# M/s Prakash Medical Stores v. Union Of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 1232
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-12
- **Case number:** Writ Tax No. 5865 of 2025
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh, Vivek Saran
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-prakash-medical-stores-v-union-of-india-ors-52806
- **Pages:** 12

## Text

1232 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i) Subject to the individual
petitioner filing a copy of this order
together with proof of deposit made, before
the Adjudicating Authority within a month,
the Adjudicating Authority shall make
available to the petitioner copy of the show
cause
notice
together
with
any
additional/supplementary notice etc. issued
in these proceedings together with copies
of Relied Upon Documents ('RUDs' in
short) within a period of two weeks from
the date of compliance shown by the
petitioner.

(ii)
Petitioners
shall
file
individual replies, if any, within a further
period of four weeks therefrom.

(iii) Thereupon the Adjudicating
Authority shall fix appropriate date for
hearing and communicate the same to the
individual
petitioner,
in
the
manner
prescribed by law with at least two weeks'
advance notice.

(iv) Petitioners undertake to
cooperate
and
participate
in
the
proceedings and not seek any undue or
long adjournment.

(v) Any amount already deposited
or recovered pursuant to the impugned
adjudication order, may be adjusted
against the amount to be deposited against
this order, which shall abide by final
adjudication order.

(vi) It is expected that the
proceedings
thus
remitted
would
be
concluded within six months from the date
of first compliance made by the petitioner.

(vii) No order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 1232
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE VIVEK SARAN, J.

Writ Tax No. 5865 of 2025

M/s Prakash Medical Stores ...Petitioner
Versus
Union Of India & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the petitioner's appeal under Section
107 of the UP GST Act, 2017 was time-barred.

Whether the principle of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act could be applied to exclude the
period
spent
in
pursuing
a
rectification
application under Section 161.

HEADNOTES
Tax Law - UP GST Act, 2017 - Sections
107, 161, - Limitation Act, 1963 - Sections
5, 14, 29 - Writ petition - filed to challenge
dismissal of GST appeal as time-barred -
dispute arose from ex-parte adjudication order
and subsequent rectification application - plea
taken that Section 14 Limitation Act principle
applies to exclude time spent in rectification
proceedings - court finds that, rectification was
bona fide, limitation kept in abeyance, appeal
filed within statutory period - court held that,
the period of limitation being three months, and
therefore the appeal filed was well within
limitation - consequently, the writ petition is
allowed - impugned order is set aside - and the
appeal is restored to its original number and
status with to decide the same strictly in
accordance with law on merits, expeditiously.
(Para - 29, 30, 31, 32)
Writ Petitions Allowed.(E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of
Central Excise (2015) 319 ELT 373 (SC)
Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v.
Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 5 SCC 791
Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada v.
Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd.
(2020) 19 SCC 681
SPK and Co. v. State Tax Officer (Madras HC,
2024)
Arvind Fashion Ltd. v. State of Haryana (P&H
HC, 2025)
12 All. M/s Prakash Medical Stores Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
1233
Atlantis Intelligence Ltd. v. Union of India
(Allahabad HC, 2025)
Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.
(2004) 3 SCC 458
Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi
(1975) 4 SCC 628
India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh
(1971) 1 SCC 24

LIST OF ACTS
UP GST Act, 2017 - Limitation Act, 1963.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
GST appeal limitation - Rectification application -
Section 14 principle - Bona fide proceedings -
Exclusion vs. condonation - Cause of justice -
Time-barred appeal.

CASE ARISING FROM
Ex-parte adjudication order dated 23.04.2024 by
Deputy Commissioner, State Tax, Kanpur. -
Rectification
application
filed
23.05.2024,
rejected 22.10.2024 - Appeal filed 29.11.2024,
dismissed as time-barred on 05.03.2025.
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Petitioners: - Shri Shri Shubham
Agrawal.
Counsel for Respondents: - Shri Ankur Agarwal
(Standing Counsel), Sudarshan Singh (CGC).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal
Singh, J.
&
Hon'ble Vivek Saran, J.)

