# M/s LR Print Solutions v. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 89
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-28
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 8387 of 2024
- **Bench:** Piyush Agrawal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-lr-print-solutions-v-m-s-exflo-sanitation-pvt-ltd-ors-53071
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950Artcle 227 - The Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996-Sections 34 & 37- Payment of
mense profit for not complying the award
in its letter and spirit- Petitioner has not
vacated the premises in question within 30 days
from the date of passing the award and further
the petitioner has not brought any material on
record to show that the award was stayed by
any of the competent Court--- The arbitral
award was not stayed or any material was
brought on record otherwise and ultimately the
award has been affirmed by the Apex Court and
no proceedings are pending thereafter---the
contesting respondent no. 1 is entitled for
mesne profits as the award was not complied
with in its letter and spiri. (Para 22 & 25)

Petition lacks merit, dismissed. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:
90 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

3 All. M/s LR Print Solutions Vs. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
89

(c) reasons for the decision; and
-

(d) where the decree appealed
from is reversed or varied, the relief to
which the appellant is entitled.

4. The appellate Court has
jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the
findings of the trial Court. The first appeal
is a valuable right of the parties and unless
restricted by law, the whole case therein is
open for re-hearing both on questions of
fact and law. The judgment of the appellate
Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious
application of mind and record findings
supported by reasons, on all the issues
arising along with the contentions put-forth
and pressed by the parties for decision of
the appellate Court. Sitting as a court of
first appeal, it was the duty of the High
Court to deal with all the issues and the
evidence
led
by
the
parties
before
recording its findings. The first appeal is a
valuable right and the parties have a right
to be heard both on questions of law and on
facts and the judgment in the first appeal
must address itself to all the issues of law
and fact and decide it by giving reasons in
support of the findings."

15. From perusal of 107 C.P.C. as
well as judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in
B. V. Nagesh(Supra), it is apparent that
appellate Court has ample power to take
additional evidence or to require such
evidence to be taken, the Appellate Court
shall have the same powers and shall
perform as nearly as may be the same
duties as are conferred and imposed by this
Code on Courts of original jurisdiction.
Therefore, there is no illegality in the
impugned order dated 17.05.2024.

16. Therefore, in light of facts of
the case, provisions of CPC and law laid
down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in B. V.
Nagesh(Supra), I found no infirmity in the
impugned order dated 17.05.2024. Petition
lacks merits and is accordingly, dismissed.

17. No order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 89
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 8387 of 2024

M/s LR Print Solutions ...Petitioner
Versus
M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Mr. Abhishek Kumar, Mr. Ishwar Kumar
Upadhyay

Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr. Ishir Sripat

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950Artcle 227 - The Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996-Sections 34 & 37- Payment of
mense profit for not complying the award
in its letter and spirit- Petitioner has not
vacated the premises in question within 30 days
from the date of passing the award and further
the petitioner has not brought any material on
record to show that the award was stayed by
any of the competent Court--- The arbitral
award was not stayed or any material was
brought on record otherwise and ultimately the
award has been affirmed by the Apex Court and
no proceedings are pending thereafter---the
contesting respondent no. 1 is entitled for
mesne profits as the award was not complied
with in its letter and spiri. (Para 22 & 25)

Petition lacks merit, dismissed. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:
90 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. M/s Shree Vishnu Constructions. Vs The
Engineer in Chief Military Engineering Services &
ors., 2023 8 SCC 329

2. U.O.I.& ors. Vs M/s Banwari Lal and sons (P)
Ltd. AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1983

3.
Small
Scale
Industrial
Manufactures
Association (Reg.) Vs U.O.I.& ors., (2021) 8 SCC
511.

4. Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs Kochi
Cricket Pvt. Ltd. & ors. ( 2018) 6 SCC 287;

5. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.& ors. Vs
U.O.I.& ors., AIR 2020 SC 122;

6. St. of Rajasthan & ors. Vs J.K. Synthetics Ltd.
& ors., (2011) 2 SCC 518

(Delivered by Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Abhishek Kumar along
with Mr. Ishwar Kumar Upadhyay, learned
counsel for the petitioner; Mr. Rahul Sripat,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.
Ishir Sripat, learned counsel for the
respondents.

2. The petition u/a 227 has been
filed
for
quashing
the
order
dated
24.6.2024 passed by the Executing Court /
Commercial Court No. 2, District Gautam
Buddh Nagar in Execution Case No. 108 of
2021.

