# M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd v. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 2528
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-17
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. 4 of 2024
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-geo-miller-co-pvt-ltd-v-u-p-jal-nigam-ors-52091
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

A. Arbitration Law - Extension of mandate
of the arbitrator - When a bench of
coequal strength is faced with conflicting
judgments of other coequal benches, the
judgment delivered earlier will continue to
govern the field of law, till such time, the
same is overturned or in case the
question(s) of law, if referred to the larger
bench is answered. This will also hold true
when a lower court is faced with
conflicting judgments of a higher court, or
a
coordinate
bench
is
faced
with
conflicting judgments of a division bench.
(Para 24)

Precedents are not mere legal doctrines; they
are the embodiment of centuries of legal wisdom
and collective judicial experience. When courts
deviate from established precedents without
due consideration, they risk undermining the
credibility and legitimacy of the legal system.
Therefore, it is imperative for courts to uphold
the sanctity of legal precedents and adhere to
established principles of judicial discipline, even
in the face of conflicting opinions or pressures to
depart from precedent. (Para 22)

B. The judgments in Lucknow Agencies
(infra) and Indian Farmers Fertilizers
(infra) having been delivered under
different factual scenarios will continue to
govern the field of law as far as Section
29A of the Act is concerned before this
Court. All applications filed u/s 29A of the Act
till such time as the Larger Bench, reference to
which was made vide this Court's order dated
February 26, 2024, returns its decision on the
5 All. M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors.
2529
questions of law, will have to be decided in
accordance with the law laid down in Lucknow
Agencies and Indian Farmers Fertilizers. The
judgment in A'Xykno Capital Services (infra)
having been delivered after the aforesaid
judgments, will not hold any precedential value.
Needless to say, this position will be subject to
the decision of the Larger Bench. (Para 33)

The doctrine of per incuriam is based on the latin
phrase meaning "thorough lack of care". It
allows the courts to depart from established
precedent when a previous decision was made
without
proper
consideration
of
relevant
statutes, regulations, or binding authorities.
However, the doctrine of per incuriam must
be exercised with caution to ensure that it
is not used as a pretext for disregarding
inconvenient precedent. The principle
should only be invoked in exceptional
cases where the error is clear and
unequivocal, and where adherence to the
precedent
would
result
in
a
grave
injustice. Per incuriam should be used
sparingly and only in exceptional cases.
(Para 32)

C. It has been held in Indian Farmers
Fertilizers (infra) that where an arbitrator
has been appointed u/s 11 of the Act, an
application for extension of the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal u/s 29A of the Act
will lie before the court which appointed
the arbitrator. (Para 27)

In light of the aforesaid, since the appointment
of the arbitrator in ARBT NOS. 4 and 5 of 2024
was made by this Court in exercise of its powers
u/s 11 of the Act, the instant applications filed
u/s 29A(4) and S. 29(A(5) of the Act are
maintainable before this Court. (Para 34)

ARBT NO.4 of 2024 is allowed and the mandate
of the arbitrator is extended for a period of 8
months from the date of this judgment. ARBT
NO. 5 of 2024 is also allowed and the mandate
of the arbitrator is extended for a period of 8
months from the date of this judgment. (Para
35, 36)

Applications allowed. (E-4)

Precedent discussed:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,916 of 55,361. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39916 for what follows._

2528 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petition which was instituted by the
appellant was not maintainable."

 (emphasis supplied)

10. Thus, in view of law laid down
by Supreme Court in M/s India Clycols
Limited (supra), we are of considered
opinion that the instant petition, without
making
pre-deposit
as
per
statutory
provision, would not be maintainable. We
hold so being fully aware of the legal
position that in case of breach of principles
of natural justice, alternative remedy is not
an absolute bar. We would have entertained
the writ petition without relegating the
petitioners to the alternative remedy under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996, had the
petitioners agreed to deposit 75% of the
amount in terms of impugned award in this
Court. As counsel for the petitioners is not
agreeable to comply with the said
condition, therefore, we decline to examine
the challenge and uphold the preliminary
objection of learned counsel for respondent
no. 3.

11.

