# M/S Durga Travels & Ors v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lko. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 58
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-12
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 1133 of 2025
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-durga-travels-ors-v-debts-recovery-tribunal-lko-ors-53225
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

virtue of Article 300A of the Constitution of
India- was contrary to the mandate of Section
14 of the Act-Writ petition maintainabledirections issued.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

58 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
maintainability of a review application after
dismissal of an appeal, there is no need to
refer to the judgments of other High Courts
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner.

11. In the present case, the
petitioner had filed a Special Appeal, in
which no leave of the Court is required.
The petitioner had invoked the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court and the delay in
filing the Special Appeal had been
condoned by a Division Bench of this
Court, whereafter the appeal became
competent to be decided on its merits. It
was thereafter that the appellant got the
appeal dismissed as withdrawn, without
seeking leave to file a review application.
Thus, the petitioner had invoked the
appellate jurisdiction of the Division Bench
and thereafter he got the Special Appeal
dismissed.

12. The review application filed
after filing and dismissal of the Special
Appeal without granting leave to the
petitioner to file a review application,
cannot be entertained by this Court in view
of the principle incorporated in Order
XLVII Rule 1 (a) C.P.C. and in view of the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd.,
Kunhayammed and Khoday Distilleries
Ltd. (Supra). Entertaining a review
application after the petitioner could not get
success in Special Appeal, would be
subversive to judicial discipline.

13. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, the review application is
dismissed.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 58
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.03.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 1133 of 2025

M/S Durga Travels & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lko. & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ashish Chaturvedi, Manoj Kumar Dwivedi,
Vandana Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Abhishek Khare, Parul Sharma, Shivansh
Shukla

Manner in which the possession has been taken
violates the rights of the petitioners vested by
virtue of Article 300A of the Constitution of
India- was contrary to the mandate of Section
14 of the Act-Writ petition maintainabledirections issued.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs Prakash Kaur & ors.;
(2007) 2 SCC 711

2. CELIR LLP Vs Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt.
Ltd. & ors.; (2024) 2 SCC 1

3. PHR Invent Educational Society Vs UCO Bank
& ors.: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 528

4. United Bank of India Vs Satyawati Tondon:
(2010) 8 SCC 110.

5. NKGSB Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs Subir
Chakravarty & ors.: (2022) 10 SCC 286

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Heard Sri Manoj Kumar Dwivedi
and Sri Ashish Chaturvedi, learned Counsel
for the petitioner as well as Sri Abhishek
3 All. M/S Durga Travels & Ors. Vs. Debt. Recovery Tribunal, Lko. & Ors.
59
Khare, Ms. Parul Sharma, Sri Shivansh
Shukla and Sri Navneet Yadav, learned
Counsel for the respondents.

2. The present petition has been
argued by the petitioners alleging that the
manner in which the possession has been
taken violates the rights of the petitioners,
which are vested by virtue of Article 300A
of the Constitution of India. It was further
alleged that the manner in which the
possession was taken, was contrary to the
mandate
of
Section
14
of
The
Securitisation
And
Reconstruction
Of
Financial Assets And Enforcement Of
Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter
referred to as "the SARFAESI Act") and in
view of violation of the constitutional and
statutory
rights,
the
petitioners
have
approached this Court.

3. The facts as arises from the
present petition are that the petitioner no.1
had taken a loan for purchasing of school
buses sometime in the year 2015 and the
petitioners no.2 to 4 were the guarantors to
the said loan. It was argued that there was a
default in payment of the outstanding
amount as such, the loan was classified as
Non-Performing Asset (NPA) and the Bank
issued a notice on 29.10.2020 under
Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act.
Subsequently, the respondent no.3-Bank,
assigned its rights to the respondent no.2,
which
is
a
Assets
Reconstruction
Company. It also appears from the record
that the notices under Section 13(4) were
also issued and thereafter, an application
was filed under Section 14 of the
SARFAESI Act before the Additional
District Magistrate (ADM), Gautambudh
Nagar for taking possession of the property.