3. Brief facts as stated in the writ
petition are that the petitioner is tenant of
the industrial plot no. C - 156, Sector 10,
NOIDA (area 114 Sq. Meter) (ground floor
of the building), since the date of execution
of tenancy agreement dated 1.7.2008 at the
rate of Rs. 8000/- per month. The
agreement was unregistered for a period of
11 months for manufacturing purpose
which continued even after expiry of the
period. There was a dispute between the
plaintiff
-petitioner
and
defendant
respondent no. 1 with regard to the
payment of rent, therefore, respondent no. 1
has filed a S.C.C. Case no. 19 of 2011 for
ejection of the petitioner. In the said suit,
the petitioner has filed an application for
rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC on the ground that since there is an
arbitration clause in the rent agreement
between the parties, as such, the dispute is
required to be decided by the Arbitrator
alone and the Court has no jurisdiction in
the matter. The said application has been
objected by respondent no. 1, however, the
Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated
19.9.2015 has rejected the plaint of the
respondent. Thereafter, respondent no. 1
has filed Arbitration petition before the sole
Arbitrator for the same relief in which the
petitioner has filed written statement.
Thereafter, the Arbitrator has allowed the
claim of the respondent no. 1 vide award
dated
19.7.2017,
against
which
the
petitioner has filed an objection under
Section
34
of
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation
Act,
1996
before
the
Commercial Court, Gautam Buddha Nagar.
The said objection under Section 34 was
rejected vide order dated 30.6.2022. Being
aggrieved to the said order, the petitioner
has filed Arbitration Appeal Defective no.
46 of 2022, under Section 37 of the Act
before this Court, which was rejected vide
order dated 6.12.2022. Thereafter the
petitioner has approached the Apex Court
in Special Leave Petition, which was also
dismissed.
During
pendency
of
the
objection filed by petitioner under Section
34 of the Act, respondent no. 1 has sold the
property in question to respondent no. 2
vide registered sale deed dated 5.3.2021
against which Suit No. 342 of 2021 was
filed by the petitioner before the Civil
Judge (Sr. Division), Gautam Buddha
Nagar for cancellation of sale deed dated
5.3.2021, which was rejected vide order
3 All. M/s LR Print Solutions Vs. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
91
dated 29.5.2023. The said order has been
challenged by the petitioner before this
Court in First Appeal No. 1000 of 2023,
which was admitted on 10.4.2024. In the
Execution Case No. 108 of 2021, the
decree holder moved an application on
3.4.2024, which was objected by the
petitioner but the court below has allowed
the application bearing paper no. 89 Ga
filed by the contesting respondent by the
impugned order dated 24.6.2024 and
judgement debtor/ petitioner was directed
to make payment of Rs. 8,58,795/-. Hence
the present petition.

4.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner submits that the award dated
19.7.2017 contemplate that if the same was
not complied within 30 days then the
petitioner would be liable to pay Rs. 15
thousand
as
mesne
profits
to
the
claimant/respondent no. 1 with compound
interest @ 10 % from 20.8.2017 till
handing over of the possession. He further
submits that the application under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act is filed within
time , the award would be deemed to be
stayed and the petitioner was not obliged to
comply with the direction of the award. He
further submits that once the award is not
operative, there is no question of mesne
profits to be paid by the petitioner to
respondent no. 1. He further submits that
once by operation of law, the award was
stayed merely on filing of the application
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,
there is no liability upon the petitioner for
making payment of the amount of mesne
profits. He further submits that by the
impugned order, the Court has not
considered
the
matter
in
a
proper
prospective, therefore, it is liable to be set
aside. He further submits that the court
below has wrongly calculated the amount
for payment for the period of December
2020 to March 2021 as the payment of said
period is already made by the petitioner. He
prays for allowing the present petition.

5. In support of his argument,
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the following judgements:-

 (i)
M/s
Shree
Vishnu
Constructions. Vs. The Engineer in Chief
Military
Engineering
Services
and
others, 2023 8 SCC 329;

(ii) Union of India and others
Vs. M/s Banwari Lal and sons (P) Ltd.
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1983;

(iii)
Small
Scale
Industrial
Manufactures Association (Reg.) Vs.
Union of India and others, (2021) 8 SCC
511.

6. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Sripat,
learned Senior Counsel submits that the
impugned order has been passed in
accordance
with
law,
therefore,
no
interference is warranted. He further
submits that award dated 19.7.2017 clearly
provides for payment of mesne profits and
penal interest in case of non compliance. It
is admitted fact that petitioner did not
vacate the premises till April 2024,
therefore, as per the award, the petitioner
was duty bound to make payment of mesne
profits along with interest. He further
submits that the award dated 19.7.2017 has
attained finality and at no stage, the said
award was stayed by any of the competent
Court and further no proceeding against the
same is pending in any of the court of law.

7. He further submits that the
petitioner has instituted the application
under Section 34 of the Act in the year
2017 but has not brought any material on
record to show that the interim order was
granted in its favour, therefore, it is
92 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
incorrect to say on the part of the petitioner
that merely filing of the application under
Section 34 of the Act, automatic stay was
deemed in favour of the petitioner.

8.
In
order
to
buttress
his
submission, learned Senior Counsel further
submits that in the year 2015, the
Arbitration Act has been amended and
admittedly, the present proceedings under
Section 34 was initiated by the petitioner in
the year 2017, therefore, merely filing of
the application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, no automatic stay can be
deemed in favour of the petitioner.

9. In support of his submission,
learned Senior Counsel for the respondent
has relied upon the following judgement:-

(i) Board of Control for Cricket
in India Vs. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. and
others ( 2018) 6 SCC 287;

(ii)
Hindustan
Construction
Company Limited and others Vs. Union
of India and others, AIR 2020 SC 122;

(iii) State of Rajasthan and
others Vs. J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and
others, (2011) 2 SCC 518.

10. He further submits that in the
case
of
Hindustan
Construction
Company Limited (supra) the Apex Court
has categorically held that no automatic
stay of the award would lie merely filing of
an application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act.

11. Learned Senior Counsel further
submits that the executing court has rightly
computed the mesne profits with interest and
it is not open for the petitioner at this stage to
challenge the grant of penal interest in favour
of respondent vide award dated 19.7.2017 as
the award has attained finality up to the stage
of Hon'ble the Supreme Court. He prays for
dismissal of the present writ petition.

12. After hearing learned counsel for
the parties, the Court has perused the records.

13. It is admitted between the parties
that the award has been passed on 19.7.2017,
in which the petitioner was directed to vacate
the premises in question and hand over the
peaceful possession within 30 days from the
date of passing the award, failing which the
respondent -claimant shall be entitled not
only for the rent but also the mesne profits
along with interest. It is also not in dispute
that against the said award, the petitioner has
filed an application under Section 34 of the
Act in the year 2017. It is also not in dispute
that the possession as per the direction of the
award was handed over in the month of April
2024.

14. The argument was raised by the
counsel for the petitioner that mere filing of
the application under Section 34 of the Act,
the arbitral award was stayed, therefore, no
default has been committed by the petitioner
which entitles respondent no. 1 to claim
mesne profits. But the record reveals that
application under Section 34 of the Act was
filed by the petitioner in the year 2017 and
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was
amended with effect from 23.10.2015.
Section 34 of the Act is considered to be
Court proceedings and amendment made
therein will apply prospectively as held by
the Apex Court in the case of Board of
Control for Cricket in India (supra) and
same was further clarified in the case of
Shree Vishnu Constructions (supra).

15. The relevant para of the
judgement passed by the Apex Court in the
case of Board of Control for Cricket in
India (supra) are quoted hereunder:-
3 All. M/s LR Print Solutions Vs. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
93

"25. That the expression "the
arbitral proceedings" refers to proceedings
before an arbitral tribunal is clear from the
heading of Chapter V of the 1996 Act,
which reads as follows:

"Conduct
of
Arbitral
Proceedings"

