# M/S Ramon Motion Auto Corp. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 6 ILRA 389
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-06-13
- **Case number:** Matters U/A 227 No. 2135 of 2022
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-ramon-motion-auto-corp-pvt-ltd-ors-v-debt-recovery-appellate-tribunal-ors-48773
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India,
Article 226, 226(2) - Securitisation And
Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And
Enforcement Of Security Interest Act,
2002 - Section -13(2), 14, 17 & 18 -
Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And
Financial Institutions Act, Section 19 -
Securitisation Application filed before
DRT Tribunal bench at Lucknow
-
interim order vacated - Appeal filed
before DRAT, Allahabad - Writ Petition
at
Lucknow
Bench
-
objection
-
maintainability writ petition @ Lucknow
bench - Power of High Courts to issue
certain writs - High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to its territory
within which the cause of action wholly
or in part arises - difference between
'cause of action' & 'right of action' -
existence of an alternative remedy is not
an absolute bar against this Court's
discretionary jurisdiction under Article
226 of Constitution - objection turned
down. (Para - 16, 17, 21, 22)

Writ Petition partly allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

## Text

6 All. M/S Ramon Motion Auto Corp. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
389
judicial mind. Non-occurrence of any
cognizable offence is also one of the
paramount condition which averted the
courts below from issuing a direction for
investigation in exercise of powers under
Sections 156 (3) CrPC.

25. In this conspectus as above, I do
not find any substance in the present writ
petition. No justifiable ground has been
made out warranting indulgence of this
Court in exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of Indian to interfere in the
impugned orders. There is no illegality,
perversity and ambiguity in the impugned
orders. The present writ petition, being
devoid of merits and misconceived, is
dismissed with no order as to the costs.
----------
(2022)06ILR A389
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 13.06.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Matters U/A 227 No. 2135 of 2022

M/S Ramon Motion Auto Corp. Pvt. Ltd. &
Ors. ...Petitioner
Versus
Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Abhishek Khare, Pritish Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:
Prashant Kumar Srivastava

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India,
Article 226, 226(2) - Securitisation And
Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And
Enforcement Of Security Interest Act,
2002 - Section -13(2), 14, 17 & 18 -
Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And
Financial Institutions Act, Section 19 -
Securitisation Application filed before
DRT Tribunal bench at Lucknow
-
interim order vacated - Appeal filed
before DRAT, Allahabad - Writ Petition
at
Lucknow
Bench
-
objection
-
maintainability writ petition @ Lucknow
bench - Power of High Courts to issue
certain writs - High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to its territory
within which the cause of action wholly
or in part arises - difference between
'cause of action' & 'right of action' -
existence of an alternative remedy is not
an absolute bar against this Court's
discretionary jurisdiction under Article
226 of Constitution - objection turned
down. (Para - 16, 17, 21, 22)

Writ Petition partly allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Manish Kumar Mishra Vs U.O.I., 2020 SCC
Online All 535 : AIR 2020 All 97

2. Nasiruddin Vs St. Transport Appellate
Tribunal, 1975 (2) SCC 671

3. U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad,
Lucknow Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 1995 (4) SCC
738

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1.

Heard
Sri
Sudeep
Kumar,
Advocate alongwith Sri Abhishek Khare,
Advocate, the learned Counsel for the
petitioners
and
Sri
Prashant
Kumar
Srivastava, Advocate, the learned counsel
for the respondent No. 3 & 4.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case
are that the petitioners had taken a financial
assistance from the Indian Overseas Bank,
Main Branch, Lucknow (respondent No. 3).
The respondent No. 3 has initiated
proceedings for recovery of the aforesaid
amount
under
provisions
of
The
Securitisation
and
Reconstruction
of
390 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 (herein after
referred to as "SARFAESI Act"), against
which
the
petitioners
had
filed
Securitisation Application No. 113 of 2017
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
Lucknow (herein after referred to as
"DRT"), in which the DRT had granted an
interim
protection
to
the
petitioners,
Thereafter
the
respondent
Bank
had
withdrawn the action initiated against the
petitioners. The respondent-Bank again
initiated proceedings for recovery of certain
amount by issuing the notice dated
05.03.2018 under Section 13 (2) of the
SARFAESI Act to the petitioners. The
petitioners submitted a reply on 31.03.2018
but without disposing off the reply, the
Bank issued a possession notice dated
24.08.2018.
The
petitioners
have
challenged the aforesaid demand notice
dated 05.03.2018 and possession notice
dated 24.08.2018 before the DRT in
Securitisation Application No. 186 of 2019
and the DRT had stayed the recovery
proceedings by means of an order dated
12.03.2019.