4. The ADM, in terms of the order
dated 21.04.2023 (Annexure-1 to the writ
petition), directed the respondent no.2 for
taking possession of the property in question.
It was also noticed in the said order that in
case, there was any order passed by any court
contrary to the said order, the order shall also
come to an end. It was also directed that the
respondent
no.2
can
take
the
actual
possession of the property in question with
the help of police authorities. The order was
sent to the Additional Commissioner of
Police for taking the effective steps for
implementation of the order. It was also
directed that the Bank and the Police, prior to
taking possession would gave reasonable
notice to the occupiers so that they can shift
their goods elsewhere. The minimum notice
prescribed was 48 hours upto one week in
writing. It was also observed that at the time
of taking possession, independent witnesses
and an Officer appointed by the Police
Commissioner
shall
be
present.
The
petitioners challenged the said order dated
21.04.2023
by
filing
a
Securitisation
Application No.360 of 2023, on which, an
order came to be passed disposing off the
interim relief application holding that in view
of the observations made by the Division
Bench of High Court in Writ-C No.22594 of
2022, the ADM/ CMM (Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate) was directed to issue at least 15
days prior notice before taking physical
possession. The respondents were granted
time to file objection.

5. It also appears from the record
that certain directions were issued by the
DRT for OTS proposal, which according
to
the
petitioners
was
availed
by
depositing an amount of Rs.27/- lac,
however,
nothing
appears
to
have
transpired beyond that. Simultaneously,
on 05.12.2023, a notice was issued for
taking physical possession of the property
in
dispute
on
27.12.2023
by
the
respondent no.2.
60 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
6. It is argued by the Counsel for
the petitioners that no notice as was
directed by the DRT to be given by the
CMM/ADM was ever served upon the
petitioners. It is stated that on 25.02.2025,
the recovery agents of the respondent no.2
came and took the forceful possession of
the property in question. It is argued that no
Government Official of the ADM Office
was present. It is stated that the muscleman
of the respondent no.2 broke open the main
gate and allegations of abuse etc. are also
levelled. In sum and substance, it is argued
that the manner in taking possession is
neither sanctioned by law under Section 14
of the SARFAESI Act nor was it in
consonance with the directions given by the
DRT and thus clearly the rights of the
petitioners under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India stood violated.
Reliance was placed on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs Prakash Kaur and
others; (2007) 2 SCC 711.

7. In the light of the said
submissions, this Court had called for a
report from the police authorities through
the Standing Counsel and from the ADM,
and this Court had appointed a Court
Commissioner in view of the allegations
that even the essentials such as medicines,
books etc. were lying in lock and were not
accessible to the petitioners.

8. In terms of the abovesaid
directions, the Court Commissioner has
submitted his report, the learned Standing
Counsel has forwarded the instructions
received from the police authorities and an
affidavit has also been filed by ADM. A short
counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of
the respondent no.2. On the basis of the short
counter affidavit, it has been argued that the
petitioners as guarantors were liable to pay
the outstanding loan amount. The petitioner
had earlier approached the DRT by filing an
securitisation appeal against the order passed
under Section 14, as such, the present writ
petition is not maintainable in view of the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of CELIR LLP vs Bafna Motors
(Mumbai) Private Limited and others;
(2024) 2 SCC 1 and in the case of PHR
Invent Educational Society vs UCO Bank
and Others: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 528 and
the petitioners should be relegated to avail the
remedy prescribed under the statute.

9. It is further argued by the Counsel
for the respondents that after the order was
passed under Section 14, the respondent no.2
took the physical possession of the property
with the assistance of the police officials as
per the law. It is further argued that the
respondent no.2 is not a 'State' within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of
India and therefore, the writ should not lie
against him. With regard to the OTS, it is
stated that the OTS was not acceptable in the
form it was submitted. He thus argues that the
writ petition filed is liable to be dismissed.
Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
United Bank of India vs Satyawati Tondon:
(2010) 8 SCC 110. The other allegations with
regard to force being used are denied.
Interestingly, the affidavit filed on behalf of
the respondent no.2 has been sworn by one
Yogesh Srivastava, who is in private job
serving as authorized representative of
respondent no.2 and claims that the Board
resolution has been passed in favour of the
deponent which is on record as AnnexureCA-1.