The entire chapter consists of
Sections 18 to 27 dealing with the conduct
of arbitral proceedings before an arbitral
tribunal. What is also important to notice is
that these proceedings alone are referred
to, the expression "to" as contrasted with
the expression "in relation to" making this
clear. Also, the reference to Section 21 of
the 1996 Act, which appears in Chapter V,
and
which
speaks
of
the
arbitral
proceedings commencing on the date on
which a request for a dispute to be referred
to arbitration is received by the respondent,
would also make it clear that it is these
proceedings, and no others, that form the
subject matter of the first part of Section
26. Also, since the conduct of arbitral
proceedings is largely procedural in
nature, parties may "otherwise agree" and
apply the Amendment Act to arbitral
proceedings that have commenced before
the Amendment Act came into force. In
stark contrast to the first part of Section 26
is the second part, where the Amendment
Act is made applicable "in relation to"
arbitral proceedings which commenced on
or after the date of commencement of the
Amendment Act. What is conspicuous by its
absence in the second part is any reference
to Section 21 of the 1996 Act. Whereas the
first
part
refers
only
to
arbitral
proceedings before an arbitral tribunal, the
second part refers to Court proceedings
"in relation to" arbitral proceedings, and
it is the commencement of these Court
proceedings that is referred to in the
second part of Section 26, as the words "in
relation to" the arbitral proceedings" in
the second part are not controlled by the
application of Section 21 of the 1996 Act.

Section 26, therefore, bifurcates
proceedings, as has been stated above, with
a great degree of clarity, into two sets of
proceedings
-
arbitral
proceedings
themselves, and Court proceedings in
relation thereto. The reason why the first
part of Section 26 is couched in negative
form is only to state that the Amendment
Act will apply even to arbitral proceedings
commenced before the amendment if
parties otherwise agree. If the first part of
Section 26 were couched in positive
language (like the second part), it would
have been necessary to add a proviso
stating that the Amendment Act would
apply
even
to
arbitral
proceedings
commenced before the amendment if the
parties agree. In either case, the intention
of the legislature remains the same, the
negative form conveying exactly what could
have been stated positively, with the
necessary proviso. Obviously, "arbitral
proceedings" having been subsumed in the
first part cannot re-appear in the second
part, and the expression "in relation to
arbitral proceedings" would, therefore,
apply only to Court proceedings which
relate to the arbitral proceedings. The
scheme of Section 26 is thus clear: that the
Amendment Act is prospective in nature,
and
will
apply
to
those
arbitral
proceedings that are commenced, as
understood by Section 21 of the principal
Act, on or after the Amendment Act, and to
Court proceedings which have commenced
on or after the Amendment Act came into
force.

....

43. The matter can also be
looked at from a slightly different angle.
Section 36, prior to the Amendment Act,
74 is only a clog on the right of the decree
holder, who cannot execute the award in
94 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
his favour, unless the conditions of this
section are met. This does not mean that
there is a corresponding right in the
judgment debtor to stay the execution of
such an award. Learned counsel on behalf
of the Appellants have, however, argued
that a substantive change has been made in
the award, which became an executable
decree
only
after
the
Section
34
proceedings were over, but which is now
made executable as if it was a decree with
immediate effect, and that this change
would, therefore, take away a vested right
or accrued privilege in favour of the
Respondents. It has been argued, relying
upon a number of judgments, that since
Section 36 is a part of the enforcement
process of awards, there is a vested right or
at least a privilege accrued in favour of the
Appellants in the unamended 1996 Act
applying insofar as arbitral proceedings
and court proceedings in relation thereto
have
commenced,
prior
to
the
commencement of the Amendment Act. The
very judgment strongly relied upon by
senior counsel for the appellants, namely
Garikapati Veeraya (supra), itself states in
proposition (v) at page 515, that the vested
right of appeal can be taken away only by a
subsequent enactment, if it so provides
specifically or by necessary intendment and
not otherwise. We have already held that
Section 26 does specifically provide that
the court proceedings in relation to arbitral
proceedings,
being
independent
from
arbitral proceedings, would not be viewed
as a continuation of arbitral proceedings,
but would be viewed separately. This being
the case, it is unnecessary to refer to
judgments such as Union of India v. A.L.
Rallia Ram, (1964) 3 SCR 164 and NBCC
Ltd. v. J.G. Engineering (P) Ltd., (2010) 2
SCC 385, which state that a Section 34
proceeding is a supervisory and not an
appellate
proceeding.
Snehadeep
Structures (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra SmallScale Industries Development Corpn. Ltd.,
(2010) 3 SCC 34 at 47-49, which was cited
for the purpose of stating that a Section 34
proceeding
could
be
regard
as
an
"appeal" within the meaning of Section 7
of the Interest on Delayed Payments To
Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial
Undertakings Act, 1993, is obviously
distinguishable on the ground that it
pertains to the said expression appearing
in a beneficial enactment, whose object
would be defeated if the word "appeal" did
not include a Section 34 application. This
is made clear by the aforesaid judgment
itself as follows:
 "36. On a perusal of the plethora
of decisions aforementioned, we are of the
view that "appeal" is a term that carries a
wide range of connotations with it and that
appellate jurisdiction can be exercised in a
variety of forms. It is not necessary that the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction will
always involve re- agitation of entire
matrix of facts and law. We have already
seen in Abhayankar [(1969) 2 SCC 74] that
even an order passed by virtue of limited
power of revision under Section 115 of the
Code is treated as an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, though under that provision,
the Court cannot go into the questions of
facts. Given the weight of authorities in
favour of giving such a wide meaning to the
term "appeal", we are constrained to
disagree with the contention of the learned
counsel for the respondent Corporation
that appeal shall mean only a challenge to
a decree or order where the entire matrix
of law and fact can be re-agitated with
respect to the impugned order/decree.
There is no quarrel that Section 34
envisages only limited grounds of challenge
to an award; however, we see no reason
why that alone should take out an
application under Section 34 outside the
3 All. M/s LR Print Solutions Vs. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
95
ambit of an appeal especially when even a
power of revision is treated as an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction by this Court and
the Privy Council.
****