3. The petitioners have further stated
that meanwhile Sri O.P. Agarwal who was
Director of the petitioner No. 1 Company,
died on 27.05.2019 and the petitioners
moved an application for substitution,
which was allowed by means of an order
dated
18.09.2019.
The
Securitisation
Application No. 186 of 2019 was dismissed
as being time barred by means of an order
dated 29.10.2021 and an application for
review of the aforesaid order is pending
before the DRT.

4. The petitioners have further stated
that meanwhile the respondent-Bank filed
an application under Section 14 of the
SARFAESI
Act
before
the
District
Magistrate, Lucknow and on 28.03.2022,
the
Additional
District
Magistrate
(Administration), Lucknow passed an order
on
the
said
application
for
taking
possession of the petitioners' property.

5. The petitioners had challenged the
order dated 28.03.2022 by filing Writ C
No. 2192 of 2022 and this Court had passed
an order dated 20.04.2022 directing the
petitioners to challenge the aforesaid orders
before the DRT under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act.

6.

The
petitioners
then
filed
Securitisation Application No. 249 of 2022
before the DRT in which notices were
issued to the respondent-Bank. During
pendency of the said application, on
22.04.2022, the Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Sadar, Lucknow issued a letter to the
Inspector,
Police
Station
Ghazipur,
Lucknow directed him to take possession
of the petitioners' property. The petitioners
filed an application for interim relief, upon
which the DRT passed an order on
28.04.2022 restraining the Bank from
taking physical possession of the property
till the next date of listing and the matter
was posed for 27.05.2022. The aforesaid
order was passed in absence of the learned
counsel for the Bank and the aforesaid
order
dated
28.04.2022
contains
a
subsequent noting that later on learned
counsel for the Bank appeared at about
04:00 p.m. and he filed an application for
urgent hearing of the matter. Upon which,
the matter fixed for 29.04.2022 i.e. the day
following the date of the order. On
02.05.2022, the DRT passed an order
recording the submission of the learned
counsel for the Bank that the loan account
has been transferred to Assets Recovery
Management Branch of the Bank, which
has not been impleaded by the petitioners
6 All. M/S Ramon Motion Auto Corp. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
391
and the petitioners had not approached the
Tribunal with clean hands and they had
suppressed the material facts. The Tribunal
ordered the case to be listed on 15.07.2022
for further arguments and the petitioners
were directed to correct the particulars of
the respondent-Bank in the array of parties.
After making the aforesaid narrations, the
DRT passed an order that the stay granted
to the petitioners is vacated on above facts.

7. The petitioners challenged the
aforesaid order dated 02.05.2022 by filing
Appeal No. 191 of 2022 before the Debts
Recovery Appellate Tribunal (which will
hereinafter referred to as "DRAT") and on
20.05.2022, DRAT has passed an order
recording the submission of the learned
Counsel for the respondent-Bank that the
appeal was filed without complying with
the fulfilling the requirement depositing
50% of the amount claimed as per Section
18 of the SARFAESI Act and, therefore, is
not
maintainable
and
recording
the
submission made by the learned counsel for
the petitioners in reply that the appeal has
not been filed against the final order passed
under Section 17 of the Act and, therefore,
no pre-deposit is required. The DRAT
ordered the case to be listed on 28.07.2022
for consideration of the matter of waiver of
deposit.

8. The petitioners have filed this
writ petition in the aforesaid factual
background, challenging the order dated
02.05.2022 passed by the DRAT whereby
the stay order dated 28-04-2022 has been
vacated, on the ground that the order has
been passed hastily, without application
of mind and that it will result in the
petitioners' property being taken away
without adjudication of the respective
rights of the parties in the case before the
DRT in which the final submissions are
going on.

9. Sri Prashant Kumar Srivastava,
the learned counsel for the respondent
No. 3 & 4 has raised a preliminary
objection against the maintainability of
the writ petition before this Court sitting
at Lucknow on the ground that the DRAT
is situated at Allahabad. He has placed
reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this
Court in Manish Kumar Mishra Vs.
Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine All
535 = AIR 2020 All 97.