1. Heard Shri Shubham Agrawal,
learned counsel for the petitoner, Shri Ankur
Agarwal, learned Standing Counsel for the
Revenue and perused the record.

2. The present writ petition has been
filed to assail the order dated 05.03.2025
passed by Additional Commissioner, Grade-2
(Appeal)-V, State Tax, Kanpur (respondent
No.4) whereby the first appeal filed by the
petitioner under Section 107 of the UP GST
Act, 2017 (herein after referred to as the Act),
against the ex-parte adjudication order dated
23.04.2024
passed
by
the
Deputy
Commissioner,
State
Tax,
Sector-27,
Lakhanpur Kanpur-respondent No.3, under
Section 73 of the Act for the Financial Year
2018-19, (creating demand of Tax/Cess
Rs.7,81,838.98/-
together
with
interest
Rs.7,86,164/- and penalty Rs.78,184/-) has
been dismissed as time barred. The remaining
prayers (in the petition) have not been
pressed.

3.
Arising
from
the
ex-parte
adjudication order dated 23.04.2024, the
petitioner first filed an application referable to
Section 161 of the Act (seeking rectification
in the order dated 23.04.2024), on 23.5.2024
i.e. after a month and one day. The said
application was rejected by the order dated
22.10.2024, as not maintainable.

4. At that stage, the petitioner filed an
appeal under section 107 of the Act on
29.11.2024 i.e. within a month and eight days
from the date of the order passed under
Section 161 of the Act.

5. According to the petitioner, there was
no delay in filing that appeal as it was entitled
to the benefit of the principle underlying
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
(hereinafter referred to as "Limitation Act").
However, the appellate authority has rejected
the appeal and dismissed those proceedings
as time-barred, vide order dated 05.03.2025.

6. Primarily, this order is under
challenge in the present writ petition. At
present, the Tribunal has not been made
functional. For that reason, the present writ
petition has been entertained, upon lifting the
self imposed bar of alternative remedy.

7. Submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner is-though, in terms, Section
14 of the Limitation Act does not apply to
1234 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings under the Act, at the same
time, the underlying principle contained in
Section 14 of the Limitation Act does
apply. Reliance has been placed on a
decision of the Supreme Court in M.P.
Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of
Central Excise 2015 (319) E.L.T. 373
(S.C.). Further reliance has been placed on
a decision of the Madras High Court in
M/s. SPK and Co. vs. The State Tax
Officer in W.P.(MD) Nos. 27787 and
27788 of 2024 and W.M.P.(MD) Nos.
23585 and 23586 of 2024 decided on
22.11.2024 and another decision of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s
Arvind Fashion Limited vs. State of
Haryana
and
others
2025:PHHC:135347-DB. Also, reliance
has been placed upon observation made in
paragraph No.14(D) of the order passed by
a
co-ordinate
bench
in
Atlantis
Intelligence Ltd. vs. Union of India and 2
others, 2025:AHC:135383-DB.

8. Thus, it has been submitted, the
learned Appeal Authority has erred in law
in declining to give benefit of the principle
contained in Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. If the duration of pendency of the
rectification of mistake application filed by
the petitioner under Section 161 of the Act
is excluded, the appeal filed by the
petitioner would be within three months
from the date of communication of the
order dated 23.4.2024. Thus, the appeal
filed is within limitation.

9. On the other hand, learned Standing
Counsel would contend that the period of
limitation is prescribed under the Act, to
file appeals etc. In the first place, the
limitation of three months existed to file
such appeal. Thereafter, delay of only one
month could be condoned, subject to
sufficient cause being established by the
petitioner. Since admittedly, the appeal was
first
preferred
by
the
petitioner
on
29.11.2024, outside four months from the
date of communication of the Adjudication
Order
dated
24.03.2024,
the
delay
condonation application has rightly been
dismissed, as time barred.

