# M/S Kamalsons v. Mrs. Sajma & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 8 ILRA 26
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-08-04
- **Case number:** F.A.F.O. No. 989 of 2012
- **Bench:** Manish Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-kamalsons-v-mrs-sajma-ors-47209
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - The Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 - Section 2(15) - gross vehicle
weight , Section 66 - Necessity for permits
, Section 66(1) , 66(3)(i) , 150(2)(a)(i)(C)
, Section 173 - Appeal - principles of
purposive construction - In construing the
wordings of legislation, interpretation
which restricts the operation of the
statute should be avoided and a purposive
construction should be adopted which
would not defeat the very purpose of the
Act . (Para -16)

Offending vehicle was a goods vehicle - in terms
of Section 66(3)(i) - provision of Section 66(1)
of the Motor Vehicles Act not applicable to any
goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which
does not exceed 3000 kg - laden weight of the
offending vehicle - registration certificate - being
2750 Kg was well within the limits specified
under Section 66(3)(i) of Motor Vehicles Act -
offending vehicle did not require any specific
permit - findings of tribunal against the
appellant - not in accordance with the provisions
of Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles
Act.(Para - 6)

HELD:- Offending vehicle being covered by
provisions of Section 66 (3)(i) of the Motor
Vehicles Act was not required to have a
special permit since its gross vehicle weight in
terms of Section 2(15) was below 3000 kg.
The liability fastened by the Tribunal upon
appellant as such was incorrect and against
the provisions of law. Judgment and award
passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, set
aside, so far as it relates to issue pertaining
to liability of appellant to satisfy the award.
Respondent No.5 i.e. the National Insurance
Company Ltd. is required to satisfy the award.
(Para - 21)

Appeal allowed. (E- 6)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

26 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
setting aside the abatement or dismissal, if
he had already applied under Order 22
Rule 3 for being brought on record within
time
and
his
application had
been
dismissed after an enquiry under Rule 5 of
Order 22, on the ground that he is not the
legal representative."

17. Upon applicability of the
aforesaid judgment in the present facts and
circumstances, it is clear that once the suit
has abated or is dismissed, any person such
as the appellants claiming to be a legal
representative of the deceased would be
required to apply for setting aside the
abatement or dismissal of the suit under
Order XXII Rule 9 (2) of the Code.
However, if such an application is
dismissed, the order dismissing such an
application would be open to challenge in
an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(k) of the
Code.

18. From aforesaid, it is clear that
once the suit has abated or it is dismissed or
in the present case the appeal, it was open
to the person claiming to be legal
representative of the deceased to apply for
setting aside of abatement or dismissal of
the suit in terms of Order XXII Rule 9(2) of
the Code. However, in the present case,
there was no application either for setting
aside of abatement or dismissal of the suit
as required to be filed under Order XXII
Rule
9(2)
of
the
Code.
In
such
circumstances, it is evident that since there
was no application for setting aside
abatement or dismissal of the suit as
contemplated in paragraph 10(f) of the
aforesaid judgment, the connotation and
purport of the application A-59 remain as
an application for substitution under Order
XXII Rule 3 of the Code and by no stretch
of imagination can it be held to be an
application for setting aside of abatement.

19. In view of aforesaid, it is evident that
the respondent has rightly objected to the
maintainability of the appeal since it is not
maintainable from an order rejecting an
application under Order XXII Rule 3 of the
Code.

