# Lko. Development Authority v. Prem Chandra

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 736
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-19
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 252 of 2026
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/lko-development-authority-v-prem-chandra-54198
- **Pages:** 15

## Text

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736 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 2 ILRA 736
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 252 of 2026

Lko. Development Authority ...Petitioner
Versus
Prem Chandra ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
Whether interest can only be awarded from the date of notification under Section 4 and not from any date
prior to initiation of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. and the award of interest from the date of
taking possession on 30.12.1984 is without jurisdiction and, therefore, the award cannot be executed to the
extent it awards interest for the period prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 47; The
Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section 4, 28 & 34- Perusal of the order dated 19.12.2025 indicates
that it nowhere assigns any reason for rejecting the objection of the petitioner that the Land
Acquisition Act does not stipulate payment of interest from a date prior to issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the Act which was the sole ground raised in the application under
Section 47 C.P.C. The submissions of the learned counsel for the opposite party-decree holder
recorded in the impugned order also do not contain any reply to the solitary ground raised in the
application under Section 47 C.P.C. and the only objection is application under Section 47 C.P.C.
advanced during pressing submissions was that the application had been filed with an intention
to cause delay in execution proceedings- The opposite party is claiming is that although he was
deprived of the possession of the land in the year 1984, he should be paid compensation at the
rates prevalent on 19.04.2010, i.e., 26 years later, and he should be given interest on the
amount of compensation calculated at the rates prevalent on 19.04.2010, since 31.12.1984. This
claim is not equitable.

Held- LARA had no jurisdiction to award interest for any period prior to 19.04.2010 - the date of issuance of
the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is settled law that the plea of lack of
jurisdiction can be raised at any stage, even during execution proceedings by filing an application under
Section 47 CPC. LARA has passed the impugned orders without dealing with the plea of lack of jurisdiction
raised by the petitioner which makes the orders unsustainable in law- Petition allowed. (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.: (2003) 3 SCC 524; . C.G. Thampi v. Jyothis: 2022 SCC OnLine
Ker 704; Tapan Chandra Deb Barma v. Dulal Chandra Deb Barma: 1979 SCC OnLine Gau 17; State of A.P. v.
V. Sarma Rao: (2007) 2 SCC 159; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.: (2003) 2 SCC 111,;
Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers: (2003) 6 SCC 659; Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra
Shankar Patil: (2010) 8 SCC 329; Union of India v. Budh Singh: (1995) 6 SCC 233; R.L. Jain (D) by LRs. Vs.
DDA and others: (2004) 4 SCC 79; Madishetti Bala Ramul v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2007) 9 SCC 650;
Tahera Khotoon v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2014) 13 SCC 613; Dhanush Vir Singh v. Ila Sharma: 2024 SCC
OnLine All 3693
2 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Prem Chandra
737
List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; The Land Acquisition Act, 1894

List of Keywords
Section 4 Land Acquisition Act; Payment of interest; from the date; issuance of notification u/s 4; plea of lack
of jurisdiction; raised at any stage; even during execution proceedings

Case Arising From
Petitioner has challenged the validity of three orders passed by the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Authority, Lucknow in Execution Case No. 42 of 2024 (i) an order dated 25.09.2025, whereby
the petitioner's objections against a calculation chart submitted by the opposite party have been rejected, (ii)
an order dated 19.12.2025, whereby the petitioner's application under Section 47 C.P.C. has been rejected
and (iii) an order dated 23.12.2025 rejecting the petitioner's objections against the decree holder's application
under Order XXI, Rule 37 CPC.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Bhanu Bajpai,
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Amit Jaiswal, Ankit Verma, Ashish Kumar Singh

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Mukund Tiwari, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Bhanu Bajpai, Advocate, the
learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Amit Jaiswal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the opposite
party and perused the records.

