# M/s Krishak Bharti Co-Operative Ltd. Kribhco Surat Gujrat v. Union of India

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 750
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-08-16
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 236 of 2002
- **Bench:** Ajay Bhanot
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-krishak-bharti-co-operative-ltd-kribhco-surat-gujrat-v-union-of-india-50570
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Railway Claim Tribunal Act,
1987-Section 23 read with Railway Claim
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989- the son
of the claimants died in an accident and
application was filed for compensation
before the Tribunal- one day the claimants
were absent and the application was
dismissed for default- Tribunal dismissed
the application in default and for restoring
the matter stating that the provisions of
the Limitation Act for filing application will
not be applicable-Tribunal held that There
is a time limit of 30 days in filing the
application-If sufficient cause is made out,
Tribunal has got power to condone the
delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act
as there is no specific exclusion or
prohibition in the section for extending
the time. Hence, considering the mandate
of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
section
5
of
the
Limitation
Act
is
applicable-Here, adequate reasons are
given by the appellants for condoning the
delay-Therefore, the Tribunal ought to
have condoned the delay.(Para 1 to 14)

B. Rule 18 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules prescribes the time
limit of 30 days in filing an application for
setting aside an order dismissing the
application for default. But, there is no
specific exclusion or prohibition in the
section for extending the time. Hence,
considering the mandate of section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act, section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable. It is true that
before Mukri Gopalan's case, there were a
large number of decisions to the effect
that section 5 of the Limitation Act is
applicable only to a civil court. Now it has
been consistently held that in the absence
of specific exclusion or prohibition, it
limitation is prescribed in a special law for
filing an application, by virtue of section 5
read with section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act, Tribunal which has all the trappings
of court can condone delay on sufficient
reasons. This is all the more applicable to
the Railway Claims Tribunal in setting
aside any order of dismissal for default of
the applicant in view of section 18(3) of
the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
(Para 6,7)
The appeal is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

750 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the ground of fraud. The very idea of
settlement through mediation or amicable
means runs and progresses through this
realm of philosophy. The Family Court in
the present case had of course not gone into
legality of MOU being undisputed, but had
rather refrained from exercising the power
by virtue of the bar under Section 13-B of
the Hindu Marriage Act. The mandate of
the
statute
remains
procedural.
The
substantive right of the two parties to settle
the conflict by an amicable settlement in a
case where the settlement so arrived is free,
the law must honour such a right. The
amicable means of settlement serve the
object of justice which the law fails to
deliver between the parties at times giving
rise to exceptional situations. This object of
all amicable settlements is bound to be
respected and recognized by the courts of
law in all such cases where the MOU
remains unquestionable and the parties
have acted upon freely in the pursuit of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India to
live with dignity.

7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Amit Kumar Vs. Suman Beniwal
reported in 2021 SCC Online 1270 has
though observed that the institution of
marriage is to be saved by preventing hasty
dissolution of marriage, but at the same
time once the parties have separated and
separation has continued on account of the
irretrievable
breakdown,
in
such
a
situation the Apex Court taking the aid of
Naveen Kohli Vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4
SCC 558 has also opined otherwise. The
parties to a marriage if allowed to litigate
would also not achieve the purpose of law
and would thus damage the institution of
marriage in equal measure. It is for this
reason
that
an
amicable
settlement
deserves to be recognized in law with
promptitude.

8. Both the parties before us have
submitted that the MOU arrived at on
28.04.2023 has been acted upon and there
is no issue out of the wedlock. Both the
parties are educated and have parted ways
out of their free will and looking to the
irreparable situation which has made the
marriage
unworkable,
to
allow
the
proceedings linger on, in such a case,
would amount to defeat the purpose of
MOU and distance the parties from the
succour of justice. It is in the peculiar
circumstances of the case, we hereby set
aside the impugned order passed by the
Family Court and remit the matter for being
decided afresh. The period of six months
which remains short of about two months
now deserves to be waived off and the
application 12-C is accordingly allowed.
The Family Court is hereby directed to
finalize the proceedings under Section 13-B
not later than two weeks from the date a
certified copy of this order is filed.