10. To the extent the Act provides for
an inflexible period of limitation to file
appeals, the principle of law enshrined
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act has
no application. Reliance has been placed on
Commissioner of Customs & Central
Excise vs. Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 5
SCC 791 and Assistant Commissioner
(CT) LTU, Kakinada vs. Glaxo Smith
Kline Consumer Health Care Limited,
(2020) 19 SCC 681.

11.
Alternatively,
it
has
been
submitted,
wherever
any
application
seeking rectification may be filed after
expiry of limitation to file such application,
no benefit may be drawn by such a person,
by relying on principle contained under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

12. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the record,
before we discuss the issue any further, it
would be useful to extract the provisions of
Section 107(1), (4) of the Act. They read as
below:

"Section
107(1):
Appeals
to
Appellate Authority.-

(1) Any person aggrieved by any
decision or order passed under this Act or
the State Goods and Services Tax Act or
the Union Territory Goods and Services
Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may
appeal to such Appellate Authority as may
be prescribed within three months from the
12 All. M/s Prakash Medical Stores Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
1235
date on which the said decision or order is
communicated to such person.

(2)...

(3)...

(4):The Appellate Authority may,
if he is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented
by
sufficient
cause
from
presenting the appeal within the aforesaid
period of three months or six months, as the
case may be, allow it to be presented within
a further period of one month."

 (emphasis supplied)

13. Section 161 of the Act reads as
below:

"Section 161: Rectification of
errors apparent on the face of record.-

Without
prejudice
to
the
provisions of section 160, and notwithstanding
anything contained in any other provisions of
this Act, any authority, who has passed or
issued any decision or order or notice or
certificate or any other document, may rectify
any error which is apparent on the face of
record in such decision or order or notice or
certificate or any other document, either on its
own motion or where such error is brought to
its notice by any officer appointed under this
Act or an officer appointed under the State
Goods and Services Tax Act or an officer
appointed under the Union Territory Goods
and Services Tax Act or by the affected person
within a period of three months from the date
of issue of such decision or order or notice or
certificate or any other document, as the case
may be:

Provided
that
no
such
rectification shall be done after a period of
six months from the date of issue of such
decision or order or notice or certificate or
any other document:

Provided further that the said
period of six months shall not apply in such
cases where the rectification is purely in
the nature of correction of a clerical or
arithmetical
error,
arising
from any
accidental slip or omission:

Provided also that where such
rectification adversely affects any person,
the principles of natural justice shall be
followed by the authority carrying out such
rectification."

 (emphasis supplied)

14. We also find it useful to extract the
provisions of Section 14 of Limitiation Act,
which reads as below:

"Section 14. Exclusion of time of
proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction.- (1) In computing the period of
limitation for any suit the time during
which the plaintiff has been prosecuting
with
due
diligence
another
civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against
the defendant shall be excluded, where the
proceeding relates to the same matter in
issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a
court which, from defect of jurisdiction or
other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.

(2) In computing the period of
limitation for any application, the time
during which the applicant has been
prosecuting with due diligence another
civil proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against
the same party for the same relief shall be
1236 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
excluded,
where
such
proceeding
is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which,
from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of
a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply
in relation to a fresh suit instituted on
permission granted by the court under rule
1 of that Order, where such permission is
granted on the ground that the first suit
must fail by reason of a defect in the
jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a
like nature.

Explanation.-For the purposes
of this section, -

(a) in excluding the time during
which a former civil proceeding was
pending, the day on which that proceeding
was instituted and the day on which it
ended shall both be counted;

(b) a plaintiff or an applicant
resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be
prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of
parties or of causes of action shall be
deemed to be a cause of a like nature with
defect of jurisdiction."