2. By means of the instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has challenged the validity of three orders passed by the Land Acquisition and
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as "the LARA") in
Execution Case No. 42 of 2024 titled Prem Chandra Vs. State and another namely - (i) an order
dated 25.09.2025, whereby the petitioner"s objections against a calculation chart submitted by the
opposite party have been rejected, (ii) an order dated 19.12.2025, whereby the petitioner"s
application under Section 47 C.P.C. has been rejected and (iii)"an order dated 23.12.2025 rejecting
the petitioner"s objections against the decree holder"s application under Order XXI, Rule 37 CPC.

3. Sri. Amit Jaiswal, the learned counsel for the opposite party has raised a preliminary
objection that the petitioner has got the remedy of challenging these orders by filing a revision
under Section 115 CPC and, therefore, the petition under Article 227 is not maintainable. In
support of this contention he has relied upon a judgment of a Single Judge Bench of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in the cases of C.G. Thampi v. Jyothis: 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 704,
Tapan Chandra Deb Barma v. Dulal Chandra Deb Barma: 1979 SCC OnLine Gau 17,
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.: (2003) 3 SCC 524,

4. In Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.: (2003) 3 SCC 524, it was held that: -

"7."The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the
Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its
parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of
law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does
738 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition
filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the
inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the
decision.

8."For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that since the insurer has a remedy by
filing an appeal before the High Court, the High Court ought not to have entertained the petition
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and for that reason, the judgment and order under
challenge deserves to be set aside. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment and order under
appeal. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. However, it would be open to
the insurer to file an appeal if it is permissible under the law."

5. In C. G. Thampi v. Jyothis: 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 704, it was held that: -

"...wherever the proceedings are under the Code of Civil Procedure and the forum is the
Civil Court, the availability of a remedy under CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a
measure of self imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its
power of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence the High Court ought not to have
entertained the Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in a case where a specific
remedy of appeal is provided under the code of Civil Procedure. Further the availability of such a
remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure to be construed as near to total bar for the remedy
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India."

6. In Tapan Chandra Deb Barma v. Dulal Chandra Deb Barma: 1979 SCC OnLine Gau
17 : AIR 1980 Gau 3, it was held that determinations made under Section 47 of the CPC on or after
01.02.1977 are not decrees and therefore not appealable, The Gauhati High Court ordered the
appellate Court to return the memorandum of appeals for due presentation before the High Court as
revisions.

7. Per contra, Sri. Mukund Tiwari, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has
invited attention of the Court to the provision contained in Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, which is as follows: -

"53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court.- Save in so far as
they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provision of the"Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act."

8. The definition of Court given in Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is as
follows: -

"(d) the expression "Court"means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless
the"appropriate Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial
officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act"
2 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Prem Chandra
739

9. The State Government has issued a Notification dated 04.08.2022 authorising the Presiding
Officers of the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority to perform the
duties of Courts and that declaring that they shall work as Special Judicial Officers. Thereafter the
Government Order dated 21.02.2024 has clarified that the Presiding Officers of the Land
Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority are also authorised to adjudicate upon
all the pending matters under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, including the execution cases.

10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that while deciding cases under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, LARA acts as a Court under the Land Acquisition Act hence the
provision of the"Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the LARA.
However, in the case of State of A.P. v. V. Sarma Rao: (2007) 2 SCC 159, the Hon"ble Supreme
Court has held that: -

"12.... Despite applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) in
relation to the proceedings pending before it, its substantive part is not applicable. A right of
appeal is provided for under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such appeals are to be filed
before the forums laid down under the Civil Procedure Code or the courts governed by the statute.
However, no appeal from a judgment of the Land Acquisition Judge can be filed before the
Principal Court of civil jurisdiction or in other words, the District Judge of the district, as such
appeals lie only before the High Court. No appeal"ex facie"or filed against the order passed by the
Reference Court is maintainable before the District Judge."

11. Sri. Tiwari has submitted that the provision under Section 115 of CPC is also a substantive
provision like the substantive provision of appeal under Section 96 CPC. Therefore, in view of the
law laid down in State of A.P. v. V. Sarma Rao (Supra), revision under Section 115 CPC would
not lie against an order passed by LARA.

12. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that State of A.P. v. V. Sarma
Rao (Supra) was decided in view of the peculiar facts of that case and it does not lay down a
general principle of universal application that no revision would lie against an order passed by
LARA. He has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana
Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.: (2003) 2 SCC 111, wherein the Hon"ble Supreme Court held that a decision
is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom.

13. I agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the opposite party that State of A.P.
v. V. Sarma Rao (Supra) does not lay down that an order passed by LARA is not amenable to
revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj
Developers: (2003) 6 SCC 659, it was held that "It is fairly a well-settled position in law that the
right of appeal is a substantive right. But there is no such substantive right in making an
application under Section 115". The Hon"ble Supreme Court clarified that "Section 115 is
essentially a source of power for the High Court to supervise the subordinate courts. It does not in
any way confer a right on a litigant aggrieved by any order of the subordinate court to approach
the High Court for relief. The scope for making a revision under Section 115 is not linked with a
substantive right."
740 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that although the order rejecting
the application under Section 47 CPC may be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this
court,"the other two orders do not fall within the category of "case decided"and, therefore, those are
not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this court. He has submitted that when three orders
passed in the same proceedings between the same set of parties are required to be challenged before
this court, challenging one order by filing a revision under Section 115 CPC, whereas filing a
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for challenging the validity of the other two
orders, will only lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Moreover, the power of superintendence
conferred upon this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not abridge the revisional
power of this court under Section 115 CPC.

15. Sri. Mukund Tiwari Senior Advocate has relied upon the judgment in the case of Shalini
Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil: (2010) 8 SCC 329, in which the Hon"ble Supreme
Court considered various precedents on the point of scope of interference under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and summarised the following principles: -

"48."The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected
but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice.
In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of
their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by
the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In
certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution can be claimed ex debito justitiae or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High
Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no
person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226,
a letters patent appeal or an intra-court appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is
maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under
Article 227. In almost all the High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High
Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the
discretion of High Court.

49."On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on
the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:

(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under
Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also
different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history
of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of
conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been
discussed above.
2 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Prem Chandra
741

(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence
under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it.
Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or
tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been
provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of
superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must
be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in"Waryam
Singh"[AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in"Waryam Singh"[AIR 1954 SC 215] have been
repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in"Waryam Singh"[AIR 1954 SC 215] , followed in subsequent
cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only
to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority".

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising
jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested
in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise
of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the
tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of
justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct
mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or
courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.

(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed
by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in"L. Chandra Kumar"v."Union of India"[(1997) 3 SCC 261 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very
doubtful.

(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section
115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and
cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be
remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's
jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an
appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
742 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under
Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and
judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it
does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the
minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice
remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the
tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised
just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public
confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is
meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be
unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will
divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."

16. The learned counsel for the opposite party has not placed any judgment in support of his
submission that the orders dated 25.09.2025 and 23.12.2025 would fall within the category of "case
decided"and would be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this court.

17. I find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that although the
order rejecting the application under Section 47 CPC may be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction
of this court,"the other two orders do not fall within the category of "case decided"and, therefore,
those are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this court. When three orders passed in the
same proceedings between the same set of parties are required to be challenged before this court,
challenging one order by filing a revision under Section 115 CPC, whereas filing a petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India for challenging the validity of the other two orders, will
only lead to multiplicity of proceedings. The power of superintendence conferred upon this court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not abridge the revisional power of this court under
Section 115 CPC and this power can be exercised where the order under challenge suffers from a
patent error of jurisdiction which can be established without any detailed factual inquiry.

18. In view of the foregoing discussion, I turn down the preliminary objection that the petition
is not maintainable and I proceed to examine the merits of the case.