10. He has further submitted that the
order
dated
02.05.2022
has
been
challenged before the DRAT and the writ
petition filed during the pendency of the
appeal is misconceived. He has also
submitted that the petitioner has not made
the statutory deposit as required by
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and,
therefore, no order can be passed in the
appeal.

11. Replying to the aforesaid
objection, Sri Sudeep Kumar, the learned
counsel for the petitioners has stated
that the petitioners' had taken a loan from
the respondent no. 3 Bank situated at
Lucknow, for recovery of the aforesaid
amount,
the
Additional
District
Magistrate (Administration), Lucknow
passed an order on 28.03.2022 for taking
possession of the petitioners' property
situated at Lucknow, in an appeal filed by
the petitioners
the DRT sitting at
Lucknow had passed an interim order on
28-04-2022 and the same has been
vacated on 02-05-2022 at Lucknow,
which is the cause of action for
approaching this Court. He has submitted
that judgment in the case of Manish
392 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Kumar
Mishra
(supra)
helps
the
petitioners.

12. The learned counsel for the
respondent-Bank has also submitted that
the petitioners had not approached the DRT
with clean hands as they had impleaded
"Indian Overseas Bank, Lucknow Main
Branch, 3 Vidhan Sabha Marg, Lucknow226001 through its authorized Officer" in
the Securitisation Application whereas the
petitioners'
loan
account
has
been
transferred
to
the
Assets
Recovery
Management Branch which has not been
arrayed as a defendant.

13. Refuting this submission, the
learned counsel for the petitioners has
submitted that the petitioners had taken
financial assistance from Indian Overseas
Bank, Main Branch, Lucknow and it was
Indian Overseas Bank Main Branch,
Lucknow which had filed an application
under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts
due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993 for recovery of the aforesaid amount
from the petitioners and, therefore, the
petitioners had impleaded the Bank with
the aforesaid description. He has further
submitted that even if the Bank has
transferred the account to any of its branch
and still the Bank had filed an application
under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts
due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993 in the name of the Branch from which
the loan had been taken the petitioners and,
therefore, the petitioners cannot be blamed
for having arrayed the said Branch. In any
case, the defect in description of the parties
is always curable and it does not affect the
maintainability of the application.

14. I have considered the rival
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties.

15. Regarding the first objection
raised by the learned Counsel for the
respondent - Bank, I find the petitioners
had taken loan from the respondent-bank at
Lucknow, the recovery proceedings have
been initiated by the respondent-Bank at
Lucknow, the Securitisation Application
No. 249 of 2022 filed by the petitioners is
pending before the DRT at Lucknow and
the DRT has passed an interim order dated
28-04-2022 in favour of the petitioners
which has been vacated by means of the
order dated 02-05-2022 passed by the DRT
at Lucknow. In furtherance of the aforesaid
order, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sadar
Lucknow has sent a letter dated 06.06.2022
to the Inspector, In-charge of the Police
Station Ghazipur, Lucknow for taking
possession of the petitioners' property
situated at Lucknow. The petitioners have
challenged the order dated 02-05-2022
before the DRAT at Allahabad and they are
aggrieved by an order of DRAT whereby
the matter has been posted for 28-07-2022.

16. The relevant portion of the Article
226 of the Constitution of India provides as
follows:-

"226. Power of High Courts to
issue certain writs: -

(1) Notwithstanding anything in
Article 32 every High Court shall have
powers, throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercise jurisdiction,
to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any
Government,
within
those
territories
directions, orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari,
or any of them, for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by Part III and for
any other purpose
6 All. M/S Ramon Motion Auto Corp. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
393

(2) The power conferred by
clause ( 1 ) to issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government, authority or
person may also be exercised by any High
Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which the cause of
action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person is
not within those territories

(3) ......."

(Emphasis Supplied)

17. A perusal of the Article 226 of the
Constitution of India makes it manifest that
it confers power upon every High Court to
issue directions, orders or writs throughout
the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. Clause (2) of the
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
further provides that the power to issue
directions, orders or writs may be exercised
by any High Court exercising jurisdiction
in relation to the territory within which the
cause of action wholly or in part arises for
exercise of such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of the Government, authority
or the residence of any person to whom
direction, order or writ is to be issued, is
not within those territories.