 (emphasis supplied)

15.
As
to
applicability
of
the
Limitation Act, the issue is not res integra.
In M.P. Steel (supra), the Supreme Court
considered the principle of pre-existing law
laid down by that court in Bhudan Singh
and another vs. Nabi Bux and another
(1970) 2 SCR 10; J. Kumaradasan Nair
vs. Iric Sohan (2009) 12 SCC 175,
Consolidated
Engg
Enterprises
vs.
Irrigation Department (2008) 7 SCC 169
and Commissioner of Sales Tax vs.
Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC
22. Thereafter, the Court distinguished
Parson Tools (supra) and held though the
provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act
may
not
apply
in
terms-to
proceedings/appeals under the Customs
Act, at the same time, the underlying
principle of Section 14 would apply to such
proceedings, as well.

16. In M.P. Steel (supra), against the
order of adjudication, the aggrieved person
directly approached the Custom Excise
Service Appellate Tribunal (the second
appeal authority). That Tribunal allowed
the appeal. Against that order, the matter
travelled to the Supreme Court. The
Revenue's appeal was allowed, and the
order of the Tribunal was set aside.
Thereafter,
the
aggrieved
person
approached the first appeal authority and
explained-it had committed a mistake in
approaching the Tribunal directly. The first
appeal was dismissed on account of delay.
On the matter again reaching the Supreme
Court (in the second round of litigation), it
was ruled that the underlying principle of
Section 14 would apply to such facts as
well.

17. Relevant to the above, first,
Parson Tools (supra) was distinguished,
on the following reasoning:

"34. However, it remains to
consider whether Shri Sanghi is right in
stating that Section 128 is a complete code
by itself which necessarily excludes the
application of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. For this proposition he relied strongly
on Parson Tools which has been discussed
hereinabove. As has already been stated,
Parson Tools was a judgment which turned
on the three features mentioned in the said
12 All. M/s Prakash Medical Stores Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
1237
case. Unlike the U.P. Sales Tax Act, there
is no provision in the Customs Act which
enables a party to invoke suo moto the
appellate power and grant relief to a
person who institutes an appeal out of time
in an appropriate case. Also, Section 10 of
the U.P. Sales Tax Act dealt with the filing
of a revision petition after a first appeal
had already been rejected, and not to a
case of a first appeal as provided under
Section 128 of the Customs Act. Another
feature, which is of direct relevance in this
case, is that for revision petitions filed
under the U.P. Sales Tax Act a sufficiently
long period of 18 months had been given
beyond which it was the policy of the
legislature not to extend limitation any
further. This aspect of Parson Tools has
been
explained
in
Consolidated
Engineering in some detail by both the
main judgment as well as the concurring
judgment. In the latter judgment, it has
been pointed out that there is a vital
distinction between extending time and
condoning delay. Like Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, Section 128 of the Customs
Act is a Section which lays down that delay
cannot be condoned beyond a certain
period. Like Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act, Section 128 of the Customs Act does
not lay down a long period. In these
circumstances, to infer exclusion of Section
14 or the principles contained in Section 14
would be unduly harsh and would not
advance the cause of justice. It must not be
forgotten as is pointed out in the
concurring
judgment
in
Consolidated
Engineering that:

"Even when there is cause to apply
Section 14, the limitation period continues to
be three months and not more, but in
computing the limitation period of three
months for the application under Section
34(1) of the AC Act, the time during which
the
applicant
was
prosecuting
such
application before the wrong court is
excluded, provided the proceeding in the
wrong court was prosecuted bona fide, with
due diligence. Western Builders [(2006) 6
SCC 239] therefore lays down the correct
legal position."

