# M/s Gupta Service Station and another v. India Oil Corporation Ltd. and others

- **Citation:** (2003) 3 ILRA 690
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2003-07-16
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38343 of 2002
- **Bench:** M. Katju, R.S. Tripathi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-gupta-service-station-and-another-v-india-oil-corporation-ltd-and-others-40164
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India
Article
226Rejection
of
Tender-Indian
Oil
Corporation invited tenders to carry
petrol/diesel from terminal point to their
respective Dealers-Clause (c) (iv) of the
agreement provides that the vehicle
should not be more than 15 years old on
date of the tender. Rejection on their
ground that vehicle is more than 15 yrs.
Old. Whether justified? - yes

Held : Para 16

In our opinion, there is no merit in these
petitions.
The
matter
is
purely
contractual
and
this
Court
cannot
interfere in such matters. It is for the
concerned authorities to decide what
should be the proper age limit of the
vehicles and it is not proper for this
Court to interfere in such administrative
matters as held by the Supreme Court in
Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India AIR 1996
Supreme Court 11. The Court has very
limited scope of judicial review in
Administrative matters. In our opinion,
there has been no arbitrariness in the
matter
and
the
decision
of
the
respondents has been taken on sound
reasons, namely, the public safety and
ecology.
Cases referred to:
(1998) 6 SCC 63
AIR 1996 SC 11
2002 (4) AWC 3221
2003 (4) SCC 289

## Text

690 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
huge burden on this Court due to the large
arrears. There was a time in this country
when learned counsel used to give correct
advice to clients and the preliminary
screening of the case was done in the
chamber of the learned counsel itself, and
if there was no useful purpose in filing a
case the learned counsel would frankly
say so to his client. Today this hardly
happens and the learned counsels file all
kinds of frivolous cases thus causing
immense problems to this Court, which is
already highly overburdened with the
pending cases.

2. This malpractice has been
committed in this case too. The petitioner
has already filed civil suit no. 364 of 2002
for the same relief, which he is claiming
in this writ petition. In that suit a
temporary injunction was granted, copy of
which is Annexure-5 to the writ petition,
which was passed after hearing both the
sides. In this temporary injunction order,
the operative portion of which is on pages
134 and 135 of the writ petition, the
precise relief which the petitioner is
praying for in this writ petition has been
granted in that temporary injunction. The
defendant-respondents were restrained
from withdrawing the amount from the
respondent Bank and from depositing the
same in any other Bank account. If this
temporary injunction was not being
obeyed then the petitioner should have
filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2
A of the CPC, but instead this writ
petition has been filed. There can be no
clearer case of abuse of the process of this
Court. This writ petition should never
have been filed, and we are constrained to
observe that learned counsel in this case
has not given correct advice to his client.

3. It is well settled that if there is an
alternative remedy available this Court
does not normally interfere in writ
jurisdiction. In this case not only is there
an alternative remedy, that remedy is
actually being availed of by the petitioner
by filing a civil suit, and in fact the
petitioner has got a temporary injunction
order. This is not an isolated case, and a
large number of frivolous petitions are
being filed in this Court. It passes all
comprehension why such frivolous cases
are being filed in this Court, and the time
has now come when this Court must start
taking serious action in such matters
otherwise it will be flooded with Lakhs
and Lakhs of frivolous case.

4. We therefore, dismiss the writ
petition. We also direct the petitioner to
pay costs of Rs.25,000/= which will be
paid by the petitioner within a month
from today to the State Government,
failing which it will be recovered by the
District Magistrate Hathras as arrears of
land revenue. Learned Standing counsel
as well as Registrar General of this Court,
will communicate this order to the District
Magistrate, Hathras forthwith.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.07.2003

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J.
THE HON'BLE R.S. TRIPATHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38343 of 2002

M/s Gupta Service Station and another

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Indian
Oil
Corporation
Limited
and
others

 ...Respondent

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3 All] M/s Gupta Service Station and another V. India Oil Corporation Ltd. and others
691
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Saumitra Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri R.G. Padia
Sri Prakash Padia
Sri Arun Tandon
S.C.

Constitution
of
India
Article
226Rejection
of
Tender-Indian
Oil
Corporation invited tenders to carry
petrol/diesel from terminal point to their
respective Dealers-Clause (c) (iv) of the
agreement provides that the vehicle
should not be more than 15 years old on
date of the tender. Rejection on their
ground that vehicle is more than 15 yrs.
Old. Whether justified? - yes

Held : Para 16

In our opinion, there is no merit in these
petitions.
The
matter
is
purely
contractual
and
this
Court
cannot
interfere in such matters. It is for the
concerned authorities to decide what
should be the proper age limit of the
vehicles and it is not proper for this
Court to interfere in such administrative
matters as held by the Supreme Court in
Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India AIR 1996
Supreme Court 11. The Court has very
limited scope of judicial review in
Administrative matters. In our opinion,
there has been no arbitrariness in the
matter
and
the
decision
of
the
respondents has been taken on sound
reasons, namely, the public safety and
ecology.
Cases referred to:
(1998) 6 SCC 63
AIR 1996 SC 11
2002 (4) AWC 3221
2003 (4) SCC 289

(Delivered by the Hon'ble M. Katju, J.)

