# Luxmi Shankar Tiwari & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 357
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-28
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 4474 of 2016
- **Bench:** Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/luxmi-shankar-tiwari-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54507
- **Pages:** 10

## Text

4 All. Luxmi Shankar Tiwari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
357
well as the appellate order dated 24.12.2008 passed by respondent No.1 are unsustainable in law
and are liable to be quashed.

27. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed.

28. The impugned orders dated 18.03.2008 and 24.12.2008 are hereby quashed. The
respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with all consequential
benefits in accordance with law. However, it shall be open to the respondents to proceed afresh, if
so advised, strictly in accordance with law and after affording due opportunity to the petitioner.

29. No order as to costs.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 357
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.

Writ-A No. 4474 of 2016

Luxmi Shankar Tiwari & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
(1) Entitlement of payment of salary on the strength of appointment, which was found void ab initio as the
same was granted to a minor person.
(2) Effect of practicing suppression of material particulars, while seeking discretionary relief under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Payment of salary - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Writ - Suppression of
material facts - Post of Peon and Clerk - Age limit - Eligibility - Both the petitioners were minor
on the date of appointment - In the writ petition, the date of appointment was differently
mentioned from the date recorded in appointment schedule -Effect - Issue of effect of
suppression of material particulars, while seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India also felt into consideration: (E-1)
Held: The inconsistency in their pleadings with regard to the date of appointment, initially asserted to be the
year 1977 and subsequently altered to 1980, is not a mere trivial or inadvertent discrepancy, but one that
strikes at the very root of their claim. Such mutually destructive stands clearly betray a calculated attempt to
improve upon the case and to mislead the Court. It is a well-settled principle of law that a litigant invoking the
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court is under a solemn obligation to disclose full, true, and
correct facts. Any suppression, concealment, or distortion of material particulars disentitles such a litigant
from seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Para 51]
Further held: Any appointment of a minor to a post in an institution is impermissible and void ab initio - The
appointments in question are ex facie in clear violation of the mandatory statutory provisions governing
recruitment - Such fundamental lapses go to the root of the matter and render the entire selection process
358 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vitiated. It is well settled that any appointment made in contravention of statutory rules is illegal, void, and
unenforceable in the eyes of law, and no legal right can be claimed on the basis thereof - The petitioners
have failed to establish the legality of their appointments; no financial sanction or approval was ever
accorded, and the managerial return itself stood rejected by the competent authority. [Para 53, 56, 57 and
59]

Case Law Cited
Ram Ashish Chaudhary and others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2003 (1) ESC 170 (All) - referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India - Article 226; UP Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service of Ministerial Staff and Group 'D' Employees) Rules, 1984 - Rule 4 and 6.

List of Keywords
Grant-in-aid list, Three language formula, Kith and kin, Undue benefits, Material piece of evidence, Financial
sanction, Managerial return, Competent authority, Dehors the statutory Rules, Interpolation, Fabrication,
Scrutiny, Temporary recognition, Inconsistency, Inherently improbable, Legally untenable, Age criteria,
Minimum qualification, Minor, Documentary evidence, Manipulation, Credibility, Misrepresented material facts,
Impermissible in law, Inadvertent discrepancy, Extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction, Suppression,
Concealment, Distortion of material particulars, Discretionary relief, Illegal, Void, Public post, Inception,
Mandatory procedure for selection, Legitimize acts, Fraught, Material inconsistencies, State exchequer.

Case Arising From
Impugned order dated 20.12.2014 passed by the Director of Education (Basic), Uttar Pradesh.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant: Kamlesh Kumar Yadav, Kailash Singh Kushwaha, Kalpna Upadhyay, P. K.
Upadhyay.
Advs. for the Respondents: Shailendra Singh (SC), Jitendra Singh, Nisheeth Yadav, Raj Kumar Dhama.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manju Rani Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Shailendra
Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the State.

