# M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd v. Paradigm Enterprises & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 428
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-21
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 3886 of 2024
- **Bench:** Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-genebio-healthcare-pvt-ltd-v-paradigm-enterprises-ors-54041
- **Pages:** 28

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428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 1 ILRA 428
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 21.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 3886 of 2024

M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
Paradigm Enterprises & Ors . ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Commercial Court while passing the order impugned has completely misdirected itself in rejecting
the preliminary objections regarding limitation as the award passed by the Facilitation Council on 27.09.2023
and the said award was challenged by filing a petition before the Commercial Court under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996 on 16.01.2024 (beyond the period of three months) without any application seeking condonation
of delay

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996-Section 19,
34 & 36; The Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5 & 14- The contesting respondent had made no
prayer for condonation of delay nor any separate application for seeking condonation of delay
was moved moreover, there was no pleadings for seeking benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act nor there was any pleadings to show as to how the contesting respondent was entitled to get
the benefit of condonation of delay or Section 14 of the Limitation Act and yet the Commercial
Court rejected the objection on limitation as not maintainable which is patently perverse and it
suffers from the vice of being non reasoned and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction and the said
order is liable to be set aside.
Held- Petition No.3886 of 2024, M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. through Director Arun Kumar Srivastava v.
Paradigm Enterprises through Director Ritika Pandey and others is partly allowed, whereas Petition No.5145 of
2024, Paradigm Enterprises v. Micro, Small and others shall stand dismissed. (Para 70, 71 & 90) (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Chintal (India) Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd; (2021) 4 SCC 602; Rakesh Kumar Jain v. Zulfkar Ali; 2023
SCC OnLine All 2821; Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals v. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd.; AIR 2007 Ori 179; State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Karunesh Kumar and others; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1705; Bhaven Construction v. Sardar
Sarover Narmada Nigam Ltd.; (2022) 1 SCC 75; Shri Digant v. M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. and others; 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 2524; Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.; (2001) 8 SCC 470; Simplex Infrastructure v.
Union of India; (2019) 2 SCC 455; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation
Department and others; (2008) 7 SCC 169; Shesh Nath Singh and another v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli
Cooperative Bank Ltd. and another; (2021) 7 SCC 313; Tirupati Steel v. Subh Industrial Component and other;
(2022) 7 SCC 429; India Glycols Ltd. v. MSEFC, Telangana; (2025) 5 SCC 780; Lifestyle Equities C.V. v.
Amazon Technologies, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2153

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996; The Limitation Act, 1963

List of Keywords
1 All. M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Paradigm Enterprises & Ors.
429
Section 5 Limitation Act; Section 14 Limitation Act; No prayer for condonation of delay; Nor there was any
pleadings; How respondent was entitled to get the benefit of condonation of delay; Section 34 & 36;
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996

Case Arising From
Orders dated 17.01.2024 and order dated 20.06.2024 passed by the Commercial Court No.2, Lucknow in
Arbitration Case No.3 of 2024 whereby the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner have been turned
down

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioners(s): Pritish Kumar, Amal Rastogi
Counsel for Respondent(s): Sarvesh Kumar Dubey, A.S.G.I., Ankit Kumar Pandey, Raj Kumar Singh

(Delivered by Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh, J.)

Introduction

1. An award dated 27.09.2023 passed by the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises,
Facilitation Council, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the Facilitation Council) is in the legal
vortex between the petitioner and the private respondent no.1. Both contesting parties are at logger
heads. The present petitioner is at pains to get the said award executed whereas the private
respondent no.1 is leaving no stone unturned in challenging the said award on all possible grounds.

2. In the aforesaid context, the petitioner filed petition No.3886 of 2024 assailing the orders
dated 17.01.2024 and order dated 20.06.2024 passed by the Commercial Court No.2, Lucknow in
Arbitration Case No.3 of 2024 whereby the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner have
been turned down.