40. It may be noted that Section
6(1) empowers the buyer to obtain the due
payment by way of any proceedings. Thus
the proceedings that the buyer can resort
to, no doubt, includes arbitration as well. It
is pertinent to note that as opposed to
Section 6(2), Section 6(1) does not state
that in case the parties choose to resort to
arbitration, the proceedings in pursuance
thereof will be governed by the Arbitration
Act. Hence, the right context in which the
meaning of the term "appeal" should be
interpreted is the Interest Act itself. The
meaning of this term under the Arbitration
Act or the Code of Civil Procedure would
have been relevant if the Interest Act had
made a reference to them. For this very
reason, we also do not find it relevant that
the Arbitration Act deals with applications
and appeals in two different chapters. We
are concerned with the meaning of the term
"appeal" in the Interest Act, and not in the
Arbitration Act."

46.
In
2004,
this
Court's
Judgment in National Aluminium Company
(supra) had recommended that Section 36
be substituted, as it defeats the very
objective
of
the
alternative
dispute
resolution system, and that the Section
should be amended at the earliest to bring
about the required change in law. It would
be clear that looking at the practical aspect
and the nature of rights presently involved,
and the sheer unfairness of the unamended
provision, which granted an automatic stay
to execution of an award before the
enforcement process of Section 34 was over
(and which stay could last for a number of
years) without having to look at the facts of
each case, it is clear that Section 36 as
amended should apply to Section 34
applications
filed
before
the
commencement of the Amendment Act
also for the aforesaid reasons."

16. The relevant para of the judgement
passed by the Hob'ble the Apex Court in
the case of Shree Vishnu Constructions
(supra) is quoted hereunder:-

 9.1 The submission on behalf of
the appellant, as above, cannot be accepted
for the simple reason that this Court in the
case of BCCI (supra) was considering the
court proceedings under sections 34 and
36. To that, this Court interpreted section
26 in paragraphs 37 to 39, reproduced
hereinabove,
and
held
that
the
Amendment Act is prospective in nature,
and
will
apply
to
those
arbitral
proceedings
that
are
commenced
as
understood by section 21 of the principal
Act, on or after the Amendment Act, 2015
and to court proceedings which have
commenced on or after the Amendment Act,
2015 came into force. Therefore, any
observations made by this Court in
paragraphs 37 to 39 in the case of BCCI
(supra) shall be understood and construed
with respect to court proceedings which
have
commenced
on
or
after
the
Amendment Act
coming
into
force,
namely, the proceedings under sections 34
& 36. Therefore, the decisions of this Court
in the cases of Parmar Constructions
Company (supra) and Pardeep Vinod
Construction Company (supra) cannot be
said to be per incuriam and/or in conflict
with the decision of this Court in the case
of BCCI (supra). As observed hereinabove,
in the case of Parmar Constructions
Company (supra) which is directly on the
point, it is Civil Appeal No. 3461 of 2023
Page 40 of 42 specifically observed and
held that the 2015 Amendment Act, which
96 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
came into force w.e.f. 23.10.2015 shall not
apply to the arbitral proceedings which are
commenced
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of section 21 of the principal
Act, 1996 before the coming into force the
2015 Amendment Act, unless parties
otherwise agree (para 27). Similar view
has been expressed in the case of S.P.
Singla
Constructions
Private
Limited
(supra).
(Emphasis supplied by this Court)

17. In the aforesaid judgement,
Hon'ble
the
Supreme
Court
has
categorically held that the proceedings
under Section 34 and 36 of the Arbitration
Act are Court proceedings and any
proceeding
commenced
after
the
amendment came into force, will be
prospective in nature.