2. The present writ petition has been instituted by the petitioners praying for issuance of a writ,
order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 20.12.2014
passed by the Director of Education (Basic), Uttar Pradesh, respondent no.2. A further prayer has
been made for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to
interfere in the functioning and discharge of duties of the petitioners pursuant to the aforesaid
impugned order, and to ensure payment of their salary regularly, including arrears from the date the
same became due, within a stipulated period.

3. Placing the brief facts of the case, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioner
no. 1 is working as a Class IV employee and petitioner no. 2 as a Class III employee in a Junior
High School, namely Shiv Durgeshwar Mahabir Poorva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Ashwari, District
Varanasi. It is further submitted that the said institution was brought on the grant-in-aid list vide
order dated 02.12.2006.
4 All. Luxmi Shankar Tiwari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
359

4. It is contended that the petitioners were initially appointed on 1.7.1980 and their
appointments came to be duly approved by the District Basic Education Officer vide order dated
31.08.1987. In the said approval order, the name of petitioner no. 1 finds place at serial no. 7,
whereas the name of petitioner no. 2 is reflected at serial no. 4.

5. It is further submitted that subsequently, when the relevant papers were forwarded on
21.07.2005 under the three-language formula, the names of the petitioners were duly reflected
therein, showing petitioner no. 1 as a Class IV employee and petitioner no. 2 as a Class III
employee. It is contended that the said documents lend further corroboration to the status and
continuance of the petitioners in service.

6. Learned counsel has also drawn attention of the Court to the attendance register placed on
record, which prima facie demonstrates that the petitioners have been continuously working as nonteaching staff in the institution in question.

7. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that at the time when the
institution was brought on the grant-in-aid list, the then Manager, in collusion with certain persons
appointed on account of kith and kin, manipulated and fabricated the relevant records pertaining to
the petitioners, so as to falsely project them as Assistant Teachers, despite the fact that they were,
in reality, serving as non-teaching staff in the institution.

8. It is submitted that since the posts of the petitioners were altered in the official records by
the then Manager with a view to extend undue benefit to his kith and kin, the petitioners were
constrained to approach this Court by filing Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.25487 of 2008
(Parshu Ram and others vs. State of U.P. and others).

9. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide judgment and order dated
23.04.2012, whereby the Director of Education (Basic), U.P., Lucknow was directed to examine
the matter and take an appropriate decision with regard to the grant-in-aid status of the institution,
and to communicate the decision so taken to the petitioners as well as to the Committee of
Management.

10. It is submitted that in purported compliance of the aforesaid order, the impugned order has
been passed by the authority concerned, placing reliance upon the aforesaid fabricated documents.

11. It is submitted that the impugned order is wholly arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in the
eyes of law, being in clear violation of the directions issued by this Court in Civil Miscellaneous
Writ Petition No. 25487 of 2008.

12. It is further submitted that the petitioners were initially appointed as Peon and Clerk,
respectively, in the institution in question. Learned counsel contends that the provisions of the Uttar
Pradesh Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service
of Ministerial Staff and Group 'D' Employees) Rules, 1984 are not applicable to the appointments
of the petitioners, inasmuch as the said Rules are prospective in nature and came into force
subsequent to the date of their initial appointments.
360 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. It is submitted that the petitioners were initially appointed on 01.07.1980 on the posts of
Peon and Clerk, respectively, in the institution in question. However, it is alleged that the then
Manager, with a view to extend undue benefit to his kith and kin, manipulated and interpolated the
records relating to the appointments of the petitioners after the institution was brought on the grantin-aid list, with the intent to displace the petitioners and accommodate his own nominees in their
place.

14. It is further submitted that the impugned order has been passed in complete disregard of
the inquiry report submitted by respondent no. 3, which has not been duly considered by the
authority while arriving at the impugned decision.

15. It is submitted that the Manager of the institution prepared forged and manipulated records
by altering the designation of the petitioners from Peon and Clerk to that of Assistant Teachers. In
such circumstances, respondent no. 2 ought not to have placed reliance upon such disputed
documents while passing the impugned order, particularly when the authenticity of those records
was itself under serious challenge.