20. Consequently, the appeal fails and is
dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.

21. At this juncture, learned counsel for
appellants submits that the appeal is pending
consideration since year 2012 and even if now
an application for setting aside of abatement is
filed before the lower appellate court, it would
have
great
difficulty
with
regard
to
condonation of delay. Regarding the same, it is
apparent from the record that an application
for condonation of delay in filing the
substitution application is already on record
which has been overlooked while passing the
impugned order. As such, the same can be
considered and orders be passed thereupon due
to which pendency of the present appeal
should not come into the way although orders
pertaining to same would be required to be
passed by the court concerned who may also
take into account the provisions of Section 14
of the Limitation Act. However, no such
specific direction can be issued in the present
appeal since it has been dismissed on the issue
of non-maintainability.
----------
(2021)08ILR A26
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.08.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

F.A.F.O. No. 989 of 2012

M/S Kamalsons ...Appellant
Versus
Mrs. Sajma & Ors. ...Respondents
8 All. M/S Kamalsons Vs. Mrs. Sajma & Ors.
27
Counsel for the Appellant:
Brijendra Chaudhary, Raghunath Singh,
Vijai Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Prabhakar Trivedi

(A) Civil Law - The Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 - Section 2(15) - gross vehicle
weight , Section 66 - Necessity for permits
, Section 66(1) , 66(3)(i) , 150(2)(a)(i)(C)
, Section 173 - Appeal - principles of
purposive construction - In construing the
wordings of legislation, interpretation
which restricts the operation of the
statute should be avoided and a purposive
construction should be adopted which
would not defeat the very purpose of the
Act . (Para -16)

Offending vehicle was a goods vehicle - in terms
of Section 66(3)(i) - provision of Section 66(1)
of the Motor Vehicles Act not applicable to any
goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which
does not exceed 3000 kg - laden weight of the
offending vehicle - registration certificate - being
2750 Kg was well within the limits specified
under Section 66(3)(i) of Motor Vehicles Act -
offending vehicle did not require any specific
permit - findings of tribunal against the
appellant - not in accordance with the provisions
of Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles
Act.(Para - 6)

HELD:- Offending vehicle being covered by
provisions of Section 66 (3)(i) of the Motor
Vehicles Act was not required to have a
special permit since its gross vehicle weight in
terms of Section 2(15) was below 3000 kg.
The liability fastened by the Tribunal upon
appellant as such was incorrect and against
the provisions of law. Judgment and award
passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, set
aside, so far as it relates to issue pertaining
to liability of appellant to satisfy the award.
Respondent No.5 i.e. the National Insurance
Company Ltd. is required to satisfy the award.
(Para - 21)

Appeal allowed. (E- 6)

List of Cases cited:-
1. Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs Ashok Vishnu Kate,
[(1995) 6 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1385]

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

(C.M. Application No.31633 of 2018
for Restoration of the Appeal)

1. Application has been filed seeking
restoration of the appeal to its original
number by recalling of order dated
14.03.2018 whereby the appeal had been
dismissed
in
default
of
appearance.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of
answering respondent does not have any
objection in case the appeal is restored to
its original number. In view thereof the
application is allowed and the appeal is
restored to its original number recalling the
order dated 24.03.2018.

(Order On Memo of First Appeal
From Order)

1. Heard learned counsel for appellant
and learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent no.5.

2. The appeal is being heard and
decided today itself by the consent of
learned counsel for parties.

3. It is admitted between the parties
that the respondents no.1 to 4 are merely
proforma respondents and their being
unrepresented at the final hearing is of no
consequence.

4. First appeal from order has been
filed under Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act,1988 against the judgment and
award dated 28.05.2012 passed by Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal/ District Judge,
Barabanki in Claim Petition No.231 of
2009 whereby the claim petition was
28 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
allowed determining liability for payment
of compensation upon the owner of the
offending vehicle who is appellant herein.

5. The short question of law involved
in
the
present
appeal
pertains
to
interpretation of Section 66 and Section
2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

6. Learned counsel for appellant has
submitted that the offending vehicle was a
goods vehicle with unladen weight capacity
of 1625 kg and laden weight of 2750 Kg as
indicated in the registration certificate. It is
submitted that the issue with regard to
determination of liability for compensation
was formulated as issue no.6 by the
tribunal and has been held against the
appellant. Learned counsel has submitted
that as per Section 66(1) of the Motor
Vehicles Act,1988, the use of a vehicle as a
transport vehicle in any public place
whether actually carrying passenger or
goods or not has to be in term of conditions
of permit granted or countersigned by
Regional State Transport Authority or any
prescribed authority. It is submitted that in
terms of Section 66(3)(i), the provision of
Section 66(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act
would not be applicable to any goods
vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which
does not exceed 3000 kg. It is therefore
submitted that the laden weight of the
offending vehicle as per the registration
certificate being 2750 Kg was well within
the limits specified under Section 66(3)(i)
of Motor Vehicles Act, due to which the
offending vehicle did not require any
specific permit. Therefore, the findings of
the tribunal against the appellant is not in
accordance with the provisions of Section
66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

7. Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent no.5 has refuted the
submissions advanced by learned counsel
for appellant with the submission that the
provision of Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor
Vehicles Act have to be seen in the context
of the definition of gross vehicle weight as
given in Section 2(15) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 whereby the gross
vehicle weight in respect of any vehicle
means the total weight of the vehicle and
load certified and registered by the
registering authority as permissible for that
vehicle. In view of aforesaid submission,
learned counsel submits that for the said
purpose, the total weight of the vehicle has
to be taken as an addition of unladen
weight plus the laden weight. Considering
the aforesaid, it is submitted that the total
unladen weight of the offending vehicle
being 1625 Kg was required to be added to
the laden weight of the vehicle being 2750
kg i.e. a total weight of 4375 Kg. It is
submitted that the condition would indicate
gross vehicle weight of the offending
vehicle exceeding 3000 Kg as indicated in
Section 66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
due to which the offending vehicle was
required to have a permit for plying. Since
the offending vehicle did not have any
permit to ply the goods, the same
constituted a breach of the Insurance Policy
due to which the answering respondent was
not liable for compensation in terms of
Section 150(2)(a)(i)(C) of the Motor
Vehicles Act as the purpose of the vehicle
was not allowed by the permit under which
the vehicle was used.

8.

In
view
of
the
aforesaid
submissions, the following point arises for
determination, which is as follows:-

"Whether the offending vehicle
was required to ply only with a permit in
accordance with Section 66(1) and the
consequences on plying without such
8 All. M/S Kamalsons Vs. Mrs. Sajma & Ors.
29
permit under 150(2) (a) (i) (C) of the Motor
Vehicles Act,1988."

9. With regard to the aforesaid point
of determination, it is clear that the
respondent no.5, being Insurance Company
was liable to be excluded for payment of
compensation in terms of Section 150(2)
(a) (i) (C) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988
in case the offending vehicle was being
plied for a purpose which was not allowed
by the permit under which the vehicle was
used. The said question has to be seen in
the context of Section 66 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988. The aforesaid section is
as follows:

"66. Necessity for permits.-(1)
No owner of a Motor Vehicle shall use or
permit the use of the vehicle as a transport
vehicle in any public place whether or not
such vehicle is actually carrying any
passengers or goods save in accordance
with the conditions of a permit granted or
countersigned by a Regional or State
Transport Authority or any prescribed
authority authorizing him the use of the
vehicle in that place in the manner in which
the vehicle is being used:

Provided that a stage carriage
permit shall, subject to any conditions that
may be specified in the permit, authorize
the use of the vehicle as a contract
carriage:

Provided further that a stage
carriage permit may, subject to any
conditions that may be specified in the
permit, authorize the use of the vehicle as a
goods carriage either when carrying
passengers or not:

Provided also that a goods
carriage permit shall, subject to any
conditions that may be specified in the
permit, authorize the holder to use the
vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in
connection with a trade or business carried
on by him.