18. In the celebrated judgment in the
case of Nasiruddin vs State Transport
Appellate Tribunal, 1975 (2) SCC 671,
which was a case decided long after
coming into force of the Constitution of
India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that:-

"38... If the cause of action arises
wholly within Oudh areas then the
Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction.
Similarly, if the cause of action arises
wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh
then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If
the cause of action in part arises in the
specified Oudh areas and part of the cause
of action arises outside the specified areas,
it will be open to the litigant to frame the
case
appropriately
to
attract
the
jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at
Allahabad....".

 (Emphasis Supplied)

19. As per the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nasiruddin
(supra) an application under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India will lie at
Lucknow even if the petitioners allege that
a part of the cause of action arose within
the areas of Oudh.

20. The judgment of Nasiruddin
(supra) was followed and reaffirmed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari
Parishad, Lucknow Vs. State of U.P. and
others, 1995 (4) SCC 738, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, "to
decide
the
question
of
territorial
jurisdiction it is necessary to find out the
place where the "cause of action" arose.
We, with respect, reiterate that the law laid
down by a Four-Judge Bench of this Court
in Nasiruddin's case holds good even today
despite the incorporation of an explanation
to Section 141 to the Code of Civil
Procedure".

21. In Manish Kumar Mishra Vs.
Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine All 535
= AIR 2020 All 97, a Full Bench of this
Court has explained the law regarding
territorial jurisdiction and the difference
between "cause of action" and "right of
action" in the following words: -
394 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"133. The
meaning
of
the
expression "cause of action" as distinct
from "right of action", as evolved in terms
of the precedents, would go to show that a
right of action is a remedial right
affording a redress for the infringement of
a legal right and a right of action arises as
soon as there is an invasion of rights
whereas a cause of action would refer to
the set of operative facts giving rise to
such right of action. A person residing
anywhere in the country being aggrieved
by an order of the Government (Central or
State), or authority or person may have a
right of action at law but the same can be
enforced by invoking the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of only that High Court, within
whose territorial limits the cause of action
wholly or in part arises.

134. The "right of action" being
the right to commence and maintain an
action is therefore distinguishable from
"cause of action" in that the former is a
remedial right while the latter would
comprise the operative facts giving rise to
such remedial right. The former would be
a matter of right and would depend upon
the substantive law whereas the latter
would be governed by the law of
procedure.

135. It is, therefore, seen that a
"cause
of
action"
is
the
fact
or
corroboration of facts which affords a
party right to judicial interference on his
behalf. The "cause of action" would be
seen to comprise : (i) the plaintiff's
primary
right
and
the
defendant's
corresponding primary duty; and (ii) the
delict or wrongful act or omission of the
defendant, by which the primary right and
duty have been violated. The term "right
of action" is the right to commence and
maintain action or in other words the
right to enforce a cause of action. In the
law of pleadings, "right of action" can be
distinguished from "cause of action" in
that the former is a remedial right while
the latter would comprise the operative
facts giving rise to such remedial right.
The former would be a matter of right and
depend on the substantive law while the
latter would refer to the bundle of
operative facts and would be governed by
the law of procedure.

** *

146. We may therefore observe
that Article 226(1) provides the source of
power of the High Court as well as its
territorial jurisdiction, whereas Article
226(2)
amplifies
the
jurisdiction
in
relation to a cause of action by providing
that the territorial jurisdiction would be
exercisable in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, arises,
wholly or in part. The cause of action
would include material and integral facts
and accrual of even a fraction of cause of
action within the jurisdiction of the Court
would provide territorial jurisdiction for
entertaining the petition.

147. The territorial jurisdiction
is to be decided on the facts pleaded in the
petition and in determining the objection of
lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court
would
be
required
to
take
into
consideration all the facts pleaded in
support of the cause of action without
embarking upon an enquiry as to the
correctness or otherwise of the said facts.
The question whether a High Court has
territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition is to be answered on the basis of
the averments made in the petition, the
truth
or
otherwise,
whereof
being
immaterial. The expression "cause of
6 All. M/S Ramon Motion Auto Corp. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
395
action", for the purpose of Article 226(2),
is to be assigned the same meaning as
under Section 20(c) CPC, and would mean
a bundle of facts which are required to be
proved. However, the entire bundle of facts
pleaded, need not constitute a cause of
action as what is necessary to be proved
are material facts on the basis of which a
writ petition can be allowed.