16. It is further submitted that respondent no. 3, after conducting a spot inspection, submitted
an inquiry report categorically recording that the petitioners were in fact working in the institution
in question. However, the said inquiry report, being a material piece of evidence, has not been duly
considered by the authority while passing the impugned order, rendering the same vitiated for nonconsideration of relevant material.

17. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 4, on the other hand, submits that after the
institution was brought on the grant-in-aid list in the year 2006, a managerial return was forwarded
by the Manager of the institution for approval of the list of teachers who were allegedly working in
the institution on the date it was taken on grant-in-aid.

18. It is contended that the said managerial return was subjected to scrutiny by a three-member
District Level Committee comprising the Finance and Accounts Officer, the Basic Shiksha
Adhikari, and the Senior Block Education Officer. Upon due examination, the Committee found
the same to be not in accordance with law and rejected it. Consequently, the said proposal was not
forwarded to the Regional Level Committee for financial approval.

19. It is further submitted that no financial sanction or approval was ever granted by the
competent authority with respect to the said managerial return, and the same stood rejected by the
District Level Committee vide order dated 28.09.2006.

20. Challenging the aforesaid list teachers of the institution, namely Parshu Ram and others,
filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 25487 of 2008 before this Court. The said writ petition
was disposed of vide order dated 23.04.2012, whereby a direction was issued to the competent
authority to examine the claim of the petitioners therein and to take an appropriate decision in
accordance with law.
4 All. Luxmi Shankar Tiwari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
361

21. It is further submitted that in compliance of the aforesaid order, the Director of Basic
Education undertook a detailed scrutiny of the appointments of all such teachers whose names were
included in the managerial return. Upon such examination, it was found that the appointments had
been made dehors the applicable rules and were not in consonance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, the impugned order dated 20.12.2014 came to be passed.

22. In view thereof, it is contended that since the appointments were found to be illegal and
not duly approved, no liability could be fastened upon the State to release salary to such persons
from the State exchequer.

23. A perusal of the records placed on behalf of the Management indicates that the teachers
concerned have submitted separate representations seeking to establish that approval was granted
vide order dated 31.03.1987. However, it is noteworthy that two different documents bearing the
same reference number have been brought on record, each purporting to grant approval, but
containing materially different lists of teachers and ministerial staff.

24. This apparent discrepancy gives rise to serious doubt regarding the genuineness and
authenticity of the documents relied upon, and prima facie suggests interpolation or fabrication at
some stage. In such circumstances, the matter warrants cautious scrutiny, as the possibility of
forgery or manipulation of records by interested parties cannot be ruled out.

25. It is further submitted that pursuant to the directions issued by this Hon'ble Court, a fresh
inquiry was conducted by the Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikari, and a detailed report dated
05.12.2016 has been brought on record. The said report records that upon spot inspection of the
institution, the petitioners were not found to be working on the posts of Clerk and Peon.

26. It is further noted in the report that the attendance register of the institution does not reflect
the presence of the petitioners for the period from July, 2016 to December, 2016, which was also
placed before the inspecting authority. The report further refers to written resignations allegedly
tendered by Parmeshwar Singh on 25.06.1987 and by Lakshmi Shankar Tiwari on 25.05.1987.

27. On the strength of the aforesaid material, it is sought to be contended that the petitioners
were not working in the institution as Clerk and Peon.

28. It was further brought to the notice of the authority that subsequent to the alleged
resignation of the petitioners, fresh appointments had already been made on the said posts.

29. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioners have sought to set
up a case that they were appointed as Peon and Clerk, respectively, on 01.07.1980, at a time when
the institution was unaided. It is contended that the institution was granted temporary recognition
on 04.03.1981, and thereafter, permanent recognition was accorded on 02.09.1985.

30. It is further submitted that petitioner no. 2 claims to have been appointed as Clerk on
01.07.1980, whereas his date of birth is recorded as 08.06.1967. As such, he would have been only
about 13 years of age at the time of the alleged appointment. This glaring inconsistency, according
362 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to the learned counsel, renders the claim set up by petitioner no. 2 inherently improbable and
legally untenable, thereby casting serious doubt on the veracity of his appointment.

31. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the Uttar Pradesh Recognized
Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Ministerial Staff
and Group 'D' Employees) Rules, 1984 prescribe the qualifications and eligibility conditions for
appointment to the post of Clerk. In particular, Rule 6 provides that a candidate seeking recruitment
to any of the posts under the said Rules must have attained the age of 18 years and must not exceed
30 years of age as on the first day of July following the year in which the vacancy is notified.

32. It is further provided that the upper age limit is relaxable by five years in the case of
candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Dependants of Freedom Fighters,
or as may be provided by the State Government from time to time.

33. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh
Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of
Ministerial Staff and Group 'D' Employees) Rules, 1984 prescribes the minimum qualifications for
appointment to the post of Clerk, which require a candidate to have passed the Intermediate
examination or its equivalent, along with a minimum typing speed of 30 words per minute in Hindi.
Insofar as Group 'D' employees are concerned, the minimum qualification prescribed is passing
Class V from an institution recognized by the State of Uttar Pradesh or an equivalent examination.

34. In view of the aforesaid statutory requirements, it is contended that a person aged about 13
years could neither possess the requisite educational qualifications nor satisfy the minimum age
criteria, and therefore, could not have been legally appointed on the post of Clerk or even as a Class
IV employee.

35. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioners cannot be
permitted to rely upon such documents, the authenticity whereof is itself under serious doubt. It is
contended that the mandatory procedure prescribed for recruitment to the posts of Peon and Clerk
has not been followed in the present case. No documentary evidence has been brought on record to
establish issuance of any advertisement, intimation of vacancy to the Basic Shiksha Adhikari,
participation of the nominee of the Basic Shiksha Adhikari in the selection committee, or
compliance of other statutory preconditions as contemplated under the Rules of 1984.

36. In view thereof, it is argued that the records relied upon by the petitioners for claiming
salary from the State exchequer are wholly unreliable and appear to be fabricated, and
consequently, no right can be claimed on the basis of such documents.

37. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioners had earlier
claimed, in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 25487 of 2008, that they had been working in the
institution since the year 1977, as is evident from the pleadings and as noticed in the order dated
23.04.2012 passed by this Court.
4 All. Luxmi Shankar Tiwari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
363

38. However, in the present proceedings, the petitioners have set up an altogether different
case by asserting that their appointments were made on 01.07.1980.

39. It is contended that this inconsistency in the stand taken by the petitioners clearly indicates
that they have sought to improve upon their case by introducing a new version of facts, which,
according to the learned counsel, demonstrates manipulation and undermines the credibility of their
claim.

40. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that after the institution was brought
on the grant-in-aid list, the managerial return was forwarded for financial approval before the
Regional Level Committee. However, the same was rejected, and consequently, no employee of the
institution was held entitled to receive salary from the State exchequer.

41. It is further contended that the petitioners have claimed to have been appointed as Clerk
and Peon in the institution on 01.07.1980 (as asserted), which is wholly contrary to law, inasmuch
as the mandatory procedure prescribed for such appointments was not followed. The alleged
appointments are, therefore, dehors the statutory rules, and no legal right accrues to the petitioners
on the basis thereof. Accordingly, it is submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief as
claimed in the present writ petition.

42. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Committee of
Management that in Writ Petition No. 25487 of 2008, the petitioners themselves have categorically
stated that petitioner no. 2 had joined the institution in the year 1977. In support thereof, a copy of
the appointment schedule was annexed, wherein the date of birth of petitioner no. 2 has been
recorded as 08.06.1967, and the date of initial appointment has been shown as 01.07.1977.
Evidently, on the said date, petitioner no. 2 was merely about 10 years of age.

43. In the present writ petition, however, a different stand has been taken, and the date of
appointment of petitioner no. 2 is now sought to be shown as 01.07.1980. Even if the said date is
accepted, petitioner no. 2 would still be below 18 years of age at the time of alleged appointment.