3. After the preliminary objections were turned down, the petitioner moved an application for
releasing the amount deposited by the respondent no.1 which has been allowed vide order dated
27.09.2024 passed by the Commercial Court No.2, Lucknow in the aforesaid Arbitration Case No.3
of 2024 and being aggrieved, the private respondent no.1 herein, filed an independent petition
assailing the said order by means of the connected Petition No.5145 of 2024.

4. Since the issue involved in these two petitions are between the same parties and
interconnected, hence both the petitions are being decided by this common judgment.

5. For convenience, M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. hereinafter, will be referred to as the
"petitioner" whereas Paradigm Enterprises (who is the petitioner of the connected petition) will be
referred to as the "contesting respondent".

Factual Matrix

6. Before proceedings further, it will be appropriate to notice the facts giving rise to the instant
petition. The contesting respondent no.1 acting as an authorized distributor of the petitioner
company had made a bid on GEM Portal and was successful in getting an order to supply 20 lakh
Novel Coronavirus Sample Collection Kit. The aforesaid order was placed with the petitioner and it
430 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
was supplied directly to the U.P. Medical Supplies Corporation. Though the contesting respondent
received the entire payment of Rs.1,27,12,739/- but it was not paid to the petitioner. In this factual
background, the petitioner made a reference under section 18 of the Micro Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2006) before the
Facilitation Council who after hearing the parties made its award on 27.09.2023.

7. The contesting respondent assailed the said award dated 27.09.2023 by filing a writ petition
before a Division Bench of this Court bearing Writ-C No.8511 of 2023 which came to be dismissed
vide order dated 17.10.2023, leaving it open for the contesting respondent to assail the said award
in terms of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act of 1996) before the appropriate court.

8. The contesting respondent then on 16.01.2024 filed a petition before the Commercial Court
Lucknow under section 34 of the Act of 1996 which was registered as Arbitration Case No.3 of
2024.

9. The said case was registered on 17.01.2024 and notices were issued to the petitioner (who
was the respondent in the petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996). The petitioner after having
put in appearance before the Commercial Lucknow filed his preliminary objections regarding
maintainability of the petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 primarily on two grounds: (i)
that the contesting respondent had not deposited 75% of the awarded amount in terms of Section 19
of the Act of 2006, hence the petition under section 34 could not be entertained; (ii) that the petition
under section 34 of the Act of 1996 itself was barred by limitation and in absence of any
application seeking condonation of delay, the petition could not have been registered as a regular
petition, hence the petition under section 34 was liable to be dismissed on the aforesaid grounds.

10. In the interregnum, the petitioner had pressed for the recovery of the awarded sum and in
furtherance thereof, a recovery notice had been issued to the State Authorities for recovery. The
contesting respondent assailed the said recovery by filing another writ petition before a Division
Bench of this Court bearing Writ-C No.3594 of 2024.

11. After hearing the parties the said writ petition was disposed of on 19.04.2024, noticing the
contention of the contesting respondent that he was ready to deposit 75% of the awarded sum
before the Commercial Court, with observation that the sum would be deposited within a week and
in case if the said amount was deposited, then the Commercial Court would admit the petition as
per the settled law and the district administration may not pursue the recovery proceedings. Later,
by means of order dated 01.05.2024 the period of one week as granted in the order dated
19.04.2024 was extended by further three days.

12. Armed with the order of the Division Bench dated 19.04.2024 the contesting respondent
filed an application depositing 75% of the award passed under the Act of 2006 and also raised
objections to the preliminary objections filed by the petitioner before the Commercial Court.
Another application was filed seeking stay on the recovery proceedings.
1 All. M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Paradigm Enterprises & Ors.
431

13. The Commercial Court No.2, Lucknow after hearing the parties turned down the
preliminary objections raised by the petitioner by means of order dated 20.06.2024 which is the
subject matter of challenge in Petition No.3886 of 2024.