19. Grievance of the petitioner is that under provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, interest
can be paid since the date of notification under Section 4 and not prior to it. In Union of India v.
Budh Singh: (1995) 6 SCC 233, the Hon"ble Supreme Court held that the question whether the
respondents-owners of the lands are entitled to interest from the date on which possession was
initially taken, preceding the date on which the notification under Section 4(1) was published, is a
jurisdictional issue and the finding in this behalf touches and trenches into the jurisdictional power
2 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Prem Chandra
743
of the court, acting under the Act regarding award of interest. This is the precise issue involved in
the present case, where the LARA has awarded interest since prior to the notification.

20. The dispute between the parties emanates from an award dated 12.07.2012, passed by the
Land Acquisition Officer Nagar Mahapalika-I, Lucknow / Additional District Magistrate,
Lucknow. The award states that a notification under Section 4/17 of the Land Acquisition Act was
issued on 19.04.2010 and a notification under Section 6/17 of the Land Acquisition Act was
published on 04.01.2011. As against the date of taking possession of the acquired land, the award
states that the land is in possession of the petitioner since before. The award directs payment of
interest from the date of taking possession of the land.

21. The opposite party had filed a reference no.119 of 2015, which was decided by LARA by
means of a judgment and order dated 10.04.2024. The following issues were framed by the
authority: -

"1."Whether the compensation declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is
improper and insufficient, if yes, what was the market value of the property on the date of
publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act?

2."Other relief which the claimant is entitled to."

22. Apparently, no issue was framed regarding the date of taking possession of the land.
However, while deciding issue no.1, the authority has held that it is clear that possession of the land
had been taken in the year 1983-84, but as the date of taking possession has not been ascertained,
the authority assumed 30.12.1984 to be the date of taking over possession. LARA held that the
claimant is entitled to get compensation at the market"value of the land as on the date of issuance
of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, i.e., 19.04.2010, which was
Rs.6,771/- per square meter. The opposite party was also held entitled to receive interest at the rate
of 12% from the date of notification i.e. 09.04.2010 till the date of the award, i.e., 12.07.2012 and
30% solatium. The opposite party was further held entitled to get interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from the date of possession i.e. 30.12.1984, for a period of one year and thereafter interest
at the rate of 15%.

23. The aforesaid order dated 10.04.2024, passed in reference has been challenged by filing a
belated appeal which is yet to be admitted."The delay has not yet been condoned and the appeal is
yet to be admitted.

24. The opposite party filed Execution Case No.42 of 2024 for execution of the award passed
in reference. The opposite party "decree holder filed a calculation chart calculating interest from
the date of possession and not from the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act. The petitioner filed objections against it and filed its own calculation chart
calculating interest from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The LARA rejected the
petitioner"s objection by means of the impugned order dated 25.09.2025 (Annexure No.2 to the
petition) by holding that the petitioner had not taken possession of the land after its acquisition and
it had been taken earlier. The award states that the interest will be payable from the date of taking
744 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
over possession of the land. Therefore, the objections of the petitioner against the calculation chart
calculating interest from the date of possession i.e. 31.12.1984 were rejected and"the calculation
chart of the petitioner calculating interest from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act
was also rejected. The authority accepted the calculation chart of the opposite party-decree holder
for calculating interest from the date of possession.

25. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application under Section 47 CPC, stating that interest
can only be awarded from the date of notification under Section 4 and not from any date prior to
initiation of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. The award of interest from the date of
taking possession on 30.12.1984 is without jurisdiction and, therefore, the award cannot be
executed to the extent it awards interest for the period prior to the notification under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act. In support of this contention the petitioner relied upon the judgment of
the Hon"ble Supreme Court in the case of R.L. Jain (D) by LRs. Vs. DDA and others: (2004) 4
SCC 79.

26. From the record it appears that the opposite party did not file any objection against the
petitioner's application under Section 47 C.P.C."