(2) The holder of a goods
carriage permit may use the vehicle, for the
drawing of any trailer or semi-trailer not
owned by him, subject to such conditions as
may be prescribed:

1[Provided that the holder of a
permit of any articulated vehicle may use
the prime-mover of that articulated vehicle
for any other semi-trailer]

(3)
The
provisions
of
subsection(1) shall not apply-

(a) to any transport vehicle
owned by the Central Government or a
State
Government
and
used
for
Government purposes unconnected with
any commercial enterprise;

(b) to any transport vehicle
owned by a local authority or by a person
acting under contract with a local authority
and used solely for road cleansing road
watering or conservancy purposes;

(c) to any transport vehicle used
solely for police, fire brigade or ambulance
purposes;

(d) to any transport vehicle used
solely for the conveyance of corpses and
the mourners accompanying the copies;

(e) to any transport vehicle used
for towing a disabled vehicle or for
removing goods from a disabled vehicle to
a place of safety;

(f) to any transport vehicle used
for any other public purpose as may be
prescribed by the State Government in this
behalf;

(g) to any transport vehicle used
by a person who manufactures or deals in
motor vehicles or builds bodies for
attachment to chassis, solely for such
purposes and in accordance with such
conditions as the Central Government may,
by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf;
30 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i) to any goods vehicle, the
gross vehicle weight of which does not
exceed 3,000 Kilograms;

(j) subject to such conditions as
the
Central
Government
may,
by
notification in the Official Gazette,
specify,
to
any
transport
vehicle
purchased in one State and proceeding to
a place, situated in that State or in any
other
State,
without
carrying
any
passenger or goods;

(k) to any transport vehicle
which has been temporarily registered
under Section 43 while proceeding empty
to
any
place
for
the
purpose
of
registration of the vehicle;

(m) to any transport vehicle
which, owing to flood, earthquake or any
other natural calamity, obstruction on
road, or unforeseen circumstances, is
required to be diverted through any other
route, whether within or outside the State
with a view to enabling it to reach its
destination;

(n) to any transport vehicle used
for such purposes as the Central or State
Government may, be order, specify;

(o) to any transport vehicle
which is subject to a hire-purpose, lease
or hypothecation agreement and which
owing to the default of the owner has
been taken possession of by or on behalf
of the person with whom the owner has
entered into such agreement, to enable
such
motor
vehicle
to
reach
its
destination; or

(p) to any transport vehicle
while proceeding empty to any place for
purpose of repair.

(4) Subject to the provisions of
sub-section (3), sub-section (1) shall, if
the State Government by rule made under
Section 96 so prescribes, apply to any
motor vehicle adapted to carry more than
nine persons excluding the driver."

10. From a reading of Section 66 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, it is discernible that
use of Motor Vehicle as a transport vehicle
in any public place whether carrying any
passengers or goods or not is prohibited
unless and until, it is in accordance with the
condition
of
a
permit
granted
or
countersigned by a Regional or State
Transport Authority or any prescribed
authority authorizing the use of the vehicle
in that place in the manner in which the
vehicle is being used.

11. The exception to Section 66(1) of
the Motor Vehicles Act is indicated in Subsection (2) with the relevant portion being
Sub-section 3(i) which indicates that the
provisions of Sub-section (1) would not
apply to any goods vehicle, the gross
vehicle weight of which does not exceed
3,000 Kg.

12. The definition of the word 'gross
vehicle weight' has been defined in Section
2(15) of the Motor Vehicles Act which is as
follows:

"(15) "gross vehicle weight"
means in respect of any vehicle the total
weight of the vehicle and load certified and
registered by the registering authority as
permissible for that vehicle;"

13. The definition of the word 'gross
vehicle weight' indicated in Section 2(15)
of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly means the
total weight of the vehicle and the load
certified and registered by the registering
authority. The terms of the aforesaid
section would clearly imply that the gross
vehicle weight of any vehicle would mean
the base unladen weight of vehicle plus the
load certified by registering authority as
being permissible for that vehicle.
8 All. M/S Kamalsons Vs. Mrs. Sajma & Ors.
31

14. In the present case, a perusal of
the registration certificate indicates that the
offending vehicle has an unladen weight of
1625 Kg with laden weight being 2750 kg.
The basic explanation of the gross vehicle
weight as indicated in Section 2(15) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would mean the
base unladen weight of the vehicle plus the
weight of load permitted. In the registration
certificate the laden weight of the vehicle in
question is clearly indicated as 2750 kg.
The meaning thereof clearly is that the base
unladen weight of the vehicle is 1625 Kg
with permissible load of 1125 kg. which in
its entirety would constitute laden weight
of the vehicle.