14. The petitioner had moved an application for release of the amount deposited by the
contesting respondent which was allowed by the Commercial Court initially on 19.07.2024. This
order dated 19.07.2024 was challenged by the contesting respondent by filing a petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India bearing No.3611 of 2024. A Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court by means of judgment and order dated 02.08.2024 allowed the petition setting aside the order
dated 19.07.2024 with a direction to the Commercial Court to consider the application filed by the
contesting respondent for stay of the award, alongwith the application for release of the amount and
decide the same expeditiously, by a reasoned order.

15. In furtherance of the order dated 12.08.2024 passed in Writ Petition No.3611 of 2024 the
matter was reconsidered by the Commercial Court who vide its order dated 27.09.2024 allowed the
application for release of the deposited sum subject to the condition that the petitioner would
furnish an indemnity indicating that in case if any adverse order was passed in the petition under
section 34 of the Act of 1996, then the petitioner would refund the aforesaid amount released
alongwith 6% interest per annum, to the Court.

16. In so far as the application for stay of the recovery proceedings is concerned, the said
application was also disposed of, directing the contesting respondent to furnish a security to the
extent of remaining 25% of the awarded sum within a period of three weeks and subject to the
aforesaid the recovery proceedings were stayed.

17. The contesting respondent being aggrieved against the said order dated 27.09.2024
assailed the same in the connected Petition No.5145 of 2024 and prayed that the order directing the
contesting respondent to furnish a security towards 25% of the awarded sum be set aside as well as
another part of the same order be also set aside whereby the amount has been released in favour of
the petitioner and the amount so released may be directed to be refunded.

18. The record further indicates that by means of order dated 05.11.2024 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Writ Petition No.5145 of 2024 it was directed that the said petition be connected
alongwith Petition No.3886 of 2024. The record further indicates that both the petition were heard
by a Co-ordinate Bench and judgment was reserved on 12.11.2024. However, the Co-ordinate
Bench while dictating the judgment found that certain clarifications were required and the matter
was directed to be listed for rehearing. The Co-ordinate Bench on 19.03.2025 had directed the
petitioner to file a copy of an affidavit indicating specifically the date on which the said application
had been filed. In the meantime, the matter was placed before this Court. This Court had called for
a report from the Registrar (Listing) which was placed before the Court on 27.10.2025 indicating
that the matter was now cognizable by this Court. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that this Court
being seized of the aforesaid two petitions, heard the learned counsel for the parties, finally.

Submissions on behalf of the parties
432 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

19. Shri Pritish Kumar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Amal Rastogi for the
petitioner while assailing the order dated 20.06.2024 (which is under challenge in Petition No.3886
of 2024) has submitted that the Commercial Court No.2 while passing the order impugned has
completely misdirected itself in rejecting the preliminary objections regarding limitation. It was
urged that apparently the award passed by the Facilitation Council was dated 27.09.2023. The said
award was challenged by filing a petition before the Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act
of 1996 on 16.01.2024 and the limitation for filing a petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is
provided in Section 34 (3) itself.

20. It was submitted that an award under Section 36 of the Act of 1996 could be challenged
within a period of three months and only 30 days period thereafter was the period for which the
delay could be condoned. Since the award was dated 27.09.2023 and the same was received by the
contesting respondent on 06.10.2023, hence the Petition under Section 34 ought to have been filed
within three months i.e. latest by 06.01.2024. Admittedly, the Petition was filed on 16.01.2024,
however, there was no application filed by the contesting respondent seeking condonation of delay.

21. In absence of any application seeking condonation of delay, it was not open for the
Commercial Court to have treated the Petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, within time.
Moreover, in absence of any application seeking condonation of delay, the Court was not vested
with jurisdiction to ignore or condone the delay. Filing an application seeking condonation of delay
is mandatory and in absence of the application the Petition under Section 34 itself was defective. In
the aforesaid circumstances, the Court did not consider the matter in the correct perspective and the
finding recorded by the Court that the application was within time, is a perverse finding which
cannot be sustained. In support of his submission, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the
decision of the Apex Court in Chintal (India) Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd; (2021) 4 SCC
602.

22. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the issue of limitation goes
to the roots of the matter. As soon as the petitioner received the notice of the Petition under Section
34 of the Act 1996 and put in appearance before the Court, preliminary objections were raised at
the first instance. It was urged that there is no dispute between the parties in so far as the fact that
the Petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was filed by the contesting respondent beyond the
period of three months. It is also not in dispute that the Petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
was not accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay.

23. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner emphasized that the first order passed by the
Commercial Court dated 17.01.2024 (which is under challenge in the Petition No.3886 of 2024) by
which it registered the petition itself was bad. Attention of the Court was drawn to the order dated
17.01.2024 to state that as per the Munsarim report the Petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
was appropriately stamped with court fee and it was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.
It also noticed that the petition was time barred but in view of the order passed by the High Court,
which has been brought on record (of the petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996) as
Annexure-7 with the petition, it was not time barred. Considering the said report the case was
registered and notices were issued to the petitioner.
1 All. M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Paradigm Enterprises & Ors.
433

24. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that this reference to the order passed by the
High Court and that the Petition was within time, is a complete misreading of the order of the High
Court since the High Court did not condone the delay nor directed that the Petition to be treated
within time, hence the basic registration of the case as a regular Petition, treating it to be within
time, itself was bad.

25. Learned Senior Counsel has further urged that this fact came to the notice of the petitioner
only when the summons from the Commercial Court was served on the petitioner and immediately,
the preliminary objections were raised. The petitioner had raised a two fold objections: (i) related to
the non compliance of Section 19 of the Act of 2006 which mandates deposit of 75% amount of the
arbitral award. Since the Petition under Section 34 did not accompany the said pre-deposit, hence
the petition could not be entertained; (ii) The petition under Section 34 of the Act was barred by
limitation:

26. It is urged, that as far as the objections regarding non deposit of 75% of the awarded sum
is concerned, the same may not have much bearing now as the same was made good by the
contesting respondent in light of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ-C
No.3594 of 2024. However, the issue of limitation still survived for the reason that despite bringing
it to the notice of the Court, in writing yet the contesting respondent did not file any application
seeking condonation of delay. Even in the Petition filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, there
was no prayer nor any averments were made to seek condonation of delay.

27. Significantly, while the petitioner had filed his preliminary objections in writing which
was responded by the contesting respondent yet he did not make any application for seeking
condonation of delay. In such circumstances where there was no application seeking condonation
of delay despite notice to the contesting respondent who had the opportunity to avail but did not.
Hence, in light of the clear mandate propounded by the Apex Court in Chintal India (supra) the
Petition was beyond time and therefore neither the delay could have been condoned nor the petition
itself could have been registered as a regular Petition.

28. It was submitted that the Court without giving any cogent reason, in a mechanical manner,
has turned down the preliminary objection holding that they were not maintainable and this was
apparently erroneous as the order suffers from non application of judicial mind apart from the fact
that it is arbitrary and against the settled principle of law, hence it deserves to be set aside and as a
consequence, the Petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 filed by the contesting respondent
deserves to be dismissed as time barred.

29. Per contra, Shri Sarvesh Dubey, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has
submitted that the issue of limitation as sought to be projected by the learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioner is not correct. It is urged that the contesting respondent had assailed the award dated
27.09.2023 by filing writ petition before a Division Bench of this Court bearing Writ-C No.8511 of
2023. The said petition was disposed of on 17.10.2023 by permitting the contesting respondent to
avail the alternate remedy to file objection under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the
appropriate Court. On 16.10.2023 the contesting respondent had already filed the petition before
the Commercial Court which was taken up on 17.10.2023 and noticing the order passed by the
434 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Division Bench, the Petition was treated to be within time and in such circumstances the issue of
delay did not arise at all. It is for the aforesaid reason that the Commercial Court has rightly
rejected the preliminary objection relating to limitation as not maintainable since, the Petition itself
was rightly filed within the time prescribed as per law.

