# Lko. Development Authority v. Mrs. Nirupama Singh & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 720
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-16
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 7111 of 2025
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/lko-development-authority-v-mrs-nirupama-singh-anr-52976
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

720 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the case of Physical Research Laboratory
(supra) a coordinate Bench of this Court
held that a national research institution of
Council
for
Scientific
&
Industrial
Research i.e. CSIR-Central Drug Research
Institute, Lucknow is not an industry under
Section 2(k) of Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No.XXXVIII
of 1947) while upholding the Award dated
8.7.1997 of the Industrial Tribunal (II)
Lucknow.

16. I have examined the material on
record in the light of case-laws cited by
learned counsel for the petitioners.

17. On examination, it is found that
Central Institute of Medicinal & Aromatic
Plants, Lucknow ; CSIR- Indian Institute of
Toxicology
Research,
Lucknow;
CSIRNational
Botanical
Research
Institute,
Lucknow which has been notified under
Section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunal
Act,
1985
through
Notification
No.R11018/16/86-At dated 31.10.1986 being a
Society controlled by the Central Government
is primarily engaged in scientific research
concerning medicinal and aromatic plants. The
object of the institute is not to carry on trade or
business or to earn profit, but to carry out
research in the national interest and for public
welfare.
The
activity
undertaken
by
C.I.M.A.P. is thus academic and scientific in
nature and cannot be equated with any
commercial or industrial venture. In this view
of the matter, the judgment rendered in the
case of Physical Research Laboratory
(supra) vide which this Hon'ble Supreme
Court clarified that institutions engaged solely
in research or educational functions, devoid of
commercial or economic character, cannot be
treated as 'industry' squarely covers to the
present facts and circumstances of the present
case.

18. It is settled principle of law that a
research institute is not an industry within the
meaning of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 as
well as Uttar Pradesh Industrial Dispute Act,
1947. The other legal and factual issues may
not be decided keeping in view of the
aforesaid settled principle of law.

19. Considering in totalities of facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court is of the
opinion that the Central Institute of Medicinal
and Aromatic Plants, Lucknow being a purely
research
and
scientific
organization
functioning under the Council of Scientific
and Industrial Research does not fall within
the definition of 'Industry' under Section 2(j) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

20. In the result, all the writ petitions are
allowed, except Writ-C No.1004654 of 2005
(Shiv Narain Singh and another v. Presiding
Officer, labour Court, U.P., Lucknow and
another), Writ-C No.1000938 of 2006 (Rishi
Deo Mishra and 4 others v. Presiding Officer,
Central Govt. Industrial Trib. And Anr.), Writ-C
No.1000940 of 2006 (Hari Shanker Dubey and 3
Ors. v. Presiding Officer Cental Govt. Industrial
Trib. And Anr.) and Writ-A No.8817 of 1992
(Rajendra Mishra v. Industrial Tribunal), being
filed by the petitioners in individual capacity,
which are hereby dismissed.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 720
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 7111 of 2025

Lko. Development Authority ...Petitioner
Versus
Mrs. Nirupama Singh & Anr.
 ...Respondents
12 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Nirupama Singh & Anr.
721
Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whether, in exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction under article 227 of
Constitution
of
India,
interference
was
warranted with the order dated 30.07.2025
passed
by
National
Consumer
Disputes
Redressal
Commission
rejecting
the
petitioner/Lucknow
Development
Authority's
application for condonation of an inordinate
delay of 544 days in filing the consumer appeal,
particularly when the petitioner had taken selfcontradictory stands on oath regarding the
cause of delay, failed to furnish a credible, bona
fide and sufficient explanation, and when the
National Commission had exercised its discretion
in
conformity
with
the
settled
principles
governing condonation of delay under the law of
limitation
and
the
object
of
expeditious
adjudication under the Consumer Protection Act.