9. With the aforesaid observation, the
instant appeal is disposed of.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 750
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 236 of 2002

M/s Krishak Bharti Co-Operative Ltd.
Kribhco Surat Gujrat ...Appellant
Versus
Union of India ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Ashok Kumar Bhatnagar

Counsel for the Respondents:
8 All. M/s Krishak Bharti Co-Operative Ltd. Kribhco Surat Gujrat Vs. Union of India
751
A. Srivastava, Anil Srivastava, J.P. Maurya

A. Civil Law - Railway Claim Tribunal Act,
1987-Section 23 read with Railway Claim
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989- the son
of the claimants died in an accident and
application was filed for compensation
before the Tribunal- one day the claimants
were absent and the application was
dismissed for default- Tribunal dismissed
the application in default and for restoring
the matter stating that the provisions of
the Limitation Act for filing application will
not be applicable-Tribunal held that There
is a time limit of 30 days in filing the
application-If sufficient cause is made out,
Tribunal has got power to condone the
delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act
as there is no specific exclusion or
prohibition in the section for extending
the time. Hence, considering the mandate
of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
section
5
of
the
Limitation
Act
is
applicable-Here, adequate reasons are
given by the appellants for condoning the
delay-Therefore, the Tribunal ought to
have condoned the delay.(Para 1 to 14)

B. Rule 18 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules prescribes the time
limit of 30 days in filing an application for
setting aside an order dismissing the
application for default. But, there is no
specific exclusion or prohibition in the
section for extending the time. Hence,
considering the mandate of section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act, section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable. It is true that
before Mukri Gopalan's case, there were a
large number of decisions to the effect
that section 5 of the Limitation Act is
applicable only to a civil court. Now it has
been consistently held that in the absence
of specific exclusion or prohibition, it
limitation is prescribed in a special law for
filing an application, by virtue of section 5
read with section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act, Tribunal which has all the trappings
of court can condone delay on sufficient
reasons. This is all the more applicable to
the Railway Claims Tribunal in setting
aside any order of dismissal for default of
the applicant in view of section 18(3) of
the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
(Para 6,7)
The appeal is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shyam Santaram Sali (Marathi) Vs UOI, Guj.
HC

2. Mukri Gopalan's case (1995) AIR SC 2272

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

1.

Heard
Shri
Ashok
Kumar
Bhatnagar,
learned
counsel
for
the
appellant and Shri Varun Pandey, learned
counsel for the respondent-Union of India.

2. The instant first appeal from order
arises out of a judgement and order dated
09.02.2000 as well as 21.01.2002 under
Section 23 of the Railway Claim Tribunal
Act in Claim Case No.9700392 passed by
the learned Railway Claims Tribunal,
Lucknow Bench, Lucknow dismissing the
claim of the appellant in default on
09.02.2000 and rejecting the restoration
application by order dated 21.01.2002.

3. The learned Tribunal in the
impugned judgement dated 21.01.2002 has
declined the application for restoration on
the footing that it was time barred and the
delay cannot be condoned since the
Limitation Act does not apply to the
proceedings under the Railway Claim
Tribunal Act, 1987 read with Railway
Claim Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989.

4. The facts are narrow in compass.
The claim case filed by the appellant was
dismissed
for
non
prosecution
on
09.02.2000. Thereafter, the appellant filed a
restoration
application
on 04.10.2000.
There was a delay of 8 months in
instituting the application for restoration.
752 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The time limit for filing an application to
set
aside
the
order
dismissing
the
application for default is 30 days.