15. The submission of learned counsel
for answering respondent that the gross
vehicle weight of the offending vehicle as
defined in Section 2(15) of the Motor
Vehicles Act would mean the addition of
unladen weight of 1625 kg with laden weight
of 2750 kg does not hold good since the same
would do violence to the definition of the
word gross vehicle weight as defined under
Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles
Act,1988. From a bare understanding of
Section 2(15) of the Motor Vehicles
Act,1988, such an explanation to the
definition cannot be sustained.

16. With regard to interpretation of
statute, it is now well settled that the same
is to be read in its entirety and the purport
and object underlying the statute is required
to be given effect to by applying the
principles of purposive construction. It is
well settled that in construing the wordings
of legislation, interpretation which restricts
the operation of the statute should be
avoided and a purposive construction
should be adopted which would not defeat
the very purpose of the Act.

17. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the
case of Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok
Vishnu Kate has observed as under:-

13.In
Hindustan
Lever
Ltd.v.Ashok Vishnu Kate[(1995) 6 SCC 326
: 1995 SCC (L&S) 1385] this Court
observed : (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 41-42)

"41. In this connection, we may
usefully turn to the decision of this Court in
Workmenv. American Express International
Banking Corpn. [(1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985
SCC (L&S) 940] wherein Chinnappa
Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made
the following observations : (SCC p. 76)

'4. The principles of statutory
construction
are
well
settled.
Words
occurring in statutes of liberal import such
as social welfare legislation and human
rights' legislation are not to be put in
Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian
dimensions. In construing these legislations
the imposture of literal construction must
be avoided and the prodigality of its
misapplication must be recognised and
reduced.
Judges
ought
to
be
more
concerned with the "colour", the "content"
and the "context" of such statutes(we have
borrowed
the
words
from
Lord
Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v.Simmonds
[(1971) 1 WLR 1381 : (1971) 3 All ER 237
(HL)] ). In the same opinion Lord
Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to
be left behind in some island of literal
interpretation but is to enquire beyond the
language, unisolated from the matrix of
facts in which they are set; the law is not to
be interpreted purely on internal linguistic
considerations. In one of the cases cited
before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v.
Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cumLabour Court [(1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981
SCC (L&S) 16] we had occasion to say :
(SCC p. 447, para 6)
32 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"6.
?
Semantic
luxuries
are
misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and
butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of
necessity, receive a broad interpretation.
Where legislation is designed to give relief
against certain kinds of mischief, the court is
not to make inroads by making etymological
excursions." '

42.
Francis
Bennion
in
his
Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., has dealt
with the Functional Construction Rule in
Part XV of his book. The nature of purposive
construction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659
thus:

'A purposive construction of an
enactment is one which gives effect to the
legislative purpose by?

(a) following the literal meaning of
the enactment where that meaning is in
accordance with the legislative purpose (in
this Code called a purposive-and-literal
construction), or

(b) applying a strained meaning
where the literal meaning is not in
accordance with the legislative purpose (in
the Code called a purposive-and-strained
construction).'

At p. 661 of the same book, the
author has considered the topic of 'Purposive
Construction'
in
contrast
with
literal
construction.
The
learned
author
has
observed as under:

'Contrast
with
literal
construction.?Although the term "purposive
construction" is not new, its entry into fashion
betokens a swing by the appellate courts
away from literal construction. Lord Diplock
said in 1975:"If one looks back to the actual
decisions of the [House of Lords] on
questions of statutory construction over the
last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by
the evidence of a trend away from the purely
literal towards the purposive construction of
statutory
provisions."
The
matter
was
summed up by Lord Diplock in this way?