1. This writ petition and connected
writ petition nos. 33665 of 2002, 34179 of
2002, 37098 of 2002, 38346 of 2002,
38348 of 2002, 38352 of 2002, 41445 of
2002 41447 of 2002, 41448 of 2002 and
53829 of 2002 are being disposed off by a
common judgment.

2. Heard learned counsel for the
parties.

3. The petitioner has prayed for a
writ of certiorari quashing para 11 (c) (iv)
of the Special Tender Conditions of
Tender No. JOINT/POL/02/16 (Annexure
5 to the petition) and for a mandamus
directing the respondent authorities to
permit the petitioner to participate in the
Tender in question dated 29.7.2002
without
placing
the
restriction
that
vehicles should be less than 15 years old.

4. The petitioner no. 1 is a
partnership concern and petitioner no. 2 is
one of his partners doing the business of
maintaining a retail petrol and diesel
outlet at Mughalsarai, District Chandauli
for the purpose of transporting petrol and
diesel from the Indian Oil Corporatrion
Terminals at Chandauli. The petitioner
had also engaged their oil tankers with
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
(HPCL). The engagement of the oil
tankers had been done by the HPCL by
calling tenders from various oil tanker
owners. Such tenders have been called
every Two/Three years for engaging oil
tankers for the purpose of transporting
petrol and diesel from the terminals to
different petrol and diesel outlets within
the local area of operation of the
terminals.

5. It is alleged in para 5 of the
petition that the petitioner's oil tankers
were engaged by the Hindustan Petroleum
Corporations for the past several years on
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692 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
the basis of tenders, and work orders
allotted to them. In the tender number
JOINT/POL/002,
the
terms
and
conditions of engagement of oil tankers so
far as the age of vehicle is concerned, was
as follows:

AGE OF THE VEHICLE

"Any quoted vehicle over 20 years
old shall be replaced within one year from
the date of the Work Order for the
Transport Contract. This condition will be
superseded by the Court Order/Statutory
Requirement,
wherever
applicable.
However, no further extension of this
time limit will be granted."

6. On the basis of the above tender,
three vehicles of the petitioner, which
were more than 15 years old and are
running with the Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation were engaged as stated in
para 9 of the petition. It is alleged in para
10 of the petition that the above vehicles
are in good running condition and having
fitness
certificates
granted
by
the
Regional Transport Authorities under the
Motor Vehicles Act, vide Annexure-2.
The
vehicles
also
have
necessary
explosive licence granted by the Deputy
Chief
Controller
of
Explosives,
Allahabad, vide Annexure-3 to the
petition. They have also permits granted
by the Regional Transport Authority vide
Annexure-4.

7. In para 13 of the petition, it is
alleged that the Indian Oil Corporation
alongwith
three
other
petroleum
corporations namely HPCL, BPCL and
IBP had called upon tenders for another
term of two years from 1.10.2002 to
30.9.2004 (further extendable for a period
of one year) being general tender no.
JOINT/POL/02. For supply location of
Chandauli, the tender no. specified is
JOINT/POL/02 which has been issued on
29.7.2002, fixing the last date for
submission of tender as 21.8.2002, with
new terms and conditions in so far as the
age of vehicle is concerned which has
been reduced to 15 years.

8. Para 11 (c) (iv) of Annexure 5 to
the petition may be seen in this
connection, which states:

"Age of the vehicle should not
exceed 15 years on the date of opening of
tender."

9. A perusal of the above clause
shows that a vehicle which is over 15
years old, is debarred from participating
in the tender on behalf of its owner. It is
alleged in para 14 of the petition that on
the basis of the above condition, the
vehicles of the petitioner referred to above
shall not be able to be included in the list
of vehicles for the purposes of qualifying
the tenders, though they are in perfect
running condition and having fitness
certificate, explosive license and permits
issued by the authorities.

10. It is alleged in para 15 of the
petition that the operation of the limit of
the petitioner's vehicles is restricted to the
retail outlets within the jurisdiction of the
concerned oil terminal, and the same
never exceeds 50 Kms.

11. It is alleged that there in no age
bar of transport vehicles mentioned in the
Motor Vehicles Act or Rules, and as such
the age limit of 15 years is only illegal.

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3 All] M/s Gupta Service Station and another V. India Oil Corporation Ltd. and others
693
12. It is alleged that the above
condition is highly unreasonable and
violates the principles of natural justice.