18. In the present case, the
application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act was filed by the petitioner
in the year 2017, which is much after the
enforcement of the amended Act in the year
2015, therefore, the argument of the
counsel for the petitioner that merely on
filing of the application under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act, against the award in
question was automatically stayed, is
misplaced and cannot be accepted.

19. Further, Hon'ble the Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
Hindustan
Construction Company Limited (supra)
after has taken note of its earlier judgement
passed in the case of Board of Control for
Cricket in India (supra) has categorically
held that no automatic stay of the award
would lie just because of filing an appeal
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

20. The other argument raised by
the counsel for the petitioner after relying
upon the judgement of the Apex Court in
the
case
of
Small
Scale
Industrial
Manufactures Association (supra) that
since there was no default on the part of the
petitioner, the mesne profits ought not to
have been granted.

21. On perusal of the aforesaid
judgement, it appears that the
said
judgement was entirely based upon the
facts of that case as the same was related to
the economic policies framed by the Union
Government, but the facts of the case in
hand are entirely different. The petitioner
has not hand over the possession within 30
days as per the award dated 19.7.2017, or
award was stayed or set aside by the
competent Court, therefore, the benefit of
the said judgement cannot be accorded in
favour of the petitioner.

22. Admittedly, the petitioner has
not vacated the premises in question within
30 days from the date of passing the award
and further the petitioner has not brought
any material on record to show that the
award was stayed by any of the competent
Court, therefore, the contesting respondent
no. 1 is entitled for mesne profits.

23. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the
case of State of Rajasthan Vs. J.K.
Synthetics Ltd. (supra) has held as under :

14. The contesting respondents
filed the second round of writ petitions
before the High Court challenging the
demand for interest and the validity of Rule
64A, on two grounds : that Rule 64-A was
invalid; that the rate of interest was
excessive. The learned Single Judge
negatived the first contention in view of the
decision of this South Eastern Coalfields.
He however accepted the second contention
and restricted the rate of interest to 12% per
3 All. M/s LR Print Solutions Vs. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
97
annum. The contesting respondents have
not challenged the order of the High Court
holding that they are liable to pay interest
at 12% per annum. They have in fact paid
the interest at such rate. Before us, one of
the contentions urged to resist the claim of
the State for increase in the rate of interest,
is with reference to the fundamental
question about the liability itself. It was
submitted that they were not liable to pay
interest on the increase in royalty amount,
in view of their challenge to the increase
and order of interim stay of the High Court.
It was submitted by the contesting
respondents, that even if the writ petitions
challenging
the
notification
dated
17.2.1992 revising the royalty rate were
ultimately dismissed, in the absence of any
specific direction by the High Court to pay
interest on the difference in royalty amount,
they were not liable to pay any interest
during the period of operation of stay. This
question is no longer res integra. We may
refer to 11 the decisions of this Court that
have categorically laid down about the
liability to pay interest for the period of
stay when the stay is ultimately vacated.
 15. In Kanoria Chemicals and
Industries Ltd. vs. UP State Electricity
Board - 1997 (5) SCC 772, this Court held
that grant of stay of a notification revising
the electricity charges does not have the
effect of relieving the consumer of its
obligation to pay interest (or late payment
surcharge) on the amount withheld by them
by reason of the interim stay, if and when
the writ petitions are dismissed ultimately.
The said principle was based on the
following reasoning :

