# M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 11 ILRA 723
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-11-26
- **Case number:** Misc. Single No. 27631 of 2021
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-pan-realtors-pvt-ltd-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46661
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Development Act, 1973: Section 41(3) -
U.P.
Industrial
Development
Area
Act,
1976: Section 12 - Indian Constitution,
1950: Article 226, 227 - The Court examined
whether an "Authority" i.e., " State Government"
under Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973 is a
"Tribunal" or not. On perusal it is ascertained
that the power of adjudication is conferred upon
to the 'State Government' is by the statute, the
'State Government' is under obligation to act
judicially and is also required to follow principle
of natural justice, the 'State Government' in this
aforesaid sub-section decides the lis between the
parties and decision of the 'State Government'
under this sub-section is binding and final. Thus,
having satisfied all the parameters/tests, the
Court concluded that the 'State Government'
under 41(3) of the Act of 1973 is a 'Tribunal'.
(Para 20)

Under Article 227, the High Court exercise the power
to correct the errors of jurisdiction and not to upset
pure prior findings of facts. (Para 23)

Petition Disposed of. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,810 of 108,449. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39810 for what follows._

11 All. M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
723

31. In this case, admittedly, the Misc. Case
No. 422 of 2016 filed by the petitioners was not
pending as the same was dismissed for want of
prosecution on 16.07.2015 and was not restored
at the time of passing the final order dated
09.10.2018 in M.N.R. No. 82 of 2014, filed by
the mother of the deceased.

32. From the aforesaid, it is crystal clear
that one essential/ necessary requirement for
applying Section 10 of C.P.C. was not present at
the time of passing the impugned order dated
09.10.2018 which is to the effect that "Both the
suits should be pending before the Court of
Law". As such, this Court is of the view that the
Trial Court rightly decided the subsequent case.

33. Upon due consideration of aforesaid
particularly the findings recorded by this Court
on the issue of contradictory decision and
missing of one essential condition for applying
the provisions of Section 10 of C.P.C., this
Court is of the view that no interference in
impugned orders is required in exercise of
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.

34. Accordingly, the writ petition is
dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2021)12ILR A723
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 26.11.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Misc. Single No. 27631 of 2021

M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Abhishek Khare, Apoorva Tewari
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Waseeq Uddin Ahmed

A. Maintainability - U.P. Urban Planning &
Development Act, 1973: Section 41(3) -
U.P.
Industrial
Development
Area
Act,
1976: Section 12 - Indian Constitution,
1950: Article 226, 227 - The Court examined
whether an "Authority" i.e., " State Government"
under Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973 is a
"Tribunal" or not. On perusal it is ascertained
that the power of adjudication is conferred upon
to the 'State Government' is by the statute, the
'State Government' is under obligation to act
judicially and is also required to follow principle
of natural justice, the 'State Government' in this
aforesaid sub-section decides the lis between the
parties and decision of the 'State Government'
under this sub-section is binding and final. Thus,
having satisfied all the parameters/tests, the
Court concluded that the 'State Government'
under 41(3) of the Act of 1973 is a 'Tribunal'.
(Para 20)

Under Article 227, the High Court exercise the power
to correct the errors of jurisdiction and not to upset
pure prior findings of facts. (Para 23)

Petition Disposed of. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

1. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs P.N. Sharma
& anr. AIR 1965 SC 1595

2. Haji Manzoor Ahmed & anr. Vs State AIR 1970
Allahabad page 467

3. All Party Hill Leaders Conference Vs Captian W.A.
Sangma (1977) 4 SCC 161

4. St. of Guj.Vs Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Assn.
(2012) 10 SCC 353: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1229: (2013)
1 SCC (Cri) 35: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 56: 2012 SCC
OnLine SC 874 page 365

5. Aidal Singh Vs Karan Singh AIR 1957 All 414 (FB)

6. Kihoto Hollohan Vs Zachillhu 1992 Supp (2) SCC
651 page 705

7. Umaji Keshao Meshram Vs Radhikabai 1986 (Supp)
SCC 401
724 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
8. T.C. Basappa Vs T. Nagappa & anr. AIR 1954 SC
440

9. Manmohan Singh Jaitla Vs Commr., Union Territory
of Chandigarh 1984 Supp SCC 540: 1985 SCC (L&S)
269 page 545

10. Waryam Singh Vs Amarnath AIR 1954 SC 215

11. Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs Ahmad Ishaque AIR 1955
SC 233

12. M.L. Sethi Vs R.P. Kapur (1972) 2 SCC 427

13. Chandrasekhar Singh Vs Siya Ram Singh (1979) 3
SCC 118

14. Mohd. Yunus Vs Mohd. Mustaquim (1983) 4 SCC
566

15. Rena Drego Vs Lalchand Soni ( 1998) 3 SCC 341

16. Baby Vs Travancore Devaswom Board (1998) 8
SCC 310

17. Ajaib Singh Vs Sirhind Co-operative Marketing
cum Processing Service Society Ltd. (1999) 6 SCC 82

18. Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs Rajendra Shankar Patil
(2010) 8 SCC 329

19. Madras Bar Association Vs U.O.I.(2014) 10 SCC 1

20. Radhey Shyam Vs Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423

21. Surya Dev Rai Vs Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC
675

22. Ram Kishan Fauji Vs St.of Har. (2017) 5 SCC 533

23. Bikram Chatterji & ors. Vs U.O.I. & ors. Writ
Petition No. 940 of 2017

24. Kartar Singh Vs St.of Punj.(1994) 3 SCC 675
(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard Sri Apoorva Tewari, learned
Counsel for the petitioner, Sri Devendra Mohan
Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for opposite
party no. 1 and Sri Waseeq Uddin Ahmed,
learned Counsel for opposite party no. 2.

2. The petitioner by means of present
petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution
of India has sought the following main
reliefs:-

"a) To issue an appropriate order or
direction commanding the respondent no. 1 to
decide the revision of the petitioner preferred
under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning
and Development Act, 1973 read with Section 12
of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act,
1976 expeditiously within a fixed reasonable
period of time:

b) To issue an appropriate order or
direction commanding the respondent no. 2 not
to take any coercive measures against the
petitioner pursuant to recovery certificate dated
12.09.2019 during the pendency of revision
before the respondent no. 1:"

3. At the very outset, on pointing out
regarding the defect as pointed out by the
Registry of this Court, which is to the effect that
the present petition for relief(s) sought is
cognizable by the Division Bench of this Court
under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the
learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri Apoorva
Tewari, submitted that present petition for the
main relief(s) quoted above, is maintainable
before this Court under Article 227 of
Constitution of India. Elaborating his argument
he submitted that being aggrieved by the order
of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority
dated 06.03.2018 and recovery certificate dated
12.09.2019, the revision petition was filed under
Section 41(3) of U.P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 {in short "Act of 1973"}
read with Section 12 of U.P. Industrial
Development Area Act, 1976 {in short "Act of
1976"}.
11 All. M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
725

4. He further submitted that it appears from
the language of Section 41(3) of the Act of 1973
that the State functions as Quasi Judiciary
Authority and being so is covered under
expression "Tribunal". In support of his
submission he has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Versus
P.N.Sharma and Another reported in AIR 1965
SC 1595. Paragraphs on which reliance has
been placed are quoted hereinunder:-

"9. Tribunals which fall within the
purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special
position of their own under the scheme of our
Constitution. Special matters and questions
are entrusted to them for their decision and
in that sense, they share with the courts one
common characteristic; both the courts and
the tribunals are "constituted by the State
and
are
invested
with
judicial
as
distinguished from purely administrative or
executive functions", (vide Durga Shankar
Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh [(1955) 1
SCR 267 at p. 272] ). They are both
adjudicating bodies and they deal with and
finally determine disputes between parties
which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The
procedure followed by the courts is regularly
prescribed and in discharging their functions
and exercising their powers, the courts have
to conform to that procedure. The procedure
which the tribunals have to follow may not
always be so strictly prescribed, but the
approach adopted by both the courts and the
tribunals is substantially the same, and there
is no essential difference between the
functions that they discharge. As in the case
of courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the
State's inherent judicial power which has
been transferred and by virtue of the said
power, it is the State's inherent judicial
function which they discharge. Judicial
functions and judicial powers are one of the
essential attributes of a sovereign State, and
on considerations of policy, the State
transfers its judicial functions and powers
mainly to the courts established by the
Constitution; but that does not affect the
competence of the State, by appropriate
measures, to transfer a part of its judicial
powers
and
functions
to
tribunals
by
entrusting to them the task of adjudicating
upon special matters and disputes between
parties. It is really not possible or even
expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively
the features which are common to the
tribunals and the courts, and features which
are distinct and separate. The basic and the
fundamental feature which is common to both
the courts and the tribunals is that they
discharge judicial functions and exercise
judicial powers which inherently vest in a
sovereign State.

10. XXX

11. XXX

12. XXX

13. XXX

14. XXX

15. XXX

16. XXX

17. XXX

18. XXX

19. XXX

20. XXX

21. XXX

22. XXX
726 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

23. XXX

24. XXX

25. It would thus be seen that in
dealing with the question as to whether
Respondent 2, while it exercises its appellate
power under Rule 6(6), is a tribunal under
Article 136(1), we must enquire whether
Respondent 2 has been clothed with the State's
inherent judicial power to deal with disputes
between parties and determine them on the
merits fairly and objectively. That is the test
which has been consistently applied by this
Court in considering the question about the
status of any body or authority as a tribunal
under Article 136(1). Before we proceed to
apply this test to Respondent 2's status under
Rule 6(6), we think it is necessary to advert to
one aspect of the matter which sometimes
creates some confusion.

26. We have referred to the three
essential attributes of a sovereign State and
indicated that one of these attributes is the
legislative power and legislative function of the
State, and we have also seen that in determining
the status of an authority dealing with disputes,
we have to enquire whether the power conferred
on the said authority or body can be said to be
judicial power conferred on it by the State by
means of a statute or statutory rule. The use of
the expression "judicial power" in this context
proceeds on the well-recognised concept of
political science that along with legislative and
executive powers, judicial power vests in a
sovereign State. In countries where rigid
separation of powers has been effected by
written Constitutions, the position is very
different. Take, for instance, the Australian
Constitution. Section 71 of the Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution Act (63 & 64 Vict.
Chapter 12) provides that the judicial power of
the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal
Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of
Australia, and in such other federal courts as
Parliament creates, and in such other courts as
it invests with federal jurisdiction. The High
Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so
many other Justices, not less than two, as
Parliament prescribes. It is clear that the
scheme of Sections 71 to 80 which form part of
Chapter III of the said Constitution, is that the
judicial power of the State can be conferred only
on courts recognised by the provisions of the
said Chapter. In other words, it is not competent
to the legislature in Australia to confer judicial
power properly so-called on any body or
authority other than or apart from the courts
recognised by Chapter III and so, the use of the
expression "judicial power" or its conferment in
regard to tribunals which are not courts
properly so-called, would under the Australian
Constitution be wholly inappropriate. If any
tribunals other than courts are established and
power is given to them to deal with and decide
special disputes between the parties, the power
which such tribunals would exercise cannot be
described as judicial power, but would have to
be called quasi-judicial power.

27. This technical aspect of the matter
which is present under the Constitutions based
on rigid separation of powers, should not be
ignored when we are dealing with the question
posed under Article 136(1) of our Constitution
under our Constitution, there is no rigid
separation of powers as under the Australian
Constitution;
and
so,
it
would
not
be
constitutionally inappropriate or improper to
say that judicial power of the State can be
conferred on the hierarchy of courts established
under the Constitution as well as on tribunals
which are not courts strictly so-called. Indeed,
the fact that Article 136(1) refers to courts and
tribunals and makes the determination, sentence
or order passed by them subject to appeal to this
Court by special leave, shows that our
Constitution assumes that judicial power of the
State can be vested in and exercised by both
11 All. M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
727
courts and tribunals alike. We have already seen
that the function discharged by courts and
tribunals mentioned in Article 136(1) is
essentially the same, though the nature of the
questions entrusted to their jurisdiction, the
procedure required to be followed by them, and
the extent and character of their powers may be
different.

28. As a result of the rigid separation
of powers on which the Australian Constitution
is based, questions which arise for decision of
courts in Australia take a very different form.
Let us refer to the decision of the Privy Council
in Shell Company of Australia, Ltd. v. Federal
Commissioner of Taxation [1931 AC 275] by
way of illustration. In that case, the Privy
Council had to consider whether the Board of
Review created by Section 41 of the Federal
Income Tax Assessment Act, 1922-1925, to
review the decisions of the Commissioner of
Taxation, and whose members are to hold office
for seven years, is a court exercising the judicial
power of the Commonwealth within the meaning
of Section 71 of the Constitution of Australia. If
the answer had been in the affirmative, the
amending section by which the Board of Review
was constituted, would have been invalid
because of the provisions of Section 71 of the
Australian Constitution. The Privy Council
however, examined the functions of the Board
and its powers and considered the scheme of the
relevant provisions of the Taxation Act and
came to the conclusion that the Board of Review
was not a court and stood in the same position
as the Commissioner. It was observed that the
orders of the Board of Review were not made
conclusive for any purpose whatsoever, and that
the decisions of the Board were made the
equivalent of the decision of the Commissioner.
In dealing with the status of the Board in the
context of the requirements of Section 71 of the
Australian Constitution, Lord Sankey L.C.
observed that "the authorities are clear to show
that there are tribunals with many of the
trappings of a court which, nevertheless, are not
courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial
power" (p. 296). It is in this connection that
Lord Sankey referred to certain attributes of
courts which he characterised as trappings. The
negative propositions which he enunciated by
reference to these trappings, indicate that the
presence of the trappings would not make the
Board a court and would not lead to the
inference that the judicatory power exercised by
tribunals was judicial power which courts alone
can exercise. It would thus be noticed that the
reference to the trappings was intended to show
that the presence of the trappings does not alter
the character of the tribunal, the decisive test
being that judicial power under the Australian
Constitution can be conferred only on courts
and not on tribunals. When we refer to tribunals
in dealing with the problem posed by Article
136(1), it is necessary to bear in mind the
context in which Lord Sankey referred to these
trappings.

29. XXX

30. We have referred to these two
decisions only for the purpose of emphasising
the fact that the technical considerations which
flow from the strict and rigid separation of
powers, would not be applicable in dealing with
the question about the status of Respondent 2 by
reference to Article 136(1) of our Constitution.
The use of the expression "judicial power" in the
context,
cannot
be
characterised
as
constitutionally impermissible or inappropriate,
because our Constitution does not provide, as
does Chapter III of the Australian Constitution,
that judicial power can be conferred only on
courts
properly
so-called.
If
such
a
consideration was relevant and material, then it
would no doubt, be inappropriate to say that
certain authorities or bodies which are given the
power to deal with disputes between parties and
finally determine them, are tribunals because the
judicial power of the State has been statutorily
728 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
transferred to them. In that case, the more
appropriate expression to use would be that the
powers which they exercise are quasi-judicial in
character, and tribunals appointed under such a
scheme of rigid separation of powers cannot be
held to discharge the same judicial function as
the courts. However, these considerations are,
strictly speaking, in-applicable to the Indian
Constitution, because though it is based on a
broad separation of powers, there is no rigidity
or exclusiveness involved in it as under Section
71 as well as other provisions of Chapter III of
the Australian Constitution; and so, it would not
be inappropriate to say that the main test in
determining the status of any authority in the
context of Article 136(1) is whether or not
inherent judicial power of the State has been
transferred to it.

31. XXX

32. XXX

33. XXX

34. In this connection, we may usefully
recall the observation made by Lord Haldane in
Local Government Board v. Arlidge [(1915) AC
120, 120] . Said Lord Haldane: "My Lords,
when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed,
those whose duty it is to decide it must act
judicially. They must deal with the question
referred to them without bias, and they must give
to each of the parties the opportunity of
adequately presenting the case made. The
decision must be come to in the spirit and with
the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose
duty it is to mete out justice. But it does not
follow that the procedure of every such tribunal
must be the same". Having regard to the nature
of the power conferred on the State Government,
it seems to us clear that for reaching a fair and
objective decision in the dispute brought before
it in its appellate jurisdiction, the State
Government has the power to devise its own
procedure and to exercise such other incidental
and subsidiary powers as may be necessary to
deal effectively with the dispute. We are,
therefore, satisfied that the State Government
which exercises its appellate jurisdiction under
Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) of the Rules is a tribunal
within the meaning of Article 136(1); and so, the
present appeal brought before this Court against
the impugned appellate order passed by
Respondent 2, is competent. In the result, the
preliminary objection raised by Mr Goyal fails
and must be rejected.

35. XXX

36. XXX

37. XXX

38. XXX

39. XXX

40. XXX

41. XXX

42. XXX

43. XXX

44. An authority other than a court
may be vested by statute with judicial power in
widely different circumstances, which it would
be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt
to define exhaustively. The proper thing is to
examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain
whether the powers vested in the authority can
be truly described as judicial functions or
judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of
this case, it is sufficient to say that any outside
authority empowered by the State to determine
conclusively the rights of two or more
contending parties with regard to any matter in
controversy between them satisfies the test of an
11 All. M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
729
authority vested with the judicial powers of the
State and may be regarded as a tribunal within
the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of
adjudication implies that the authority must act
judicially and must determine the dispute by
ascertainment of the relevant facts on the
materials before it and by application of the
relevant law to those facts. This test of a tribunal
is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that
other bodies not satisfying this test are also
tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential
that the power of adjudication must be derived
from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority
or body deriving its power of adjudication from
an agreement of the parties, such as a private
arbitrator or a tribunal acting under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not
satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article 136. It
matters little that such a body or authority is
vested with the trappings of a court. The
Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with
some of the trappings of a court, so also the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority
acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many
of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and
authorities are not tribunals.

45. The word "tribunal" finds place in
Article 227 of the Constitution also, and I think
that there also the word has the same meaning
as in Article 136.

46. Now, the question is whether the
State Government deciding an appeal under
Rule 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers
Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules,
1952 (hereafter referred to as the Service Rules)
is a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 of
the Constitution. The State Government made
the Service Rules in exercise of its rule-making
power under Section 112 read with Section
49(2) of the Factories Act, 1947. The Service
Rules relate to the qualifications and conditions
of service of a Welfare Officer in a factory and
are well within the rule-making power. Rule 6 of
the Service Rules prescribes the conditions of
service of a Welfare Officer. Sub-rule (1) and (2)
of Rule 6 provide that the Welfare Officer must
have the appropriate status corresponding to the
status of other executive heads of the factory,
and his conditions of service shall be the same
as
of
other
members
of
the
staff
of
corresponding status in the factory. Sub-rule (3)
empowers the management to impose on the
Welfare Officer one or more of the following
punishments viz. (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of
increments including stoppage at an efficiency
bar; (iii) reduction to a lower stage in a time
scale; (iv) suspension; and (v) dismissal or
termination of service in any other manner. The
first proviso to sub-rule (3) provides that no
order of punishment shall be passed against the
Welfare Officer unless he has been informed of
the grounds on which it is proposed to take
action and given a reasonable opportunity of
defending himself against the action proposed to
be taken in regard to him. The second proviso to
sub-rule (3) imposes the further safeguard that
the management cannot impose any punishment
on him other than censure except with the
previous
concurrence
of
the
Labour
Commissioner, Punjab. Sub-rule (4-) provides
that before passing orders on a reference under
the last proviso, the Labour Commissioner shall
give the Welfare Officer an opportunity of
showing cause against the proposed action, and,
if necessary, may hear the parties in person.
Sub-rule (5) provides that if the Labour
Commissioner refuses to give his concurrence,
the management may appeal to the State
Government within thirty days from the date of
the receipt of such refusal. Sub-rule (6) provides
that the Welfare Officer upon whom the
punishment of dismissal or termination of
service is imposed may appeal to the State
Government against the order of punishment
within thirty days from the date of the receipt of
the order by him. The decision of the State
Government under both sub-rules (5) and (6) is
made final and binding. Sub-rule (7) empowers
730 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the State Government to pass such interim
orders as may be necessary pending the decision
of the appeal filed under sub-rule (5) or sub-rule
(6). If the management imposes a punishment
without making a reference to the Labour
Commissioner
and
without
obtaining
his
concurrence, the order of the management is a
nullity and is liable to be set aside on this
ground alone on an appeal by the Welfare
Officer under sub-rule (6). On the other hand, if
the action of the management does not amount
to a punishment, an appeal under sub-rule (6) is
incompetent and is liable to be dismissed on that
ground.

47. On an appeal under sub-rule (6),
the dispute is whether the action of the
management amounts to a punishment and if so,
whether the punishment should be imposed. The
dispute concerns the civil rights of the
management and the Welfare Officer. The State
Government is empowered to decide this dispute
between the two contending parties. Since the
State Government is empowered to give a
decision, it may either confirm the punishment
or set it aside and pass consequential orders
such as an order of reinstatement. As a matter of
fact, in the instant case the State Government
passed an order of reinstatement. By the express
words of sub-rule (6) of Rule 6, the decision of
the State Government is made final and binding.
The appellate decision conclusively determines
the rights of the contending parties with regard
to the matter in controversy between them. The
appellate function and the power of conclusive
determination of the civil rights of the parties
with regard to matters in controversy between
them indicate that the State Government is under
a duty to act judicially and to decide the dispute
solely by ascertaining the facts on the materials
before it and by the application of the relevant
law on the point. As the rule does not prescribe
any procedure for the hearing of the appeal, the
State Government may devise its own procedure
consistently with its judicial duty. Normally, the
State Government has the advantage of
enquiries with regard to the subject-matter of
the dispute at two previous stages viz. once by
the management under sub-rule (3) and again by
the Labour Commissioner under sub-rule (4).
The State Government may also call upon the
parties to make their representations in writing,
at the appellate stage. As a matter of fact, in this
case
the
parties
were
asked
to
make
representations,
and
they
did
so.
On
ascertaining the relevant facts, the State
Government may decide whether having regard
to the relevant law viz. the ordinary law of
master and servant as modified by the industrial
law, the action of the management amounts to a
punishment, and if so, whether such punishment
should be imposed. A consideration of all these
matters shows that the State Government
deciding an appeal under Rule 6(6) of the
Service Rules is vested with the judicial powers
of the State, and satisfies the test of a tribunal as
contemplated by Article 136 of the Constitution.
It follows that the preliminary objection that the
appeal under Article 136 does not lie, must be
rejected."

5. He has also placed reliance upon
paragraph(s) 67 to 73 of the judgment passed by
the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Haji
Manzoor Ahmed and another Versus State
reported in AIR 1970 Allahabad page 467, the
same are as under:-

"67. The respondents say that the
aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court
must be confined to authorities which are tribunals
within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution,
inasmuch as the requirement that the reasons
should be stated proceeds upon the consideration
that the impugned order is open to appeal to the
Supreme Court and that the omission to state the
reasons precludes the Supreme Court from
effectively
exercising
its
jurisdiction.
The
contention, in my opinion, is not well founded.
From M.P. Industries Ltd. [A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671.]
11 All. M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
731
onward, the Supreme Court, it seems to me, placed
the necessity for giving reasons on two broad
grounds. The first arose out of the need to exclude
or minimize arbitrariness on the part of the
authority making the order, and the second arose
upon the need to make the order amenable to
effective judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court. It
does appear that in some of its decisions,
especially Bhagat Raja [A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1606.] ,
the Supreme Court laid emphasis almost entirely
on the second of the two grounds. The two grounds
may also be said to be inter-related, in the sense
that the second is intended to achieve the object
underlying the first. But I am inclined to the view
that even if the order is not open to appeal to the
Supreme Court it is necessary that it should state
its reasons. It may be that the authority is not a
tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1) of the
Constitution. That I believe, makes little difference.
What is relevant, I think, is that the order is made
in the exercise of a quasi judicial jurisdiction. As
regards such an order, the party against whom it is
made is entitled to know the reasons upon which it
has been made. And that is apart from the
consideration that it enables him to challenge the
order in appeal before the Supreme Court. The
need for disclosing reasons in quasi judicial
orders arises from the ancient maxim integrated
into our judicial system, that justice must not only
be done but must also appear to be done. It is a
principle arising out of the recognition that
judicial tribunals must inspire public confidence
and
safeguard
against
the
suspicion
of
arbitrariness and partiality. That is an objective
which, speaking for myself, I consider to be an
essential condition to the functioning of all courts
and tribunals, judicial or quasi judicial. It is the
glory of the rule of law that it is founded upon
reasons. And reasons as opposed to arbitrary
when distinguishes the rule of law from the rule of
men.

68. But even if, as the respondents
contend, the pronouncements of the Supreme
Court mentioned above must be confined to
tribunals within the meaning of Art. 136(1) of
the Constitution I have no hesitation in holding
that
the
State
Government
exercising
jurisdiction under Sec. 7-F of the Act is such a
tribunal.

69. It was at one time recognised as
settled law that a tribunal falls within the ambit
of Art. 136(1) if it derives authority from the
sovereign power of the State and if it is invested
with any part of the judicial functions of the
State as distinct from purely administrative or
executive functions if it further enjoys the
"trappings of a court." That was the view
expressed in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of
Bharat Bank Ltd. [A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188.] and
later in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj
Singh [A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 241.] . It was reiterated
in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand
[A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 677.] .

70. In Jaswant Sugar Mills [A.I.R.
1963 S.C. 677.] the Supreme Court examined
the question whether a Conciliation Officer, who
was empowered under clause 29 of a
Government Order under the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act to grant permission to an employer
to alter the conditions of service to the prejudice
of the workmen during a pending dispute or to
discharge or punish them during such dispute,
was a tribunal for the purposes of Art. 136(1).
The Supreme Court referred to the absence of
"the trappings of a court" in the Consiliation
Officer. It pointed out that he was not required
to sit in public, no formal pleadings were
contemplated before him, and he was not
expowered to compel the attendance of
witnesses nor restricted in making an enquiry to
evidence which the parties brought before him.
He was not capable of delivering an effective
judgment or an award effecting the rights of the
parties. He was not invested with powers similar
to those of the civil courts under the Code of
Civil Procedure for enforcing the attendance of
any person and examining him on oath,
732 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
compelling production of documents, issuing
commissions for the examination of the
witnesses
and
other
matters.
These
considerations prevailed with the Supreme
Court in holding that the Conciliation Officer
was not a tribunal. But since then the law
declared by the Supreme Court has taken a
wider sweep. In Associated Cement Companies
Ltd. [A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1595 at p. 1606
(paragraph 33).] the Supreme Court explained
that the presence of all or some of the trappings
of a court is really not a decisive consideration,
that the main and the basic test was

"Whether the adjudicating power,
which a particular authority is empowered to
exercise, has been conferred upon it by a statute
and can be described as a part of the State's
inherent power exercised in dis-charging its
judicial function." It held that applying this test,
the State Government, deciding an appeal under
sub-rules (5) and (6) of Rule 6 of the Punjab
Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of
Service Rules (1952) was a tribunal. It pointed
out that the judicial power of the State

"... has been conferred on the State
Government by a statutory Rule and it can be
exercised in respect of disputes between the
management and its Welfare Officers. Where is,
in that sense, a lis there is affirmation by one
party and denial by another, and the dispute
necessarily involves the rights and obligations of
the parties to it. The order which the State
Government ultimately passes is described as its
decision and it is made final and binding.
Besides, it is an order passed on appeal."