The
writ
petition
is,
accordingly,
dismissed
as
not
maintainable, however, without prejudice
to the rights of the petitioners to avail such
other remedy as may be available to them
under the law.
---------
(2024) 5 ILRA 2528
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. 4 of 2024
With
Civil Misc. Arbiration Application No. 5 of 2024

M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri S.D. Singh with Sri Shadab Alam,
Advocates Sri Sujeet Kumar with Ms.
Chhaya Gupta, Advocates

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Vimlesh Kumar Rai, Advocate for U.P. Jal
Nigam, Sri Anand Prakash Paul, Advocate
for Kanpur Development Authority

A. Arbitration Law - Extension of mandate
of the arbitrator - When a bench of
coequal strength is faced with conflicting
judgments of other coequal benches, the
judgment delivered earlier will continue to
govern the field of law, till such time, the
same is overturned or in case the
question(s) of law, if referred to the larger
bench is answered. This will also hold true
when a lower court is faced with
conflicting judgments of a higher court, or
a
coordinate
bench
is
faced
with
conflicting judgments of a division bench.
(Para 24)

Precedents are not mere legal doctrines; they
are the embodiment of centuries of legal wisdom
and collective judicial experience. When courts
deviate from established precedents without
due consideration, they risk undermining the
credibility and legitimacy of the legal system.
Therefore, it is imperative for courts to uphold
the sanctity of legal precedents and adhere to
established principles of judicial discipline, even
in the face of conflicting opinions or pressures to
depart from precedent. (Para 22)

B. The judgments in Lucknow Agencies
(infra) and Indian Farmers Fertilizers
(infra) having been delivered under
different factual scenarios will continue to
govern the field of law as far as Section
29A of the Act is concerned before this
Court. All applications filed u/s 29A of the Act
till such time as the Larger Bench, reference to
which was made vide this Court's order dated
February 26, 2024, returns its decision on the
5 All. M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors.
2529
questions of law, will have to be decided in
accordance with the law laid down in Lucknow
Agencies and Indian Farmers Fertilizers. The
judgment in A'Xykno Capital Services (infra)
having been delivered after the aforesaid
judgments, will not hold any precedential value.
Needless to say, this position will be subject to
the decision of the Larger Bench. (Para 33)

The doctrine of per incuriam is based on the latin
phrase meaning "thorough lack of care". It
allows the courts to depart from established
precedent when a previous decision was made
without
proper
consideration
of
relevant
statutes, regulations, or binding authorities.
However, the doctrine of per incuriam must
be exercised with caution to ensure that it
is not used as a pretext for disregarding
inconvenient precedent. The principle
should only be invoked in exceptional
cases where the error is clear and
unequivocal, and where adherence to the
precedent
would
result
in
a
grave
injustice. Per incuriam should be used
sparingly and only in exceptional cases.
(Para 32)

C. It has been held in Indian Farmers
Fertilizers (infra) that where an arbitrator
has been appointed u/s 11 of the Act, an
application for extension of the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal u/s 29A of the Act
will lie before the court which appointed
the arbitrator. (Para 27)

In light of the aforesaid, since the appointment
of the arbitrator in ARBT NOS. 4 and 5 of 2024
was made by this Court in exercise of its powers
u/s 11 of the Act, the instant applications filed
u/s 29A(4) and S. 29(A(5) of the Act are
maintainable before this Court. (Para 34)

ARBT NO.4 of 2024 is allowed and the mandate
of the arbitrator is extended for a period of 8
months from the date of this judgment. ARBT
NO. 5 of 2024 is also allowed and the mandate
of the arbitrator is extended for a period of 8
months from the date of this judgment. (Para
35, 36)

Applications allowed. (E-4)

Precedent discussed:
1. M/s. Jaypee Infratech Ltd. Vs Ehbh Services
Private Ltd. & anr., 26.02.2024 (Para 5(i))

2. Lucknow Agencies LKO Vs UP Awas Vikas
Parishad & ors., MANU/UP/0885/2019 (Para
5(iv))

3. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd. Vs
Manish Engineering Enterprises, MANU/ UP/
0515/2022 (Para 5(v))

4. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Pranay Sethi &
ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680 5 (Para 5(vii))

5. Union Territory of Ladakh & ors. Vs Jammu
and Kashmir National Conference & anr., 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1140 (Para 5(vii))

6. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. Vs Ajay Kumar
Sharma, (2016) 15 SCC 289 (Para 11)

7. Mary Pushpam Vs Telvi Curusumary, (2024) 3
SCC 224, (Para 20)

Present applications have been filed u/s
29(A)(4) and S. 29(A)(5) of the Arbitration
& Conciliation Act, 1996, praying for
extension of the mandate of the arbitral
tribunal.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

1. These applications have been filed
under Section 29(A)(4) and Section
29(A)(5) of the Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the
'Act') praying for extension of the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal.

2. Since the instant applications
(ARBT - 4 of 2024 and ARBT - 5 of 2024)
involve similar issues, they are being taken
up together.

FACTS

3. The brief factual matrix involved in
ARBT - 4 of 2024 has been delineated
below:
2530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(a) M/s Geo Miller and Co. Pvt.
Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the
'Petitioner - ARBT 4') and U.P. Jal Nigam
and Others (hereinafter referred to as the
'Respondents - ARBT 4') entered into a
contract. Disputes and differences arose
between the parties which were referred to
arbitration.