Headnotes
Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 5 -The petitioner,
Lucknow Development Authority, invoked
the supervisory jurisdiction of High Court
under article 227 of Constitution to assail
the order dated 30.07.2025 passed by
National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, New Delhi, whereby its
application seeking condonation of an
inordinate delay of 544 days in filing a
consumer appeal against the judgment of
State
Consumer
Commission
dated
23.11.2023 was rejected - Before the
National
Commission,
the
petitioner
attributed the delay to the alleged failure
of its counsel to inform it of State
Commission's judgment and to internal
administrative processing, whereas the
record revealed that the impugned order
had been received by the Authority on
06.12.2023 - In the petition before the
High Court, the petitioner took a different
stand by asserting that knowledge of
judgment was acquired on 14.12.2023
and that the delay was occasioned by
mandatory procedural approvals within
the Authority - The National Commission,
finding the explanation unsatisfactory and
inconsistent, declined to condone the
delay, observing that such indulgence
would defeat the object of expeditious
consumer adjudication, which led to the
filing of instant petition.
Held: The plea taken by Lucknow Development
Authority (LDA) that delay in filing the appeal by
it was attributable to the multiple lengthy
compulsory procedural stages to which it is
subject to by virtue of it being a statutory
authority, fails to make out a reasonable
explanation for the inordinate delay caused in
filing the appeal against the impugned order
dated 23.11.2023 - The record before the
National Commission shows that the order dated
23.11.2023 was received by the appellant on
06.12.2023 whereas before High court, the
petitioner has pleaded that the order dated
23.11.2023 came to notice of the LDA on
14.12.2023 - Therefore, the plea taken before
High Court that the delay occurred because the
petitioner's Advocate had not informed about
the order dated 23.11.2023, is false - When it is
apparent on the face of the record that the
petitioner has not approached High Court with
clean hands and has made statements which
are contrary to the statements made on oath
earlier, it is apparent that the petitioner has not
been able to give a sufficient explanation for the
inordinate delay of 544 days in filing the appeal
and it is merely trying to create an excuse for
condonation of delay - Thus, petition lacks merit
and it is accordingly, dismissed. [Paras 16, 19,
21] (E-13)

Case Law Cited
Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana
and others, 2014 (11) SCC 351; Lingeswaran
v. Thirunagalingam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC
2233; Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1093; Basawaraj v. Land
Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81; Esha
Bhattacharjee
v.
Managing
Committee
of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC
649; Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs.
v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1278;
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563; Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved
Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380 -
referred to

List of Acts
Limitation Act, 1963
List of Keywords
Petition under Article 227 of Constitution of
India; Condonation of delay; Inordinate delay;
Sufficient explanation; Application u/s 5 of
Limitation Act; Consumer appeal; Consumer
722 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Protection Act; National Consumer Disputes
Redressal
Commission;
State
Commission;
Statutory authority; Affidavit on oath; Selfcontradictory statements, Personal knowledge;
Receipt of order; Administrative processing;
Mandatory provision; Lack of bona fides;
Dishonest
intention;
Negligence;
Inaction;
Unclean hands; Discretionary relief; Reasonable
explanation; Judicial discretion; Dismissal of
petition.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Matters Under
Article 227 No. - 7111 of 2025

From
the
Judgment
and
Order
dated
30.07.2025, passed by the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in
First Appeal No.NC/FA/342/2025

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Petitioner:
Ratnesh Chandra

Advs. for the Respondent:
Nil

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ratnesh Chandra, the learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner

Lucknow
Development Authority and perused the records.

2. By means of the instant petition filed
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
the petitioner has challenged the validity of
an order dated 30.07.2025, passed by the
National
Consumer
Disputes
Redressal
Commission, New Delhi in First Appeal
No.NC/FA/342/2025
titled
Lucknow
Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Nirupma
Singh and another, whereby the petitioner's
application for condonation of delay bearing
IA-No.8181 of 2025 seeking condonation of
delay of 544 days in filing the appeal, has
been rejected.

3. In the application for condonation
of delay the appellant had pleaded that "the
State Commission had passed its judgment
on 23.11.2023 by imposing heavy amount
to be paid to the respondent. Due to
mistake the learned counsel for the
appellant after passing of impugned
judgment did not inform to the appellant
authority about passing of impugned
judgment by the Hon'ble State Commission
and due to which timely proceeding could
not be done in the aforesaid matter for
filing of present appeal against the
impugned judgment and order. As soon as
the learned counsel had informed to the
authority about passing of impugned
judgment, the appellant authority had
processed
the
matter
for
obtaining
permission from authorities for filing the
appeal in the aforesaid matter. It is
submitted that long time was spent in
processing
the
file
and
obtaining
appropriate permission from the concerned
authorities. As soon as the permission was
obtained, the vakalatnama was issued in
favour of concerned Advocate for filing
appeal before this Hon'ble Commission.
After issue of vakalatnama the records/ file
of aforesaid matter was handed over to the
advocate, thereafter the above appeal was
drafted and same is being filed today
before this Hon?ble Commission".

4. The application for condonation of
delay was supported by an affidavit of Sri.
Atul Krishna Singh, who is presently
posted as Deputy Secretary in Lucknow
Development Authority, who verified the
aforesaid averments to be true and correct
to the best of his knowledge and belief.