5. The question is whether the
application
under
Section
5
of
the
Limitation Act applies to the proceedings
under the Railway Claim Tribunal Act,
1987 read with Railway Claim Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1989 and whether the
delay condonation application was liable to
be heard on merits. The legal issue which
arises for determination has been decided
by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in
Shyam Santaram Sali (Marathi) v.
Union of India by holding as under:

"6.Rule 18 of the Railway Claims
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules prescribes the
time limit of 30 days in filing an
application for setting aside an order
dismissing the application for default. But,
there is no specific exclusion or prohibition
in the section for extending the time.
Hence, considering the mandate of section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable. It is true that
before Mukri Gopalan's case, AIR 1995 SC
2272, there were a large number of
decisions to the effect that section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable only to a civil
court. Now it has been consistently held
that in the absence of specific exclusion or
prohibition, it limitation is prescribed in a
special law for filing an application, by
virtue of section 5 read with section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act, Tribunal which has
all the trappings of court can condone delay
on sufficient reasons. This is all the more
applicable to the Railway Claims Tribunal
in setting aside any order of dismissal for
default of the applicant in view of section
18(3) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act,
1987.

7. In view of the above discussions,
we are of the opinion that section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable and Tribunal
should have condoned the delay as
sufficient reasons are given for condoning
the delay. Here, the son of the claimants
died in an accident and application was
filed for compensation before the Tribunal.
It is true that on one day the claimants were
absent and the application was dismissed
for default. By filing an application for
setting aside the order dismissing the
application in default and for restoring the
matter, the provisions of the Limitation Act
for filing application will not be applicable.
There is a time limit of 30 days in filing the
application. Therefore, it has to be filed
within 30 days. If sufficient cause is made
out, Tribunal has got power to condone the
delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act
and liberal approach has to be adopted by
the Tribunal. Here, adequate reasons are
given by the appellants for condoning the
delay. Therefore, the Tribunal ought to
have condoned the delay. Therefore, we
condone the delay in filing the application
for setting aside the order dismissing the
application for default and the matter is
remanded to the Tribunal for deciding the
question on merits. We are not expressing
any opinion regarding the merits of the
matter. Parties shall appear before the
Tribunal on 14.01.2008. The appeal is
allowed."

6.

The
same
issue
fell
for
consideration before the Hon'ble Gujarat
High Court in Dharmesh Madhubhai
Parmar v. Union of India wherein the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act to the proceedings under the Railway
Claim Tribunal Act, 1987 read with
Railway Claim Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
1989 was affirmed and the application for
8 All. M/s Krishak Bharti Co-Operative Ltd. Kribhco Surat Gujrat Vs. Union of India
753
delay condonation was allowed on merits
stating the legal position as under:

"6. Rule 18 of the Railway Claims
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules prescribes the
time limit of 30 days in filing an
application for setting aside an order
dismissing the application for default. But,
there is no specific exclusion or prohibition
in the section for extending the time.
Hence, considering the mandate of section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable. It is true that
before Mukri Gopalan's case, AIR 1995 SC
2272, there were a large number of
decisions to the effect that section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable only to a civil
court. Now it has been consistently held
that in the absence of specific exclusion or
prohibition, it limitation is prescribed in a
special law for filing an application, by
virtue of section 5 read with section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act, Tribunal which has
all the trappings of court can condone delay
on sufficient reasons. This is all the more
applicable to the Railway Claims Tribunal
in setting aside any order of dismissal for
default of the applicant in view of section
18(3) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act,
1987.

7. In view of the above discussions,
we are of the opinion that section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable and Tribunal
should have condoned the delay as
sufficient reasons are given for condoning
the delay. Here, the son of the claimants
died in an accident and application was
filed for compensation before the Tribunal.
It is true that on one day the claimants were
absent and the application was dismissed
for default. By filing an application for
setting aside the order dismissing the
application in default and for restoring the
matter, the provisions of the Limitation Act
for filing application will not be applicable.
There is a time limit of 30 days in filing the
application. Therefore, it has to be filed
within 30 days. If sufficient cause is made
out, Tribunal has got power to condone the
delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act
and liberal approach has to be adopted by
the Tribunal. Here, adequate reasons are
given by the appellants for condoning the
delay. Therefore, the Tribunal ought to
have condoned the delay. Therefore, we
condone the delay in filing the application
for setting aside the order dismissing the
application for default and the matter is
remanded to the Tribunal for deciding the
question on merits. We are not expressing
any opinion regarding the merits of the
matter. Parties shall appear before the
Tribunal on 14.01.2008. The appeal is
allowed."