(b) Petitioner - ARBT 4 filed an
application under Section 11 of the Act for
appointment of an arbitrator before this
Court.

(c) Vide orders dated September
16, 2021 and October 6, 2021, this Court
appointed Mr. Justice R.D. Khare (Former
Judge of this Court) as the sole arbitrator.

(d) The time limited for making
an arbitral award as provided under Section
29A of the Act expired on February 29,
2024. The arbitrator could not publish his
award within the statutory time limit, and
therefore, he asked the parties to seek
extension of time in accordance with the
law.

(e) Hence, the Petitioner - ARBT
4 filed the instant application being Civil
Misc. Arbitration Application No. - 4 of
2024 under Section 29A of the Act.

4. The brief factual matrix involved in
ARBT - 5 of 2024 has been delineated
below:

(a) Disputes and differences
arose between GPT Infraprojects Limited
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Petitioner -
ARBT 5) and Kanpur Development
Authority (hereinafter referred to as the
'Respondent - ARBT 5') which were
referred to arbitration.

(b) The arbitrator in the case was
appointed by this Court under Section 11 of
the Act vide orders dated June 18, 2021 and
July 29, 2021.

(c) Since the time limit to make
an arbitral award in accordance with
Section 29A of the Act was about to expire
on March 7, 2024, the Petitioner - ARBT 5
filed the instant application being Civil
Misc. Arbitration Application No. - 5 of
2024 seeking extension of time before this
Court.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
APPLICANT IN ARBT NO. 4 OF 2024

5. Sri S.D. Singh, learned counsel
appearing for the applicant has made the
following submissions:

(i) This Court vide its order dated
February 26, 2024 passed in M/s. Jaypee
Infratech Limited -v- Ehbh Services
Private Limited and Another had referred
the issue regarding Section 29A of the Act
before the Larger Bench in light of various
conflicting judgments passed by different
Coordinate Benches of this Court.

(ii) The question which arose in
the present matter was that what will be the
situation for deciding the cases during the
pendency of the issues referred to the
Larger Bench.

(iii)
According
to
various
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
earlier decision can be relied upon during
the pendency of the reference before the
Larger Bench unless there is a specific
order restraining the Court from deciding
any matter on the issues that have been
referred to the Larger Bench.

(iv) Judgment of this Court in
Lucknow Agencies LKO -v- UP Awas
Vikas Parishad and Ors. reported in
MANU/UP/0885/2019
deals
with
a
different situation and as such the said
judgment is not in conflict of any of the
judgments delivered by other Coordinate
Benches of this Court. In the said case it has
5 All. M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors.
2531
been held by this Court that when the
arbitrator has not been appointed under
Section 11 of the Act, an application under
Section 29A of the Act would be
maintainable only before the court as
defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.

(v) The issue that "Whether an
application filed under Section 29A of the
Act for extension of the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal is maintainable before this
Court or before the Court as defined under
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, when this Court
has appointed the arbitrator under Section
11 of the Act" arose before this Court for
the first time in Indian Farmers Fertilizers
Cooperative
Limited
-v-
Manish
Engineering
Enterprises
reported
in
MANU/UP/0515/2022.

(vi) It has been held in Indian
Farmers Fertilizers (supra) that when this
Court has exercised its jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the Act to appoint the
arbitrator, an application under Section
29A of the Act would be maintainable
before this Court only. Therefore, it is clear
that the first judgment on this issue is Indian
Farmers Fertilizers (supra).

(vii) The instant matter or any
other similar matter are not required to be
kept pending till such time the reference
made to Larger Bench is answered. The
instant matter or any other similar matter is
needed to be decided by this Court based on
its
judgement
in
Indian
Farmers
Fertilizers (supra), as per the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
National Insurance Co. Ltd. -v- Pranay
Sethi & Ors. reported in (2017) 16 SCC
680 and Union Territory of Ladakh & Ors.
-v-
Jammu
and
Kashmir
National
Conference and Anr. reported in 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1140.

(viii) The Constitution Bench of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pranay
Sethi (supra) held that there can be no
scintilla of doubt that an earlier decision of
co-equal Bench binds another Bench of the
same strength".

(ix) The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Union Territory of Ladakh & Ors. -v-
Jammu
and
Kashmir
National
Conference and Anr. (supra) dealt with the
issue that what will be the course of action
for deciding the pending matters or the
matters which have been filed during the
interregnum period, when any issue is
pending before the Larger Bench.