27. The application has been rejected by means of the impugned order dated 19.12.2025,
wherein the objection raised in the application under Section 47 C.P.C. is mentioned and it is
mentioned that counsel for the opposite party-decree holder opposed the application under Section
47 C.P.C. stating that the petitioner is merely causing delay in execution proceedings. The authority
has held in the impugned order that a sum of Rs.15,33,11,140/- has already been attached as per the
report (C-17) submitted by the accounts officer and the judgment debtor has made an endorsement
"no objection". The grounds raised in the application under Section 47 CPC amounts to questioning
the validity of the award. The award has been challenged in First Appeal No.84 of 2024, wherein
no interim order has been passed. The authority held that the application had been filed merely to
cause delay in execution proceedings and accordingly rejected the application."

28. A bare perusal of the order dated 19.12.2025 indicates that it nowhere assigns any reason
for rejecting the objection of the petitioner that the Land Acquisition Act does not stipulate
payment of interest from a date prior to issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act which
was the sole ground raised in the application under Section 47 C.P.C. The submissions of the
learned counsel for the opposite party-decree holder recorded in the impugned order also do not
contain any reply to the solitary ground raised in the application under Section 47 C.P.C. and the
only objection is application under Section 47 C.P.C. advanced during pressing submissions was
that the application had been filed with an intention to cause delay in execution proceedings.

29. Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act contains provision for payment of interest and it
provides as follows: -

"34. Payment of interest. -When the amount of such compensation is not paid or
deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded
with interest thereon at the rate of"nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking
possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited:
2 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Prem Chandra
745

Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a
period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per
centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the
amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of
such expiry."

30. The other provision relevant for payment of interest is Section 28, which provides as
follows: -

"28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation. - If the sum
which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in
excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may
direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of"53[nine per centum] per
annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess
into Court.

Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part
thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which
possession is taken, interest at the rate of' fifteen per centum per annum, shall be payable from the
date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has
not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry."

31. In Union of India v. Budh Singh: (1995) 6 SCC 233, the Hon"ble Supreme Court held
that: -

"5.""the statute covers the entire field of operation of the liability of the State to make
payment of interest and entitlement thereof by the owner when land has been taken over and
possession in consequence thereof, the land owner was deprived of the enjoyment thereof. Thus, it
could be seen that the court has no power to impose any condition to pay interest in excess of the
rate and manner prescribed by the statute as well as for a period anterior to the publication of
Section 4(1) notification under the Act. The parameter for initiation of the proceedings is the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the State Gazette or in an
appropriate case in District Gazette as per the local amendments. But the condition precedent is
publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the appropriate gazette. That would give
legitimacy to the State to take possession of the land in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Any possession otherwise would not be considered to be possession taken under the Act. In fact, a
situation has been envisaged under Section 48(2) of the Act, namely, that when proceedings under
the Act were initiated and in the midstream the proceedings were dropped, the owner who has been
deprived of the enjoyment of the property, the statute prescribes the remedy of determination of the
amount of compensation due to the owner for the damages suffered by the owner in consequence of
the notice of the proceedings under the Act. The statute also imposes liability on the State to
reimburse the costs incurred by the owner to defend the proceedings under the Act. The Act is a
self-contained code and common law principles of justice, equity and good conscience cannot be
extended in awarding interest, contrary to the provisions of the statute."
746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

32. In R.L. Jain v. DDA: (2004) 4 SCC 79, the Hon"ble Supreme Court discussed numerous
precedents, ncluding the case of Budh Singh (Supra) and concluded that: -

"17.1."The normal rule, therefore, is that if on account of acquisition of land a person is
deprived of possession of his property he should be paid compensation immediately and if the same
is not paid to him forthwith he would be entitled to interest thereon from the date of dispossession
till the date of payment thereof. But here the land has been acquired only after the preliminary
notification was issued on 9-9-1992 as earlier acquisition proceedings were declared to be null
and void in the suit instituted by the landowner himself and consequently, he was not entitled to
compensation or interest thereon for the anterior period.