5. The National Commission recorded
in the impugned order that a perusal of the
record shows that the State Commission
had passed the impugned order on
23.11.2023. A copy of the order was
received by the appellant on 06.12.2023
12 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Nirupama Singh & Anr.
723
and
the
appeal
has
been
filed
on
02.07.2025. The grounds mentioned for the
delay are not convincing enough to
condone the delay. Being a consumer
dispute such condonation would defeat the
purpose of Consumer Protection Act. The
National Commission has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
cases of Brijesh Kumar and others Vs.
State of Haryana and others: 2014 (11)
SCC 351, in which the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: -

"10. The courts should not adopt
an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting
the application for condonation of delay.
However the court while allowing such
application has to draw a distinction
between delay and inordinate delay for
want of bona fides of an inaction or
negligence would deprive a party of the
protection of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition
precedent for exercise of discretion by the
court for condoning the delay. This Court
has time and again held that when
mandatory provision is not complied with
and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily
and convincingly explained, the court
cannot condone the delay on sympathetic
grounds alone."

6. The National Commission has also
relied upon the judgment in the case of
Lingeswaran v. Thirunagalingam: 2022
SCC OnLine SC 2233, wherein it was held
that: -

"5.
We
are
in
complete
agreement with the view taken by the High
Court. Once it was found even by the
learned trial Court that delay has not been
properly explained and even there are no
merits in the application for condonation of
delay, thereafter, the matter should rest
there and the condonation of delay
application was required to be dismissed.
The approach adopted by the learned trial
Court that, even after finding that, in
absence of any material evidence it cannot
be said that the delay has been explained
and that there are no merits in the
application, still to condone the delay
would be giving a premium to a person
who fails to explain the delay and who is
guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the
decision of this Court in the case of Popat
Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition
Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to
be referred to. In the said decision, it is
observed and held that the law of limitation
may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The Court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. The statutory provision
may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the Court has no
choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same.

5.1. In the case of Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of
Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, in
paragraph 14, it is observed and held as
under:

"The law of limitation is founded
on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963
has not been enacted with the object of
destroying the rights of the parties but to
ensure that they approach the court for
vindication
of
their
rights
without
unreasonable delay. The idea underlying
the concept of limitation is that every
remedy should remain alive only till the
expiry of the period fixed by the legislature.
At the same time, the courts are empowered
to condone the delay provided that
sufficient cause is shown by the applicant
for not availing the remedy within the
prescribed period of limitation."
724 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. The aforesaid judgment has been
followed
in
Thirunagalingam
v.
Lingeswaran: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093.

8. Before this court the petitioner has
pleaded in para 26 of the petition that "it
was for the first time came to the notice of
the LDA on 14/12/2023, that the judgment
dated 23/11/2023 has been rendered by the
State Commission and no sooner the said
fact
came
to
the
notice
of
LDA,
immediately the process of filing the appeal
was initiated and the delay in filing the
appeal occurred due to the fact that, being
a statutory authority, the Petitioner is
mandatorily required to route the proposal
for filing the appeal through multiple
administrative divisions, including legal,
technical and financial branches, for
scrutiny, opinion, approval and sanction at
various levels of hierarchy. The movement
of the file through these compulsory
procedural stages, which is beyond the
control
of
deponent,
consumed
considerable time and thereby occasioned
unavoidable
delay
in
instituting
the
appeal".

9. The affidavit in support of the
Writ Petition has been filed by Sri. Atul
Krishna Singh, Deputy Secretary in
Lucknow Development Authority, who
has verified the above quoted averments
made in paragraph 26 of the petition to be
true to the personal knowledge. It is
significant to note that the same deponent
had filed the affidavit in support of the
application for condonation of delay in
filing the appeal before the National
Consumer
Disputes
Redressal
Commission stating that the learned
counsel for the Lucknow Development
Authority had not informed the Authority
about the judgment passed by the State
Commission due to which the appeal
against the impugned judgment could not
be filed within time.

10. From the aforesaid facts it is
clear
that
the
petitioner
Lucknow
Development Authority has been taking
self contradictory stands for the same
matter
at
different
stages.
In
the
application filed under Section 5 of
Limitation
Act
before
the National
Commission it pleaded that the counsel
for the appellant had not informed about
the order dated 23.11.2023 due to which
the proceedings could not be instituted
timely. The record before the National
Commission revealed that the order dated
23.11.2023 was received by the appellant
on 06.12.2023. Before this court the
petitioner had pleaded that the order
dated 23.11.2023 came to notice of the
LDA on 14.12.2023.