"Holding otherwise would mean
that even though the Electricity Board,
which was the respondent in the writ
petitions succeeded therein, is yet deprived
of the late payment surcharge which is due
to it under the tariff rules/regulations. It
would be a case where the Board suffers
prejudice on account of the orders of the
court and for no fault of its. It succeeds in
the writ petition and yet loses. The
consumer files the writ petition, obtains
stay of operation of the Notification
revising the rates and fails in his attack
upon the validity of the Notification and yet
he is relieved of the obligation to pay the
late payment surcharge for the period of
stay, which he is liable to pay according to
the statutory terms and conditions of supply
- which terms and conditions indeed form
part of the contract of supply entered into
by him with the Board. We do not think
that any such unfair and inequitable
proposition can be sustained in law....... It
is equally well settled that an order of stay
granted
pending disposal
of
a
writ
petition/suit or other proceeding comes to
an end with the dismissal of the substantive
proceeding and that it is the duty of the
court in such a case to put the parties in the
same position they would have been but for
the interim orders of the court. Any other
view would result in the act or order of the
court prejudicing a party (Board in this
case) for no fault of its and would also
mean rewarding a writ petitioner in spite of
his failure. We do not think that any such
unjust consequence can be countenanced
by the courts. As a matter of fact, the
contention
of
the
consumers
herein,
extended logically should mean that even
the enhanced rates are also not payable for
the period covered by the order of stay
because
the
operation
of
the
very
notification revising/enhancing the tariff
rates was stayed. Mercifully, no such
argument was urged by the appellants. It is
ununderstandable how the enhanced rates
can be said to be payable but not the late
payment surcharge thereon, when both the
enhancement
and
the
late
payment
surcharge are provided by the same
98 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Notification - the operation of which was
stayed."

24. The Apex Court in the aforesaid
judgement has categorically held that after
dismissal of the writ petition, the consumer
is liable to pay interest even during period
of interim order which entitle the consumer
to withhold the amount.

25. The case in hand, the arbitral
award dated 19.7.2017 was not stayed
or any material was brought on record
otherwise and ultimately the award
dated 19.7.2017 has been affirmed by
the Apex Court and no proceedings are
pending thereafter. Thus, in view of the
aforesaid
facts,
the
contesting
respondent no. 1 is entitled for mesne
profits as the award dated 19.7.2017
was not complied with in its letter and
spirit.

26. In view of the aforesaid
discussions as well as law laid down by the
Apex Court as referred herein above, no
interference is called for by this Court in
the impugned order.

27. The petition lacks merit and
same is dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 98
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.03.2025 &
26.03.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 10194 of 2024
(Civil)

Govind Ram Pandey & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Nutan Prakash & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Ravi Shanker Pathak, Sri Siddharth
Niranjan, Sri Yadvendra Pai Pandey, Sri
Dharam Pal Singh (sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
Ms. Ananya Pandey, Sri Ashish Kumar
Dubey, Sri Durlabh Kumar Pandey, Sri
Badri Mani Triparthi, Sri Rahul Sahai, Sri
Rakesh Kumar , Sri Yadvendra Rai Pandey,
Ms. Nandani Sharma, Sri C.L. Pandey (Sr.
Adv.), Sri H.N. Singh (Sr. Adv.)

Civil Law-The Constitution of India, 1950Artcle 227 - The Code of Civil Procedure,
1908-Section 94 - Order 40 Rule 1-
Appointment of Receivers and controlling day to
day functioning of Sri Thakur Baldeo Ji Maharaj
Temple aka Dauji Mandir--- No person shall act
as Receiver of the Temple in question and a
Seven Member Management Committee be
constituted in terms of Agreement dated
02.09.1904---Matter remitted with following
directions to learned District Judge (1) Convene
a meeting of 734 Pandas/Sevayats of Dauji
Temple, who are divided in six Thoks, to be
conducted by the senior most Additional District
Judge within a month (2) A supplementary
agreement would be executed by all 734
members only to the extent that their names
are brought on record, without touching upon
the terms and conditions laid out in the
Agreement dated 02.09.1904 (3) members shall
select a person from their respective Thoks to
be sent to Committee of Management for
managing the affairs of the Temple (4)
Management Committee would be constituted in
terms of Agreement dated 02.09.1904 and only
the new members of 734 families would become
part of the supplementary agreement (5) newly
constituted Management Committee would look
after day to day affairs of the Temple---The
District Judge, Mathura, is hereby requested to
get the complete inventory prepared of all
movable and immovable properties of Dauji
Temple,
including
cash,
bank
accounts,
ornaments etc. immediately, within a period of
two days from today. When the management is
handed over to newly constituted Committee of
Management, the inventory so prepared shall
also be passed on. (Para 61 to 65) (E-15)