 (Emphasis supplied)

18. Second, as to the applicability of the
principle contained in Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, the Supreme Court further
observed as below:

35. Merely because Parson Tools
also dealt with a provision in a tax statute
does not make the ratio of the said decision
apply to a completely differently worded tax
statute with a much shorter period of
limitation - Section 128 of the Customs Act.
Also, the principle of Section 14 would apply
not merely in condoning delay within the
outer period prescribed for condonation but
would apply de hors such period for the
reason
pointed
out
in
Consolidated
Engineering above, being the difference
between exclusion of a certain period
altogether under Section 14 principles and
condoning delay. As has been pointed out in
the said judgment, when a certain period is
excluded by applying the principles contained
in Section 14, there is no delay to be
attributed to the appellant and the limitation
period provided by the concerned statute
continues to be the stated period and not
more than the stated period. We conclude,
therefore, that the principle of Section 14
which is a principle based on advancing
the cause of justice would certainly apply
to exclude time taken in prosecuting
proceedings which are bona fide and with
due diligence pursued, which ultimately
end without a decision on the merits of the
case."
1238 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

 (emphasis supplied)

19. Third, as to the object/purpose of
Section 14 or its principle, the Supreme
Court observed as below:

"41.The language of Section 14,
construed in the light of the object for
which the provision has been made, lends
itself to such an interpretation. The object
of Section 14 is that if its conditions are
otherwise
met,
the
plaintiff/applicant
should be put in the same position as he
was
when
he
started
an
abortive
proceeding. What is necessary is the
absence of negligence or inaction. So long
as the plaintiff or applicant is bonafide
pursuing a legal remedy which turns out to
be abortive, the time beginning from the
date of the cause of action of an appellate
proceeding is to be excluded if such
appellate proceeding is from an order in an
original
proceeding
instituted
without
jurisdiction or which has not resulted in an
order on the merits of the case. If this were
not so, anomalous results would follow.
Take the case of a plaintiff or applicant
who has succeeded at the first stage of
what
turns out
to be
an abortive
proceeding. Assume that, on a given state
of facts, a defendant ? appellant or other
appellant takes six months more than the
prescribed period for filing an appeal. The
delay in filing the appeal is condoned.
Under explanation (b) of Section 14, the
plaintiff or the applicant resisting such an
appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a
proceeding. If the six month period
together with the original period for filing
the appeal is not to be excluded under
Section 14, the plaintiff/applicant would
not get a hearing on merits for no fault of
his, as he in the example given is not the
appellant. Clearly therefore, in such a case,
the entire period of nine months ought to be
excluded. If this is so for an appellate
proceeding, it ought to be so for an original
proceeding as well with this difference that
the time already taken to file the original
proceeding, i.e. the time prior to institution
of the original proceeding cannot be
excluded. Take a case where the limitation
period for the original proceeding is six
months. The plaintiff/applicant files such a
proceeding on the ninetieth day i.e. after
three months are over. The said proceeding
turns out to be abortive after it has gone
through a chequered career in the appeal
courts. The same plaintiff/applicant now
files a fresh proceeding before a court of
first
instance
having
the
necessary
jurisdiction. So long as the said proceeding
is filed within the remaining three month
period, Section 14 will apply to exclude the
entire time taken starting from the ninety
first day till the final appeal is ultimately
dismissed. This example also goes to show
that the expression ?the time during which
the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding? needs
to be construed in a manner which
advances the object sought to be achieved,
thereby advancing the cause of justice."

 (emphasis supplied)

20. Fourth, as to interpretation of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, after
considering the pre-existing law on that
point, the Supreme Court opined-it must be
interpreted extremely liberally as it furthers
the cause of justice. Thus, it was observed
below:

"42.
Section
14
has
been
interpreted
by
this
Court
extremely
liberally inasmuch as it is a provision
which furthers the cause of justice. Thus, in
Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills
Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 458, this Court held:
12 All. M/s Prakash Medical Stores Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
1239