11. Apparently, the LDA has been
making self contradictory statements on
oath and all of them cannot be correct.

12.
In
Basawaraj
v.
Land
Acquisition Officer: (2013) 14 SCC 81,
the Hon?ble Supreme Court summarized
the law regarding condonation of delay
by stating that:?

"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party
is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to
12 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Nirupama Singh & Anr.
725
condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay
by
imposing
any
condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature".

13.
In
Esha
Bhattacharjee
v.
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy: (2013) 12 SCC 649, the
Hon?ble Supreme Court discussed the law
regarding
condonation
of
delay
as
explained
in
various
precedents
and
summarized the same as follows:?

"21.
From
the
aforesaid
authorities the principles that can broadly
be culled out are:

(i) There should be a liberal,
pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic
approach while dealing with an application
for condonation of delay, for the courts are
not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.

(ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper
spirit, philosophy and purpose regard
being had to the fact that these terms are
basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining factsituation.

(iii) Substantial justice being
paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be
attached to deliberate causation of delay
but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable
to a party seeking condonation of delay is
a significant and relevant fact.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that
adherence to strict proof should not affect
public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate
there is no real failure of justice.

(vii) The concept of liberal
approach has to encapsule the conception
of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play.

(viii) There is a distinction
between inordinate delay and a delay of
short duration or few days, for the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas
to the latter it may not be attracted. That
apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.

(ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction
or negligence are relevant factors to be
taken into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts are
required to weigh the scale of balance of
justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go by
in the name of liberal approach.

(x) If the explanation offered is
concocted or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts should
be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that
no
one
gets
away
with
fraud,
misrepresentation
or
interpolation
by
taking recourse to the technicalities of law
of limitation.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are
to
be
carefully
scrutinized
and
the
approach should be based on the paradigm
726 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual
perception.

(xiii) The State or a public body
or an entity representing a collective cause
should be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we
may add some more guidelines taking note
of the present day scenario. They are:

(a)
An
application
for
condonation of delay should be drafted
with careful concern and not in a half
hazard manner harbouring the notion that
the courts are required to condone delay
on the bedrock of the principle that
adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal
to justice dispensation system.

(b) An application for condonation
of delay should not be dealt with in a routine
manner on the base of individual philosophy
which is basically subjective.

(c) Though no precise formula
can be laid down regard being had to the
concept of judicial discretion, yet a
conscious effort for achieving consistency
and collegiality of the adjudicatory system
should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.

(d) The increasing tendency to
perceive delay as a non-serious matter
and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can
be exhibited in a non-challant manner
requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters."

(Emphasis supplied)

14. In Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased)
Through Lrs. v. Union of India: 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1278, after discussing the
various precedents on the issue, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court summarized the principles
regarding condonation of delay in the
following words:?

"29.
Considering
the
aforementioned decisions, there cannot be
any quarrel that this Court has stepped in
to ensure that substantive rights of private
parties and the State are not defeated at the
threshold
simply
due
to
technical
considerations of delay. However, these
decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that
condonation of delay being a discretionary
power available to courts, exercise of
discretion must necessarily depend upon
the sufficiency of the cause shown and the
degree of acceptability of the explanation,
the length of delay being immaterial.
Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause
being shown or an acceptable explanation
being proffered, delay of the shortest range
may not be condoned whereas, in certain
other cases, delay of long periods can be
condoned if the explanation is satisfactory
and acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an 'explanation' and
an 'excuse'. An 'explanation' is designed
to give someone all of the facts and lay out
the cause for something. It helps clarify
the circumstances of a particular event
and allows the person to point out that
something that has happened is not his
fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must
however be taken to distinguish an
'explanation' from an 'excuse'. Although
people tend to see 'explanation' and
'excuse' as the same thing and struggle to
find out the difference between the two,
there is a distinction which, though fine, is
real. An 'excuse' is often offered by a
person
to
deny
responsibility
and
consequences when under attack. It is sort
of a defensive action. Calling something
as just an 'excuse' would imply that the
explanation proffered is believed not to be
true. Thus said, there is no formula that
caters to all situations and, therefore, each
case for condonation of delay based on
existence or absence of sufficient cause has
to be decided on its own facts. At this stage,
we cannot but lament that it is only
12 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Nirupama Singh & Anr.
727
excuses, and not explanations, that are
more often accepted for condonation of
long delays to safeguard public interest
from those hidden forces whose sole
agenda is to ensure that a meritorious
claim does not reach the higher courts for
adjudication.