10. The personal affidavit filed by
ADM through the Standing Counsel
indicates that the ADM had passed an order
on 21.04.2023 under Section 14 of the
3 All. M/S Durga Travels & Ors. Vs. Debt. Recovery Tribunal, Lko. & Ors.
61
SARFAESI Act. In terms of the said order,
the Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Gautam Budh Nagar had to execute the
said order after nominating a suitable
police officer to whom a letter was written
on 06.03.2025.

11. After passing of the interim
order by this Court, a report was sought
from the police officer. In terms of the said
report, it was stated that the Advocate of
the respondent no.2-Company had served a
legal notice on petitioner no.1 and after the
notice was served, 5-6 officials of the
respondent-Bank
contacted
the
Police
Station Sector 39 Noida and Sub-Inspector,
Sachin Tomar, Chauki In-charge Sector 41;
Sub-Inspector Yashwant Singh; Lady SubInspector Priya; Constable Sudhir and Lady
Constable Anjali were sent in the presence
of the officials of the company along with
videographer to the immovable property
wherein, the proceedings were conducted.
It is further argued that the property
consists of three stories house, on which,
ground floor was taken in possession but in
view of the request made by the occupant,
in view of the Board Examination of the
child, two days time were granted and the
possession of the first floor was not taken.
The said Officer, who has sworn the
affidavit, also states that he was not present
at the site when the possession was taken. It
is also stated that in view of the Board
Examination, half of the first floor portion
was not taken.

12. The report of the Court
Commissioner has been filed wherein after
a visit, he reported that goods belonging to
the petitioners are lying inside the premises
when the Court Commissioner visited the
premises. At the time of inspection, some
goods were taken by the petitioners for
their use. It is stated that lock with seal of
the respondent no.2 were found on the
locks and some locks were not sealed. It is
stated that in terms of the direction issued,
the necessary medicines and medical
equipments belonging to the father of the
petitioner and some medicines lying on the
first floor were handed over to the
petitioner and some books were handed
over to the children of the petitioners.

13. In the instructions submitted by
the learned Standing Counsel across the
Bar that a letter of the respondent no.2 was
received on 19.05.2024 in the office of the
Additional Commissioner of Police, Nioda
and on the said, the officers as noted were
sent. It was stated that they were also paid,
one day's salary through the respondent
no.2. The factum with regard to the
possession was also disclosed.

14. In the light of the pleadings and
the facts as recorded above, the first issue
to be decided is "whether the writ petition
would lie or not as argued by the Counsel
for the respondent"?

15. In view of the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court that generally with
regard to the steps taken under the
SARFAESI Act by the creditor, a remedy
is prescribed under the SARFAESI Act
also. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of CELIR LLP vs Bafna Motors
(Supra) had noticed the observations made
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of United Bank of India vs Satyawati
Tondon (Supra), wherein, it was observed
that the acts provides for a comprehensive
procedure and also for redressal of the
grievances by the quasi judicial bodies and
the court should insist upon availing the
said remedy. It was also observed that
although
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India, the High Court has
62 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
wide powers for issuance of writs for
enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part-III or for any other purpose,
however, a self restraint should be observed
by the High Court while exercising power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. It was also observed that although
the exhaustion of alternative remedy is a
rule of discretion, the same should be
exercised cautiously. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court also noticed the law with regard to
the alternative remedy in the cases and the
conclusions as under were recorded:

"110. We summarise our final
conclusion as under:

110.1. The High Court was not
justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution more
particularly when the borrowers had
already availed the alternative remedy
available to them under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act.

110.2. The confirmation of sale
by the Bank under Rule 9(2) of the 2002
Rules invests the successful auctionpurchaser with a vested right to obtain a
certificate of sale of the immovable
property in the form given in Appendix V to
the Rules i.e. in accordance with Rule 9(6)
of the Security Interest (Enforcement)
Rules, 2002.

110.3. In accordance with the
unamended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI
Act, the right of the borrower to redeem the
secured asset was available till the sale or
transfer of such secured asset. In other
words, the borrower's right of redemption
did not stand terminated on the date of the
auction-sale of the secured asset itself and
remained alive till the transfer was
completed in the favour of the auctionpurchaser, by registration of the sale
certificate and delivery of possession of the
secured asset. However, the amended
provisions
of
Section
13(8)
of
the
SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right
of the borrower to redeem the secured asset
stands extinguished thereunder on the very
date of publication of the notice for public
auction under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules.
In effect, the right of redemption available
to the borrower under the present statutory
regime is drastically curtailed and would
be available only till the date of publication
of the notice under Rule 9(1) of the 2002
Rules and not till the completion of the sale
or transfer of the secured asset in favour of
the auction-purchaser.