148. In order to confer jurisdiction on
the High Court to entertain a writ petition,
the Court must be satisfied from the entire
facts pleaded in support of the cause of
action that those facts constitute a cause so
as to empower the Court to decide a
dispute which has, at least in part, arisen
within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact
pleaded in the application may not ipso
facto lead to the conclusion that those facts
give rise to a cause of action within the
Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those
facts are such which have a nexus or
relevance with the lis that is involved in the
case. Facts, which have no bearing with the
lis or the dispute involved in the case would
not give rise to a "cause of action" so as to
confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court
concerned, and only those facts which give
rise to a cause of action within a Court's
territorial jurisdiction which have a nexus
or relevance with the lis that is involved in
that case, would be relevant for the
purpose of invoking the Court's territorial
jurisdiction, in the context of clause (2) of
Article 226."

22. Examining the facts of the case in
light of the law laid down in the above
noted case, I am of the considered opinion
that the petitioners' immediate grievance,
which compelled them to file the instance
Writ Petition arose upon passing of the
order dated 20-05-2022 by the DRAT at
Allahabad, whereby the matter has been
posted for 28-07-2022 without passing any
interim order, and, therefore, "the right of
action" can be said to have accrued to the
petitioners at Allahabad. However, the
"cause of action" for filing the Writ
Petition, which is the bundle of facts
leading to filing of the instant Writ Petition,
is that the petitioners' had taken a loan from
the respondent no. 3 Bank situated at
Lucknow, for recovery of the aforesaid
amount the Additional District Magistrate
(Administration), Lucknow passed an order
on 28.03.2022 for taking possession of the
petitioners' property situated at Lucknow,
in an appeal filed by the petitioners the
DRT sitting at Lucknow had passed an
interim order on 28-04-2022 and the same
has been vacated on 02-05-2022 at
Lucknow. Therefore, it cannot be said that
the cause of action for approaching this
Court, or at least a part thereof, has not
accrued to the petitioners at Lucknow and I
reject the preliminary objection raised by
the learned Counsel for the respondent -
Bank that the writ petition filed by the
petitioners is not maintainable before this
Court sitting at Lucknow

23. Regarding the second objection
raised by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the petitioners have not
made statutory deposit required under
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The
learned counsel for the petitioners has
submitted that the Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act requires a deposit of 50%
of the amount of debts due to be deposited
by any person aggrieved by an order made
by the DRT under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act. He has submitted that the
petitioners' application under Section 17 of
the SARFAESI Act is still pending, and,
therefore, the provision of making a deposit
of 50% of the amount does not apply to the
appeal filed by the petitioners. He has
396 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
further submitted that the petitioners have
filed an application seeking exemption
from making a deposit and the DRAT has
fixed 28.07.2022 for disposal of the
aforesaid application.

24. Regarding the objection raised by
the learned Counsel for the respondent-
Bank in respect of the petitioners having
impleaded the Indian Overseas Bank, Main
Branch, Lucknow, I find that the petitioners
had taken the financial assistance from
Indian Overseas Bank Main Branch,
Lucknow and it was the said Branch which
had filed the application against the
Petitioners under Section 19 of the
Recovery of Debts due to Banks and
Financial
Institutions
Act,
1993
for
recovery of the aforesaid amount from
them and, therefore, the petitioners had
impleaded the Bank with the aforesaid
description.
In
any
case,
the
Asset
Recovery Management Branch of the Bank
is not a separate juristic person and is not a
legal entity distinct from the Bank. In case,
during pendency of the case the Bank has
transferred the account to any of its branch
and still the Bank had filed an application
under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts
due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993 in the name of the Branch which had
granted the loan to the petitioners, the
petitioners cannot be blamed for having
arrayed the said Branch as a respondent.
Even if there is a defect in the description
of a arty, it is always curable and it does
not affect the maintainability of the
application.