18."In a case where the landowner is dispossessed prior to the issuance of preliminary
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act the Government merely takes possession of the land but
the title thereof continues to vest with the landowner. It is fully open for the landowner to recover
the possession of his land by taking appropriate legal proceedings. He is therefore only entitled to
get rent or damages for use and occupation for the period the Government retains possession of the
property. Where possession is taken prior to the issuance of the preliminary notification, in our
opinion, it will be just and equitable that the Collector may also determine the rent or damages for
use of the property to which the landowner is entitled while determining the compensation amount
payable to the landowner for the acquisition of the property. The provisions of Section 48 of the Act
lend support to such a course of action. For delayed payment of such amount appropriate interest
at prevailing bank rate may be awarded.

19."The case may be examined from the equitable consideration as well. In the earlier
acquisition proceedings the notification under Section 4(1) had been published on 13-11-1959 and
the Collector had made an award for Rs. 6301 for the plot in dispute on 30-12-1961. The award
was made within 1"months of dispossession which allegedly took place on 10-11-1961. This
amount was paid to R.L. Jain and was retained by him. Learned counsel for the respondent has
placed before the Court a copy of the sale certificate issued in favour of R.L. Jain on 31-8-1961
which shows that the plot was purchased by him for Rs. 3200 only and thus he had received almost
double amount of compensation. Therefore, even on equitable ground he is not entitled to any
amount from the date of dispossession till the date of second notification under Section 4(1) of the
Act which was issued in 1992."

33. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that in R.L. Jain v. DDA
(supra), the Hon"ble Supreme Court held that if on account of acquisition of land a person is
deprived of possession of his property he should be paid compensation immediately and if the same
is not paid to him forthwith he would be entitled to interest thereon from the date of dispossession
till the date of payment thereof.

34. Sri. Jaiswal has also relied upon the following observation made in Madishetti Bala
Ramul v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2007) 9 SCC 650: -

"20."In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, although the proper course for
us would have to remand the matter back to the Collector to determine the amount of compensation
2 All. Lko. Development Authority Vs. Prem Chandra
747
to which the appellants would be entitled for being remained out of possession since 1979, we are
of the opinion that the interest of justice would be met if this appeal is disposed of with a direction
that additional interest @ 15% per annum on the amount awarded in terms of award dated 2-11999 for the period 16-3-1979 till 22-12-1991, should be granted, which, in our opinion, would
meet the ends of justice."

35. The learned Counsel for the opposite party as also relied upon the judgment in the case of
Tahera Khotoon v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2014) 13 SCC 613, wherein the Hon"ble
Supreme Court referred to the decisions in the cases of R.L. Jain"v."DDA"(supra)
and"Madishetti Bala Ramul"(supra) and held that: -

"13."Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the
opinion that the exercise that has been done by this Court in"Madishetti Bala Ramul"requires to be
adopted.

14."In the instant case, it is not in dispute nor can it be disputed by either side that the
property in dispute was in possession of the Warangal Municipal Committee. In fact the said
Municipal Committee had developed the aforesaid land into a park. Since there was a dispute
among the owners of the land with the Municipal Committee, the Municipal Committee had sought
the assistance of the State Government to acquire the property and to hand over the same to the
Municipal Committee for its use and development.

15."It is also not in dispute that the Municipal Committee was in possession of the
aforesaid property right from 1-1-1938 till the Notification was issued by the State Government on
10-1-1996. Keeping in view the observations made by this Court in"Madishetti Bala Ramul, we
direct the State Government to pay rents/damages at the rate of 15% on the compensation awarded
from the date the landowners were dispossessed, namely, from 1-1-1938 till the date of issuance of
the preliminary Notification i.e. 10-1-1996. The calculations shall be made by the State
Government as expeditiously as possible and disburse the aforesaid amount to the appellants as
early as possible, at any rate, within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order."

36. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the award in question
awards interest since the date of taking over possession to compensate the undue loss suffered by
the opposite party by illegally being deprived of the possession of his property without its
acquisition.

37. In the present case, the land has been acquired only after a notification under Section 4 of
the Act was issued on 09.09.1992, as the earlier acquisition proceedings were declared to be null
and void in the suit instituted by the opposite party himself.