(x) Based on the facts and
circumstances of this case, it is prayed that
this Court may be pleased to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 29(A) of the Act
and extend the time period for making the
arbitral award.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

6. I have heard the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and perused the
material on record.

7. The question of law involved in the
instant applications is as to which of the
judgments in light of the conflicting
position of law on Section 29A of the Act
espoused by different coordinate Benches
of this Court would hold the field till such
time as the reference to Larger Bench
made vide this Court's order dated
February 26th, 2024 is answered. Hence,
for the better adjudication of the matter, I
have divided the instant judgment into
two issues:

Issue No. 1: When there are
conflicting judgments of different benches
of coequal strength of a court on a similar
question of law, which one assumes the
status of binding precedent when the said
question of law has been referred to a larger
bench for adjudication ?
2532 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Issue No. 2: Which judgment
will govern the field of law on Section 29A
of the Act as far as this Court is concerned
?

ISSUE NO. 1

8. The principle of judicial discipline
is a cornerstone of the legal system,
essential for maintaining the integrity,
coherence, and predictability of judicial
decisions. One of the key mechanisms
through
which
judicial
discipline
is
maintained is the doctrine of stare decisis,
which literally means "to stand by things
decided". Under this doctrine, courts are
bound to follow their own previous
decisions when confronted with similar
legal issues. This principle serves several
important purposes. Firstly, it promotes
consistency and predictability in the law,
ensuring that similar cases are decided in a
uniform
manner.
This
fosters
legal
certainty and promotes the rule of law by
providing
litigants
with
a
clear
understanding
of
their
rights
and
obligations.
Secondly,
stare
decisis
promotes respect for judicial authority and
fosters public confidence in the legal
system. By adhering to established legal
precedents, courts demonstrate a respect for
the decisions of their predecessors and the
principle of continuity in the law. This
enhances
the
legitimacy
of
judicial
decisions and reinforces the notion that
courts are impartial arbiters of legal
disputes, guided by established legal norms
rather than personal preferences or biases.

9. Additionally, the doctrine of stare
decisis promotes judicial efficiency by
reducing the need for courts to revisit
settled
legal
issues.
By
following
established legal precedents, courts can
focus their attention on resolving new and
novel legal questions, rather than relitigating issues that have already been
decided. This streamlines the judicial
process and enables the courts to operate
more effectively, ensuring that scarce
judicial resources are allocated efficiently.

10. When a Coordinate Bench issues
a judgment on a particular legal issue, that
judgment becomes binding precedent for
subsequent cases involving a similar issue
before another Coordinate Bench. This
ensures that similar cases are decided in a
consistent and uniform manner, regardless
of the particular composition of the Bench.

11. In State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others -v- Ajay Kumar Sharma reported
in (2016) 15 SCC 289, the Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
espoused
on
the
significance of the doctrine of stare decisis
as follows:

"13. Time and again this Court
has emphatically restated the essentials
and principles of "precedent" and of stare
decisis which are a cardinal feature of the
hierarchical character of all common law
judicial systems. The doctrine of precedent
mandates that an exposition of law must be
followed and applied even by coordinate or
co-equal Benches and certainly by all
smaller Benches and subordinate courts.
That is to say that a smaller and a later
Bench has no freedom other than to apply
the law laid down by the earlier and larger
Bench; that is the law which is said to hold
the field. Apart from Article 141, it is a
policy of the courts to stand by precedent
and not to disturb a settled point. The
purpose of precedents is to bestow
predictability on judicial decisions and it is
beyond cavil that certainty in law is an
essential ingredient of rule of law. A
departure may only be made when a
5 All. M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors.
2533
coordinate or co-equal Bench finds the
previous decision to be of doubtful logic or
efficacy and consequentially, its judicial
conscience is so perturbed and aroused
that it finds it impossible to follow the
existing ratio. The Bench must then comply
with the discipline of requesting the
Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute a larger
Bench.

14. If binding precedents even of
coordinate strength are not followed, the
roots of continuity and certainty of law
which should be nurtured, strengthened,
perpetuated and proliferated will instead
be deracinated. Although spoken in a
totally different context, we are reminded of
the opening stanza of the poem "The
Second Coming" authored by William
Butler Yeats. The lines obviously do not
advert to the principle of precedent but they
are apposite in bringing out the wisdom of
this ancient and venerable principle.

"Turning and turning in the
widening gyre

The falcon cannot hear the
falconer;

Things fall apart; the centre
cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the
world."