"14. ... In the submission of the
learned Senior Counsel, filing of civil writ
petition claiming money relief cannot be
said to be a proceeding instituted in good
faith and secondly, dismissal of writ
petition on the ground that it was not an
appropriate remedy for seeking money
relief cannot be said to be 'defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature'
within the meaning of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. It is true that the writ
petition was not dismissed by the High
Court on the ground of defect of
jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is wide in its application,
inasmuch as it is not confined in its
applicability only to cases of defect of
jurisdiction but it is applicable also to
cases where the prior proceedings have
failed on account of other causes of like
nature. The expression 'other cause of like
nature' came up for the consideration of
this Court in Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B.
Mohan Singh Oberoi[(1975) 4 SCC 628]
and it was held that Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such
cases where the defects are not merely
jurisdictional strictly so called but others
more
or
less
neighbours
to
such
deficiencies. Any circumstance, legal or
factual, which inhibits entertainment or
consideration by the court of the dispute on
the merits comes within the scope of the
section and a liberal touch must inform the
interpretation of the Limitation Act which
deprives the remedy of one who has a
right."

Similarly, in India Electric Works
Ltd. v. James Mantosh, (1971) 1 SCC 24,
this Court held:

"7. It is well settled that although
all questions of limitation must be decided by
the provisions of the Act and the courts
cannot travel beyond them the words ?or
other cause of a like nature? must be
construed liberally. Some clue is furnished
with regard to the intention of the legislature
by Explanation III in Section 14(2). Before
the enactment of the Act in 1908, there was a
conflict amongst the High Courts on the
question whether misjoinder and non-joinder
were defects which were covered by the
words ?or other cause of a like nature?. It
was to set at rest this conflict that
Explanation III was added. An extended
meaning was thus given to these words.
Strictly speaking misjoinder or non-joinder of
parties could hardly be regarded as a defect
of jurisdiction or something similar or
analogous to it."

 (emphasis supplied)

21. Insofar as the decisions of the
Madras High Court and High Court of
Punjab and Haryana in M/s. SPK and Co.
(supra) and M/s Arvind Fashion Limited
(supra) are concerned, they too have laid
down law consistent to the decision of the
Supreme Court, in M.P. Steel (supra).
While we may not find ourselves in perfect
agreement to the expression of 'merger' used
in those decisions, and may only say on
rectification
made
by
the
same
authority/court that order relates back to the
date of the original order passed, on the
meaty/fundamental issue of applicability of
the underlying 'principle' of Section 14, we
find ourselves in complete agreement, to
those decisions.

22. Insofar as the order passed by coordinate bench in Atlantis Intelligence Ltd.
(supra) is concerned, though the issue raised
therein may have been slightly different,
observation made in paragraph 14(D) is
pertinent. For ready reference, it reads as
below:
1240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"D. The principle of Section 14 of
the Limitation Act which is a principle
based on advancing the cause of justice
would certainly apply to exclude time taken
in prosecuting proceedings which are bona
fide and with due diligence pursued, which
ultimately end without a decision on the
merits of the case."

 (emphasis supplied)

23. However, there may survive no
merit in the other submission advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioner on the
strength of Section 29 of the Limitation
Act. With respect to that, in M.P. Steel
(supra), it was observed as below:

"28. The sheet anchor in Mukri
Gopalan
was
Section
29(2)
of
the
Limitation Act. Section 29(2) states:-

"29. Savings. - (2) Where any
special or local law prescribes for any suit,
appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall
apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and
to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local
law."

A bare reading of this Section
would show that the special or local law
described therein should prescribe for any
suit, appeal or application a period of
limitation
different
from
the
period
prescribed by the schedule. This would
necessarily mean that such special or local
law would have to lay down that the suit,
appeal or application to be instituted under
it should be a suit, appeal or application of
the nature described in the schedule. We
have already held that such suits, appeals
or applications as are referred to in the
schedule are only to courts and not to
quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals. It is
clear, therefore, that only when a suit,
appeal or application of the description in
the schedule is to be filed in a court under
a special or local law that the provision
gets attracted.

This is made even clearer by a
reading of Section 29(3). Section 29(3)
states:-

"29. Savings. - (3) Save as
otherwise provided in any law for the time
being in force with respect to marriage and
divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to
any suit or other proceeding under any
such law."