...I am not reluctant to adopt a
purposive construction where to apply the
literal meaning of the legislative language
used would lead to results which would
clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But
in doing so the task on which a court of
justice
is
engaged
remains
one
of
construction, even where this involves
reading into the Act words which are not
expressly included in it.' "

18. Once the entire laden weight of
the offending vehicle as per registration
certificate is indicated as 2750 kg,
obviously no permit for the offending
vehicle was required in terms of Section
66(3)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

19. From a perusal of the impugned
judgment and award, it is apparent that
although such a plea had been taken by the
appellant but the same has been rejected
while deciding issue no.6. However, the
reasoning of the tribunal with regard to
such submission of the appellant is not
quite understandable since the aforesaid
submission has been rejected only on the
ground that provisions of Section 66 of the
Motor Vehicles Act would be applicable
only in case they are notified in the official
gazette and since no such notification has
been issued in the official gazette, the
appellant would not derive any benefit
from Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

20. The impugned judgment and
award does not indicate as to why the
provision of Section 66 were required to be
separately notified in the gazette once the
Act itself in its entirety has been notified
and published in the gazette of India
Extract, part II dated 22.05.1989 and had
come into force on 01.07.1989. Section 66
of the Motor Vehicles Act does not indicate
that it would have to be notified separately
8 All. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Vashishtha Mauray
33
in the gazette. The said provision being a
part and parcel of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 therefore stood notified alongwith
notification of the Act itself in May, 1989.
The said ground by the Tribunal is clearly
against the provisions of statute.

21. Considering the aforesaid, it is
held that the offending vehicle being
covered by provisions of Section 66 (3)(i)
of the Motor Vehicles Act was not required
to have a special permit since its gross
vehicle weight in terms of Section 2(15)
was below 3000 kg. The liability fastened
by the Tribunal upon appellant as such was
incorrect and against the provisions of law.
In view of aforesaid, the appeal succeeds
and is allowed setting aside the judgment
and award dated 28.05.2012 passed by
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ District
Judge, Barabanki in Claim Petition No.231
of 2009, so far as it relates to issue no.6
pertaining to liability of appellant to satisfy
the award. As a consequence, it is held that
the Respondent No.5 i.e. the National
Insurance Company Ltd. is required to
satisfy the award. Parties shall bear their
own costs.
----------
(2021)08ILR A33
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.08.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

F.A.F.O. No. 1037 of 2008

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
Vashishtha Mauray ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
B.C. Pandey

Counsel for the Respondent:
Akhilesh
Kumar
Srivastava,
Prabhakar
Tiwari, R.K. Singh, Rajendra Pratap Singh

(A) Civil Law - The Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 - Section 170 - Impleading insurer in
certain cases , Section 173 - Appeals -
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 103 -
Burden of proof as to certain fact -
contributory
negligence
-
once
the
defendants
had
failed
to
raise
the
necessary pleadings and no issue was
framed and no evidence was produced on
the said question, then it was not open for
the defendants to make out a new
case.(Para -16)

Present appeal pertains to the factum of
contributory negligence on the part of the
claimant due to which he has suffered
injuries.Para - 6)

HELD:- There is no pleading on behalf of the
defendant-appellant (Insurance Company) with
regard to contributory negligence on the part of
the claimant and therefore rightly no issue with
regard to the said fact has been framed by the
Tribunal. Evidence on record has been clearly
considered by the Tribunal in a cogent and
reasonable manner and, therefore, also the
submissions
of
the
defendant-appellant
regarding
contributory
negligence
of
the
claimant
does
not
hold
any
good
ground.Claimant-respondent is granted liberty
to move appropriate application for withdrawal
of the outstanding awarded amount which shall
be paid upon such an application being made
with up to date interest.(Para - 17,21,23)

Appeal dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Bachhaj Nahar Vs Nilima M&al & anr. , Civil
Appeal No.5798-5799 of 2008

2. Ram Swarup Gupta (Dead) by LRs Vs Bishun
Narain Inter College & ors. , (1987) 2 SCC 555

3. Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs Mohamed Haji Latif
& ors., AIR 1968 SC 1413