110.4. The Bank after having
confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the
2002 Rules could not have withheld the
sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the 2002
Rules,
and
entered
into
a
private
arrangement with a borrower.

110.5. The High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution could not
have applied equitable considerations to
overreach the outcome contemplated by the
statutory auction process prescribed under
the SARFAESI Act.

110.6. The two decisions of the
Telangana
High
Court
in
Concern
Readymix and Amme Srisailam do not lay
down the correct position of law. In the
same way, the decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Pal Alloys & Metal
India (P) Ltd. Vs Allahabad Bank: 2021
SCC OnLine P&H 2733 also does not lay
down the correct position of law.

110.7. The decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Sri Sai Annadhatha
Polymers vs Canara Bank: 2018 SCC
OnLine Hyd 178 and the decision of the
Telangana High Court in K.V.V. Prasad
Rao Gupta vs SBI 2021 SCC OnLine TS
328 lay down the correct position of law
while interpreting the amended Section
13(8) of the SARFAESI Act"
3 All. M/S Durga Travels & Ors. Vs. Debt. Recovery Tribunal, Lko. & Ors.
63
16. It is also essential to notice at
this stage, the law with regard to the
manner of taking possession as prescribed
under Section 14 came for consideration
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case
of
NKGSB Co-operative
Bank
Limited vs Subir Chakravarty and others:
(2022) 10 SCC 286, in which, the Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
confronted
with
the
question as to whether the physical
possession in terms of the order under
Section 14 can be taken by an Advocate
Commissioner appointed under Section 14
or not. In view of the language contained in
Section 14(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court noticing the
different views taken by the High Courts
held that an advocate has to be regarded as
an
Officer
of
the
Court
and
thus
subordinate to CMM/ DM for the purpose
of Section 14 (1-A) of the SARFAESI Act.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court applied the
test of 'functional subordination' to hold
that an advocate was subordinate to the
CMM/ DM, being an officer of the court.
In the light of the said two judgments, it is
also essential to note the mandate of
Section 14 along with Section 14(1-A) of
the SARFAESI Act, which are as under:

 "14.
Chief
Metropolitan
Magistrate or District Magistrate to assist
secured creditor in taking possession of
secured asset.-

 (1) Where the possession of any
secured assets is required to be taken by
the secured creditor or if any of the secured
assets is required to be sold or transferred
by
the
secured
creditor
under
the
provisions of this Act, the secured creditor
may, for the purpose of taking possession
or control of any such secured assets,
request, in writing, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate or the District Magistrate
within whose jurisdiction any such secured
asset or other documents relating thereto
may be situated or found, to take
possession
thereof,
and
the
Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or, as the case
may be, the District Magistrate shall, on
such request being made to him-

(a) take possession of such asset
and documents relating thereto; and

(b) forward such asset and
documents to the secured creditor:

Provided that any application by
the secured creditor shall be accompanied
by an affidavit duly affirmed by the
authorised officer of the secured creditor,
declaring that-

(i) the aggregate amount of
financial assistance granted and the total
claim of the Bank as on the date of filing
the application;

(ii) the borrower has created
security interest over various properties
and that the Bank or Financial Institution
is holding a valid and subsisting security
interest over such properties and the claim
of the Bank or Financial Institution is
within the limitation period;

(iii) the borrower has created
security interest over various properties
giving the details of properties referred to
in sub-clause (ii)above;

(iv) the borrower has committed
default in repayment of the financial
assistance
granted
aggregating
the
specified amount;

(v) consequent upon such default
in repayment of the financial assistance the
account of the borrower has been classified
as a non-performing asset;

(vi) affirming that the period of
sixty days notice as required by the
provisions of sub-section (2) of section 13,
demanding payment of the defaulted
financial assistance has been served on the
borrower;
64 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(vii)
the
objection
or
representation in reply to the notice
received from the borrower has been
considered by the secured creditor and
reasons
for
non-acceptance
of
such
objection or representation had been
communicated to the borrower;