12. What follows from the aforesaid
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is
that the doctrine of stare decisis holds
paramount importance. The adherence to
precedent is not merely a matter of legal
formalism but serves the vital function of
bestowing
predictability
on
judicial
decisions, thereby fostering certainty in the
law. The analogy drawn by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court to William Butler Yeats'
poem "The Second Coming" poignantly
captures the essence of the doctrine of stair
decisis. Just as the falcon in Yeats' poem
struggles to maintain its courts amidst
chaos and disarray, so too does the legal
system face the risk of fragmentation and
disintegration when courts fail to uphold
established precedents. Without the anchor
of precedent to guide its decisions, the
judiciary risks descending into a state of
"mere anarchy", where the fundamental
principles of justice and equity are cast
aside in favour of individual whim or
caprice.

13. Indeed, the parallels between
Yeats' evocative imagery and the principles
of stare decisis are striking. The image of
"things fall apart" when the centre cannot
hold resonates with the chaos that ensues
when legal precedent is disregarded,
leading to uncertainty, inconsistency, and a
loss of faith in the judicial system. In
contrast, the preservation of precedent
serves as a bulwark against the tide of legal
tumult, anchoring the law in a bedrock of
stability and continuity.

14. Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo
eloquently stated "The labor of judges
would be increased almost to the breaking
point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not
lay one's own course of bricks on the secure
foundation of the courses laid by others
who had gone before him." Thus, while
precedent provides a foundation for legal
reasoning, it also allows for the exercise of
judicial
wisdom
and
discretion
in
exceptional cases.

15. In the intricate tapestry of legal
precedent, one of the most formidable
challenges facing the judiciary is the
dilemma of conflicting precedents. At the
hear of the dilemma lies the clash of titans
- two or more precedents that stand in
direct opposition to one another. This clash
may arise due to a variety of reasons,
2534 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
including divergent interpretations of
statutory
language,
conflicting
judicial
philosophies, or evolving societal norms. When
confronted with conflicting precedents by
earlier benches of coequal strength, courts
usually have limited options before them. One
such option is the principle of distinguishing,
whereby a court seeks to identify meaningful
differences between the conflicting precedents
and apply the one that is most applicable to the
case at hand. This approach allows courts to
preserve the integrity of both precedents while
harmonizing their application to the facts before
them. In addition to the same, another option
available to courts in cases of conflicting
precedents is to make a reference to a bench of
larger strength. This option recognizes the
complexity and significance of the issue at
hand. Take for example, the practice of en blanc
review present in the United States. En blanc
review involves rehearing a case before all the
judges of a court, rather than a smaller panel,
and is typically reserved for cases of exceptional
importance or complexity. By convening a
larger bench, courts ensure that decisions of
significant consequences are made with the
benefit of a wider range of perspectives and
expertise.

16. However, the question remains as
to the path that must be followed till such
time as the larger bench returns its decision.

17. Reference in this regard can be
made to the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in National Insurance
Company Limited -v- Pranay Sethi (supra)
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
grappled with a similar question and
concluded as follows after making a
reference to precedents:

"16. In State of Bihar v. Kalika
Kuer [State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer, (2003)
5 SCC 448] , it has been held :

"10. ... an earlier decision may
seem to be incorrect to a Bench of a
coordinate jurisdiction considering the
question later, on the ground that a
possible aspect of the matter was not
considered or not raised before the court or
more aspects should have been gone into by
the court deciding the matter earlier but it
would not be a reason to say that the
decision was rendered per incuriam and
liable to be ignored. The earlier judgment
may seem to be not correct yet it will have
the binding effect on the later Bench of
coordinate jurisdiction. ..."

The Court has further ruled :

"10. ... Easy course of saying
that earlier decision was rendered per
incuriam is not permissible and the matter
will have to be resolved only in two ways -
either to follow the earlier decision or refer
the matter to a larger Bench to examine the
issue, in case it is felt that earlier decision
is not correct on merits."

17. In G.L.
Batra v. State
of
Haryana [G.L. Batra v. State of Haryana,
(2014) 13 SCC 759 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S)
575] , the Court has accepted the said
principle on the basis of judgments of this
Court
rendered
in Union
of
India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [Union
of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.,
(1985) 4 SCC 369 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 11]
, Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector,
Thane [Sundarjas
Kanyalal
Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC
396] and Tribhovandas Purshottamdas
Thakkar v. Ratilal
Motilal
Patel [Tribhovandas
Purshottamdas
Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel, AIR 1968
SC 372] . It may be noted here that the
Constitution
Bench
in Madras
Bar
Assn. v. Union
of
India [Madras
Bar
Assn. v. Union of India, (2015) 8 SCC 583]
has
clearly
stated
that
the
prior
Constitution Bench judgment in Union of
5 All. M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors.
2535
India v. Madras
Bar
Assn. [Union
of
India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC
1] is a binding precedent. Be it clarified, the
issues that were put to rest in the earlier
Constitution Bench judgment were treated
as precedents by the later Constitution
Bench.