29. When it comes to the law of
marriage and divorce, the Section speaks
not only of suits but other proceedings as
well. Such proceedings may be proceedings
which are neither appeals nor applications
thus making it clear that the laws relating
to marriage and divorce, unlike the law of
limitation, may contain proceedings other
than suits, appeals or applications filed in
courts. This again is an important pointer
to the fact that the entirety of the Limitation
Act including Section 29(2) would apply
only to the three kinds of proceedings
mentioned all of which are to be filed in
courts."

 (emphasis supplied)

24. Then, as to the objection raised by
learned Standing Counsel on the strength of
12 All. M/s Prakash Medical Stores Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
1241
Hongo India (supra) and Glaxo Smith
Kline (supra), those are cases that
excluded applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act to proceedings under similar
pari materia provisions of other Acts. The
exclusion of principle contained in Section
5 of the Limitation Act arises not on the
strength of any specific or direct exclusion
offered under express provision of the Act
or the Limitation Act, but by virtue of the
self-contained specific scheme of limitation
and condonation of delay limited (by time)
provision in Section 107(1) read with
Section 107(4) of the Act, as extracted
above. In the first place, the period of
limitation available to file appeals is three
months. Second, the power to condone
delay is limited and thus hedged in terms of
the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section
107 of the Act, to one month.

25. Accordingly, the delay may be
condoned for not more than one month.
Once the power to condone delay has been
specifically provided under Section 107(4)
of the Act, that is a special Act, it amounts
to necessary and automatic exclusion of the
general principle contained in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act. On that point, the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Hongo
India (supra) and Glaxo Smith Kline
(supra) specifically hold the field. In
Hongo India (supra), it has been observed
as below:

"32. As pointed out earlier, the
language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE,
35-G and 35-H makes the position clear
that an appeal and reference to the High
Court should be made within 180 days only
from the date of communication of the
decision or order. In other words, the
language used in other provisions makes
the position clear that the legislature
intended
the
appellate
authority
to
entertain the appeal by condoning the
delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60
days which is the preliminary limitation
period for preferring an appeal. In the
absence of any clause condoning the delay
by showing sufficient cause after the
prescribed period, there is complete
exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The High Court was, therefore, justified in
holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after expiry of the
prescribed period of 180 days."

33...

34...

35. It was contended before us
that the words "expressly excluded" would
mean that there must be an express
reference made in the special or local law
to the specific provisions of the Limitation
Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in
this case is the Central Excise Act. The
nature of the remedy provided therein is
such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should
govern the several matters provided by it.
If, on an examination of the relevant
provisions, it is clear that the provisions of
the
Limitation
Act
are
necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred
therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our
considered view, that even in a case where
the special law does not exclude the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the court to
examine whether and to what extent, the
nature of those provisions or the nature of
the subject-matter and scheme of the
special law exclude their operation. In
1242 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore,
is to be judged not from the terms of the
Limitation Act but by the provisions of the
Central Excise Act relating to filing of
reference application to the High Court.

36. The scheme of the Central
Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion
that the time-limit prescribed under Section
35-H(1) to make a reference to the High
Court is absolute and unextendable by a
court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the
court to respect the legislative intent and by
giving liberal interpretation, limitation
cannot be extended by invoking the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.".

37. In the light of the above
discussion, we hold that the High Court has
no power to condone the delay in filing the
"reference
application"
filed
by
the
Commissioner under unamended Section
35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944
beyond the prescribed period of 180 days
and rightly dismissed the reference on the
ground of limitation."

26. However, no such implied or
necessary
exclusion
to
the
general
applicability of the underlying principle of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act may be
read in the Act, even though it remains a
special Act. As summarized by the
Supreme Court in M.P. Steel (supra),
Section 14 is a beneficial piece of
legislation-to further the cause of justice
where a person pursues a case with due
diligence. He may not be non-suited
occasioned by a mistake of seeking remedy
before a wrong forum. Thus, the underlying
principle of Section 14 recognizes-that it
applies to persons (claiming its benefit),
who may have admittedly made a mistake.
Only then, the applicability of Section 14
of the Limitation Act may arise and not
otherwise. As to what nature of mistake
may lead to application of Section 14 of the
Act, it is clear that it may be in the nature
of lack of jurisdiction or defect of like
nature (construed liberally). As to the
wrong forum before whom, such mistake
may have been committed, Section 14 is
categorical. It includes in its scope,
proceedings instituted before the original
authority.