(viii) the borrower has not made
any repayment of the financial assistance
in spite of the above notice and the
Authorised Officer is, therefore, entitled to
take possession of the secured assets under
the provisions of sub-section (4) of section
13 read with section 14 of the principal
Act;

(ix) that the provisions of this Act
and the rules made thereunder had been
complied with:

Provided further that on receipt
of the affidavit from the Authorised Officer,
the District Magistrate or the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may
be, shall after satisfying the contents of the
affidavit pass suitable orders for the
purpose of taking possession of the secured
assets within a period of thirty days from
the date of application:

Provided also that if no order is
passed
by
the
Chief
Metropolitan
Magistrate or District Magistrate within
the said period of thirty days for reasons
beyond his control, he may, after recording
reasons in writing for the same, pass the
order within such further period but not
exceeding in aggregate sixty days.

Provided
also
that
the
requirement of filing affidavit stated in the
first proviso shall not apply to proceeding
pending before any District Magistrate or
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the
case may be, on the date of commencement
of this Act.

(1A) The District Magistrate or
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate may
authorise any officer subordinate to him,-

(i) to take possession of such
assets and documents relating thereto; and

(ii) to forward such assets and
documents to the secured creditor.

 (2) For the purpose of securing
compliance with the provisions of subsection
(1),
the
Chief
Metropolitan
Magistrate or the District Magistrate may
take or cause to be taken such steps and
use, or cause to be used, such force, as
may, in his opinion, be necessary.
 (3)
No
act
of
the
Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the District
Magistrate or any officer authorised by the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District
Magistrate done in pursuance of this
section shall be called in question in any
court or before any authority."

17. On a plain reading of the
abovesaid two provisions, it is clear that
Section
14
empowers
the
District
Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate to take possession of the
property
concerned.
Section
14(1-A)
further empowers the District Magistrate or
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to
"authorized any Officer subordinate to
him" to take possession of the said assets
and thereafter to forward such assets to the
secured creditor. Thus, in terms of the
mandate of Section 14 (1-A), it is clear that
the District Magistrate or the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate can either take the
possession himself or can authorize any
officer subordinate to him.

18. In the present case, admittedly,
the ADM did not take the possession
himself and delegated the Additional
Commissioner of Police with a further
power to delegate it to a Police Officer for
taking the possession. The question that
arises
"whether
the
Additional
Commissioner of Police is an officer
3 All. M/S Durga Travels & Ors. Vs. Debt. Recovery Tribunal, Lko. & Ors.
65
subordinate to the District Magistrate and
whether, the District Magistrate was within
his power further allow the delegation of
powers by the Additional Commissioner of
Police or not". There is no material on
record by either of the parties to suggest or
argue that the Additional Commissioner of
Police, can be termed as an officer
subordinate to the Additional District
Magistrate,
even
if
the
functional
subordination
test
is
accepted
for
interpreting Section 14(1-A) as held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
NKGSB
Co-operative
Bank
Limited
(Supra).

19.
Admittedly
as
per
the
pleadings, the possession of immovable
property (mortgaged) was taken by an
Officer who was delegated the authority by
the Additional Commissioner of Police and
the officer delegated by him are neither
functionally subordinate to the Additional
District Magistrate nor can be termed as an
officer of the court. In addition, the
petitioners were also deprived of their
possession over movable assets (which
were not hypothecated/ mortgaged).

20.
As,
the
possession
of
immovable and movable assets have been
taken contrary to the mandatory provisions,
I have no hesitation in holding that the
remedy of issuance of a writ court be
available as prima facie, there was a
violation of the rights vested by virtue of
Article 300A of the Constitution of India,
which have been on the face of it not
followed and thus a writ petition would lie.
Thus, this conclusion deals with the
argument
of
the
Counsel
for
the
respondents that a writ would not lie.

21. Another aspect to be observed
in the matter that even the directions of the
ADM in its order dated 21.04.2023 were
not complied, as no notice was ever served
to the guarantors i.e. the petitioners no.2
and 4. The notice admittedly was served
only on the petitioner no.1, thus, the intent
of the order dated 21.04.2023 of giving
prior notice so that the goods can be
removed well in time, was also not
observed. It is also to be noticed that the
directions given by the DRT in its order
dated 12.05.2023 directing the ADM to
issue at least 15 days prior notice before
taking possession have also not observed in
the present case.