18. In this regard, we may refer
to a passage from Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan
Dubey [Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey,
AIR 1962 SC 83] :

"10. Law will be bereft of all its
utility if it should be thrown into a state of
uncertainty by reason of conflicting
decisions, and it is therefore desirable that
in case of difference of opinion, the
question should be authoritatively settled.
It sometimes happens that an earlier
decision [Dasrath Singh v. Damri Singh,
1925 SCC OnLine Pat 242 : AIR 1927 Pat
219] given by a Bench is not brought to the
notice
of
a
Bench
[Ram
Asre
Singh v. Ambica Lal, AIR 1929 Pat 216]
hearing the same question, and a contrary
decision is given without reference to the
earlier decision. The question has also been
discussed as to the correct procedure to be
followed when
two
such
conflicting
decisions are placed before a later Bench.
The practice in the Patna High Court
appears to be that in those cases, the earlier
decision is followed and not the later. In
England the practice is, as noticed in the
judgment
in Gundavarupu
Seshamma v. Kornepati
Venkata
Narasimharao [Gundavarupu
Seshamma v. Kornepati
Venkata
Narasimharao, 1939 SCC OnLine Mad 367
: ILR 1940 Mad 454] that the decision of a
Court of Appeal is considered as a general
rule to be binding on it. There are
exceptions to it, and one of them is thus
stated in Halsbury's Laws of England,

'1687. ... the court is not bound
to follow a decision of its own if given per
incuriam. A decision is given per incuriam
when the court has acted in ignorance of a
previous decision of its own or of a court of
a coordinate jurisdiction which covered the
case before it, or when it has acted in
ignorance of a decision of the House of
Lords. In the former case it must decide
which decision to follow, and in the latter it
is bound by the decision of the House of
Lords.'

In
Katragadda
Virayya
v.
Katragadda
Venkata
Subbayya
[Katragadda
Virayya
v.
Katragadda
Venkata Subbayya, 1955 SCC OnLine AP
34 : AIR 1955 AP 215] it has been held by
the Andhra High Court that under the
circumstances aforesaid the Bench is free
to adopt that view which is in accordance
with justice and legal principles after
taking
into
consideration
the
views
expressed in the two conflicting Benches,
vide also the decision of the Nagpur High
Court in D.D. Bilimoria v. Central Bank of
India [D.D. Bilimoria v. Central Bank of
India, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 97 : AIR 1943
Nag 340] . The better course would be for
the Bench hearing the case to refer the
matter to a Full Bench in view of the
conflicting authorities without taking upon
itself to decide whether it should follow the
one Bench decision or the other. We have
no doubt that when such situations arise,
the Bench hearing cases would refer the
matter for the decision of a Full Court."

19. Though the aforesaid was
articulated in the context of the High Court,
yet this Court has been following the same
as is revealed from the aforestated
pronouncements including that of the
Constitution Bench and, therefore, we
entirely agree with the said view because it
is the precise warrant of respecting a
precedent which is the fundamental norm of
judicial discipline.
2536 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

20. In the context, we may
fruitfully note what has been stated
in Pradip
Chandra
Parija v. Pramod
Chandra
Patnaik [Pradip
Chandra
Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, (2002)
1 SCC 1] . In the said case, the Constitution
Bench was dealing with a situation where
the two-Judge Bench [Pradip Chandra
Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, Civil
Appeal No. 791 of 1993, order dated 24-101996 (SC)] disagreeing with the threeJudge Bench [Nityananda Kar v. State of
Orissa, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 516 : 1992 SCC
(L&S) 177] decision directed the matter to
be placed before a larger Bench of five
Judges of this Court. In that scenario, the
Constitution Bench stated :

"6. ... In our view, judicial
discipline and propriety demands that a
Bench of two learned Judges should follow
a decision of a Bench of three learned
Judges. But if a Bench of two learned
Judges concludes that an earlier judgment
of three learned Judges is so very incorrect
that in no circumstances can it be followed,
the proper course for it to adopt is to refer
the matter before it to a Bench of three
learned Judges setting out, as has been
done here, the reasons why it could not
agree with the earlier judgment. ..."

21. In Chandra Prakash v. State
of U.P. [Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P.,
(2002) 4 SCC 234 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 496]
, another Constitution Bench dealing with
the concept of precedents stated thus :

"22. ... The doctrine of binding
precedent is of utmost importance in the
administration of our judicial system. It
promotes certainty and consistency in
judicial decisions. Judicial consistency
promotes
confidence
in
the
system,
therefore, there is this need for consistency
in the enunciation of legal principles in the
decisions of this Court. It is in the above
context,
this
Court
in Raghubir
Singh [Union of India v. Raghubir Singh,
(1989)
2
SCC
754]
held
that
a
pronouncement of law by a Division Bench
of this Court is binding on a Division Bench
of the same or smaller number of Judges.
..."