27. Seen in that light, an application
seeking rectification of mistake was, filed
by way of a remedy exits on the statute
book. It lies before the authority that may
have passed the order, including the
Adjudication Authority. Whether such an
application may be maintainable, and if
maintainable, whether it may be allowed,
are questions that may be answered only
after
conclusion
of
proceedings
for
rectification.

28. To the extent the statute creates a
forum
but
permits
exercise
of
its
jurisdiction only in certain circumstances
and not in others, it cannot be said that the
application filed by the petitioner was so
misconceived to begin with that it may be
readily inferred therefrom-either it was not
in 'good faith' or that it was not 'bona fide'.
Therefore, that conclusion, if reached,
would be harsh and may result in
unnecessarily
restricting
natural
full
applicability of the underlying principle
contained in Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. That would itself obstruct the cause of
justice.

29. The statutory remedy to seek
rectification of our order being in addition
to the statutory remedy to file an appeal, at
12 All. Gaurav Mehta Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1243
first, limitation to seek either or both those
remedies, starts running, simultaneously. If
no application is filed under Section 161 of
the Act to seek rectification (of a mistake in
such order), upto three months, the
limitation to seek rectification would expire
at the end of three months. In that case,
simultaneously, the normal period of
limitation to file first appeal against such
order would also have run continuously and
concurrently and, therefore, it would also
be exhausted, simultaneously. If, however,
before
expiry
of
three
months,
an
application is filed under Section 161 of the
Act, to seek rectification in that order, the
running of limitation (to file appeal against
such order), would be put in abeyance from
the date of filing of such application, upto
the date when that application is decided.

30. This leads us to the conclusion, to
apply the underlying principle of Section
14 Limitation Act, wherever an application
seeking rectification of mistake apparent on
the face of record may be filed within time,
as may have been done in the present case,
the application of the underlying principle
of Section 14 Limitation Act, may not be
examined with a microscope, any further.
To the extent that application is filed 'bona
fide' in 'good faith' and is pursued, that
principle would apply, without doubt. The
only exception to that principle may bewhere the application seeking rectification
of a mistake is itself filed beyond the
period of limitation prescribed under
Section 161 of the Act. There no such
benefit may arise. Here, that application
was filed within the time prescribed under
the said provisions.

31. To the extent, respondent no. 3
rejected that application, we find occasion
arose to the petitioner to claim benefit of
Section
14
of
the
Limitation
Act,
occasioned by the mistake on part of the
petitioner,
in
filing
that
application.
Consequentially, and without exception,
the duration of that application (filed by the
petitioner seeking rectification of mistake
in the adjudication order dated 23.4.2024),
having remained pending, has to be
excluded from the limitation to file appeal,
as running of limitation remained in
abeyance, during pendency of application
filed under Section 161 of the Act. Here,
that period must be excluded. Thus, the
appeal was filed within two months and
nine days from the date of the ex-parte
adjudication order. The period of limitation
being three months, the appeal filed was
well within limitation.

32. Consequently, the writ petition is
allowed. Accordingly, the order dated
23.04.2024 is set aside and the appeal is
restored to its original number and status.
We expect that the same would be dealt
with and decided strictly in accordance
with law on merits, expeditiously.

33. No order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 1243
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIKRAM D. CHAUHAN, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 33209 of 2023

Gaurav Mehta ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the Applicant (husband) filing altered
ICICI
Bank
statements
in
maintenance
proceedings
amounts
to
forgery
under
Section 466 IPC, and whether the summoning