30. Shri Dubey, has further pointed out that the contesting respondent had also filed his
objections to the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner wherein it was clearly stated that
the petition was filed on 16.01.2024 and considering the facts and circumstances the delay was
condoned. The Petition was admitted and in any case the contesting respondent was entitled to the
benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, if required, hence the contention of the petitioner that
the petition was time barred was not correct.

31. Shri Dubey has further urged that there is another aspect of the matter which requires
consideration and i.e. the issue of approbate and reprobate. It is submitted that the petitioner had
put in appearance in the Petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and had also raised a
contention that the Petition was not maintainable for want of predeposit of 75% of the awarded sum
in terms of Section 19 of the Act of 2006. The contesting respondent had deposited 75% of the
award and it was also got released by the petitioner in the proceedings pending before the
Commercial Court. Once the Petition itself (if not maintainable for being time barred) then the
petitioner could not have insisted for deposit of 75% of the amount. Now having contested the
proceedings and having insisted for making the pre deposit and having participated in the
proceedings to get the amount released, is all indicative of the fact that the petitioner by its own
conduct had given up the plea of limitation. Moreover, by conduct the petitioner could not
approbate and reprobate, hence the Commercial Court rightly rejected the preliminary objection
and the petitioner is also not entitled to raise the issue of limitation before this Court, as it is
misconceived and deserves to be dismissed.

32. Shri Dubey, in support of his submission has relied upon the decision of a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Jain v. Zulfkar Ali; 2023 SCC OnLine All 2821. He has
also relied upon a decision of the Orissa High Court in Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals v. Orissa
Mining Corporation Ltd.; AIR 2007 Ori 179 and he has further relied upon the decision of the
Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Karunesh Kumar and others; 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1705.

Writ Petition No.5145 of 2024

33. Shri Dubey while pressing the Petition bearing No.5145 of 2024 has urged that the order
releasing the amount in favour of the petitioner is against the mandate of Section 19 of the Act of
2006. No reasons have been recorded despite the fact that on an earlier occasion a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.3611 of 2024 had directed the Commercial Court to pass a
reasoned order.

34. It was further urged that the Commercial Court did not record any reason as to what were
the circumstances which prevailed and persuaded the Commercial Court to pass an order releasing
the entire sum of 75% of deposited amount. There was no justification for the Commercial Court to
1 All. M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Paradigm Enterprises & Ors.
435
have directed the contesting respondent to furnish a security for the remaining 25% of the award
and subject to it the recovery proceedings were to be stayed, and the said direction was apparently
bad in the eyes of law.

35. It was also urged that even the High Court had noticed that the award was not valid and he
relied upon para-17 of the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 19.04.2024 passed in
Writ Petition-C No.3594 of 2024 hence there was no reason to release any amount or require the
contesting respondent to furnish a security.

36. Shri Dubey further submitted that in case if this Court found that the Petition under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was barred by limitation then this Court would necessarily pass an
appropriate direction directing the petitioner to return the amount received by him as the petitioner
cannot be permitted to retain the benefits of an order and yet challenge the same. In such
circumstances, it was urged that the petition filed by the petitioner bearing No.3886 of 2024 was
liable to be dismissed and the Petition No.5141 of 2024 deserved to be allowed.

37. Responding to the submissions of Shri Dubey in so far as the Petition No.5451 of 2024 is
concerned, Shri Pritish Kumar, learned Senior Counsel urged that the Act of 2006 is a special
enactment which clearly indicates in Section 19 that making a pre deposit was mandatory. Once the
amount was deposited, the Court was justified in releasing the same. In order to protect the rights of
the parties, the Court had already put the petitioner on terms, to file an indemnity to the extent that
in case if an order was passed adverse to the petitioner, in the petition under Section 34 of the Act
of 1996, then the petitioner would refund the said released amount alongwith 6% interest per
annum to the Court.