Be
it
noted, Chandra
Prakash [Chandra
Prakash v. State
of
U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234 : 2002 SCC (L&S)
496] concurred with the view expressed
in Raghubir
Singh [Union
of
India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC
754] and Pradip Chandra Parija [Pradip
Chandra
Parija v. Pramod
Chandra
Patnaik, (2002) 1 SCC 1] .

22. In Sandhya
Educational
Society v. Union
of
India [Sandhya
Educational Society v. Union of India,
(2014) 7 SCC 701] , it has been observed
that judicial decorum and discipline is
paramount and, therefore, a coordinate
Bench has to respect the judgments and
orders passed by another coordinate
Bench.
In Rattiram v. State
of
M.P. [Rattiram v. State of M.P., (2012) 4
SCC 516 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 481] , the
Court dwelt upon the issue, what would be
the consequent effect of the later decision
which had been rendered without noticing
the earlier decisions. The Court noted the
observations in Raghubir Singh [Union of
India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC
754]
and
reproduced
a
passage
from Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Municipal
Corpn. [Indian
Oil
Corpn.
Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn., (1995) 4 SCC 96]
which is to the following effect : (Rattiram
case [Rattiram v. State of M.P., (2012) 4
SCC 516 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 481] ,

"27. ... '8. ... The Division Bench
of the High Court in Municipal Corpn.,
Indore v. Ratnaprabha
Dhanda [Municipal
Corpn.,
Indore v. Ratnaprabha Dhanda, 1988 SCC
OnLine MP 116 : 1989 MP LJ 20] was
5 All. M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors.
2537
clearly in error in taking the view that the
decision
of
this
Court
in Ratnaprabha [Municipal
Corpn.,
Indore v. Ratnaprabha, (1976) 4 SCC 622]
was not binding on it. In doing so, the
Division Bench of the High Court did
something which even a later co-equal
Bench of this Court did not and could not
do. ...' (Indian Oil Corpn. case [Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn., (1995) 4
SCC 96] , SCC p. 100, para 8)"

23. It also stated what has been
expressed in Raghubir Singh [Union of
India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC
754] by R.S. Pathak, C.J. It is as follows :
(Rattiram case [Rattiram v. State of M.P.,
(2012) 4 SCC 516 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri)
481] ,

"26. ... '28. We are of opinion
that a pronouncement of law by a Division
Bench of this Court is binding on a Division
Bench of the same or a smaller number of
Judges, and in order that such decision be
binding, it is not necessary that it should be
a decision rendered by the Full Court or a
Constitution Bench of the Court. ...'
(Raghubir
Singh
case [Union
of
India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC
754] , SCC p. 778, para 28)"

24. In Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir
Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC
(Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014)
1 SCC (L&S) 149] the three-Judge Bench
had delivered the judgment on 12-4-2013.
The purpose of stating the date is that it has
been delivered after the pronouncement
made in Reshma Kumari case [Reshma
Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65
: (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 826] . On a perusal of the decision
in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9
SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013)
3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]
, we find that an attempt has been made to
explain what the two-Judge Bench had
stated
in Santosh
Devi [Santosh
Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012)
6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC
(L&S) 167] . The relevant passages read as
follows : (Rajesh case [Rajesh v. Rajbir
Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC
(Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014)
1 SCC (L&S) 149] , SCC p. 61, paras 8-9)
***

27. We are compelled to state
here that in Munna Lal Jain [Munna Lal
Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma, (2015) 6 SCC
347 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 315 : (2015) 4
SCC (Cri) 195] , the three-Judge Bench
should have been guided by the principle
stated
in Reshma
Kumari [Reshma
Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65
: (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 826] which has concurred with the
view expressed in Sarla Verma [Sarla
Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009)
2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1002] or in case of disagreement, it should
have been well advised to refer the case to
a larger Bench. We say so, as we have
already expressed the opinion that the dicta
laid down in Reshma Kumari [Reshma
Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65
: (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 826] being earlier in point of time
would be a binding precedent and not the
decision in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh,
(2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179
: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC
(L&S) 149] ."