(Emphasis added)

15. In Postmaster General v. Living
Media India Ltd.: (2012) 3 SCC 563, the
Hon?ble Supreme Court refused to condone
the delay of 427 days in filing the SLP by
holding that: -

"27. It is not in dispute that the
person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant
with
the
issues
involved
including
the
prescribed
period
of
limitation for taking up the matter by way
of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In
the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing
of the Government is a party before us.
* * *

29. In our view, it is the right
time to inform all the government bodies,
their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless
they
have
reasonable
and
acceptable explanation for the delay and
there was bona fide effort, there is no need
to accept the usual explanation that the
file
was
kept
pending
for
several
months/years due to considerable degree
of procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone
under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few."

(Emphasis added)

16. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
the plea taken by the LDA that delay in
filing the appeal by it was attributable to
the multiple lengthy compulsory procedural
stages to which it is subject to by virtue of
it being a statutory authority, fails to make
out a reasonable explanation for the
inordinate delay caused in filing the appeal
against
the
impugned
order
dated
23.11.2023

17. In paragraph 21, 25 and 31 of the
writ petition the petitioner has specifically
pleaded that the delay in filing the appeal
was attributable to the fault of the previous
counsel of the Authority who did not
inform the Authority about the passing of
the impugned order dated 23.11.2023 and
the petitioner should not be made to suffer
for it. It has been pleaded that the National
Commission therefore should have taken a
lenient view in allowing the application of
condonation of delay for filing the appeal
against the impuged order.

18. In Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved
Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that: -

"10. It appears that the entire
blame has been thrown on the head of the
advocate who was appearing for the
petitioners in the trial court. We have
noticed over a period of time a tendency on
the part of the litigants to blame their
lawyers of negligence and carelessness in
attending the proceedings before the court.
728 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Even if we assume for a moment that the
concerned
lawyer
was
careless
or
negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a
ground to condone long and inordinate
delay as the litigant owes a duty to be
vigilant of his own rights and is expected to
be equally vigilant about the judicial
proceedings pending in the court initiated
at his instance. The litigant, therefore,
should not be permitted to throw the entire
blame on the head of the advocate and
thereby disown him at any time and seek
relief."

19. The record before the National
Commission shows that the order dated
23.11.2023 was received by the appellant
on 06.12.2023 whereas before this court,
the petitioner has pleaded that the order
dated 23.11.2023 came to notice of the
LDA on 14.12.2023. Therefore, the plea
taken before this Court that the delay
occurred because the petitioner's Advocate
had not informed about the order dated
23.11.2023, is false. Making two self
contradictory statements on oath makes it
manifest that the petitioner has approached
this Court with a dishonest intention and
with unclean hands, which disentitles it to
claim
the
discretionary
relief
of
condonation of delay of 544 days in filing
the appeal. When it is apparent on the face
of the record that the petitioner has not
approached this court with clean hands and
has made statements which are contrary to
the statements made on oath earlier, it is
apparent that the petitioner has not been
able to give a sufficient explanation for the
inordinate delay of 544 days in filing the
appeal and it is merely trying to create an
excuse for condonation of delay.

20. In these circumstances, this court
finds no good ground to interfere in the
impugned order dated 30.07.2025, passed
by
the
National
Consumer
Disputes
Redressal
Commission,
New
Delhi
rejecting the application for condonation of
544 days? delay in filing the appeal.

21. The petition lacks merit and the
same is accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 728
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MS. NAND PRABHA SHUKLA, J.

Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 35164 of 2025

Sanjay Agarwal ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
Whether the trial ought to have been conducted
in the manner as prescribed under Chapter
XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
provisions of Sections 244 or 245 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure would not apply to the
proceedings of the Complaint Case pending
before a Special Court which happens to be the
learned Sessions Judge under the U.P. Dacoity
Affected Areas Act, 1983

Head Notes
The Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections
452, 323, 504, 506, 392, 406, 420 & 120B;
The Uttar Pradesh Dacoity Affected Areas
Act, 1983- Sections 2(b) & 7; The Code of
Criminal Procedure-1973- Sections 5, 244
& 245, Chapter XVIII; The Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,2023-Section
582- The Uttar Pradesh Dacoity Affected
Areas Act is a Special Act and Section 7 of
the Act expressly lays down the procedure
and power of a Special Court which has
been constituted by virtue of Section 5 of
the Cr.P.C. The Special Court thus consists
of the Sessions Judge or the Additional
Sessions Judge, empowered to try the
scheduled
offences
by
following
the