44. Such inconsistent and contradictory pleadings, coupled with the fact that in both instances
petitioner no. 2 was admittedly a minor and thus ineligible for appointment to any post in the
institution, clearly indicate that the petitioners have misrepresented material facts and have
attempted to mislead this Hon'ble Court as well as the respondent authorities. The conduct of the
petitioners, therefore, prima facie amounts to playing fraud upon the Court.

45. Learned Standing Counsel, Mr. Shailendra Singh, has placed reliance upon the judgment
rendered in Ram Ashish Chaudhary and others vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2003
(1) ESC 170 (All) wherein a Division Bench of this Court has categorically held that any
appointment made in favour of a minor is per se illegal and void in the eyes of law.

46. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Committee of Management, while denying
the averments made in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, submits that no such Tribhasha Anudaan
was ever granted by the State Government to the institution in question on 21.07.2005, and the
364 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
document relied upon by the petitioners is wholly fabricated and has been brought on record with a
fraudulent intent.

47. It is further submitted that a bare perusal of the said document reveals that the date of birth
of petitioner no. 2 has been shown as 08.06.1967, while his date of appointment is indicated as
01.07.1980. Even on the face of it, such an appointment would be impermissible in law, as the
petitioner was admittedly below the legally permissible age for appointment at the relevant time.

48. Moreover, any document pertaining to the alleged selection and appointment of the
petitioners is in clear contravention of the provisions of the applicable Rules of 1984, and therefore
cannot be relied upon for any legal sanctity.

49. Learned counsel for the respondent-Committee of Management has further submitted that
the alleged appointments of the petitioners, even if assumed to have been made, are in clear
violation of the provisions of Rules 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the Rules, 1978, as well as Rules 13, 14, 15
and 16 of the Rules, 1984. Consequently, such appointments are wholly illegal and void ab initio in
the eyes of law.

50. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

51. This Court is constrained to observe that the petitioners have failed to approach the Court
with clean hands. The inconsistency in their pleadings with regard to the date of appointment,
initially asserted to be the year 1977 and subsequently altered to 1980, is not a mere trivial or
inadvertent discrepancy, but one that strikes at the very root of their claim. Such mutually
destructive stands clearly betray a calculated attempt to improve upon the case and to mislead the
Court. It is a well-settled principle of law that a litigant invoking the extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction of this Court is under a solemn obligation to disclose full, true, and correct facts. Any
suppression, concealment, or distortion of material particulars disentitles such a litigant from
seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The conduct of the
petitioners, therefore, renders them undeserving of any indulgence from this Court.

52. Even if the version set up by the petitioners is accepted arguendo, it remains an admitted
and incontrovertible position that petitioner no. 2 was below 18 years of age at the time of the
alleged appointment. An appointment of a minor to a public post is per se illegal, void, and non est
in the eyes of law. Such an appointment lacks legal sanctity from its very inception and is liable to
be treated as nullity.

53. It is a settled principle of law that any appointment of a minor to a post in an institution is
impermissible and void ab initio. The Division Bench judgment in Ram Ashish Chaudhary
(supra) unequivocally affirms this legal position.

54. It is a settled principle that no right, whether equitable or legal, can flow from an act which
is void ab initio. Consequently, any claim founded upon such an inherently illegal appointment is
wholly unsustainable and cannot be countenanced by this Court.
4 All. Luxmi Shankar Tiwari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
365

55. Furthermore, the respondents have rightly contended that the alleged appointments are in
flagrant violation of the statutory provisions governing recruitment, namely, the Rules of 1978 and
the Rules of 1984. The said Rules prescribe a mandatory procedure for selection and appointment,
including issuance of proper advertisement, constitution of a duly constituted selection committee,
and approval by the competent authority. Non-compliance with such mandatory requirements
vitiates the entire selection process and renders the appointments wholly illegal and unsustainable
in the eyes of law.