38. Learned Senior Counsel has further urged that it is now to well settled that a money decree
is not stayed. In the given circumstances where the Act of 2006 provides for recovery through the
State Authorities and it was resorted to then in order to get stay the proceedings, the contesting
respondent deposited the amount on his own. The intention of the contesting respondent to deposit
the said sum was also noticed by the Division Bench in its order dated 19.04.2024 passed in Writ-C
No.3594 of 2024. The said amount was for the benefit of the petitioner. The petitioner has already
submitted the indemnity as required by the Commercial Court and in such circumstances the order
dated 27.09.2024 releasing the sum in favour of the petitioner and requiring the contesting
respondent to furnish a security for the remaining 25% cannot be said to be bad rather its only in
consonance with law, which requires no interference.

39. It was further urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that even the pre
deposit of 75% which has been made is only 75% of the amount as indicated in the award dated
27.09.2023 rather as per the Act of 2006 the pre deposit of 75% is to be computed on the total
decreetal amount, computed alongwith updated interest, till the date when the petition under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was made. This compliance in the instant case was insufficient and in
any case the Commercial Court has granted indulgence to the contesting respondent by accepting
insufficient amount as compliance, which is not as per law and in the given circumstances, the
Petition filed by the contesting respondent deserves to be dismissed.
436 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Discussion and Analysis

40. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and also perused the
material on record.

41. At the outset, it will be appropriate to notice Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act of 1996 vis-a-vis the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article
226/227 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in Bhaven
Construction v. Sardar Sarover Narmada Nigam Ltd.; (2022) 1 SCC 75 gives guidance and the
relevant observations of the Apex Court is as under:-

"18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework, mandates that a legislative
enactment cannot curtail a constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. COAI [Nivedita Sharma v.
COAI, (2011) 14 SCC 337 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947] , this Court referred to several judgments and
held : (SCC p. 343, para 11)

"11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any
dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of
the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary
legislation - L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3
SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] . However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power
vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition
against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any
public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different
thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be
entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has
an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by
law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation."

(emphasis supplied)

It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to allow judicial interference beyond
the procedure established under the enactment. This power needs to be exercised in exceptional
rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under the statute or a clear "bad faith" shown by one of
the parties. This high standard set by this Court is in terms of the legislative intention to make the
arbitration fair and efficient.

19. In this context we may observe Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC [Deep Industries Ltd. v.
ONGC, (2020) 15 SCC 706] , wherein interplay of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act and Article 227
of the Constitution was analysed as under : (SCC p. 714, paras 16-17)

"16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause contained in Section 5 which states
that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the
Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section
37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others.
1 All. M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Paradigm Enterprises & Ors.
437
Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second
appeal being filed [see Section 37(2) of the Act].

17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the
entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the
same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched
by the non obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note
is that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing
first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in
interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us hereinabove
so that interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent
jurisdiction."

(emphasis supplied)

20. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to show exceptional circumstance
or "bad faith" on the part of the appellant, to invoke the remedy under Article 227 of the
Constitution. No doubt the ambit of Article 227 is broad and pervasive, however, the High Court
should not have used its inherent power to interject the arbitral process at this stage. It is brought
to our notice that subsequent to the impugned order of the sole arbitrator, a final award was
rendered by him on merits, which is challenged by Respondent 1 in a separate Section 34
application, which is pending.

21. Viewed from a different perspective, the arbitral process is strictly conditioned upon
time limitation and modelled on the "principle of unbreakability". This Court in P. Radha Bai v. P.
Ashok Kumar [P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 773] ,
observed : (SCC p. 459, paras 36-37)

36.3. Third, Section 34(3) reflects the principle of unbreakability. Dr Peter Binder in
International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in Uncitral Model Law Jurisdictions, 2nd
Edn., observed:

"An application for setting aside an award can only be made during the three months
following the date on which the party making the application has received the award. Only if a
party has made a request for correction or interpretation of the award under Article 33 does the
time-limit of three months begin after the tribunal has disposed of the request. This exception from
the three month time-limit was subject to criticism in the working group due to fears that it could
be used as a delaying tactics. However, although "an unbreakable time-limit for applications for
setting aside" was sought as being desirable for the sake of "certainty and expediency" the
prevailing view was that the words ought to be retained "since they presented the reasonable
consequence
of
Article
33."
According to this "unbreakability" of time-limit and true to the "certainty and expediency" of the
arbitral awards, any grounds for setting aside the award that emerge after the three month timelimit has expired cannot be raised.

37. Extending Section 17 of the Limitation Act would go contrary to the principle of
"unbreakability" enshrined under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act."

(emphasis in original)
438 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

If the courts are allowed to interfere with the arbitral process beyond the ambit of the
enactment, then the efficiency of the process will be diminished."

42. In a recent decision, the Apex Court in Shri Digant v. M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. and
others; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2524 considering the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India in context with order arising out of the District Courts the Apex Court has
noticed as under:-

"22. The scope of High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 fell for consideration
before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath1 This Court held that
judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226, though
they may be questioned in the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution. The power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate
cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning
grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a
jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such
failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised
in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.

23. In the case on hand, the appellate court had considered in detail the issue as to
whether the trial court was justified in proceeding with the case, without further notice to the
defendants, after submission of pursis (Exh.42) by defendants' counsel, claiming no instructions.
After a threadbare analysis and taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances, the
appellate court held that the trial court committed no wrong in proceeding with the matter. The
appellate court noticed that the advocate representing the defendants had claimed no instructions
but not sought withdrawal of his Vakalatnama and the matter thereafter remained pending for over
three months till it was decided in March 2015. In between no effort was made by the defendants to
engage another lawyer. Moreover, the defendants did not come up with a case that their lawyer's
notice was not served on them therefore, they could not engage another counsel. Besides that, the
record also indicated that the intention of the defendants was to delay the proceedings because
earlier also the suit had proceeded ex parte against them though, later, those orders were recalled.
Therefore, in our view, once the appellate court took into consideration all relevant aspects
including the fact that pursis (Exh.42) did not seek withdrawal of the Vakalatnama, and withdrawal
was not even permitted, there was no such jurisdictional error which warranted exercise of powers
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court without any justification went on to
consider the procedure prescribed for withdrawal of Vakalatnama when neither withdrawal of
Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal. In such
circumstances, the entire exercise of the High Court was misconceived. More so, when the view
taken by the appellate court that defendant cannot take advantage of his own wrong was a
plausible view based on materials available on record. Hence, in our view, appellate court's order
was not amenable to interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution in interfering with a well reasoned order of the appellate court."
1 All. M/s Genebio Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Paradigm Enterprises & Ors.
439

43. Keeping the aforesaid parameters in mind, this Court proceeds to examine the contention
of the respective parties. The issue of limitation definitely goes to the roots of the jurisdiction of the
Court to entertain a matter, in the first place. It is now to well settled that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 (see Union
of India v. Popular Construction Co.; (2001) 8 SCC 470 which was followed by the Apex Court
in Simplex Infrastructure v. Union of India; (2019) 2 SCC 455 wherein in para 11 it was noticed
as under:-

"11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the extension of the prescribed
period for any appeal or application subject to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant or
applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the
prescribed period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application to an application
challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. This has been settled by this Court
in its decision in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company [Union of India v. Popular
Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470] , wherein it held as follows : (SCC pp. 474-75, paras
12 &14)

"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words
are "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and
would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further.
To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended
period under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle
of interpretation would justify such a result.

***

14.