8. The judgments rendered by the
Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Shyam
Santaram Sali (Marathi) (supra) and
Dharmesh Madhubhai Parmar (supra)
will govern the fate of this case as well.

9. In the wake of the preceding
discussion, this Court finds that Section 5
of the Limitation Act is applicable to the
proceedings taken out under the Railway
Claim Tribunal Act, 1987 read with
Railway Claim Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
1989. The delay condonation application
filed
in
support
of
the
restoration
application is liable to be considered on
merits.

10. The cause shown for the application
for delay condonation discloses that the
case was transferred from the Tribunal at
Gorakhpur to the Railway Claims Tribunal
at Lucknow. Due to oversight on part of the
office of the learned counsel for the
appellant,
this
fact
could
not
be
754 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
communicated
to
the
appellant.
The
absence of the appellant /his counsel when
the matter was taken up for hearing before
the learned Railway Claims Tribunal at
Lucknow was due to bonafide reasons and
for circumstances beyond his control. The
appellant upon getting knowledge of the
order dismissing the claim petition for non
prosecution immediately filed a restoration
application without further delay. The
application for delay condonation discloses
that the cause for delay was genuine,
bonafide and the delay was not intentional.
This Court also finds that the appellant was
always diligent in the prosecution of his
claim. Moreover, when the substantive
rights of the parties are engaged before the
courts, the endeavour of the courts is
always to serve substantive justice and not
shut the doors of justice to the claimants on
technicalities.

11. In this wake, the application for
delay
condonation
is
liable
to
be
entertained and is allowed. The restoration
application is liable to be allowed and is
allowed.

12. The judgement and order dated
09.02.2000 as well as 21.01.2002 passed by
the learned Railway Claims Tribunal,
Lucknow Bench, Lucknow is liable to be
set aside and is set aside.

13. The matter is remitted to the
learned tribunal for decision on merits.

14. The instant first appeal from order
is allowed.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 754
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.07.2023

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ASHUTOSH SRIVASTAVA, J.

First Appeal from Order No. 301 of 2020

Ruhi Arora & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
Smt. Monika & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Santosh Tripathi, Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, Sri
Ashok
Kumar Bais, Sri Ramesh Chandra
Srivastava, Sri Dev Dutt Arora(In-Person), Sri
M.D. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.D. Ojha

Civil Law-Motor Vehicle Act, 1988-Section
173-Challenge to-award of compensation-
unmarried
sister
and
father
of
the
deceased filed seeking to modify the
award - The appellant No. 1(unmarried
sister)
has
not
been
awarded
any
compensation-The
appellant
No.
2
(father) has been awarded 10% of the
compensation
computed
i.e.
Rs.5,23,032.80 or Rs.5,28,033/-. The wife
and minor children of the deceased have
been awarded 60%, 15% and 15% of the
compensation along with 6% interest per
annum-Tribunal manifestly erred in law in
denying
the
compensation
to
the
appellant No. 1 (sister of the deceased) on
the ground that she could not be treated
to be dependent upon her deceased
brother during the life time of her father
(Appellant No. 2)-She was also liable to be
awarded compensation to the extent of
15% of the amount of compensation
awarded- Moreso, the Tribunal wrongly
apportioned
10%
amount
for
the
appellant No. 2 whereas he ought to have
been awarded 20% as he lost his only
son-As per Apex Court decision in Magna
General Insurance Case and the decision
in Pranay Sethi Case, the surviving
spouse (wife of the deceased) is entitled
for spousal consortium to the extent of
40,000/- instead of Rs. 2,500/- awardedLikewise the funeral expenses are liable to
be increased to Rs. 15,000/- from Rs.
2,500/- awarded - The appellants herein