22. In view of the infirmities as
noticed above, clearly there is a infraction
of the rights guaranteed under Article 300A
of the Constitution of India, the manner of
taking the possession is not in accordance
with the mandate of Section 14 (1-A) of the
SARFAESI Act and taking of possession of
movable assets was without any authority
of law, thus, I have no hesitation in holding
that the manner in which the possession
was taken, was contrary to law.

23. As regards the submission of
the Counsel for the respondents that a writ
would not lie as it is not a "State" within
the
meaning of
Article
12 of
the
Constitution of India, the said argument
merits rejection for the sole reason that in
the present case, the possession of the
immovable and the movable assets have
been taken by the Government Authorities
and thus a writ would lie.

24. Needless to emphasize that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs Prakash Kaur (Supra)
has emphasized that any violation of the
supremacy of rule of law has to be
deprecated, the procedure prescribed under
law should be scrupulously followed which
66 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
has not been done in the present case. Thus,
the present writ petition deserves to be
allowed and is accordingly allowed.

25. However, the respondent no.2
would be at liberty to take possession in
accordance with law strictly in terms of the
mandate of Section 14 (1-A) of the
SARFAESI Act. The ADM shall ensure
that the possession should be taken strictly
in terms of the mandate of Section 14 (1-A)
of the SARFAESI Act.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 66
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 1667 of 2025

Kanti Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Gyanendra Pathak, Abhishek Srivastav,
Adarsh Kumar Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950Artcle 227 - The Uttar Pradesh Land
Revenue Code, 2006-Sections 80 & 82-The
impugned order in utter mechanic manner as
also without application of mind and without
taking note of the specific provisions related to
the issue involved before it--- The application
preferred under Section 80 of the Code can be
allowed or rejected after taking note of the
conditions indicated in the statutory provisions
including the conditions indicated under SubSection (4), (7) and (8) of Section 80 of Code
and the permission so granted can be cancelled
only in terms of Section 82 of the Code and all
these aspects ought to have been taken note of
by the opposite party no.2 who failed to take
note
of
the
same-Impugned
order
set
aside/quashed. (Para 6-8)

Petition allowed. (E-15)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey,
learned State Counsel and perused the
material available on record.

2. By means of the present petition,
the petitioner has assailed the order dated
23.07.2024
passed
by
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate- Bahraich to the extent of
condition(s)
imposed
therein
while
exercising power under Section 80 of U.P.
Land Revenue Code, 2006 (in short 'Code')
in the case registered as Computerized
Case No.T802024028697, instituted by the
petitioner- Kanti Devi.

The operative portion of the order
dated 23.07.2024 reads as under.

 "अतः तहसीलदार सदर बहराइच की जाांच आख्या
ददनाांदकत 09-07-2024 तथा पत्रावदलत अदिलेखों के
परीक्षणोपरान्त ग्राम अमीनपुरनगरौर परगना तहसील व दजला बहराइच
खाता सांख्या 146 गाटा सांख्या 145 रक्बा 0.532हे० में से
0.266हे० िूदम में आवेददका कान्ती देवी पुत्री जुग्गी लाल पत्नी
दवद्याराम दनवासी खुटेहना हाल पता नगरौर परगना तहसील व जनपद
बहराइच का नाम सांयुक्त रूप से सक्रमणीय िूदमधर दजज है, की िूदम को
उ० प्र० राजस्व सांदहता 2006 की धारा 80(2) अस्सी (दो) के
अन्तगजत गैर-कृदिक घोदित दकया जाता है। यह आदेश दकसी प्रकार के
मुआवजा धनरादश दनधाजरण / अन्तरण के दलए प्रिावी नहीं होगा। तथ्यों
को दिपाकर यदद आदेश प्राप्त दकया जाता है तो स्वतः शून्य होगा।
आदेश की एक प्रदत तहसीलदार सदर बहराइच को आवश्यक कायजवाही
हेतु िेजी जाये। बाद आवश्यक कायजवाही पत्रावली सांग्रहीत हो।"

3.
The
underline
portion
of
operative
portion
of
order
dated