56. The appointments in question are ex facie in clear violation of the mandatory statutory
provisions governing recruitment. There is nothing on record to demonstrate compliance with the
essential procedural requirements, such as issuance of a proper advertisement inviting applications,
constitution of a duly constituted selection committee, participation of authorized nominees of the
competent authority, or grant of approval by the competent authority.

57. Such fundamental lapses go to the root of the matter and render the entire selection process
vitiated. It is well settled that any appointment made in contravention of statutory rules is illegal,
void, and unenforceable in the eyes of law, and no legal right can be claimed on the basis thereof.

58. A perusal of the record reveals the existence of conflicting documents bearing identical
reference numbers yet containing materially divergent particulars. Such inconsistencies give rise to
grave and legitimate doubts regarding their authenticity and genuineness. The document dated
21.07.2005, heavily relied upon by the petitioners, does not inspire confidence and appears to have
been introduced with the oblique intent of lending an artificial veneer of legitimacy to an otherwise
untenable claim.

59. It is a well-settled principle of law that no claim for salary can be sustained against the
State exchequer unless the appointment in question is lawful and duly approved by the competent
authority. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to establish the legality of their
appointments; no financial sanction or approval was ever accorded, and the managerial return itself
stood rejected by the competent authority. In such circumstances, the claim for payment of salary is
wholly misconceived and legally untenable.

60. The law is unequivocal that no right can accrue from an illegal appointment, and the
Courts cannot be called upon to recognize or legitimize acts which are void ab initio. It is equally
well settled that equitable considerations, howsoever compelling, cannot be permitted to override
or dilute the mandate of statutory provisions.

61. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
petitioners have miserably failed to establish the legality or validity of their alleged appointments.
Their claims are fraught with material inconsistencies and suffer from a clear lack of credibility.
The impugned order, upon careful scrutiny, does not suffer from any illegality, perversity, or
infirmity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

62. Consequently, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief, including the claim for payment
of salary from the State exchequer.
366 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

63. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 366
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ-A No. 5028 of 2012
And
Other Connected Cases

Aanjaney Tripathi & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
(1) Applicability of the principle of natural justice and principles of audi alteram partem before passing the
impugned order of cancellation of selection process.
(2) Validity of the impugned order of cancellation of entire selection process without making segregation
between tainted and non-tainted candidates.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Selection and appointment - Cancellation - Principle of natural justice -
Principles of audi alteram partem - Applicability - Post of Principal and Assistant Teacher in
Sanskrit Schools - Selection process was duly held and Committee of management issued
appointment letter - Petitioners were also started payment of salary - However, after time the
DIOS withheld the salary - No show cause notice was issued, no opportunity of hearing was
given, and no enquiry was conducted - Effect - Joint Director, vide impugned order, cancelled
the entire selection process - Validity challenged: (E-1)
Held: It is a settled principle of law that any order having civil consequences must conform to the principles
of audi alteram partem. The impugned order which has resulted in termination of service and deprivation of
salary, has been passed in flagrant violation of such principles and is therefore vitiated in law - The impugned
order dated 25.06.2012 has been passed by the opposite party no. 2 in a wholly arbitrary, illegal manner
without issuing any notice whatsoever and in complete violation of principles of natural justice. The said order
proceeds to cancel the entire selection process without recording any specific finding of irregularities or
manipulation in the selection of the petitioners/ Assistant Teachers, except with respect to three individuals
namely Sri Brijesh Kumar, Ms. Ragini Rai and Sri Ajay Kumar Yadav without any segregation between tainted
and non-tainted candidates. [Para 48 and 50]
(B) Constitution of India - Article 14 - Right to equality - Cancellation of entire selection
process - Failure to make segregation between tainted and non-tainted candidates - Effect: (E1)
Held: No attempt has been made to segregate tainted candidates from untainted candidates, nor has any
finding has been recorded against the petitioners. It is settled law that innocent candidates cannot be
penalized for alleged irregularities of others. The blanket cancellation is thus arbitrary, disproportionate and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - To treat the innocent and the wrongdoers equally by
subjecting the former to the consequence of the cancellation of the entire process would be contrary to Article
14 because unequals would then be treated equally. [Para 52]