13. In our opinion, there is no merit
in these petitions. The special tender
conditions, copy of which is Annexure-5
to the petition, embodies the terms on
which the contract can be finalized. If the
petitioner or any other party does not find
any condition mentioned therein as
acceptable, he is not obliged to make a
bid for the contract. It is for the concerned
corporation to decide about the terms and
conditions on which they will give the
contract.

14. A counter Affidavit has been
filed by the Indian Oil Corporation
Reference has been made therein to the
direction of the Supreme Court in M.C.
Mehta Vs. Union of India (1998) 6 SCC
63 in which direction was issued to
restrict plying of commercial vehicles
including Taxis which are 15 years old. In
para 10 it is stated that the age of 15 years
of vehicles is fixed as per policy
guidelines and the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is a matter of
policy involving not only safety of the
traffic and the fact that the petroleum
product is highly inflammable, but the
object is also to maintain environment and
ecological balance which is one of the
directive principles in the Constitution. It
is alleged that the petitioner has no legal
right to have his aged vehicles considered
for the contract.

15. In para 14, it is stated that there
is no question of giving any opportunity
of hearing in the matter, since a policy
decision has been taken. The petitioner
has no legal right in his favour. The
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Acts or
Rules are wholly irrelevant.

16. In our opinion, there is no merit
in these petitions. The matter is purely
contractual and this Court cannot interfere
in such matters. It is for the concerned
authorities to decide what should be the
proper age limit of the vehicles and it is
not proper for this Court to interfere in
such administrative matters as held by the
Supreme Court in Tata Cellular Vs.
Union of India AIR 1996 Supreme Court
11. The Court has very limited scope of
judicial review in Administrative matters.
In our opinion, there has been no
arbitrariness in the matter and the decision
of the respondents has been taken on
sound reasons, namely, the public safety
and ecology.

17. As held by this Court in 2002 (4)
AWC 3221, Pramod Kumar Misra Vs.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others,
this Court cannot sit in appeal over the
decisions of the Administrative Authority.

As Chief Justice Neely observed:

"I have very few illusions about my
own limitations as a judge. I am not an
accountant, electrical engineer, financer,
banker,
stockbroker
or
system
management analyst. It is the height of
folly to expect Judge intelligently to
review a 5000 page record addressing the
intricacies of public utility operation. It
is not the function of a Judge to act as a
super board, or with the zeal of a
pedantic school master substituting its
judgment for that of the administrator."

18. In Federation of Railway
Officers Association and others Vs. Union
of India, (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases
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694 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
289, the Supreme Court observed that the
Court should not ordinarily interfere with
policy
matters
requiring
technical
expertise.

19. The submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner that there is no
such age restriction in the Motor Vehicles
Acts or Rules, or that natural justice was
violated, is wholly misconceived. The
restriction in question has been placed by
a party who wishes to enter into a
contract. A contract by its very nature is a
voluntary bilateral transaction, by which
two parties enter into an agreement of
their own freewill. Hence the corporation
can decide the terms on which it is
agreeable to give the contract, just as the
petitioner is free to make a tender or not,
and neither party can be compelled in this
connection.
Petitions
dismissed.
Interim
orders
vacated.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD JULY 11TH, 2003

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12588 of 1998

Ghazipur
Central
Consumers
Cooperative Stores Ltd. and another

 ...Petitioners
Versus
The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Varanasi and another
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Ajit Kumar Singh
Sri Devendra Pratap Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

U.P.
Industrial
Disputes
Act,
1947Section 6-N-Constitution of India-Article
226-Writ
Jurisdiction-Exercise
ofReinstatement-Termination of Services
of
petitioner
without
conducting
enquiry-No opportunity to show causereinstatement of workman held- legalFinding not perverse-No error of law
pointed out-

Held- Para 8

The law is well established that the
finding arrived at by the labour court on
the basis of the pleadings and the
evidence adduced by the parties should
not be lightly interfered unless the same
are demonstrated to be perverse or
suffering from any manifest error of law.
Nothing sort has been pointed out by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that
the finding recorded by labour court is
contrary to law.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anjani Kumar, J.)

1. This petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India has been filed by
the petitioners-employer challenging the
award of the Labour Court, Varanasi
dated 29th August, 1997 passed in
Adjudication Case No. 179 of 1989.

2. The following dispute was
referred to for adjudication to Labour
Court:

"D;k lsok;kstdksa }kjk vius Jfed jktsUnz izlkn
frokjh] iq= cyHknz frokjh 'kk[kk izcU/kd dh lsok;sa fnukad
21.8.87 ls lekIr fd;k tkuk mfpr rFkk@vFkok oS/kkfud
gS? ;fn ugha] rks Jfed D;k vuqrks"k ikus dk vf/kdkjh
gS?"

3. After receipt of reference labour
court issued notices to the parties. The
parties have exchanged their pleadings
and adduced evidence before labour court.
The case set up by the workmanhttp:\\allahabadhighcourt.nic.in