18. What emerges from the wisdom of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the
doctrine of precedent, is not without its
nuances and complexities. As elucidated by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, an earlier
decision, even if considered incorrect by a
later Bench, retains its binding effect on
subsequent
Benches
of
coordinate
2538 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction. The principle which emerges
is that the earlier decision must be followed
until the decision of the larger bench is
returned. This principle is rooted in
tradition, certainty, and the integrity of
precedent itself. As articulated by the Apex
Court, the law would be bereft of utility if
thrown into a state of uncertainty by
conflicting decisions. Throughout history,
the stability and continuity of law have
been
upheld
through
adherence
to
established precedent. By following the
earlier decision, even in the face of
conflicting precedents, courts preserve the
integrity of the legal system and uphold the
principle of stare decisis - the notion that
like cases should be decided like. From a
practical standpoint, following the earlier
decision until the decision of the larger
bench is returned serves to promote
certainty
and
predictability
in
the
administration of justice. When conflicting
precedents arise, uncertainty abounds, and
litigants may be left in a state of limbo,
unsure of their rights and obligations under
the law. By adhering to the earlier decision,
courts provide a measure of stability and
clarity, allowing parties to proceed with
confidence while awaiting resolution from
the larger bench.

19. In Union Territory of Ladakh &
Others -v- Jammu and Kashmir National
Conference (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reiterated the principle laid down in
Pranay Sethi (supra) and propounded that
when conflicting decisions of coequal
benches exist, the earlier one is to be
followed as binding precedent. Relevant
paragraph is extracted herein:

"35. We are seeing before us
judgments and orders by High Courts not
deciding cases on the ground that the
leading judgment of this Court on this
subject is either referred to a larger Bench
or a review petition relating thereto is
pending. We have also come across
examples
of
High
Courts
refusing
deference to judgments of this Court on the
score that a later Coordinate Bench has
doubted its correctness. In this regard, we
lay down the position in law. We make it
absolutely clear that the High Courts will
proceed to decide matters on the basis of
the law as it stands. It is not open, unless
specifically directed by this Court, to await
an outcome of a reference or a review
petition, as the case may be. It is also not
open to a High Court to refuse to follow a
judgment by stating that it has been
doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In
any case, when faced with conflicting
judgments by Benches of equal strength of
this Court, it is the earlier one which is to
be followed by the High Courts, as held by
a 5-Judge Bench in National Insurance
Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017)
16 SCC 6805. The High Courts, of course,
will do so with careful regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case before it."

20. Recently, in Mary Pushpam -v-
Telvi Curusumary reported in (2024) 3
SCC 224, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated the significance of the doctrine of
judicial discipline and propriety:

"Vikram Nath, J.- The rule of
"Judicial Discipline and Propriety" and
the doctrine of precedents has a merit of
promoting certainty and consistency in
judicial decisions providing assurance to
individuals as to the consequences of their
actions. The Constitution Benches of this
Court have time and again reiterated the
rules emerging from judicial discipline.
Accordingly, when a decision of a
coordinate Bench of the same High Court
is brought to the notice of the Bench, it is to
5 All. M/S Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors.
2539
be respected and is binding subject to right
of the Bench of such co-equal quorum to
take a different view and refer the question
to a larger Bench. It is the only course of
action open to a Bench of co-equal
strength, when faced with the previous
decision taken by a Bench with same
strength."

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's
aforesaid pronouncements serve as a
clarion call, admonishing against the perils
of judicial vacillation and indecision. The
directive to accord precedence to earlier
judgments, notwithstanding doubts cast
by
subsequent
coordinate
benches,
elucidates the unwavering commitment to
upholding the rule of law and preserving
the sanctity of legal precedent. The
Supreme Court's assertion that decisions
of coordinate benches of the same High
Court are to be respected and considered
binding, subject to the right of coequal
benches to refer the question to a larger
bench, reflects the delicate balance
between adherence to precedent and the
pursuit of legal evolution by reaffirming
the
authority
of
precedent
while
acknowledging
the
judiciary's
prerogative
to
revisit
established
doctrines when warranted.

22. Precedents are not mere legal
doctrines; they are the embodiment of
centuries of legal wisdom and collective
judicial experience. When courts deviate
from established precedents without due
consideration, they risk undermining the
credibility and legitimacy of the legal
system. Therefore, it is imperative for
courts to uphold the sanctity of legal
precedents and adhere to established
principles of judicial discipline, even in the
face of conflicting opinions or pressures to
depart from precedent.

23.

This
is
reminiscent
of
Shakespeare's
"Hamlet",
where
the
protagonist grapples with the weight of
inherited wisdom and the demands of his
own conscience. Hamlet's dilemma mirrors
the judicial predicament faced by courts
when
confronted
with
conflicting
precedents. Like Hamlet, judges must
navigate the intricate web of legal doctrines
and precedents, weighing the authority of
past decisions against the exigencies of the
present moment. In embracing the rule of
precedent, the judiciary echoes Hamlet's
famous soliloquy (To be, or not to be, that
is the question), acknowledging the
enduring power of tradition while grappling
with the imperatives of justice and fairness.

24. In light of the aforesaid, Issue No.
1 is answered as follows: