# M/S Pantaloon Retail (India) v. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Ors

- **Citation:** (2012) 3 ILRA 1132
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-09-12
- **Bench:** Dr. Satish Chandra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-pantaloon-retail-india-v-the-chief-controlling-revenue-authority-ors-42347
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Transfer of Porperty Act-Section 107-
Lease and Licence-difference between the
two explained-'Lease' denotes contract
having relationship of land lord-tenant
either for life or limited period-while word
"licence"-denotes a right of permission to
do an act or permission to carry some
business or the act-which without licence
would be unlawful.

Held: Para-28

A licence is also distinguished from a lease.
As per "Corpus Juris Secundum", a licence
generally provides the licencee with less
rights in real estate than a lease. If the
contract gives exclusive possession of the
premises against all the word, including
the owner it is a lease, but if it merely
confers of a privilege to occupy the
premises under the owner, it is a licence.
Accordingly, a licence in a property is the
permission or authority to engage in a
particular act or series of acts upon the
land of another without possessing an
interest therein, and is thus subject to
management and control retained by the
owner.
(B) Indian Stamp Act-Section 33/44-A-
Demand of stamp duty with 200% penalty
of deficit amount-plea that the deed being
licence for period of 9 years-stamp duty of
Rs. 100/- sufficient-authorities wrongly
treated as 'lease' held-mere use of word
'licence' in the deed can not decide the
nature of document-exclusive possession
and profit of land disclose nature of leaseauthorities rightly put demand of extrastamp duty-but following the ratio of law
of Appex Court in Shyam Oil Mill-penality
reduced @ 100% instead of 200%.

Held Para-33:

In the instant case, the petitioner has paid
stamp duty of Rs.100/- on the said
instrument (MOU), by considering it as a
deed of licence. But fact remains that mere
use of the words 'licence' or 'licencee'
would not be sufficient to hold that the the
said instrument (MOU) is a licence. Simply,
using the word licence will neither be
regraded conclusive nor determinative.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1999 SC 2607; AIR 1965 Supreme Court
Page 1092, paragraph 8; AIR 1957 Supreme
Court Page 657 paragraph 29; AIR 1958
Supreme Court Page 341 para 5; AIR 1966
Supreme Court , page 1295 para5; AIR 1970
Supreme Court Page 253 Para 7; 2008 VOL. 2
AWC Page 1879 Paragraph 7, Allahabad, 354 III
APP.3D 171, 289 III Dec. 420, 819 N.E.2d
1220(2d Dist.2004); (1960) 1 SCR 368; (1974) 1
SCC 202; (2011) 5 SCC 270; (2006) 286 ITR 251
MP

## Text

1132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.09.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. SATISH CHANDRA, J

Misc. Single No. - 3862 of 2012

M/S Pantaloon Retail (India)

 ...Applicant
Versus
The
Chief
Controlling
Revenue
Authority/Board Of Revenue & Ors

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Abhishek Kumar
Sri Kaushik Chaterji

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

(A) Transfer of Porperty Act-Section 107-
Lease and Licence-difference between the
two explained-'Lease' denotes contract
having relationship of land lord-tenant
either for life or limited period-while word
"licence"-denotes a right of permission to
do an act or permission to carry some
business or the act-which without licence
would be unlawful.

Held: Para-28

A licence is also distinguished from a lease.
As per "Corpus Juris Secundum", a licence
generally provides the licencee with less
rights in real estate than a lease. If the
contract gives exclusive possession of the
premises against all the word, including
the owner it is a lease, but if it merely
confers of a privilege to occupy the
premises under the owner, it is a licence.
Accordingly, a licence in a property is the
permission or authority to engage in a
particular act or series of acts upon the
land of another without possessing an
interest therein, and is thus subject to
management and control retained by the
owner.
(B) Indian Stamp Act-Section 33/44-A-
Demand of stamp duty with 200% penalty
of deficit amount-plea that the deed being
licence for period of 9 years-stamp duty of
Rs. 100/- sufficient-authorities wrongly
treated as 'lease' held-mere use of word
'licence' in the deed can not decide the
nature of document-exclusive possession
and profit of land disclose nature of leaseauthorities rightly put demand of extrastamp duty-but following the ratio of law
of Appex Court in Shyam Oil Mill-penality
reduced @ 100% instead of 200%.

Held Para-33:

In the instant case, the petitioner has paid
stamp duty of Rs.100/- on the said
instrument (MOU), by considering it as a
deed of licence. But fact remains that mere
use of the words 'licence' or 'licencee'
would not be sufficient to hold that the the
said instrument (MOU) is a licence. Simply,
using the word licence will neither be
regraded conclusive nor determinative.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1999 SC 2607; AIR 1965 Supreme Court
Page 1092, paragraph 8; AIR 1957 Supreme
Court Page 657 paragraph 29; AIR 1958
Supreme Court Page 341 para 5; AIR 1966
Supreme Court , page 1295 para5; AIR 1970
Supreme Court Page 253 Para 7; 2008 VOL. 2
AWC Page 1879 Paragraph 7, Allahabad, 354 III
APP.3D 171, 289 III Dec. 420, 819 N.E.2d
1220(2d Dist.2004); (1960) 1 SCR 368; (1974) 1
SCC 202; (2011) 5 SCC 270; (2006) 286 ITR 251
MP

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Satish Chandra, J.)

1. By this writ petition, the petitioner
has assailed the orders dated 29.06.2011
passed by the Additional District Magistrate
(Finance & Revenue), Lucknow in Case
No.264/Stamp/ 2008 under section 33/47-A
of the Indian Stamps Act as well as the
order dated 28.05.2012 passed by Chief
Controller
Revenue
Authorities
under
section 56 (1) A of the Indian Stamps Act in
Appeal
No.64
of
2011-12.
3 All] M/S Pantaloon Retail (India) V. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Ors
1133

2. The facts in narrow compass are
that the petitioner and M/s Sahara India
Commercial Corporation Ltd. had executed
an instrument on 15.07.2005 known as
"Memorandum of understanding" (MOU),
where both the parties agreed that the
petitioner will have a space about 9455.30
sq.ft. (Super area) in a commercial complex
known as Saharaganj, Hazratganj, Lucknow
on "licence basis" initially, for a period of
three years and the said period shall also be
renewable and the same has already been
renewed for a total period of 9 years.

3. The petitioner has paid stamp duty
of Rs.100/- on the said instrument (MOU),
by considering it as a deed of licence, but
the stamp authorities considered the said
instrument as a lease deed and demanded
stamp duty of Rs.33,93,500/=. The penalty
was
also
imposed
to
the
tune
of
Rs.67,87,000/- @ 200%-. Thus, the total
liability of Rs.1,01,80,500/- was saddled
upon the petitioner alongwith interest at the
rate of 1.5% per month on the deficient
amount, from the date of execution of deed
till the payment. Being aggrieved, the
petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

4. With this backdrop, Sri Abhishek
Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the instrument is nothing, but is
a deed of licence and the same cannot be
treated as a lease agreement. He also
submits that the question regarding the
distinction between the lease and licence is
a vexed one and does not have any
mathematical solution and it is the intention
of the parties. For this purpose, he relied on
the ratio laid down in the case of Delta
International Ltd. vs. Shyam Sundar
Ganeriwala reported in AIR 1999 SC
2607, where it was observed that:

"To find out whether the document
creates lease or licence real test is to find
out 'the intention of the parties', keeping in
mind that in cases where exclusive
possession is given, the line between lease
and licence is very thin."

5. Learned counsel further submits
that the lease or licence is a matter of
contract between the parties. Section 107 of
the Transfer of Property Act provides that
lease of immovable property may be made
either by registered instrument or by oral
agreement accompanied by delivery of
possession; if it is a registered instrument, it
shall be executed by both the lessee and the
lessor. This contract between the parties is
to be interpreted or construed on the well
laid
principles
for
construction
of
contractual terms viz for the purpose of
construction of contracts, the intention of
the parties is the meaning of the words they
have used and there can be no intention
independent of that meaning; when the
terms of the contract are vague or having
double intendment one which is lawful
should be preferred; and the construction
may be put on the instrument perfectly
consistent with his doing only what he had a
right to do.

6. Learned counsel also submits that
in the instant case the intention of the parties
is to create the licence , and not the lease.
The same can be observed by examining the
deed minutely and critically.

7. Regarding the interpretation of the
fiscal statutes, he also alleges that taxing
statutes will have to be interpreted strictly.
For this purpose, he relied on the ratio laid
down in the following cases:

1. The Board of Revenue Uttar
Pradesh vs. Rai Sahab Siddha Nath
1134 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
Mehrotra reported in AIR 1965 Supreme
Court, page 1092, paragraph 8;

2. A.V.Fernandez vs. The State of
Kerala reported in AIR 1957 Supreme
Court, page 657 paragraph 29; 3

3. The Central India Spinning and
Weaving and Manufacturing Company
Ltd. vs. The Municipal Committee,
Wardha reported in AIR 1958 Supreme
Court, page 341, para 5; and

4. The State of Punjab vs. M/s
Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate reported
in AIR 1966 Supreme Court, page 1295,
para5.

8. Regarding the penalty, learned
counsel submits that the penalty @ 200%
imposed by the authorities below is totally
against the law as the same was imposed in
an arbitrary and illegal manner. For this
purpose, he relied on the ratio laid down in
the following cases:

1. M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs.
State of Orissa reported in AIR 1970
Supreme Court, page 253, paragraph 7;
and

2. Smt. Asha Kapoor vs. Additional
Commissioner reported in 2008 Volume
(2) AWC, page 1879, paragraph 7,
Allahabad.

9. According to him, in the present
case, no finding has been recorded by the
authorities below as to why the penalty is
being imposed. It has only stated in a
cursory
manner
that
petitioner
has
deliberately evaded the stamp duty. The
cursory observations made by the appellate
authority is not substantiated by any
material as it is clear from the deed in
question that the parties have agreed to
create the licence. The instrument in
question was rightly executed as licence
deed by paying the stamp duty of Rs.100/-.

10. Further, Stamp Act being a taxing
statute is required to be interpreted strictly
and since the document in question is a
licence, hence, it can not be required to be
levied with the duty of stamp required for
lease. No reason has been assigned for
imposing
penalty
and
mere
cursory
observation has been made by the appellate
authority. Lastly, he made a request that the
impugned orders may kindly be set aside.

11. On the other hand, Sri D.R.Misra,
learned counsel for the department relied on
the order passed by the lower authorities.
He submits that the petitioner is a Company
registered under the Companies Act and as
per the instrument (MOU), the area has
been taken on the rent ,initially, for three
years but the same was extended. Now the
total period of tenancy is 9 years. The rate
of Rs.70.00 per sq. ft. was agreed. There is a
provision for enhancement of the rent at the
rate of 15%. Thus, the rent for 9 years
comes to Rs.7,63,53,383/=. Accordingly,
the
deficit
of
stamp
comes
to
Rs.33,93,500/=, which is supposed to be
paid by the petitioner.

12. Learned counsel further submits
that the essence of contract describes stamp
duty payable on an instrument and from a
perusal of instrument entitled 'memorandum
of understanding', it is crystal clear that the
same comes within the ambit and scope of
Section 2(16) (b) of Indian Stamp Act and
accordingly, as per Clause 35 (a) (iii) of
Schedule-I-B of Indian Stamp Act, the
instrument which has been entered into
between the petitioner and M/s Sahara India
Commercial Corporation, the requisite
3 All] M/S Pantaloon Retail (India) V. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Ors
1135
stamp duty is payable upon the said
instrument as the same is an agreement of
tenancy. He read out Clause 35 (a) (iii) of
Schedule-I-B of Indian Stamp Act, which is
reproduced as under:

35. Lease, including an under-lease or
sub-lease and any agreement to let or
sublet.

(a) Where by such lease the rent is
fixed and no premium is paid or delivered-

(iii) where the lease purpose to be for
a term exceeding five years but not
exceeding ten years.

13. He also submits that the stamp
duty is payable equally on the 'Agreement
for lease' or 'Lease agreement' in view of
provisions of Clause-35 of Parishishit-1(a)
and as such, once the essence of instrument
entitled 'memorandum of understanding'
describes the terms and conditions in the
nature
of
'lease
agreement'
thereby
disclosing the facts in respect to the
payment of lease rent in respect to the
property in question, in these circumstances,
the stamp duty is payable upon the said
instrument in accordance with law.

14. Learned counsel further alleges
that as per the terms of the instrument
entered into between the parties for the
period of 9 years, there is a provision for
enhancement of 15% rent every year and
the rent on super area of having 9455.30 sq.
ft. has been fixed as Rs.70/- per sq.mt. per
month, as such, on calculating the rent of 9
years, the amounts comes to Rs.7,63,53,383
and on which there is a deficit stamp duty of
sum of Rs.33,93,500/= which is payable by
the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant writ
petition filed by the petitioner being devoid
of merit and is liable to be dismissed with
costs.

15. After hearing both the parties, it
appears that on 05.07.2005, the petitioner
and
M/s
Sahara
India
Commercial
Corporation
Ltd.
have
executed
"Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU)
to have super area of 9455.30 sq. ft. (carpet
are: 6303.53 sq. ft.) spread over ground
floor in the commercial complex of
Saharaganj, Hazratganj, initially for a period
of three years, which is renewable. The
monthly licence fee was fixed @ of Rs.70/-
per sq.ft. per month, calculated on super
build up area. Escalation in the monthly fee
was fixed @ of 15% increase every three
year over the last prevailing rate. It appears
from the impugned orders that initially, the
lease was executed for three years but it has
been extended for a total period of nine
years. In the said MOU, as per Clause 24, it
was specifically mentioned that

"This agreement shall never be
construed as a tenancy agreement, lease
agreement or otherwise, creating any other
right/interest in the property in favour of
second party, which is not at all the
intentions of the parties."

16. At the strength of this Clause,
learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the agreement will have to be examined
as per the intention of the parties and the
intention of the parties is to create the
licence, and certainly, not the lease.

17. Needless to mention that the term
'lease' is defined under section 105 of
Transfer of Property Act, which is
reproduced as under:-

"S.105. Lease defined- A lease of
immovable property is transfer of a right to
1136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
enjoy such property, made for a certain
time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in
consideration of a price paid or promised,
or of money, a share of crops, service or
any other thing of value, to be rendered
periodically or on specified occasions to the
transfer by the transferee, who accepts the
transfer on such terms."

18. Further, Section 2(16) of Indian
Stamp Act, 1899 provides the definition of
lease. The said provision reads as under:-

2(16) "Lease" means a lease of
immovable property, and also

(a) a patta;

(b) a kabuliyat or other undertaking in
writing, not being a counterpart of a lease,
a cultivate occupy or pay or deliver rent for
immovable property;

(c) any instrument by which tolls of
any description are let;

(d) any writing on an application for
lease intended to signify that the application
is granted;

(e) any instrument by which mining
lease is granted in respect of minor
minerals as defined in clause (e) of Section
3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation
and Development) Act, 1957.

19. On the other hand, Section 52 of
Easement Act provides the definition of
licence. The said provision reads as under:-

"Section 52. Where one person grants
to another, or to a definite number of other
persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in
or upon the immovable property of the
grantor, something which would, in the
absence of such right, be unlawful, and such
right does not amount to an easement or an
interest in the property, the right is called a
licence."

20. Moreover, Section 62 (C) of the
Easement Act, 1882 itself provides that a
licence is deemed to be revoked when it has
been either granted for a limited period or
acquired on condition that it shall become
void
on
the
performance
or
nonperformance of a specified Act, and the
period expires, or the condition is fulfilled.

21. In the instant case, the petitioner
heavily relied on the ratio laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delta
International
(supra),
but
the
said
judgment was regarding to run a petrol
service station. In 1985, Delta International
Ltd. filed a Civil Suit No.491/85 in the High
Court of Calcutta for a perpetual injunction
restraining the defendants and / or their
servants, agents and assigns from using any
of the fixtures, fittings and occasions lying
at suit premises; for damages, for wrongful
use and occupation of the premises i.e. the
date of termination of lease and licence as
claimed in the plaint and for degree of
possession of the said premises and other
reliefs.

22. But in the instant case, the facts
and circumstances are quite different and
the said ratio laid down in the case of Delta
International is not applicable.

23. Needless to mention that the ratio
will have to be applied in the identical facts
and circumstances of the case. .

24. It may not be out of place to
mention that the word 'lease' is frequently
used to designate the contract by which the
relation of land-lord and tenant is created.
3 All] M/S Pantaloon Retail (India) V. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Ors
1137
Accordingly, a lease is a species of contract
for the possession and profits of land and
tenements, either for life, or for a certain
period of time, or during the pleasure of
parties, or a contract for the possession and
profits of land, for a determinate period with
the recompense of rent. Thus, a lease may
regarded as a conveyance or grant of an
estate or interest in real property, for a
limited term with condition attached.

25. On the other hand, a licence is a
right or permission granted by some
competent authority to carry on business or
to do an act which, without such licence,
would be illegal. In other words, it is a
formal or official permit or permission to
carry on some business or do some act
which, without the licence, would be
unlawful and the word 'licence' and 'permit'
are often used synonymously.

26. Regarding the property, a licence
is simply the authority to enter the land of
another and perform a specified act or series
of acts without obtaining any permanent
interest in the land. It is a permit or privilege
to do what otherwise would be trespass, or
tort or otherwise unlawful. An example is
that a ticket holder has a licence to watch
the movie in a particular show in the hall.

27. If the instrument or agreement
grants an interest or a right to use and
occupy the land, it may not be construed as
a mere licence, notwithstanding it is called a
licence by the parties, as observed in the
case of Dargis vs. Paradise Park, Inc., 354
III APP. 3D 171, 289 III Dec. 420, 819
N.E.2d 1220 (2d Dist. 2004).

28. A licence is also distinguished
from a lease. As per "Corpus Juris
Secundum", a licence generally provides
the licencee with less rights in real estate
than a lease. If the contract gives exclusive
possession of the premises against all the
word, including the owner it is a lease, but if
it merely confers of a privilege to occupy
the premises under the owner, it is a licence.
Accordingly, a licence in a property is the
permission or authority to engage in a
particular act or series of acts upon the land
of another without possessing an interest
therein, and is thus subject to management
and control retained by the owner.

29. As a further distinction between a
licence and a lease, the latter conveys an
interest in the land, requires a writing to
comply with the statute of frauds, and
transfers possession, while the former
merely excuses acts done by one on the land
in the possession of another that without a
licence would be trespasses, and conveys no
interest in land. Further, a lease is corporeal
and the licence an incorporeal and the
absence of consideration is more indicative
of a licence than a lease.

30. In the case of Associated Hotels
of India vs. R.N.Kapoor reported in
(1960) 1 SCR 368, wherein it was
observed:

"...If a document gives only a right to
use the property in a particular way or under
certain terms while it remains in possession
and control of the owner thereof, it will be a
licence. The legal possession, therefore,
continues to be with the owner of the
property, but the licensee is permitted to
make use of the premises for a particular
purpose. But for the permission, his
occupation would be unlawful. It does not
create in his favour any estate or interest in
the property."

31. Further, it is quite clear that the
distinction between lease and licence is
1138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
marked by the last clause of section 52 of
the Easement Act as by reason of a licence,
no estate or interest in the property is
created. In the case of Qudrat Ullah vs.
Municipal Board, Bareilly reported in
(1974) 1 SCC 202, wherein it was
observed:-

"....If
an
interest
in
immovable
property,
entitling
the
transferors
to
enjoyment is created, it is a lease; if
permission to use land without right to
exclusive possession is alone granted, a
license is the legal result."

32. Further, in the case of Pradeep Oil
Corporation vs. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi and anr. reported in (2011) 5SCC
270, wherein it was observed that:

"We may also notice the undisputed
fact that in the present case the parties have
agreed
that
for
the
purpose
of
determination of the agreement three
calendar months' notice had to be given.
Undoubtedly, such clause in the document
in question has a significant role to play in
the matter of construction of document.
Clearly, if the parties to the agreement
intended that by reason of such agreement
merely a license would be created, such a
term could not have been inserted."

33. In the instant case, the petitioner
has paid stamp duty of Rs.100/- on the said
instrument (MOU), by considering it as a
deed of licence. But fact remains that mere
use of the words 'licence' or 'licencee'
would not be sufficient to hold that the the
said instrument (MOU) is a licence. Simply,
using the word licence will neither be
regraded conclusive nor determinative.

34. Moreover, if a contract is for the
exclusive possession and profits of the land,
it is a lease and not a licence, no matter in
what nomenclature, the rent is to be paid.
Further, in the said MOU, as per clause 19,
it has been specifically mentioned:

"Either or both parties may terminate
this agreement any time after the date of
opening of shop by serving written notice of
six months to the other parties..."

35. Moreover, it is well settled legal
position that a licence can be revoked at
any time at the pleasure of the licensor.
Thus, by merely stating that a transaction is
a licence, not a lease, its nature can not be
changed.

36. In view of above, the instrument in
question (MOU) is a tenancy agreement,
specially by looking upon the length of the
period of nine years, the same will have to
be treated as tenancy/lease agreement.

37. Needless to mention that by an
agreement, the petitioner can not override
the legal provisions. Hence, there is no
infirmity in the order passed by the lower
authorities, though I agree with the
submission made by the learned counsel for
the petitioner that taxing statutes will have
to be interpreted strictly. Therefore, the
petitioner will have to pay the deficiency of
the stamp duty as per the Indian Stamps
Act.

38. For the similar reasons, the
penalty is leviable, but looking into the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the
instant case, the penalty @ of Rs.200%
seems to be on higher side. By taking a
lenient view as per the ratio laid down in the
case of Shyam Oil Mills vs. CIT (2006)
286 ITR 251 MP, the penalty is reduced @
3 All] Smt. Chandra Kali V. Board of Revenue and others
1139
of 100%. Thus, the petitioner will get the
partial relief from the orders passed by the
lower authorities.

39. Accordingly, the writ petition is
partly allowed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 21.09.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR, J.

Misc. Single No.3980 of 2004.

Smt. Chandra Kali

 ...Applicant
Versus
Board of Revenue & others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Balram Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri S.K. Mehrotra

U.P.Land
Revenue
Act-Section
220Power of Review-can be exercised by
Board of Revenue-Commissioner can not
exercise such power in absence of
Statutory
provision-order
passed
by
Board of Revenue setting aside the
review order passed by commissionerheld valid.

Held: Para 9 & 10

From the perusal of the abovesaid
Section, it is clear that only the Board of
Revenue has got power to review its
earlier order under the Land Revenue Act
and no any other authority has been
vested with the said power.

It is well settled proposition of law that
power to review is given to an authority
by the statute itself and that particular
authority can exercise the same and in
the absence of such provisions, no other
authority can exercise the powers of
review.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1987 SC 2186

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anil Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Satyendra Singh,
learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
State Counsel as well as Shri I. D.Shukla,
learned counsel for the respondent and
perused the record.

2. Facts in brief of the present case
are that the controversy involved in the
present case relates to plot no. 353 khata
no.111 situated in village Karmaganj,
Tehsil
Kunda,
District-Pratapgarh
recorded in the name of one Smt. Mahdei
who died on 14.10.1982

3. After the death of Smt. Mahdei,
petitioner moved an application for
mutating his name in the revenue record
in respect of the land in question on the
basis of Will deed, rejected by order dated
24.1.1987 passed by Naib Tehsildar,
challenging the petitioner by filing an
appeal under Section 21. of the U.P. Land
Revenue Act, 1901 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act), dismissed by order dated
26.8.1998 (Annexure No.3) passed by the
appellate
authority/Deputy
Collector
Kunda, Pratapgarh.

4. Order dated 26.8.1998 has been
challenged by the petitioner by filing a
revision bearing Revision No.144 of
1998,
dismissed
by
order
dated
26.10.1999 (Annexure No.4) passed by
revisional
authority/Additional
Commissioner. Thereafter, on 17.11.1999,
he filed a review application, allowed by
order dated 25.11.2002 (Annexure No.5)
passed by the Additional Commissioner.