71. Now, an order made by the State
Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act has been
held by the Supreme Court in Lala Shri
Bhagwan [1965 A.L.J. 353.] to effect the rights
of the landlord and the tenant. Sec. 3(1) confers
upon the tenant a statutory immunity against
eviction in the absence of the grounds specified
in the sub-section and of permission from the
District Magistrate to sue for ejectment. The
right of the tenant to that statutory immunity is
the subject of proceedings before the District
Magistrate and the Commissioner under Sec. 3
of the Act and before the State Government
under Sec. 7-F of the Act. The jurisdiction
exercised by each of these authorities partakes
of the same nature. It was pointed out in Lala
Shri Bhagwan [1965 A.L.J. 353.] that there was
a lis between the landlord and the tenant in
those proceedings, and there can be little doubt
that the order of the State Government under
Sec. 7-F is binding between the parties and
finally adjudicates upon the right of the tenant to
statutory immunity against eviction. Moreover,
the jurisdiction of the State Government is of a
revisional character. It may be mentioned that
when considering the relevant provisions of Sec.
3 and Sec. 7-F of the Act in Lala Shri Bhagwan
[1965 A.L.J. 353.] the Supreme Court expressly
referred to its decision in the Associated Cement
Companies [A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1595 at p. 1606
(paragraph 33).] . I am of opinion that the test
laid down in the latter case for determining
whether a body is a tribunal within the meaning
of Art. 136(1) of the Constitution is fully
satisfied by the State Government acting under
Sec. 7-F of the Act.

72. At this stage, I may refer to the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Nandram
Hanatram, Calcutta v. Union of India [A.I.R.
1966 S.C. 1922.] where the argument was
rejected that the impugned order was bad
because no reasons were stated. That decision
was explained later by the Supreme Court in
Bhagat Raja v. Union of India [A.I.R. 1967 S.C.
1606.] in the following terms:

"...... it was plain as a pike-staff that
the State Government had no alternative but to
cancel the lease; the absence of any reasons in
the order on review could not possibly leave
anybody in doubt as to whether (what the?)
11 All. M/s Pan Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
733
reasons were. As a matter of fact in the setting
of facts, the reasons were so obvious that it was
not necessary to set them out. There is nothing
in this decision which is contrary to 1966-1
S.C.R. 466: (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671) (supra). What
the decision says is that the reasons for the
action of the state were so obvious that it was
not necessary, on the facts of the case, to repeat
them in the order of the Central Government.

73. The question converged to a sharp
focus before the Supreme Court in M.P.
Industries Ltd. v. Union of Indian [A.I.R. 1966
S.C. 671.] , Subba Rao, J. explained the
necessity for disclosing reasons in a quasi
judicial order. In the case before it the Central
Government had rejected a revision application
under Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules
1955. He observed:

".... Our Constitution posits a welfare
State ...................................................................
In the context of a welfare State; administrative
tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they are the
necessary concomitants of a welfare State. But
arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the
concept of a welfare State itself. Self-discipline
and supervision exclude or at any rate minimize
arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to
disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure
guarantees consideration. The condition to give
reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at
any rate minimizes arbitrariness; It gives
satisfaction to the party against whom the order
is made; and it also enables an appellate or
supervisory Court to keep the tribunals within
bounds. A reasoned order is a desirable
condition of judicial disposal.

The
conception
of
exercise
of
revisional jurisdiction and the manner of
disposal provided in R. 55 of the Rules, are
indicative of the scope and nature of the
Government's jurisdiction. If Tribunals can
make order without giving reasons, the said
power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest
officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for
abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are
to be given, it will be an effective restraint on
such abuse, as the order, if it discloses
extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be
subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A
speaking order will at its best be a reasonable
and its worst be at least a plausible one. The
public should not be deprived of this only
safeguard.

6. Reliance has also been placed upon the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of All Party Hill Leaders
Conference Vs. Captain W.A. Sangma reported
in (1977) 4 SCC 161. Paragraphs referred are as
under:-

23. The earliest decision of this Court
as to the ambit of Article 136(1) with reference
to the order of a tribunal came up for
consideration in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v.
Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. [AIR 1950
SC 188 : (1950) 1 SCR 459 : 950 Lab LJ 21] .
The question whether an Industrial Tribunal
constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, was a tribunal within the scope of Article
136 was raised in that case. By majority the
Constitution Bench of this Court held that the
Industrial Tribunal was a tribunal for the
purpose of Article 136. Having regard to the
scheme of Article 136, this Court was not
prepared to place a narrow interpretation on the
amplitude of Article 136. This Court observed at
p. 476/478 of the Report as follows:

"As
pointed
out
in
picturesque
language by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Co. of
Australia v.