25. The petitioners have approached the
DRAT for redressal of their grievance against
the order dated 02-05-2022 whereby the
interim order dated 28-04-2022 granted in
their favour has been vacated by the DRT
without recording any reason or satisfaction
for doing the same and although there is an
imminent threat of the petitioners being
dispossessed from their property, the DRAT
has fixed the matter for 28-07-2022. This
indicates that the alternative remedy available
before the DRAT has proved not to be an
efficacious remedy. Even otherwise, the
existence of an alternative remedy is not an
absolute bar against this Court's discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The circumstances of
the case warrant interference by this Court in
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.

26. As the DRT had granted an interim
protection to the petitioners by means of the
order dated 28-04-2022, which has been
vacated by means of the order dated 02-052022 passed by the DRT merely by recording
the submissions of the parties and without
recording any finding or satisfaction of its
own and keeping in view the fact that the
final arguments in the case have already
commenced and the same are going on and
the case has been fixed for hearing further
arguments, this Court finds that in case the
petitioners are dispossessed from their
property after commencement of the final
arguments and before conclusion of the same
and passing of a final verdict, it would
occasion a failure of justice.

27. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, this Writ Petition is partly
allowed. The order dated 02-05-2022
passed by the DRT in S.A. No. 249 of 2022
is hereby quashed and it is provide that the
order dated 28-04-2022 passed by the DRT
in the aforesaid shall continue to remain in
operation till a final order is passed after
conclusion of arguments of the parties.

28. The DRT is directed to proceed
with the hearing of S.A. No. 249 of 2022
expeditiously and to make an endeavor to
6 All. Smt. Rajani Vs. Vipul Mittal & Ors.
397
conclude the same as early as possible. All
the parties to the case are directed to cooperate in expeditious disposal of the case.
In case the petitioners do not co-operate in
expeditious disposal of the matter and they
seek any unnecessary adjournments, it will
be open to the DRT to pass suitable orders
in accordance with the law taking into
consideration all the relevant facts and
circumstances.
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(2022)06ILR A397
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Matters U/A 227 No. 3265 of 2022 (Civil)

Smt. Rajani ...Petitioner
Versus
Vipul Mittal & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Anil Kumar Aditya, Sri Radhey Shyam
Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Ms. Shreya Gupta, Sri Ravi Anand Agarwal

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India,
Article 227 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Section - 151, Order - 17 Rule - 1, Order -
9 Rule - 6: - Application for Recall of
orders without Affidavit in support of
delay Condonation - Rejected - Revision
Dismissed - defendants are given enough
opportunity - impugned orders are proper.
(Para 5, 6)

(B) Civil Law - Society Registration Act,
1860: - Bar Associations are registered
societies
-
established
for
positive
contribution in welfare of its learned
members - they cannot obstruct or
interfere in the Sovereign function of the
Court. (Para 7, 9)
Writ Petition - dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. U.O.I. & anr., (2003)
2 SCC 45

2. Common Cause, a registered society & ors. v.
U.O.I. & ors., (2006) 9 SCC 295

3. Krishnakant Tamrakar v. St. of M.P., (2018) 17
SCC 27

4. District Bar Association, Dehradun Vs Ishwar
Shandilya & ors., (2020) 17 SCC 672

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

This petition is directed against the
order dated 13.04.2022 passed by the
Additional District Judge, Court No.
5/Special Judge (U.P. Gangsters and Antisocial Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986)
Muzaffarnagar, dismissing Civil Revision
No. 18 of 2022 and affirming an order
dated 07.03.2022 passed by the Civil Judge
(Senior
Division)
Fast
Track
Court,
Muzaffarnagar in Original Suit No. 372 of
2013, rejecting the petitioner's application
85C
seeking
to
recall
orders
dated
26.10.2021 and 14.12.2021.

2. By the order dated 26.10.2021, an
application
for
adjournment
by
the
defendant has been rejected and his
opportunity to cross-examine P.W.1 closed.
The suit was directed to come up for
arguments. By the order dated 14.12.2021,
in the absence of the defendant, the suit
was directed to come up for arguments exparte on 03.01.2022. A perusal of the
record shows that Original Suit No. 372 of
2013 was filed by Vipul Mittal against
Yogendra Kumar Garg before the Court of
the
Civil
Judge
(Senior
Division),
Muzaffarnagar for partition of his half
share in House No. 212/1, situate at