question of law-(b)
against appellant.

30. Now coming to substantial
question of law-(d), I find that plaint
case set up by plaintiff was that Bal
Karan had five sons including Matwar
Singh and after death of Matwar Singh
in 1945, his holding was succeeded by
his wife Dhrupraji, while defendant
contended that Matwar Singh had
already separated during his life time
and thereafter executed a 'Will' in
favour of defendant. It is admitted case
of plaintiff that property in dispute was
in possession of defendant and that is
why relief of delivery of possession by
defendant to plaintiff was sought. In
these circumstances, it was necessary
for Courts below to formulate an issue,
"whether Dhrupraji's heir got any right
over
property
in
dispute
since
application of Section 14 of Hind
Succession
Act,
1956
(hereinafter
referred to as "Act, 1956") could have
arisen only thereafter", but both the
Courts below have ignored this aspect
and neither any issue has been framed
on this aspect nor any finding has been
recorded.
However,
since
I
have
already answered substantial questions
of law-(a) and (c) holding that Civil
Court had no jurisdiction in the matter,
I do not find that it is necessary to
230 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
answer substantial question of law-(d) in
this appeal since judgments in appeal
have to be set aside on the ground of lack
of
jurisdiction
and
whenever
any
adjudication is initiated in a competent
Court of jurisdiction, it will always be
open to such Court to examine all relevant
aspects therein. Therefore, I refrain from
answering substantial question of law-(d)
either way.

31. In the result, appeal is allowed.
Impugned judgments dated 12.05.1978
passed by Munsif, Basti and dated
19.10.1982 passed by 1st Additional
District Judge, Basti are set aside.
Original Suit No. 213 of 1972 is
dismissed as not maintainable.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.08.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 4281 OF 2002
&
JAIL APPEAL No. 6316 OF 2003

Dharam Veer @ Kaiya and Ors.
 ...Appellants (In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri K.K. Dwivedi, Sri B.K. Solanki, Sri R.P.
Dwivedi, Sri Yogesh Srivastava, Sri Noor
Mohammad.

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A., Sri Hemendra Pratap Singh.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections
302/34 IPC - Appellants sentenced to
life imprisonment - Motive - Weight ofWhere direct evidence is worthy of
acceptance - absence of strong motive
does not carry much weight.
 (Para 26 and 27)

B. Relatives of victim as prosecution
witnesses
and
non-examination
of
independent witnesses - It is settled law
that merely because witnesses are close
relatives of the victim, their testimonies
cannot be discarded. However, in such a
case the Court has to adopt a careful
approach and analyse the evidence to
find out whether it is cogent and credible
evidence. (Para 28,29,30,31 and 32)

C. Section 134 Evidence Act 1872 - Nonexamination
of
wife
of
the
first
informant, mentioned as a witness in the
F.I.R, by the prosecution in the trial.
Held - Prosecution is not obliged to
adduce all witnesses mentioned in the
F.I.R or in the charge-sheet. Law is well
settled that the Court can and may act
on the testimony of a single witness
provided the witness is wholly reliable
but if there are doubts about the
testimony, the Court will insist on
corroboration. It is the quality and not
quantity that is material.
(Para 33, 34,35,36,37,38)

D.
Contradictions,
discrepancies
and
variations in the case of prosecution- All
witnesses supported the prosecution
case.
Despite
lengthy
crossexaminations, no material exists to
disbelieve their statements or render
their statements doubtful. Held - minor
contradictions,
inconsistencies,
embellishments
or
improvements
on
trivial matters which do not effect the
core of the prosecution case, should not
be made a ground on which the evidence
can be rejected in its entirety.
(Para 39,40,41,42,43and 44)

E. Question of awarding sentence and
consideration
of
aggravating
and
mitigating
circumstances-Settled
legal
position
that
appropriate
sentence should be awarded after
giving due consideration to the facts